Hinkle Metals & Supply Co., Inc. v. Compton's Appliance, Inc. et al

Filing 181

ORDER denying 144 Motion to Quash; denying 144 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by District Judge Halil S. Ozerden on 4/7/2014 (HM)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

HINKLE METALS & SUPPLY CO., INC.
v.

PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 1:12-cv-00017-HSO-RHW

COMPTON APPLIANCE, INC.,
MICHAEL C. COMPTON, and
COMPTON HEATING & AIR, LLC

DEFENDANTS

ORDER DENYING NONPARTY COMPTON’S LLC’S MOTION TO QUASH
OR ALTERNATIVELY MODIFY SUBPOENA ISSUED TO BANCORPSOUTH
AND DENYING NONPARTY COMPTON’S LLC’S MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER
BEFORE THE COURT is nonparty Compton’s LLC’s Motion [144] to Quash
or Alternatively Modify Subpoena Issued to Bancorpsouth and Motion for Protective
Order. Plaintiff Hinkle Metals & Supply Co., Inc., has filed a Response [165], and
Compton’s LLC has not filed a Rebuttal. Having considered the record and relevant
legal authorities, the Court finds that Compton’s LLC’s Motion should be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Hinkle, attempting to collect a $637,484.83 Consent Judgment [79]
in its favor against Defendants Compton’s Appliance, Inc., and Compton Heating &
Air, LLC, served a subpoena on BancorpSouth, Inc. compelling BancorpSouth to
produce “[f]or period of January 1, 2013 to the present . . . all statements, deposit
records, checks, wiring records, transfers and ACH records for all accounts of
Compton Heating & Air, LLC and Compton[’s], LLC, and any correspondence
concerning said accounts.” Subpoena [144-1]. Nonparty Compton’s LLC seeks to
quash the subpoena on grounds that it seeks irrelevant information regarding a

nonparty’s “personal and private banking information that is privileged . . . .” Mem.
[145] at 1. Compton’s LLC contends that the subpoena seeks proprietary
information, is overbroad, and was served only for purposes of annoyance and
harassment. Id. at 3. Compton’s LLC also requests “a protective order, shielding
Compton’s, LLC from these discovery inquiries.” Id. at 4.
In Response [165], Hinkle submits that (1) Compton’s LLC’s Motion is moot
because BancorpSouth has already produced the records; (2) Compton’s LLC has no
standing to quash the subpoena because it is not a party to this action; and (3)
Compton’s LLC has no standing to quash the subpoena because the subpoena was
served upon BancorpSouth, not Compton’s LLC. Resp. [165] at 1. Alternatively,
Hinkle submits that Compton’s LLC’s banking records were properly subpoenaed
for the relevant purpose of searching for assets of the judgment debtor Compton
Heating & Air, LLC, “which assets may have been fraudulently transferred to this
new entity [Compton’s LLC], and to determine if Compton’s LLC is the successor
entity to judgment debtor Compton Heating & Air, LLC.” Id. at 2.
II. DISCUSSION
A.

Good Faith Certificate
Compton’s LLC did not file a Good Faith Certificate with its Motion. The

Local Uniform Civil Rules require counsel to confer in good faith prior to the filing
of a discovery motion and state that “[a] Good Faith Certificate [Official Form No. 4]
must be filed with all discovery motions.” L.U. Civ. R. 37(a). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c) specifically addresses motions for protective orders and provides

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that motions for protective orders “must include a certification that the movant has
in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort
to resolve the dispute without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “[T]he moving
party’s filing of a Good Faith Certificate, in proper form, is a mandatory
prerequisite to the court’s consideration of a motion for protective order.” Williams
v. Weems Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., No. 4:04cv179-L-R, 2006 WL 905955, *1 (S.D.
Miss. Apr. 7, 2006). Because Compton’s LLC did not file a Good Faith Certificate
with its Motion, the Motion should be denied.
B.

Standing
Alternatively, Compton’s LLC’s Motion should be denied because Compton’s

LLC has not sufficiently addressed the standing issues raised by Hinkle. First,
Compton’s LLC has not addressed whether it has standing to file a motion to quash
in a case where it is not a party nor is it the entity served with the subpoena. The
cases cited in Compton’s LLC’s Memorandum provide that a party has standing to
quash a subpoena served on a nonparty where the party can demonstrate that it
has a personal right or privilege with respect to the subject matter requested in the
subpoena. Mem. [145] at 2 (collecting cases); see Brown v. Braddick, 595 F.2d 961,
967 (5th Cir. 1979). While Compton’s LLC claims a personal right and privilege
with respect to the subpoenaed discovery here, Compton’s LLC is not a party. The
standing cases cited by Compton’s LLC’s address motions to quash filed by parties,
not the circumstances here where a nonparty seeks to quash a subpoena served
upon another nonparty.

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Furthermore, Compton’s LLC has not established that it has standing to file
a motion for protective order. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides that
“[a] party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective
order . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Compton’s LLC is not a party, and it is not the
“person from whom discovery is sought.” For these reasons, Compton’s LLC has not
met its burden of demonstrating that it has standing to pursue the relief it requests
in its Motion. The Motion should also be denied for this reason.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Compton’s
LLC’s Motion [144] to Quash or Alternatively Modify Subpoena Issued to
Bancorpsouth and Motion for Protective Order is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this the 7th day of April, 2014.

s/ Halil Suleyman Ozerden
HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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