Parks et al v. Mississippi Department of Corrections et al

Filing 15

ORDER denying 8 Motion for Default Judgment; granting 9 Motion to Set Aside Default Signed by Chief District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr on 04/08/2013 (Guirola, Louis)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CLAUDE DULWAINE PARKS, Individually
and on behalf of others similarly situated,
TIFFANY SNYDER, and Claude Parks and
Tiffany Snyder on behalf of their minor
children
V.

PLAINTIFFS
CAUSE NO. 1:12CV275-LG-JMR

MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, MISSISSIPPI ATTORNEY
GENERAL JIM HOOD, and JOHN DOES 1-20

DEFENDANTS

ORDER SETTING ASIDE CLERK’S ENTRY OF DEFAULT AND
DENYING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
BEFORE THE COURT are the [8] Motion for Default Judgment filed by
Plaintiff Claude Dulwaine Parks and Tiffany Snyder, and the [9] Motion to Set Aside
Clerk’s Entry of Default filed by Defendants Mississippi Department of Corrections
and Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood. The Court, having reviewed the
pleadings and the relevant legal authority, finds that the Motion for Default
Judgment should be denied, and the clerk’s entry of default should be set aside.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this action on September 4, 2012, alleging
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various torts. Plaintiff Parks was convicted of a
felony in 2006 and sentenced to five (5) years in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections (MDOC). According to Plaintiffs’ complaint, MDOC
unjustifiably held Parks in its custody for over a year after he had completed his
sentence. Defendants did not file an answer, and on November 29, 2012, Plaintiffs

moved for entry of default. (Mot. for Entry of Default, ECF No. 5). On November
30, 2012, the clerk duly entered the default. (ECF No. 7).
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Default Judgment on the grounds that Defendants
have failed to plead or otherwise defend against the complaint. Defendants filed a
response in opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion, as well as a Motion to Set Aside the
Default Entry. Defendants’ proposed Answer and Defenses to Plaintiffs’ Complaint
are attached to their motion. (Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-1). Defendants submit
that they were served with process in this action on October 1, 2012, “but due to a
clerical error in accepting the process the file was never opened.” (Defs.’ Mot. 1, ECF
No. 9). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced if the clerk’s entry of
default is set aside, that they have “meritorious defenses” to the complaint, and that
they should be allowed to proceed to trial on the merits because their default was
not willful. (Id. at 2; Defs.’ Mem. 3, ECF No. 10).
Plaintiffs object to Defendants’ Motion to Set Aside the Default Entry on the
grounds that Defendants engaged in a “pattern . . . of willful defiance” of court
orders with respect to Parks’s criminal case in the Circuit Court of Harrison County
prior to their failure to file an answer in this action. Plaintiffs point to Defendants’
multiple failures to appear before the state court for hearings regarding Parks’s
sentence. They also claim that Defendants failed to respond to Parks’s notice
pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. (Mot. for Default J. 3, ECF No. 8).
Defendants respond that Attorney General Jim Hood and MDOC were not parties to
the state action, which is a separate and distinct matter.
-2-

DISCUSSION
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, the Court “may set aside an entry
of default for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has set forth several factors it considers relevant in determining
whether there is good cause to set aside a default entry. Those are “whether the
default was willful, whether setting it aside would prejudice the adversary, and
whether a meritorious defense is presented.” Lacy v. Sitel Corp., 227 F.3d 290, 292
(5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Dierschke v. O’Cheskey (In re Dierschke), 975 F.2d 181, 184
(5th Cir. 1992)). This list is not exclusive, and the Court may consider other factors,
“including whether ‘the defendant acted expeditiously to correct the default.’” Id.
Finally, where there is a “willful default,” or “an intentional failure of responsive
pleadings,” the default entry should stand. Id.
“Federal courts generally disfavor default judgments, preferring to resolve
disputes according to their merits.” Harper Macleod Solicitors v. Keaty & Keaty, 260
F.3d 389, 393 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Therefore, they “should not be
granted on the claim, without more, that the defendant had failed to meet a
procedural time requirement.” Jefferson v. La. Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corr., 401 F.
App’x 927, 929 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citation omitted) (affirming district
court’s decision to vacate entry of default, where only support for the default
judgment was the State’s failure to file a timely answer).
Here, Defendants have demonstrated that their default was the result of a
clerical error, and not willful. Plaintiffs point to the State’s failures to appear for
-3-

hearings in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, but the Court cannot determine
that the failure to file an answer in this action was “willful” based on those
proceedings. Plaintiffs likewise have not demonstrated that they will be prejudiced
if the entry of default is set aside. The only “prejudice” they point to is the fact that
this action involves “a single individual pitted against the power, resources and
experience of the Attorney General[,] and a convicted felon against the Department
of Corrections.” (Pls.’ Resp. 7, ECF No. 13). However, the identities of the parties,
and any imbalance of their respective resources, are not “prejudices” that will be
created by the setting aside of the default entry. Plaintiffs have not shown that
setting aside the default entry will lead to a loss of evidence or similar disadvantage.
“There is no prejudice to the plaintiff where ‘the setting aside of the default has done
no harm to plaintiff except to require it to prove its case,’” and merely gives “the
defendants their day in court.” Lacy, 227 F.3d at 293 (quoting Gen. Tel. Corp. v.
Gen. Tel. Answering Serv., 277 F.2d 919, 921 (5th Cir. 1960)).
Finally, the State has indicated that it will present defenses under the
Eleventh Amendment as well as the doctrine of qualified immunity. Plaintiffs have
not addressed the substance of these arguments, but contend they are
inappropriately raised at this juncture. The Court makes no determination with
respect to Defendants’ immunity claims at this time, but finds that Defendants have
sufficiently demonstrated they intend to present “meritorious defenses” that will
promote the Court’s interest in “securing a trial upon the merits.” Jenkens &
Gilchrist v. Groia & Co., 542 F.3d 114, 123 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gen. Tel., 277
-4-

F.2d at 921).
CONCLUSION
The Court will not enter a default judgment against the Defendants based on
the failure to meet a procedural deadline and nothing more. Defendants have
sufficiently demonstrated that their failure to timely answer was the result of a
clerical error, and not a willful default. Moreover, Defendants, upon realizing their
procedural default, have responded and filed a proposed answer. Therefore, the
Motion for Default Judgment is denied. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
55(c), the clerk’s entry of default shall be set aside. Defendants shall have ten days
from today’s date, or until April 18, 2013, to file an answer to the original complaint.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the [8] Motion for
Default Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Claude Dulwaine Parks and Tiffany Snyder is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the [9] Motion to Set
Aside Clerk’s Entry of Default filed by Defendants Mississippi Department of
Corrections and Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood is GRANTED. Defendants
shall file their answer on or before April 18, 2013.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 8th day of April, 2013.
s/

Louis Guirola, Jr.

LOUIS GUIROLA, JR.
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

-5-