Lane v. J.H. Haynes Electric Co., Inc.

Filing 13

ORDER denying 5 Motion to Dismiss; denying 5 Motion to Stay Proceedings Signed by Chief District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr on 03/28/2013 (Guirola, Louis)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
EVELYN J. LANE

PLAINTIFF

v.

CAUSE NO. 1:12CV381-LG-JMR

J.H. HAYNES ELECTRIC CO., INC.

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO STAY
BEFORE THE COURT is the Motion [5] to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(B)(7)
and to Stay the Proceedings, filed by Defendant J.H. Haynes Electric Company, Inc.
Haynes contends that the Union to which Plaintiff Evelyn J. Lane belonged is a
necessary party to this employment discrimination lawsuit. Haynes moves for
dismissal for Lane’s failure to name the Union as a defendant. In the alternative,
Haynes moves for joinder of the Union under Rule 19, and a stay until the joinder
issue is resolved. Lane has responded, and Haynes has replied. After careful
consideration of the parties’ arguments and the relevant law, it is the Court’s opinion
that the Union is not a necessary party to this action. The Motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND
According to her Complaint, Lane was employed by Haynes for fourteen years.
She began as a journeyman wireman, and was promoted to foreman in 2011. She was
the only female foreman working on her project at Haynes when she was terminated
on November 10, 2011. Although classified as a foreman, she received pay as a
journeyman and was required to pay for use of a company vehicle, unlike male
foremen. She alleges that at various times during her work as a foreman she received

pay that was not equal to certain male journeymen wiremen and/or foremen. She
was informed that her termination was due to a reduction in force, but she was the
only foreman terminated. Other, male, foremen – some with less seniority – were
allowed to take a demotion and/or transfer to other job sites.
Lane alleges she filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and received a Notice of Right to Sue.1 Her claims against
Haynes in this lawsuit are for gender discrimination under Title VII and Equal Pay
Act violations.
Haynes argues that Lane’s claims are inextricably intertwined with a
Collective Bargaining Agreement with the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 903 (the “Union”), because all of Haynes’ employment decisions
regarding Lane were made pursuant to the terms of the CBA. According to Haynes,
Lane’s claims attack the policies and practices in the CBA, and therefore the Union is
a necessary party to this lawsuit and should be joined pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.
DISCUSSION
Rule 19 requires that the Court examine whether a party necessary to the
action can be joined as a party, and if not, whether the case should be dismissed.2 The

1

Although Lane states the Charge and Notice of Right to Sue Letter are attached as Exhibits
“A” and “B” to the Complaint, the Court is unable to locate these documents in the record.
2

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure states in relevant part:

(a) Persons Required to Be Joined if Feasible.
(1) Required Party. A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive
the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if:

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examination is a “highly-practical, fact-based” inquiry into the facts of the case. Hood
v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 570 F.3d 625, 628 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Pulitzer-Polster v.
Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 2006)). In the case of the joinder of a union in
an employment discrimination case, the Court is primarily looking for evidence that
its judgment will adversely affect the rights of the union. See U.S. v. City of Miami,

(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
disposing of the action in the person's absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple,
or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
(2) Joinder by Court Order. If a person has not been joined as required, the court must order that the
person be made a party. A person who refuses to join as a plaintiff may be made either a defendant
or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.
(3) Venue. If a joined party objects to venue and the joinder would make venue improper, the court
must dismiss that party.
(b) When Joinder Is Not Feasible. If a person who is required to be joined if feasible cannot be joined,
the court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among
the existing parties or should be dismissed. The factors for the court to consider include:
(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person's absence might prejudice that person or the
existing parties;
(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by:
(A) protective provisions in the judgment;
(B) shaping the relief; or
(C) other measures;
(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence would be adequate; and
(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.

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Fl., 664 F.2d 435, 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[O]nce the court determined that the Unions'
rights were not adversely affected by the decree, they should have been dismissed
from the litigation since they were no longer a necessary party within the meaning of
Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
Lane’s gender discrimination claim is that she was terminated when similarlysituated males were not. She further alleges that Haynes had no policies in place
concerning gender discrimination, which led to Haynes “limit[ing], classify[ing] and
discriminat[ing] against females.” (Compl. 4 (¶¶18-19), ECF No. 1). Her Equal Pay
Act claim is that she was paid less than similarly situated males, both as a
journeyman wireman and as foreman. She seeks backpay, compensatory damages,
and attorneys fees and costs.
Haynes argues that some provisions of the CBA have become at issue by virtue
of Lane’s claims, making the Union a necessary party in order to fully adjudicate the
claims. Haynes’ argument is that it was following the guidelines of the CBA when it
terminated Lane, and it paid her the wages required by the CBA for her position.
Accordingly, if it discriminated against her, it must have been because the CBA is
discriminatory.
In support of its argument, Haynes provides case law in which a union was
joined in an employment discrimination lawsuit. In E.E.O.C. v. Braswell Motor
Freight Lines, Inc., No. CA-3-7101-D, 1974 WL 259 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 1974), the
court found that joinder of a union was proper, because “[i]n fashioning such relief as
this court may deem just and proper, it may be necessary to grant injunctive relief as
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to certain provisions of the collective bargaining agreements that may perpetuate the
effects of independently existing unlawful employment practices.” Id. at *1. Braswell
can be distinguished from this case by the form of relief requested by Lane. She asks
for money damages -- not injunctive relief of any kind.

Haynes also cites Reyes v.

Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company, 53 F.R.D. 293 (D. Kan. 1971). In that
case, the court held that because plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated the
civil rights act by certain collective bargaining agreements, the union was a necessary
party. The court therefore allowed the plaintiff to amend his complaint to join the
union, stating that “if it should later become clear . . . that [plaintiff] is only
complaining about defendant's unlawful practices under an otherwise lawful
agreement, then dismissal [of the union] at that time may be appropriate.” Reyes, 53
F.R.D. at 297. In this case, Lane makes no allegation that any provision of the CBA
is unlawful or resulted in the complained-of discriminatory employment actions.
Furthermore, the CBA provisions cited by Haynes do not refer to gender. It appears
to the Court, therefore, that Lane’s claims involve unlawful practices under an
otherwise lawful agreement. The Union is not necessary in this circumstance.
Next, Haynes cites E.E.O.C. v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d
1086 (6th Cir. 1974). In that case, the court found it appropriate to join the union
because any decree entered could have affected the collective bargaining agreement
with the employer. Neither the claims nor how the collective bargaining agreement
might have been affected by the court’s ruling are discussed in the opinion. Its
usefulness in resolving this case is therefore limited.
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In McCooe v. Town of Manchester, 101 F.R.D. 339, 341 (D. Conn. 1984), the
court joined a union in an Age Discrimination in Employment action because the
union’s collective bargaining agreement incorporated an age-based mandatory
retirement age established by the defendant town’s ordinance. Any finding that the
ordinance violated the ADEA would necessarily also call into question the lawfulness
of the collective bargaining agreement. This case is clearly distinguishable because
Lane’s claims do not implicate the Haynes CBA. Lane simply asserts that Haynes
unlawfully considered her gender in making its employment decisions. Similarly, the
court’s decision in Kinnunen v. American Motors Corporation, 56 F.R.D. 102 (E.D.
Wisc. 1972), is inapplicable because the plaintiff in that case alleged violations of a
collective bargaining agreement.
Finally, in Freeman v. Motor Convoy, No. 16185, 1979 WL 248 (N.D. Ga. June
29, 1979), the plaintiff alleged that collective bargaining agreements were entered
into with the intent to discriminate. Id at *3. Once again, that is not the situation in
this case.
In support of her argument that the Union is not a necessary party in regard to
her employment discrimination claim, Lane points to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
E.E.O.C. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 645 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1981). In that case, the Fifth
Circuit looked primarily to the language of Rule 19, stating:
Under subsection (a), persons to be joined if feasible include a party in
whose “absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties,” or, a party so situated that the disposition of the action in his
absence “may have a prejudicial effect on his ability to protect his own
interests.” Because Eastern's liability is not predicated upon the
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Union's action, we see no reason why the TWU would fall within the
scope of either category.

In regard to Lane’s Equal Pay Act claims, the analysis is essentially the same.
A union is a necessary party when the claims go to the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. See Gray v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., No. 3:11-CV-781-L, 2011
WL 6039629, *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2011). A union should be joined when
adjudicating such claims might require a court to make changes to a plaintiff’s wages
that are not provided for in the collective bargaining agreement . Id.
After reviewing these precedents and the facts and circumstances of this case,
the Court concludes that the Union is not a necessary party to this action. Lane’s
claims present questions of whether Haynes impermissibly considered her gender in
deciding how she should be compensated while she was employed and whether to
terminate her employment. As the case now stands, there is no probability that the
rights of the Union will be affected by the Court’s ultimate ruling on Lane’s claims.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion [5] to
Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(B)(7) and to Stay the Proceedings, filed by Defendant
J.H. Haynes Electric Company, Inc., is DENIED.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 28th day of March, 2013.
s/

Louis Guirola, Jr.

LOUIS GUIROLA, JR.
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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