Staten v. City of D'Iberville et al
Filing
55
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 42 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs' Section 1983 and State law claims against these defendants, in their individual capacities, and the Section 1985 claim against Wayne Payne, in his individual capacity, are dismissed. Signed by Chief District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. on 8/28/14. (RLW)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
URSULA STATEN, as Administratrix of
the Estate of Ray Charles Staten, Sr., ET AL.
v.
PLAINTIFFS
CAUSE NO. 1:13CV212 LG-JMR
CITY OF D’IBERVILLE, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PREMISED ON IMMUNITY
BEFORE THE COURT is the Motion for Summary Judgment [42] filed by
the individual defendants in this case: Joey Bosarge, Brenda Broussard, Stephen
Furney, Teddy Harder, Wayne Payne, and Rusty Quave, in their individual
capacities (the “City Defendants”). The defendants contend they are entitled to
qualified immunity from plaintiff’s claims in this action brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Additionally, Wayne Payne seeks summary judgment
in regard to Plaintiffs’ § 1985 claim against him. The issues have been fully briefed.
After due consideration of the parties’ submissions and the relevant law, it is the
Court’s opinion that the City Defendants’ Motion should be granted.
BACKGROUND
Ray Charles Staten, Sr., was arrested by D’Iberville Police Department
officer Griffin on April 29, 2011. Griffin was responding to a report of a disturbance
at Staten’s residence. Griffin checked for warrants, and found that Staten had an
active warrant from 2009.1 Staten was placed in custody and detained at the
Harrison County Detention Center. He was brought before D’Iberville Municipal
Judge Albert Fountain and found guilty of failure to pay fines of $409. His sentence
was “to serve 16 days.” (Def. Ex. B at 9, ECF No. 42-2).
On May 8, 2011, while in custody, Staten was seen by an employee of Health
Assurance, LLC, for complaints of diarrhea and stomach pain. Health Assurance
had a contract with defendant Harrison County, Mississippi, to provide medical
services to inmates and pre-trial detainees at the jail. After his initial visit, Staten
did not improve. When his condition worsened, and he was eventually rushed to
Garden Park Medical Clinic, where he was pronounced dead.
Defendants Teddy Harder, Stephen Furney, Brenda Broussard, and Joey
Borsage are current and former council members for the City of D’Iberville. Rusty
Quave is the Mayor of the City of D’Iberville. Wayne Payne is the Chief of Police for
the City of D’Iberville. The Plaintiffs allege that these defendants are liable for
violations of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that they
were part of a civil conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Plaintiffs also allege a
Fourteenth Amendment claim against the City Defendants for imprisoning Staten
without determining whether he was indigent.
DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs request that they be allowed more time to
1
The warrant was “for fail to pay, original charge trespassing.” (Def. Ex. B
at 4, ECF No. 42-2).
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conduct immunity-related discovery before being required to respond to the City
Defendants’ summary judgment motion. However, upon review of the Plaintiffs’
response, it is apparent that what they seek is discovery related to policies or
customs of the governmental entities that are defendants in this lawsuit. For
example, Plaintiffs state that they “need discovery on these matters to show the
defendants maintained a policy/practice that violated [Staten’s] due process and
equal protection rights.” (Pl. Resp. 8, ECF No. 48). They also argue that the Court
“should allow Plaintiffs to conduct discovery to identify the policymaker for the City
of D’Iberville.” (Pl. Resp. 10).
At issue in this motion are the individual capacity claims against the City
Defendants, in which the Plaintiffs “seek to impose personal liability upon a
government official for actions he takes under color of state law.” Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). The policy and custom questions on which
Plaintiffs seek discovery are not relevant to the individual capacity claims now at
issue. The Court finds a continuance for additional discovery to be unwarranted.
A. Qualified Immunity/Legal Standard
Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil
damages to the extent that their conduct is objectively reasonable in light of clearly
established law. Crostley v. Lamar Cnty., Tex., 717 F.3d 410, 422 (5th Cir. 2013)
(citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To determine whether an
official is entitled to qualified immunity, the court asks (1) whether the plaintiff has
alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional or statutory right, and (2)
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whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the clearly
established law at the time of the incident. Charles v. Grief, 522 F.3d 508, 511 (5th
Cir. 2008). “A right is clearly established only if its contours are sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.” Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 502 (5th Cir. 2013). “When there is no
controlling authority specifically prohibiting a defendant's conduct, the law is not
clearly established for the purposes of defeating qualified immunity.” Id. at 503.
Once a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden to
demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense. Crostley, 717 F.3d at 422 (quoting
McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002)).
In this summary judgment motion, the defendants, in their individual
capacities, assert that they are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. The
Court analyzes the motion under the well-established summary judgment standard.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see generally, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 576, 586B87
(1986); Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 464 (5th Cir. 1999). The
Fifth Circuit has provided instructions for evaluating qualified immunity at the
summary judgment stage:
The qualified immunity defense is appropriate at the summary
judgment stage when (1) a plaintiff has established that the defendant
has engaged in the complained-of conduct, or (2) the court “skip[s] for
the moment, over . . . still-contested matters to consider an issue that
would moot their effect if proved.” [Baker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107,
1124 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981)]. “If resolution of [qualified immunity] in
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the summary judgment proceedings turns on what the defendant
actually did, rather than on whether the defendant is immunized from
liability . . ., and if there are conflicting versions of his conduct, one of
which would establish and the other defeat liability, then the case is
inappropriate for summary judgment.” [Id. at 1123-24]. Although
summary judgment may be appropriate based on a plaintiff’s inability
to prove the facts essential to recovery, this “has nothing to do with the
qualified immunity defense.” Id.
Haverda v. Hays Cnty., 723 F.3d 586, 599 (5th Cir. 2013).
B. Fourth Amendment Claim
The Plaintiffs allege that Staten’s seizure and detention was unreasonable
and therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the seizure and
detention by the City Defendants was “made pursuant to policies, practices and
customs of jailing individuals who are too poor to immediately pay their
outstanding fines without giving them the option of community service or alternate
payment arrangements and incarcerating individuals beyond the time specified in
the court order.” (Compl. 10 (¶41), ECF No. 1).
The Court first notes that with the exception of Officer Griffin, none of the
City Defendants are alleged to have taken any actions related to Staten’s arrest and
incarceration. Their involvement is limited to their respective roles in formulating
and generally enforcing the policy of the City of D’Iberville. In other words, there is
no personal involvement in or knowledge of Staten’s situation alleged on the part of
the Chief of Police, the Mayor or the council members of the City of D’Iberville. “[A]
government official can be held liable only for his own misconduct.” Carnaby v. City
of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 2011). The Plaintiffs seem to argue that the
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act of formulating an unconstitutional policy suffices to impose individual liability
on the policymaker(s). In the Court’s view, that is an issue that goes to the liability
of the municipality rather than personal liability of the individuals. The Court’s
research has not uncovered an instance where a policymaker has been subjected to
personal liability for the act of making a policy. It is not at all clear that
formulating a policy determined to be unconstitutional is, in itself, an unlawful act.
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 245 (2009) (unless unlawfulness of conduct
is clearly established, officials are entitled to qualified immunity). Therefore, the
Chief of Police, Mayor and council members of the City of D’Iberville are entitled to
summary judgment in regard to the § 1983 claims, in their individual capacities.
The Plaintiffs have not alleged or demonstrated that these persons took some action
to violate Staten’s constitutional rights. Hampton v. Oktibbeha Cnty. Sheriff Dept.,
480 F.3d 358, 365 (5th Cir. 2007) (plaintiff must allege that official himself actually
violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights to overcome official’s qualified immunity).
In regard to Officer Griffin, the Fourth Amendment requires police officers to
have probable cause before performing a custodial arrest. Martin v. Thomas, 973
F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1992). “Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts
and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are
sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was
committing an offense.” Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 814 (5th
Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. McCowan, 469 F.3d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 2006)).
“Even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that
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probable cause is present are entitled to [qualified] immunity.” Haggerty v. Texas
S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 656 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). To overcome Officer
Griffin’s qualified immunity in regard to the Fourth Amendment claim, the
Plaintiffs must present competent summary judgment evidence sufficient to support
the conclusion that probable cause to arrest Staten was lacking. See Allen v.
Jackson Cnty., Miss., No. 1:12cv57-HSO-RHW, 2014 WL 940270 at *10 (S. D. Miss.
Mar. 11, 2014).
Staten was arrested based on an outstanding arrest warrant that had been
issued by Municipal Judge Albert Fountain. The “Capias”2 was entered on
December 3, 2009, and reads in pertinent part:
You are therefore commanded forthwith to take the body of said Ray
Charles Staten and safely keep in jail until the next regular session of
the Municipal Court of the City of D’Iberville, at which time Ray
Charles Staten will be given a SHOW CAUSE HEARING FOR
CONTEMPT OF COURT, unless said defendant pays a CASH FINE
plus $100.00 CONTEMPT COSTS for a total of $409.00, or be
otherwise discharged by due course of law.
(Def. Mot. Ex. B 6, ECF No. 42-2). An outstanding arrest warrant suffices to
establish probable cause for that person’s arrest. See Duckett v. City of Cedar Park,
Tex., 950 F.2d 272, 280 (5th Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs advance no reason why Officer
2
Plaintiffs argue that the Municipal Court should have issued an arrest
warrant rather than a document entitled “Capias,” because under Mississippi
statute, a “Capias” should issue after an indictment, and there was no indictment in
Staten’s case. Miss. Code § 99-9-1. Regardless of its title, the document was clearly
a command to arrest Staten and bring him before the court. The distinction drawn
by plaintiffs does not affect the constitutional rights at issue here, and so the Court
will not address it further.
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Griffin should have believed that the warrant was insufficient to establish probable
cause for Staten’s arrest. The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based
on probable cause. Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1994).
Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot show a constitutional violation committed by any
City of D’Iberville defendant, terminating the qualified immunity analysis. The
City Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in regard to plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment claim.
Plaintiffs also claim that the City Defendants can be liable under the Fourth
Amendment because Staten allegedly remained at the Harrison County Adult
Detention Center longer than required by the Municipal Court Order. The City
Defendants argue that this claim should be analyzed under the Fourteenth, rather
than the Fourth Amendment, because Staten’s arrest had been completed by that
time and he was in custody of Harrison County. The Fifth Circuit has stated that
the due process clause is implicated in cases of continued incarceration beyond the
term of a court-ordered sentence. Terry v. Hubert, 609 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2010)
(citing Brooks v. George Cnty., Miss. 84 F.3d 157, 166 (5th Cir. 1996)).
B. Fourteenth Amendment Claim
The Court must consider two Fourteenth Amendment claims against the City
Defendants. The first is the one above, wherein the Plaintiffs allege that Staten
remained incarcerated beyond his sentence. The second is an allegation that “[t]he
defendants, their agents, servants and employees, knowingly incarcerated Staten
for nonpayment of fines without determining whether he was indigent and had a
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good faith effort to discharge the outstanding debt and without offering alternatives
to incarceration. . . .”3 (Compl. 12 (¶47)).
It is undisputed that Staten’s sixteen day sentence was imposed on May 5,
2011. The Plaintiffs provide a document that appears to be a printout from the
HCADC. (Pl. Ex. 5, ECF No. 47-5). The printout states that Staten was sentenced
to “16 days rec 2-1 rel 5-13-11,” which shows that Judge Fountain ordered that
Staten was to receive two days credit for each day served, and he was to be released
on May 13. (Id.).
However, on May 10, Sargent Swann of the City of D’Iberville Police
Department filled out a release form for Staten with the comment: “Release timed
[sic] served per Judge Fountain.” (Def. Mot. Ex. B 7-8, ECF No. 42-2). According to
Swann’s handwritten note stapled to the form, the release was “due to Staten
having a medical emergency and being transported to the hospital.” (Id. at 7). A
second notation by Swann stated “this person was pronounced deceased tonight.”
(Id.).
3
The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs brought a Fourteenth Amendment
claim against the City Defendants. Plaintiffs specify that the Fourteenth
Amendment allegations are made against the Harrison County defendants, (see
Compl. 11-12 (¶¶43-48), and it is possible that the sentence set out above is merely
a continuation of the allegations against the specific Harrison County defendants
named. However, Plaintiffs allege in the “Facts” portion of their Complaint that the
“City of D’Iberville and Harrison County maintain a consistent practice of jailing
individuals who are too poor to immediately pay their outstanding fines, without
giving them the option of community service or alternate payment arrangements.”
(Compl. 4 (¶13)). The entirety of the Complaint adequately states a Fourteenth
Amendment claim against the City Defendants.
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Although Plaintiffs allege that Judge Fountain intended to give Staten credit
for time served and therefore imposed the eight day sentence to begin on the day of
Staten’s arrest, they make no argument in support of this allegation, nor do they
show evidence in the record that Staten’s sentence was improperly computed. The
sentencing document signed by Judge Fountain is blank where the Judge could
have noted credit for time served. (Def. Ex. B 9, ECF No. 42-2). More importantly,
Plaintiffs do not show that any of the City Defendants were involved with the
imposition, computation, or termination of Staten’s incarceration.
The Plaintiffs next argue it was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for
the City Defendants to fail to determine whether Staten was indigent before
sentencing him to time in custody. A defendant cannot be sentenced to time in jail
for failing to pay a fine, when the defendant does not have the means to pay.
Pederson v. City of Haltom City, 108 F. App’x 845, 848 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971)). But the Plaintiffs do not allege, argue, or provide
evidence that any of the City Defendants were involved in Staten’s criminal
proceedings after his arrest was completed. Plaintiffs therefore cannot point to any
action taken by any of the City Defendants that violated Staten’s constitutional
rights. In sum, the Plaintiffs have shown no basis for imposing personal liability on
any of the City Defendants for any constitutional violations that might have
occurred.
C. Section 1985 Conspiracy
Plaintiffs allege that the City of D’Iberville, Police Chief Payne, and Sheriff
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Brisolara conspired to establish procedures to incarcerate indigent individuals for
unpaid fines, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Plaintiffs do not specify which
subsection of § 1985 they rely upon, but the Court notes that only subsections two
and three are relevant to plaintiff’s allegations. Payne argues that Plaintiffs cannot
show that he is liable to them under either subsection two or three.
To state a claim under § 1985(3), Plaintiffs must allege: (1) a conspiracy
involving two or more persons; (2) for the purpose of depriving, directly or
indirectly, a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; and (3) an
act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) which causes injury to a person or property,
or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Hilliard
v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1994). The Plaintiffs must show that the
conspiracy was motivated by a class-based animus. Id. The Fifth Circuit has
explained that a group must be targeted because of some protected common
attribute. Hagan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 48, 53 (5th Cir. 1995). This
common attribute must consist of an inherited or immutable characteristic such as
gender, race, religion, or national origin. Galloway v. State of La., 817 F.2d 1154,
1159 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Bryant v. Military Dep’t of Miss., 597 F.3d 678, 687
(5th Cir. 2010) (refusing to recognize whistleblowers as a class); Torres v. Cnty. of
Webb, 150 F. App’x 286, 291 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 2005) (holding that persons who
oppose abortion do not constitute a class under Section 1985).
There is an identical class-based animus requirement for a § 1985(2) claim.
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As the Fifth Circuit has explained, § 1985(2) has two parts. Daigle v. Gulf State
Util.’s Co., Local Union No. 2286, 794 F.2d 974, 979 (5th Cir. 1986). The first part
proscribes conspiracies that interfere with the administration of justice in federal
court, and the second part proscribes conspiracies that interfere with the
administration of justice in state court. Id. (citing Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719,
725 (1983)). As there was no federal court proceeding underlying Plaintiffs’ claims,
only the second part of § 1985(2) is at issue in this case. The Fifth Circuit has
determined that the class-based animus requirement of § 1985(3) also applies to
claims under the second part of § 1985(2). Id. (citing Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc.,
648 F.2d 340, 346 (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110 (1981)).
The Plaintiffs have not asserted any facts or produced any evidence of
class-based animus in this case. Nor have they responded to Payne’s argument that
they cannot show such evidence. The Court is unconvinced that “indigent
individuals” should be recognized as a class under Section 1985 based on Fifth
Circuit precedent. Furthermore, as explained previously, the Plaintiffs cannot
demonstrate that Staten’s constitutional rights were violated by Payne. As a result,
Wayne Payne is entitled to summary judgment as to the Plaintiffs’ Section 1985
claims.
D. State Law Claims
The City Defendants contend that to the extent the Plaintiffs have alleged
State law tort claims against them, those claims are barred by the Mississippi Tort
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Claims Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1, et seq. Plaintiffs’ Response does not address
this argument. Having reviewed the allegations, the Court is of the opinion that
Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not plead any State law tort claims against the City
Defendants, and therefore this issue is moot and need not be addressed further.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion for
Summary Judgment [42] filed by defendants Joey Bosarge, Brenda Broussard,
Stephen Furney, Teddy Harder, Wayne Payne, and Rusty Quave, is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 and State law claims against these defendants, in their
individual capacities, and the Section 1985 claim against Wayne Payne, in his
individual capacity, are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 28th day of August, 2014.
s/
Louis Guirola, Jr.
LOUIS GUIROLA, JR.
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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