Hagan v. Jackson County, Mississippi et al

Filing 84

Order Granting Defendants Mike Byrd, Hope Thornton, Linda Jones, Eddie Clark, and Chad Heck's Motion 22 to Dismiss Plaintiff's Claims Against Them in Their Official Capacities. Signed by District Judge Halil S. Ozerden on February 10, 2014. (NM)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JAMES HAGAN

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v.
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JACKSON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, §
MIKE BYRD, Individually and
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in his Official Capacity as
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Sheriff of Jackson County,
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Mississippi; HOPE THORNTON,
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Individually and in her Official
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Capacity as Detective in the
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Jackson County Sheriff’s
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Department; LINDA JONES,
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Individually and in her Official
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Capacity as Detective in the
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Jackson County Sheriff’s
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Department; EDDIE CLARK,
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Individually and in his Official
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Capacity as Detective in the Jackson §
County Sheriff’s Department; CHAD §
HECK, Individually and in his
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Official Capacity as Sergeant in the §
Jackson County Sheriff’s
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Department; TRAVELERS
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CASUALTY AND SURETY
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COMPANY OF AMERICA, JOHN
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OR JANE DOES 1-10
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PLAINTIFF
CIVIL NO.: 1:13cv268-HSO-RHW
DEFENDANTS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MIKE BYRD, HOPE THORNTON,
LINDA JONES, EDDIE CLARK, AND CHAD HECK’S MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST THEM IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES
BEFORE THE COURT is the Motion to Dismiss [22] Plaintiff James Hagan’s
official capacity claims against Defendants Mike Byrd, Hope Thornton, Linda Jones,
Eddie Clark, and Chad Heck. Having considered the Motion, Plaintiff’s Amended

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Response in Opposition [27],1 the moving Defendants’ Reply [29], the record, and
relevant legal authorities, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion should be
granted, and Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendants Mike Byrd, Hope
Thornton, Linda Jones, Eddie Clark, and Chad Heck should be dismissed with
prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff James Hagan (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Defendants Jackson
County, Mississippi, Mike Byrd, Hope Thornton, Linda Jones, Eddie Clark, Chad
Heck, and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America on June 24, 2013.
Compl. 1-6 [1]. Plaintiff advances several claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985, 1986, and 1988 stemming from allegations that Defendants falsely arrested
Plaintiff and charged him with various crimes, all of which were subsequently
dismissed. Id. 6-21. Plaintiff asserts these claims against Defendants Mike Byrd,
Hope Thornton, Linda Jones, Eddie Clark, and Chad Heck (the “Department
Defendants”) both individually and in their official capacities as members of the
Jackson County Sheriff’s Department. Id. at 1-6.
On August 26, 2013, the Department Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s
official capacity claims only. Mot. to Dismiss 1 [22]. The Department Defendants
note that Plaintiff has sued Jackson County and, relying upon Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985), contend that Plaintiff’s official capacity claims are
merely redundant of Plaintiff’s claims against Jackson County. Id. at 2.
On September 6, 2013, Plaintiff filed both his original Response in Opposition [26] and an Amended
Response in Opposition [27]. The Amended Response in Opposition is identical to the original
Response in Opposition but for a change to the certificate of service.
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Plaintiff responds that Graham “only dictates that a municipality cannot be
held liable on a respondeat superior basis and a judgment against an official in his
or her personal capacity does not impose liability on the governmental entity.” Am.
Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss 2 [27]. According to Plaintiff, whether his official
capacity claims against the Department Defendants are redundant of his claims
against the County is irrelevant. Id. at 3. Plaintiff maintains that the Department
Defendants and Jackson County are separate and distinct legal entities and thus
dismissal of his official capacity claims is improper. Id. at 4.
In Reply [29], the Department Defendants point out that the authority relied
upon by Plaintiff arises from a district court in the Third Circuit and takes a
position contrary to that taken by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Reply to Pl.’s
Am. Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss 2 [29]. Because Plaintiff has sued Jackson
County, the Department Defendants posit that there is no legal basis for them to
remain listed as Defendants in their official capacities. Id.
II. DISCUSSION
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading
an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Graham, 473 U.S. at
165-66 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690,
n. 55 (1978)). “As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity
to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated
as a suit against the entity.” Id. at 166 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 47172 (1985)); see also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)

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(noting an action against a government official in his or her official capacity is
tantamount to a suit against the government itself); McCarthy v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d
407, 414 (5th Cir. 2004) (concluding official capacity suits should be treated as a
suit against the entity for which the official acts as an agent).
The Department Defendants should be dismissed as parties because a claim
brought against a governmental employee in his or her official capacity is actually a
claim against the governmental entity itself. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66 (1985).
Plaintiff has sued Jackson County, the governmental entity for which the
Department Defendants acted as agents. Jackson County has received notice [14]
of Plaintiff’s suit and has responded [41]. While Plaintiff’s individual capacity
claims against the Department Defendants are legally distinct, Plaintiff’s official
capacity claims against the Department Defendants are redundant of Plaintiff’s
claims against Jackson County. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s official capacity
claims against the Department Defendants should be dismissed with prejudice.
See, e.g., Fife v. Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC, 945 F. Supp. 2d 721, 731 (S.D. Miss.
2013) (“Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendant White are redundant
since her employer . . . is a party to this lawsuit.”); Hinson v. Rankin Cnty., Miss.,
873 F. Supp. 2d 790, 792 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66)
(“The official capacity claims against Constable Bean and Sheriff Pennington are
the functional equivalent of claims against Rankin County.”); McGee v. Parker, 772
F. Supp. 308, 312 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66) (“[T]he

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naming of a public official as a defendant in his official capacity is simply another
way of pleading an action against the entity of which the officer is an agent.”).
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff James
Hagan’s official capacity claims against Defendants Mike Byrd, Hope Thornton,
Linda Jones, Eddie Clark, and Chad Heck are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against these Defendants remain pending.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 10th day of February, 2014.

s/ Halil Suleyman Ozerden
HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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