Anderson v. Harrison County Adult Detention Center et al
Filing
94
ORDER denying 77 Motion for Attorney Fees; finding as moot 91 Motion to Strike Signed by Chief District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr on 02/25/2015 (Guirola, Louis)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PATRICIA ANDERSON
PLAINTIFF
v.
CAUSE NO. 1:13CV302-LG-JCG
HARRISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI
DEFENDANT
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
AND FINDING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE REPLY
BEFORE THE COURT are the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [77] filed by the
defendant Harrison County, Mississippi, and the Motion to Strike Reply [91] filed
by the plaintiff Patricia Anderson. Both motions have been fully briefed by the
parties. After reviewing the submissions of the parties, the record in this matter,
and the applicable law, the Court finds that Harrison County’s Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees should be denied. The Court further finds that Anderson’s Motion
to Strike is moot.
BACKGROUND
On July 22, 2013, Patricia Anderson filed this lawsuit against the Harrison
County Adult Detention Center, the Harrison County Board of Supervisors,
Harrison County, Mississippi, Elaine Lege, and David Sanderson, alleging that she
was subjected to a discriminatory shift change. In her Complaint, Anderson, who
is an African American, claimed that the defendants committed race discrimination
in violation of Title VII, and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act. Anderson’s claims
against the detention center were dismissed pursuant to an Agreed Order entered
on September 19, 2014. Lege and Sanderson filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, and Harrison County, Mississippi, and the Board of Supervisors filed
two joinders in the Motion. In her response in opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment, Anderson voluntarily withdrew her Rehabilitation Act and
FMLA claims. After the parties finished briefing the Motion for Summary
Judgment, Lege, Sanderson, and the Board of Supervisors were dismissed pursuant
to an Agreed Order, leaving Harrison County, Mississippi, as the only remaining
defendant.
On December 1, 2014, this Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order
[75] granting summary judgment in favor of Harrison County, Mississippi, because
Anderson had not set forth a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court also
noted that Anderson had not demonstrated that Harrison County’s reason for the
shift change was pretext for discrimination. Harrison County has filed the present
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, because it claims that Anderson’s lawsuit was frivolous.
Anderson has filed a Motion to Strike the reply [90] Harrison County filed in
support of its Motion, because the reply references other claims and litigation filed
by Anderson.
DISCUSSION
Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that a district court
has discretion to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the prevailing party
in a lawsuit brought under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Attorneys’ fees can
also be recovered by the prevailing party in an ADA case. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
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As Congress enacted § 706(k) in part to “promote the vigorous
enforcement of the provisions of Title VII,” the Supreme Court has
held that a successful defendant can only recover § 706(k) fees “if the
plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”
The Court has cautioned district judges to “resist the understandable
temptation . . . to conclud[e] that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately
prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without
foundation.”
Autry v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 704 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Christiansburg Garment Co., v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978)). “When
considering whether a case is frivolous, a district court should look to factors such
as whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case, whether the defendant
offered to settle, and whether the court held a full trial.” Myers v. City of W.
Monroe, 211 F.3d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 2000). “These factors are, however, guideposts,
not hard and fast rules. Determinations regarding frivolity are to be made on a
case-by-case basis.” Id. “Even when the law or facts appear questionable or
unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for
bringing suit.” Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422. When a plaintiff presents credible
evidence supporting her claim, she has shown that her case has arguable merit, and
the prevailing defendant is not entitled to attorneys’ fees. Vaughner v. Pulito, 804
F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 1986). “The stringent standard applicable to defendants is
intended to ensure that plaintiffs with uncertain but arguably meritorious claims
are not altogether deterred from initiating litigation by the threat of incurring
onerous legal fees should their claims fail.” Myers, 211 F.3d at 292 n.1.
Harrison County asserts that it is entitled to attorneys’ fees because
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Anderson admitted during her deposition that the individual she named as a
comparator held a different job at the detention center. Harrison County also
argues that Anderson’s decision to dismiss some of the defendants to this lawsuit
indicates that she knew her entire case lacked merit. In its reply, Harrison County
provided evidence of multiple worker’s compensation claims concerning injuries
that Anderson allegedly suffered while sitting on either a chair or a stool. The
County contends that these claims demonstrate that Anderson has a history of
filing frivolous claims.
This case presents a close question, but the Court finds that Harrison County
is not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees. Although they performed different duties,
Anderson and her alleged comparator were both generally classified as correction
officers, and Anderson presented evidence that the alleged comparator was not
subjected to the same shift change to which Anderson was subjected. Therefore,
Anderson submitted some evidence to support her claim. The fact that Anderson
voluntarily dismissed some defendants and claims actually indicates that Anderson
acted in good faith by continuing to evaluate the merits of her case throughout this
litigation. As for Anderson’s worker’s compensation claims, this Court is not in a
position to determine the merits of those claims; thus those claims do not support
an award of attorneys’ fees in this lawsuit.1
1
Anderson filed a Motion to Strike the reply’s reference to her worker’s
compensation claims. The Court finds that the Motion to Strike is moot, because
the arguments and evidence concerning the worker’s compensation claims do not
affect the Court’s decision on the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Harrison County’s Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees should be denied, and Anderson’s Motion to Strike is moot.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees [77] filed by the defendant Harrison County, Mississippi, is
DENIED.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion to
Strike Reply [91] filed by the plaintiff Patricia Anderson is MOOT.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 25th day of February, 2015.
s/
Louis Guirola, Jr.
LOUIS GUIROLA, JR.
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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