Tuskan v. Jackson County Mississippi et al

Filing 53

ORDER granting Motion to Dismiss Official Capacity Claims 9 . Signed by District Judge Halil S. Ozerden on July 29, 2014. (NM)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RONALD TUSKAN
v.
JACKSON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI,
MIKE BYRD, INDIVIDUALLY AND
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
SHERIFF OF JACKSON COUNTY,
MISSISSIPPI; HOPE THORNTON,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
DETECTIVE IN THE JACKSON
COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT; TRAVELERS
CASUALTY AND SURETY
COMPANY OF AMERICA; AND
JOHN OR JANE DOES 1-10

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PLAINTIFF
CIVIL NO. 1:13cv356-HSO-RHW
DEFENDANTS

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIMS
BEFORE THE COURT is the Motion to Dismiss [9] Plaintiff Ronald Tuskan’s
official capacity claims against Defendants Mike Byrd and Hope Thornton. Having
considered the Motion, Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition [11], the record, and
relevant legal authorities, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion should be
granted, and Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendants Mike Byrd and
Hope Thornton should be dismissed with prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Ronald Tuskan (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against Defendants Jackson
County, Mississippi, Mike Byrd (“Byrd”), Hope Thornton (“Thornton”), and

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Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America on September 11, 2013.
Compl. 1 [1]. Plaintiff advances several claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985,
1986, and 1988 stemming from allegations that Defendants falsely arrested
Plaintiff and investigated him for downloading and possessing child pornography,
which investigation was allegedly without a reasonable evidentiary or factual basis
and was ultimately unfruitful. Id. at 5-22. Plaintiff asserts these claims against
Byrd and Thornton both individually and in their official capacities as members of
the Jackson County Sheriff’s Department. Id. at 2.
On October 24, 2013, Byrd and Thornton moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s official
capacity claims only. Mot. to Dismiss 1 [9]. Byrd and Thornton note that Plaintiff
has also sued Jackson County and, relying upon Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
165-66 (1985), contend that Plaintiff’s official capacity claims are merely redundant
of Plaintiff’s claims against Jackson County. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff responds that Graham “only dictates that a municipality cannot be
held liable on a respondeat superior basis and a judgment against an official in his
or her personal capacity does not impose liability on the governmental entity.” Pl.’s
Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, 2 [11]. According to Plaintiff, whether his official
capacity claims against Byrd and Thornton are redundant of his claims against
Jackson County is irrelevant. Id. at 3. Plaintiff maintains that Byrd, Thornton,
and Jackson County “are separate and distinct entities legally” and thus dismissal
of his official capacity claims is improper. Id. at 4. To date, Byrd and Thornton
have not filed a rebuttal.
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II. DISCUSSION
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading
an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Graham, 473 U.S. at
165-66 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690,
n.55 (1978)). “As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity
to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated
as a suit against the entity.” Id. at 166 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 47172 (1985)); see also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)
(noting an action against a government official in his or her official capacity is
tantamount to a suit against the government itself); McCarthy v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d
407, 414 (5th Cir. 2004) (concluding official capacity suits should be treated as a
suit against the entity for which the official acts as an agent).
To the extent they have been sued in their official capacities, Byrd and
Thornton should be dismissed as parties because a claim brought against a
governmental employee in his or her official capacity is actually a claim against the
governmental entity itself. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66 (1985). Plaintiff has sued
Jackson County, the governmental entity for which Byrd and Thornton acted as
agents. Jackson County has received notice [3] of Plaintiff’s suit and has responded
[8]. While Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against Byrd and Thornton are
legally distinct, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Byrd and Thornton are
redundant of Plaintiff’s claims against Jackson County. For these reasons,
Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Byrd and Thornton should be dismissed
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with prejudice. See, e.g., Fife v. Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC, 945 F. Supp. 2d 721,
731 (S.D. Miss. 2013) (“Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendant White
are redundant since her employer . . . is a party to this lawsuit.”); Hinson v. Rankin
Cnty., Miss., 873 F. Supp. 2d 790, 792 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at
165-66) (“The official capacity claims against Constable Bean and Sheriff
Pennington are the functional equivalent of claims against Rankin County.”);
McGee v. Parker, 772 F. Supp. 308, 312 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (citing Graham, 473 U.S.
at 165-66) (“[T]he naming of a public official as a defendant in his official capacity is
simply another way of pleading an action against the entity of which the officer is
an agent.”).
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants
Mike Byrd and Hope Thornton’s Motion to Dismiss Official Capacity Claims [9] is
GRANTED and Plaintiff Ronald Tuskan’s official capacity claims against
Defendants Mike Byrd and Hope Thornton are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against these Defendants remain pending.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 29th day of July, 2014.

s/ Halil Suleyman Ozerden
HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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