Braswell v. Jackson County Mississippi et al

Filing 183

ORDER granting 172 Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant Jackson County, Mississippi, and for Partial Summary Judgment by individual Defendants William E. Patteson, Lamar Palmer, and Jonathan Blakeney. Signed by District Judge Halil S. Ozerden on January 22, 2016. (ENW)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DWIGHT BRASWELL
v.
JACKSON COUNTY,
MISSISSIPPI, et al.

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PLAINTIFF
Civil Action No. 1:13cv451-HSO-RHW

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
[172] MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY DEFENDANT
JACKSON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BY DEFENDANTS WILLIAM E. PATTESON,
LAMAR PALMER, AND JONATHAN BLAKENEY
BEFORE THE COURT is the Motion [172] for Summary Judgment by
Defendant Jackson County, Mississippi, and for Partial Summary Judgment by
individual Defendants William E. Patteson, Lamar Palmer, and Jonathan
Blakeney. This Motion is fully briefed. Having considered the Motion, related
pleadings, the record, and relevant legal authorities, the Court is of the opinion that
the Motion [172] should be granted, and that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant
Jackson County, Mississippi, should be dismissed in their entirety. Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants William E. Patteson, Lamar Palmer, and Jonathan
Blakeney pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for unreasonable seizure should
be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants William E.

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Patteson, Lamar Palmer, and Jonathan Blakeney, in their individual capacities,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for excessive force will proceed.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background
This case arises out of the arrest of Plaintiff Dwight Braswell by the Jackson

County, Mississippi, Sheriff’s Department, on April 29, 2012. Investigative Report
[172-1] at 1-4. Plaintiff was arrested in Vancleave, Mississippi, by Deputy Chris
Goff, who is not a Defendant in this case, for disorderly conduct and trespassing,
following which Deputy Goff transported Plaintiff to the Jackson County Adult
Detention Center (the “ADC”). Id.; Dep. of Dwight R. Braswell [172-2] at 20-21.
Sergeant Michael Nutefall was on patrol and also responded to the call that
prompted Plaintiff’s arrest. Dep. of Sergeant Michael Nutefall [175-2] at 7, 9.
According to Sergeant Nutefall, who is not a party to this action, Plaintiff “was
acting belligerent, cussing, hollering, [and] making threats.” Id. at 9. “Deputy Goff
arrested [Plaintiff], put him in handcuffs.” Id. Sergeant Nutefall opened the back
door of Deputy Goff’s police vehicle so that Deputy Goff could place Plaintiff in the
backseat. Id. As Deputy Goff departed with Plaintiff for the ADC, Sergeant
Nutefall contacted the ADC to inform the staff there that “Deputy Goff would need
a ‘meet and great,” and that “he had a ‘hot one’ coming in.” Id. According to
Sergeant Nutefall, “[t]hat’s a term we use for a violent arrestee.” Id. Sergeant

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Nutefall “believe[d] that [he] made a statement that [Plaintiff] had made threats
towards law enforcement, to be careful.” Id.
According to Plaintiff, an unidentified “deputy slapped him in the face when
they arrived at the garage of the [ADC].” Pl.’s Answers to First Set of Interrogs.
[172-3] at 16. Plaintiff claims that while at the ADC, he was beaten and restrained
and that he suffered damages. Id. at 11, 16-17. Plaintiff alleges that officers
employed excessive force against him both at the ADC and after he was transported
to a hospital for medical treatment. Plaintiff was released from the ADC on April
30, 2012. Release Sheet [175-10] at 2.
B.

Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed his Complaint [1] on December 6, 2013, against Defendants

Jackson County, Mississippi (the “County”); Sheriff Mike Byrd, individually and in
his official capacity as Sheriff of Jackson County; Major Brian Grady, individually
and in his official capacity as Jail Administrator for the ADC; and Travelers
Casualty and Surety Company of America (“Travelers”). Compl. [1] at 1.
Plaintiff later filed an Amended Complaint [102], omitting any claims against
Sheriff Mike Byrd and Major Brian Grady, who are no longer Defendants in this
case. Plaintiff named as Defendants the County; William E. Patteson, individually;
Lamar Palmer, individually; Jonathan Blakeney, individually; Travelers; and “John
or Jane Does 1-15.” Am. Compl. [102] at 1-3. Jackson County, Patteson, Palmer,
and Blakeney (the “Jackson County Defendants”) subsequently filed a Motion to

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Dismiss Certain Claims [167], which the Court granted. The remaining claims
against the Jackson County Defendants are under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for
unreasonable seizure and excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment, and against Defendant Jackson County, Mississippi, for inadequate
training and/or supervision, negligent hiring and retention, and failure to discipline
or take necessary corrective action.
Defendant Jackson County, Mississippi, seeks dismissal of all claims against
it, while the individual Defendants Patteson, Palmer, and Blakeney seek dismissal
of the unreasonable seizure claim asserted against them.1
II. DISCUSSION
A.

Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(a) provides that summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the movant
carries this burden, “the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
To rebut a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing
party must show, with “significant probative evidence,” that there exists a genuine

“Defendants Patteson, Palmer, and Blakeney acknowledge the numerous disputed facts
with respect to [the use of excessive force], and therefore do not seek summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment, due process, excessive force claim.” Defs.’ Mem. [173] at
10.
1

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issue of material fact. Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir.
2000). “A genuine dispute of material fact means that evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Royal v. CCC&R
Tres Arboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). If the
evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment is
appropriate. Cutting Underwater Techs. USA, Inc. v. ENI U.S. Operating Co., 671
F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
249 (1986)). In deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court
views facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. RSR
Corp. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 858 (5th Cir. 2010). In general, a defendant
bears the burden of proving any affirmative defense. Crescent Towing & Salvage
Co. v. M/V Anax, 40 F.3d 741, 744 (5th Cir. 1994).
B.

Unreasonable Seizure Claims Against Individual Defendants
Plaintiff refers to this claim in the Amended Complaint as one for

“unreasonable seizure.” See, e.g., Am. Compl. [102] at 13, 15, 17. For the reasons
that follow, summary judgment on the unreasonable seizure claim as to Defendants
Patteson, Palmer, and Blakeney is appropriate because the record is devoid of any
evidence those individuals had any personal involvement in Plaintiff’s initial arrest
or were in any way causally connected to any alleged deprivation which occurred
during the initial arrest.

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“A Section 1983 claimant must ‘establish that the defendant was either
personally involved in the deprivation or that his wrongful actions were causally
connected to the deprivation.’” Jones v. Lowndes Cty., Miss., 678 F.3d 344, 349 (5th
Cir. 2012) (quoting James v. Tex. Collin Cty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008)). To
the extent that the “unreasonable seizure” claim relates to any excessive force
allegedly employed at the time of Plaintiff’s initial arrest, summary judgment in the
individual Defendants’ favor is appropriate because there is no competent summary
judgment evidence that any of the named individual Defendants were present or
involved in any way with Plaintiff’s initial arrest. See id.; see also Ramirez v.
Knoulton, 542 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures of the person has been
applied in § 1983 actions to impose liability on police officers who employ excessive
force).
To the extent that Plaintiff’s “unreasonable seizure” claim is one premised
upon any alleged false arrest, summary judgment is appropriate for the same
reason. See Jones, 678 F.3d at 349; see also Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 164
(5th Cir. 2009) (holding that to establish that individual defendants violated a
plaintiff’s constitutional rights on a false arrest claim, plaintiff must show that the
officers lacked probable cause). The individual Defendants are entitled to summary

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judgment on any “unreasonable seizure” claim arising out of Plaintiff’s initial
arrest.2
C.

Claims Against Jackson County
“[C]laims against local governments premised on a theory of respondeat

superior are not cognizable under § 1983.” Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657,
668 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-94
(1978)). “Accordingly, ‘isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal employees
will almost never trigger liability,’ but rather ‘the unconstitutional conduct must be
directly attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action or
imprimatur.’” Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 412 (5th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)).
“To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show the
deprivation of a federally protected right caused by action taken ‘pursuant to an
official municipal policy.’” Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir.
2010) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). To this end, “[a] plaintiff must identify: (1)
an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual
or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is
that policy or custom.” Id. at 541-42 (quoting Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d
325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)). These three elements “are necessary to distinguish

To the extent that Plaintiff’s “unreasonable seizure” claim refers to excessive force
allegedly applied once Plaintiff arrived at the ADC, such a claim is coextensive with
Plaintiff’s “excessive force” claim. The individual Defendants have not moved for summary
judgment on the “excessive force” claim, which will proceed as to the individual Defendants.
2

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individual violations perpetrated by local government employees from those that
can be fairly identified as actions of the government itself.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at
578.
1.

Plaintiff’s “Unreasonable Seizure” Claim Against the County

As discussed earlier, Plaintiff refers to this claim in the Amended Complaint
as one for “unreasonable seizure.” See, e.g., Am. Compl. [102] at 13, 15, 17. It is
unclear whether Plaintiff is alleging unreasonable seizure or excessive force
associated with his initial arrest, or unlawful seizure or false arrest in connection
with the arrest. Regardless, summary judgment in the City’s favor on such a claim
is appropriate.
Plaintiff has not pointed to any official written or otherwise specially
articulated policy to support an “unreasonable seizure” claim against the County as
it relates to the initial arrest. Nor has Plaintiff directed the Court to any competent
summary evidence on this point. See Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th
Cir. 2003) (“Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through
the record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary
judgment.”). Plaintiff’s opposition to the County’s request for summary judgment
focuses on the Sheriff’s Department employees at the ADC. Pl.’s Mem. [176] at 1621. Because Plaintiff has not shown that an official policy or custom of the County
was the moving force behind any alleged constitutional violation as to his

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“unreasonable seizure” claim, summary judgment in the County’s favor on this
claim is warranted.
Moreover, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a constitutional violation by any
County employee or agent as it relates to his initial arrest. Plaintiff has not pointed
to any competent summary judgment evidence indicating that the arresting officer
employed any excessive force at the scene. When asked if the arresting officer
forcefully placed him into the patrol car, Plaintiff testified “I don’t remember. But I
don’t believe I was forced in there, no.” Dep. of Dwight R. Braswell [172-2] at 21.
To the extent that Plaintiff’s “unreasonable seizure” claim is premised upon
an alleged false arrest, to demonstrate a constitutional violation he must show that
the officer lacked an arguable probable cause for his arrest. See Club Retro, L.L.C.
v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 204 (5th Cir. 2009). “The Supreme Court has defined
probable cause as the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that
are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in
believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Id. at 206 (quoting Piazza v. Mayne,
217 F.3d 239, 245-46 (5th Cir. 2000)). “A showing of probable cause requires much
less evidence than does a finding sufficient to convict.” Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d
1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).

Defendants assert that the arresting deputy had sufficient probable cause to
arrest Plaintiff because Plaintiff’s actions on the day in question were in violation of

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at least three Mississippi criminal statutes, namely Mississippi Code §§ 97-35-9, 9735-11, and 97-35-15. Defs.’ Mem. [173] at 6. Section 97-35-9 provides as follows:
A person who wilfully disturbs the peace of any family or person by an
explosion of gunpowder or other explosive substance, or by loud or
unusual noise, or by any tumultuous or offensive conduct, shall be
punished by fine or imprisonment, or both; the fine not to exceed one
hundred dollars, and the imprisonment not to exceed six months in the
county jail.
Miss. Code § 97-35-9. Section 97-35-11 reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Any person who enters the dwelling house of another, or the yard or
curtilage thereof, or upon the public highway, or any other place near
such premises, and in the presence or hearing of the family or the
possessor or occupant thereof, or of any member thereof, makes use of
abusive, profane, vulgar or indecent language, or is guilty of any
indecent exposure of his or her person at such place, shall be punished
for a misdemeanor.
Miss. Code § 97-35-11. Finally, Mississippi Code § 97-35-15(1) provides that:
Any person who disturbs the public peace, or the peace of others, by
violent, or loud, or insulting, or profane, or indecent, or offensive, or
boisterous conduct or language, or by intimidation, or seeking to
intimidate any other person or persons, or by conduct either calculated
to provoke a breach of the peace, or by conduct which may lead to a
breach of the peace, or by any other act, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine
of not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment
in the county jail not more than six (6) months, or both.
Miss. Code § 97-35-15(1).
Plaintiff testified that he had
called 911 and said, y’all need to send somebody back to Seaman Road.
There may be an altercation. I went back. There was no altercation.
The next thing that I know, a patrol car pulled up. I think it was
Deputy Goff pulled up. And I was cussing at Ronnie Wood. He’s

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Hispanic. I did use some profane language towards him simply
because he pulled a gun on me after all I’ve done for him.
Dep. of Dwight R. Braswell [172-2] at 20. Because the undisputed summary
judgment record supports the conclusion that the arresting deputy had probable
cause to believe that Plaintiff was violating one or more of the foregoing statutes,
Defendants have shown that there was no unlawful arrest of Plaintiff. The County
is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for “unreasonable
seizure.”

2.

Plaintiff’s Excessive Force Claim Against the County

Plaintiff has not pointed to any official written policy to support his excessive
force claim. Instead, Plaintiff appears to advance two alternative theories of
municipal liability: (1) unwritten custom of employing excessive force; and (2)
inadequate training. Pl.’s Mem. [176] at 16-21.
(a)

Unwritten Custom of Employing Excessive Force

“An official policy may take various forms, including a widespread practice
that is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents
municipal policy.” Fennell, 804 F.3d at 413 (quotation omitted). “Regardless of its
form, the policymaker must have actual or constructive knowledge of the official
policy or custom.” Id. (citations omitted).
Official policy may “arise in the form of a widespread practice that is ‘so
common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal
policy.’” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009)

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(quoting Piotrowski, 237 F. 3d at 579). “A customary policy consists of actions that
have occurred for so long and with such frequency that the course of conduct
demonstrates the governing body’s knowledge and acceptance of the disputed
conduct.” Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 2010)
(citing Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 1984)).
“It is thus clear that a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘a pattern of abuses that
transcends the error made in a single case.’” Peterson, 588 F.3d at 850-51 (quoting
Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 582). “A pattern requires similarity and specificity; ‘[p]rior
indications cannot simply be for any and all ‘bad’ or unwise acts, but rather must
point to the specific violation in question.’” Id. at 851 (quoting Estate of Davis ex
rel. McCully v. City of North Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 383 (5th Cir. 2005)). “A
pattern also requires ‘sufficiently numerous prior incidents,’ as opposed to ‘isolated
instances.’” Id. (quoting McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir.
1989)). A plaintiff seeking to withstand summary judgment must provide sufficient
evidence “to provide context that would show a pattern of establishing a municipal
policy.” Id. at 851.
Plaintiff relies primarily upon the testimony of Kristen McIlwain, whom he
describes as a sergeant with the Sheriff’s Department who has worked at the ADC.
Pl.’s Mem. [176] at 18. McIlwain testified that
when we would be on patrol and somebody would upset us, the sheriff
would get on the radio and say, beat his ass or make him pay and stuff
like that. And I watched the sheriff, you know, on the video with Stahl

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kick the guy that was, you know, under arrest. And that is against our
policy for the Jackson County Sheriff’s Department.
Dep. of Kristen McIlwain [175-13] at 12.
McIlwain further testified as follows:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Now, did he ever tell you to beat somebody’s ass?
The sheriff?
Yes.
He would make it known that you’d beat people – you know, if
they mess with you, his exact words was, make them pay at the
pump, beat their ass.
And did you do that?
Absolutely not.
* * *
So just because the sheriff said that, that didn’t mean people
were going to do it, right?
Well, I will tell you this, this sheriff doesn’t condone [sic] it in no
way, shape, fashion or form.

Id. at 12-13.
McIlwain was asked to describe the “video with Stahl” she referenced in her
testimony. McIlwain responded as follows:
A.

Q.
A.
Q.

It was Dustin Gregg and Chris Goff – yeah. Dustin Gregg and
Chris Goff were, I believe, on a traffic stop out east somewhere.
And they were dealing with [John] Mark Stahl. And he was just
acting crazy, to say the least. But they let him get in his car,
which was wrong. They let him get in his car. He takes off with
the police car, and there’s a pursuit.
And then I believe it was Captain Nevels – it was one of
the captains. He may have been a lieutenant then – PITs him
and takes out the car, and then the sheriff was called and shows
up. And then as he is standing against the car in his handcuffs,
the sheriff comes up and kicks him or knees him.
Okay. So he was in handcuffs?
Yes.
Was he in the custody of the Jackson County Sheriff’s
Department?

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A.
Q.
A.

Yes, sir.
And did he pose a danger to anybody?
I didn’t see on the tape where he did.

Id. at 22-23.
With respect to Byrd’s purported direction to the deputies, McIlwain testified
as follows:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

And I think you described earlier that you had actually heard
him get on the radio and encourage other people to do the same
type of contact [sic]?
Absolutely.
And so what kind of stuff would he say on the radio?
Beat his ass, make him pay at the pump, just stuff like that.
So was that on rare occasions?
That was on really any - - you know, the sheriff, if you mess with
one of his officers, that was his - - you know, and they let it be
known over the radio that he was being, you know, combative or
whatever, that’s what he would say. When I had trouble with
an inmate or trouble with anybody, I didn’t let anyone know
that, you know. People out there didn’t need to know that I was
having trouble or whatever. You know, I handled it. I’ve never
had to assault anyone, even as a small female.

Id. at 25.
Plaintiff’s reliance on the foregoing testimony is not sufficient competent
summary judgment evidence to demonstrate a pattern of frequent, prior
constitutional violations similar to the events at issue in this case. McIlwain’s
testimony references only one other specific incident involving an arrestee named
Stahl. See Dep. of Kristen McIlwain [175-13] at 12, 22-24. McIlwain’s testimony
indicates that the excessive force allegedly employed was used after a police
pursuit, during Stahl’s initial arrest. See id. The Stahl incident occurred on or

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about June 18, 2012. See Stahl Compl. [172-5] at 1, 3. The incident in this case
occurred almost two months earlier, on April 29 and 30, 2012. See, e.g., Am. Compl.
[102] at 5; Investigative Report [172-1] at 1-4. A pattern requires “‘sufficiently
numerous prior incidents,’ as opposed to ‘isolated incidents.’” Peterson, 588 F.3d at
851 (quoting McConney, 863 F.2d at 1184) (emphasis added).
Even assuming the Stahl incident were sufficiently factually similar to
Plaintiff’s, Plaintiff has identified only this one other specific incident, which
occurred after Plaintiff’s arrest. Plaintiff has offered no competent summary
judgment evidence demonstrating any context regarding the size of the Jackson
County Sheriff’s Department or the number of arrests during the relevant time
period. See Peterson, 588 F.3d at 851. Nor is it clear from McIlwain’s general
deposition testimony when, in relation to Plaintiff’s arrest, any of Byrd’s statements
were purportedly made.
In sum, Plaintiff has not carried his summary judgment burden of
establishing an unofficial custom or a pattern or practice of excessive force as a
basis for imposing municipal liability against the County.
(b)

Inadequate Training

“In limited circumstances, a local government’s decision not to train certain
employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the
level of an official government policy for purposes of § 1983.” Connick v. Thompson,

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563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). “A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at
its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Id. (citation omitted).
[T]o succeed on a Monell claim arising from a municipality’s failure to
adopt an adequate training policy, a plaintiff must demonstrate that:
“(1) [the municipality’s] training policy procedures were inadequate, (2)
[the municipality] was deliberately indifferent in adopting its training
policy, and (3) the inadequate training policy directly caused [the
constitutional violation].”
Kitchen v. Dallas Cty., Tex., 759 F.3d 468, 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Sanders–Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 381 (5th Cir. 2010)). “‘Deliberate
indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor
disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61.
The Fifth Circuit has explained that “[u]nder the applicable case law, there
are two ways in which a plaintiff can establish a municipality’s deliberate
indifference to the need for proper training.” Kitchen, 759 F.3d at 484. “The first
and more typical approach . . . is to demonstrate that a municipality had ‘[n]otice of
a pattern of similar violations,’ which were ‘fairly similar to what ultimately
transpired’ when the plaintiff[’]s own constitutional rights were violated.”
Id. (quoting Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 381 (5th Cir. 2010)).
“The second approach . . . is the limited exception for ‘single-incident liability’
in a ‘narrow range of circumstances’ where a constitutional violation would result
as ‘the highly predictable consequence’ of a particular failure to train.” Id. (quoting
Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 329 (5th Cir. 2008)). “[S]howing merely that
additional training would have been helpful in making difficult decisions does not

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establish municipal liability.” Id. at 485 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 68). Instead,
“the unconstitutional consequences of failing to train [must] be so patently obvious
that a city could be liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of
violations.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 64.
Under the first approach, the Court has already determined that Plaintiff has
not submitted sufficient competent summary judgment proof establishing a pattern
of constitutional violations bearing sufficient resemblance to the events at issue in
this case. The one specific incident upon which Plaintiff relies, the Stahl incident,
occurred after the alleged use of excessive force involving Plaintiff. The evidence
presented by Plaintiff fails to describe any constitutional violations that were “fairly
similar to what ultimately transpired” at the time Plaintiff’s rights were allegedly
violated. Kitchen, 759 F.3d at 484. “Without notice that a course of training is
deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have
deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional
rights.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. Plaintiff cannot establish municipal liability
under the first approach.
Turning to the second approach, Plaintiff has not shown the applicability of
the “limited exception for single-incident liability.” Kitchen, 759 F.3d at 484.
Plaintiff makes a conclusory statement that there was a “complete void of any
training policies for the deputies working at the ADC” which led to violations of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Pl.’s Mem. [176] at 21. Plaintiff cites the

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deposition testimony of Defendants Blakeney, Palmer, and Patteson in an effort to
demonstrate “a complete lack of training [the County’s] correctional officers and
how to handle and treat pretrial detainees.” Id. at 20. The Court is not persuaded
that this evidence supports Plaintiff’s conclusory statements regarding the alleged
lack of training for officers.3 Plaintiff has not shown a failure to train. Even if he
had, Plaintiff has not shown that the violation of his constitutional rights was a “the
highly predictable consequence” of any deficiencies in training. Kitchen, 759 F.3d at
484.
To the extent Plaintiff complains that the Sheriff’s Department “had
absolutely no policies or procedures on how to train its employees at the [ADC] or
what qualifications were required for an employee of the [ADC],” Pl.’s Mem. [1765]
at 20, Plaintiff has not shown how the purported absence of these policies or
procedures directly caused his alleged constitutional deprivation. Plaintiff has not
In the deposition excerpts submitted by Plaintiff, each officer testified to the training that
he had received through the Sheriff’s Department. See, e.g., Dep. of Jonathan Blakeney
[175-14] at 7-8; Dep. of Lamar Palmer [175-15] at 10-16; Dep. of William Patteson [175-16]
at 9-10. Blakeney testified that when he was first hired, he “shadow[ed] another
corrections officer,” that he subsequently received additional training “at different times,”
and that he has received individualized or specialized training for his corrections officer
position “throughout the time [he] was there.” Dep. of Jonathan Blakeney [175-14] at 7-8.
Lamar testified that he was issued and required to read the standard operating procedures
of the Sheriff’s Department, that he received training on the use of force through the
Sheriff’s Department’s mounted patrol division, that he attended follow-up training through
a “corrections officers class that was held at the Harrison County Sheriff’s Office,” that he
has attended some “conference classes” since he was hired, and that he has been trained on
“less than lethal” force instruments. Dep. of Lamar Palmer [175-15] at 10-16. Palmer
testified that he had received training through a 96-hour class at Harrison County
Corrections Academy when he was moved from his patrolman position to the ADC, that he
had received and read the Sheriff’s Department’s standard operating procedures, and that
he received a “refresher course” every year on deadly force. Dep. of William Patteson [17516] at 8-10.
3

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pointed to any competent summary judgment evidence even suggesting that any
County policymaker was deliberately indifferent to possible deficiencies in the
officers’ training. Plaintiff offers conclusory assertions that Sheriff Byrd exhibited
deliberate indifference to citizens’ rights and argues that “Plaintiff has alleged
sufficient allegations in the Amended Complaint to articulate a colorable action
against Jackson County, Mississippi.” Id. at 21. More, however, is required at the
summary judgment stage. A party cannot defeat summary judgment with
conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated assertions, which is all that Plaintiff
offers on this claim against the County. Davis v. Fort Bend Cty., 765 F.3d 480, 484
(5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
In sum, Plaintiff has not shown the County’s purportedly inadequate training
of its officers rose to the level of an official government policy or custom for purposes
of § 1983. Plaintiff’s claims against the County will be dismissed in their entirety.
III. CONCLUSION
To the extent the Court has not addressed any of the parties’ arguments, it
has considered them and determined that they would not alter the result. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Motion [172] for Summary
Judgment by Defendant Jackson County, Mississippi, and for Partial Summary
Judgment by individual Defendants William E. Patteson, Lamar Palmer, and
Jonathan Blakeney should be granted. Plaintiff’s claims against the County should
be dismissed in their entirety. Plaintiff’s claims against Patteson, Palmer, and

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Blakeney pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for unreasonable seizure should
be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against Patteson,
Palmer, and Blakeney pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for excessive force
will proceed.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion [172]
for Summary Judgment by Defendant Jackson County, Mississippi, and for Partial
Summary Judgment by individual Defendants William E. Patteson, Lamar Palmer,
and Jonathan Blakeney is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant
Jackson County, Mississippi, and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants William E.
Patteson, Lamar Palmer, and Jonathan Blakeney pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1988 for unreasonable seizure are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1988 against Defendants William E. Patteson, Lamar Palmer, and Jonathan
Blakeney, in their individual capacities, will proceed.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 22nd day of January, 2016.

s/ Halil Suleyman Ozerden
HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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