Jones v. King
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing with prejudice Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. A separate Judgment shall be entered. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on September 15, 2014 (dsl)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ANDRE J. JONES, #78086
V.
PETITIONER
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-CV-477-KS-MTP
RON KING
RESPONDENT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the relief sought in the Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus [1]. The Petition [1] is dismissed with prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 2008, a jury found Petitioner guilty of murder. On November 10,
2008, he was sentenced to life in prison. On January 7, 2009, he filed a notice of appeal.
He raised two issues: 1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, and
2) that the verdict was not supported by the weight of the evidence. On May 10, 2010,
the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the verdict. Jones v. State, 39 So. 3d 860, 867
(Miss. 2010). It later denied Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing, Jones v. State, 2010
Miss. LEXIS 404 (Miss. Aug. 5, 2010), and the United States Supreme Court denied
Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Jones v. Mississippi, 131 S. Ct. 932, 178
L. Ed. 2d 775 (2011).
On March 18, 2011, Petitioner filed an “Application for Leave to Proceed in Trial
Court with Post-Conviction Motion,” in which he challenged certain findings of the trial
judge, claimed that there was newly discovered evidence, alleged prosecutorial
misconduct, and claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On April 13, 2011, the
Mississippi Supreme Court denied the motion.
On May 27, 2011, Petitioner filed a second “Application for Leave to File Motion
for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief,” in which he claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel during trial and on appeal. On July 20, 2011, the Mississippi Supreme Court
dismissed the motion as a successive writ pursuant to MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-27. It
further held: “Notwithstanding the procedural bar, . . . the petition is without merit.”
Petitioner sought a rehearing of the motion, but the motion was denied.
On August 15, 2011, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [1]
in this Court. He raises four grounds challenging his conviction: 1) that the evidence
was insufficient to support the verdict, 2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 3)
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and 4) that the verdict was not supported
by the weight of the evidence.
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Evidence Insufficient to Support the Verdict
First, Petitioner argues that the State failed to offer any evidence that he killed
anyone. Specifically, he notes that the State offered no witness who actually saw him
stab the victim. Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court
determines “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct.
2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); see also Gilley v. Collins, 968 F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir.
1992). The evidence can be “sufficient to support a conviction even though the facts also
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support one or more reasonable hypotheses consistent with the defendant’s claim of
innocence.” Gilley, 968 F.2d at 468. “Where, as in this case, a state appellate court
thoughtfully reviews the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, that court’s determination
is entitled to great weight.” Parker v. Procunier, 763 F.2d 665, 666 (5th Cir. 1985).
It is undisputed that Petitioner and the victim had been arguing prior to the
murder. Vernon Barnes testified – contrary to Petitioner’s testimony – that Petitioner
and the victim had also been physically fighting earlier in the day, prior to the fight at
Barnes’ house that ended in the victim’s death. Barnes testified that Petitioner walked
into the kitchen, came back with a knife, and started punching the victim. Although
Barnes did not see Petitioner stab the victim, he testified that he exited the house with
Petitioner after the victim fell, that Petitioner held the murder weapon as they exited,
and that Petitioner licked the victim’s blood from the knife.
After a detailed review of the evidence, the Mississippi Supreme Court
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. It stated:
In the instant case, there was testimony that [Petitioner] was the first
person to grab the knife and that he attacked [the victim]. The case
largely consisted of the State’s witnesses’ testimony against [Petitioner’s]
testimony. This presents a factual dispute to be resolved by a jury. We
cannot conclude that any rational trier of fact could not have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, when the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State.
Jones, 39 So. 3d at 867. The Mississippi Supreme Court’s determination on this issue
is “entitled to great weight.” Parker, 763 F.2d at 666. After a thorough review of the
record, the Court concludes that it agrees with the Mississippi Supreme Court. The
evidence, when viewed “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” is sufficient to
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support a guilty verdict by a rational trier of fact. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
B.
Ineffective Assistance – Trial
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel erred by proceeding to trial on a theory
of self-defense, while Petitioner claims that he never admitted to killing anyone in selfdefense. He previously asserted this claim in his second “Application for Leave to File
Motion for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief,” which the Mississippi Supreme Court
dismissed as a successive writ pursuant to MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-27.
“When a state court decision rests on a state law ground that is independent of
a federal question and adequate to support the judgment, federal courts lack
jurisdiction to review the merits of the case. The independent and adequate state
ground doctrine applies to bar federal habeas when a state court declines to address
a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner has failed to meet a state procedural
requirement.” Moore v. Hargett, 83 F.3d 699, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1996). For this doctrine
to apply, “the state courts adjudicating a habeas petitioner’s claims must explicitly rely
on a state procedural rule to dismiss the petitioner’s claims.” Id. at 702. This Court
“presumes that the state court’s express reliance on a procedural bar functions as an
independent and adequate ground in support of the judgment.” Id.
A petitioner can avoid the procedural bar by “establishing that the procedural
rule is not strictly or regularly followed,” or he can demonstrate “cause for the default
and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate
that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
Id. To demonstrate “cause,” the petitioner must show that “something external to
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[him], something that cannot be fairly attributed to him,” prevented him from
complying with the procedural rule. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753, 111 S.
Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991). “To show a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a
petitioner must show that he did not commit the crime of conviction.” Fairman v.
Anderson, 188 F.3d 635, 644 (5th Cir. 1999) (punctuation omitted).
The bar on successive writs at Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(9) is a procedural bar
that functions as an independent and adequate ground in support of the judgment. See
Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695, 701 n. 5 (5th Cir. 2000). It is strictly and regularly
followed. See Moore, 83 F.3d at 703. Petitioner has not demonstrated an external cause
for the default or that he is innocent of the crime of conviction. Therefore, this ground
for relief is procedurally barred.
C.
Ineffective Assistance – Appeal
Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel erred by failing to raise the issues
herein on direct appeal. Like his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
Petitioner previously asserted this claim in his second “Application for Leave to File
Motion for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief,” which the Mississippi Supreme Court
dismissed as a successive writ pursuant to MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-27. Therefore, this
ground for relief is also procedurally barred.
D.
Verdict Not Supported by Weight of Evidence
Finally, Petitioner argues that the jury’s verdict was not supported by the
weight of the evidence. “A reversal based on the weight of the evidence . . . draws the
. . . court into questions of credibility. The ‘weight of the evidence’ refers to a
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determination by the trier of fact that a greater amount of credible evidence supports
one side of an issue or cause than the other.” Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 37-38, 102
S. Ct. 2211, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982). Therefore, “[a] federal habeas court has no power
to grant habeas corpus relief because it finds that the state conviction is against the
weight of the evidence . . . .” Young v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1097, 1105 (11th Cir. 1985); see
also Lattimore v. King, No. 4:11-CV-71-GHD-SAA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110590 (N.D.
Miss. Aug. 11, 2014). This ground for relief is denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court denies the relief sought in the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus [1]. The Petition [1] is dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 15th day of September, 2014.
s/Keith Starrett
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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