Hale v. Harrison County Board of Supervisors et al

Filing 137

ORDER adopting Report and Recommendations re 49 Report and Recommendations.; denying 63 Motion for TRO; denying 107 Motion for Immediate Ruling on TRO ; denying 12 Motion for Contempt; denying 13 Motion ; denying 23 Motion for Enforcement of Consent Decree. Signed by Chief District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr on 2/24/2015. (JCH)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOHN HALE
v.

PLAINTIFF
CAUSE NO. 1:14CV61-LG-JCG

HARRISON COUNTY BOARD
OF SUPERVISORS, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS
This cause comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendations of
United States Magistrate John C. Gargiulo entered in this cause on February 4,
2015. Magistrate Judge Gargiulo reviewed a number of motions filed by plaintiff
John Hale, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this prison conditions
action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The motions request two forms of
injunctive relief against the Harrison County defendants: 1) a preliminary
injunction to require the Harrison County Adult Detention Center officials to
provide him with certain pain medication and treatment [13, 23, 63, and 107]; and
2) “strict enforcement” of a consent decree governing HCADC operations. [12, 23].
Because Hale has been moved from the HCADC to another institution in Meridian,
Mississippi, it is not possible for the Court to provide the injunctive relief Hale
requests. Also, Hale may not enforce the terms of the consent decree between
Harrison County and the United States in this § 1983 action. The Court will
therefore adopt the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations to the extent
he recommends that all of the Motions be denied, and that Hale’s claims seeking to
enforce the consent decree be dismissed.

BACKGROUND
In this lawsuit, Hale complains that HCADC officials have denied him
appropriate pain medication and treatment, a high protein diet which he requires
for medical reasons, and access to the courts. He contends that jail officials have
acted with deliberate indifference to his need for certain medical care, and have
caused him to lose an appeal at the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Hale’s claims
are for violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and for enforcement of a consent decree entered
into by Harrison County and the United States which governs the operations of the
HCADC. The Motions that are the subject of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendations concern Hale’s requests for preliminary injunctive relief and for
enforcement of the consent decree.1
The Magistrate Judge first found that Hale’s request for preliminary
injunctive relief might be moot because Hale was no longer housed at the HCADC.
The Magistrate Judge went on to examine the propriety of preliminary injunctive
relief, and concluded that in essence, Hale’s medical care claims contested the

1

The Motions are:
[12] Petition for Contempt Proceedings as to the Consent Decree
Against the Harrison County Jail;
[13] Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief from Vengeful
Punitive Action Taken by Defendant Dr. Coulter;
[23] Motion for Enforcement of Consent Decree and Ruling on
Plaintiff’s Request for Injunction to Stop Retaliatory Acts and
Refill Medications That Were Stopped for Retaliation Alone;
[63] Motion for Temporary Restraining Order; and
[107] Motion for Immediate Ruling on Temporary Restraining
Order.

prison doctor’s choice of pain treatment and medication. Because allegations of this
kind do not implicate constitutional rights, the Magistrate Judge found it unlikely
that Hale will prevail on the merits of his medical care-related claims. The
Magistrate Judge recommended that preliminary injunctive relief be denied for that
reason.
In regard to the motions implicating and attempting to enforce a consent
decree between the United States and Harrison County,2 the Magistrate Judge
noted that Hale cannot enforce a consent decree through § 1983. The Magistrate
Judge recommended that the motions seeking to enforce the consent decree be
denied and the claims dismissed.
Hale objects that the Magistrate Judge made errors regarding Hale’s
previous litigation history, erroneously concluded that Hale had not shown that his
back pain and reflux issues are serious medical needs, and generally misinterpreted
Hale’s arguments. Hale contends that he does not want any particular medication
but only adequate management and treatment for his pain – “[t]he controversy is
not that Plaintiff disagreed with treatment it is that Dr. Coulter told Nurse
Pactioner [sic] to reduce the level of treatment when it was contraindicated and he
did so with an evil intent and stoped [sic] meds in retalation [sic] for assertin [sic] of
rights.” (Pl. Obj. 8, ECF No. 133). Hale also objects that the Magistrate Judge
failed to include all of Hale’s claims in the Report and Recommendations, such as
his claim for violation of the ADA and the access to courts claim. Hale does not

2

Presumably, Hale refers to the Consent Judgment entered January 12,
1995 in United States v. Harrison County, Mississippi, No. 1:95cv5GR (S.D. Miss.)

address the mootness issue, nor does he object to the Magistrate Judge’s analysis
and conclusion that Hale may not enforce the consent decree through this § 1983
action.
THE LEGAL STANDARD
When any party objects to the Report and Recommendation, the Court must
review the objected-to portions de novo. See Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de
C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 646 (5th Cir. 1994); Longmire v. Guste, 921 F.2d 620, 623 (5th
Cir. 1991). Such a review means that the Court will consider the record which has
been developed before the Magistrate Judge and make its own determination on the
basis of that record. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675 (1980). The
unobjected-to findings and recommendations are reviewed only to determine
whether they are either clearly erroneous or contrary to law. United States v.
Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989).
Hale’s objections concern the Magistrate Judge’s analysis of the merits of
Hale’s claim that he is receiving inadequate and/or inappropriate medical care for
his back pain and reflux issues. The Court does not address Hale’s merits-based
objections because Hale is no longer subject to the actions of the defendants, and
therefore enjoining their actions would serve no purpose. Hale did not object to the
remainder of the Magistrate’s findings and conclusions. Accordingly, the Court does
not conduct a de novo review, but reviews the Report and Recommendations only to
determine if the conclusions therein are either clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
A. Preliminary Injunctive Relief
Hale must prove the following four elements to be eligible for preliminary

injunctive relief: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a
substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued; (3) that the
threatened injury to the movant outweighs any harm that may result from the
injunction to the non-movant; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the
public interest. DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.
1996). A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, Cherokee Pump &
Equip., Inc. v. Aurora Pump, 38 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1994), “not to be granted
routinely, but only when the movant, by a clear showing, carries [the] burden of
persuasion.” Black Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Dallas, 905 F.2d 63, 65 (5th Cir.
1990) (quoting Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th
Cir. 1985)); Cherokee Pump, 38 F.3d at 249 (quoting Miss. Power & Light v. United
Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985)) (“The decision to grant a
preliminary injunction is to be treated as the exception rather than the rule”).
Hale has been transferred from the HCADC — the facility in which the
alleged violations occurred — to the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility in
Meridian, Mississippi to serve his eighteen year sentence. The Court was notified
of his change of address in November 2014. Although Hale returned to the HCADC
in December 2014, he was transferred out within a month and arrived back in the
Meridian facility in January 2015, where he apparently remains. As such, his
claims for injunctive relief based upon conditions at the HCADC have become moot.
Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock Cnty., Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991) (transfer
of prisoner renders injunctive relief moot). The Court has no reason to assume that
Hale will be transferred back to the HCADC, making a claim for relief based upon

that possibility too remote and speculative. Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277,
279 (5th Cir. 1987). If Hale is housed at the HCADC in the future and subjected to
actions he believes entitle him to a preliminary injunction, he may move at that
time for injunctive relief. The currently pending motions will be denied.
B. Enforcement of the Consent Decree
Hale requests that the Court: 1) hold Harrison County and its Sheriff in
contempt of the consent decree, (Pl. Mot. for Contempt Proceedings 1, ECF No. 12);
and 2) strictly enforce the terms of the consent decree, as HCADC officials “continue
to violate the rights of myself and the citzens [sic] of this County.” (Pl. Mot. for
Enforcement of Consent Decree 1, ECF No. 23). The Magistrate Judge concluded
that the consent decree does not provide Hale with rights he can enforce through a §
1983 action. The Court finds this conclusion to be a correct statement of the law.
See Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1122-23 (5th Cir. 1986). The motions
seeking enforcement of the consent decree will be denied, and the claims based on
violation of the consent decree will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
After reviewing the Report and Recommendations, Hale’s objections, the
record in this case and the relevant law, it is the Court’s opinion that the
Magistrate Judge’s conclusions are neither contrary to law nor clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, the Court will adopt the Report and Recommendations to the extent
that the motions for preliminary injunctive relief will be denied as moot, the
motions seeking to enforce the consent decree will be denied, and claims based upon
violation of the consent decree will be dismissed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Report and
Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge John C. Gargiulo, entered in
this cause on February 4, 2015, is ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Hale’s Motions [12,
13, 23, 63, and 107] are DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Hale’s claims
seeking to enforce a consent decree between Harrison County and the United States
are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 24th day of February, 2015.

s/

Louis Guirola, Jr.

LOUIS GUIROLA, JR.
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE