Seibert v. Jackson County, Mississippi et al
Filing
28
ORDER denying Defendant Jackson County's 10 Motion to Dismiss; and granting in part and denying in part Defendant Mike Byrd's 11 Motion to Dismiss. The Court grants the motion as to Plaintiff's officia-capacity Section 1983 claims, but denies it in all other respects. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on August 19, 2014 (dsl)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KRISTAN SEIBERT
PLAINTIFF
V.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:14-CV-188-KS-MTP
JACKSON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
For the reasons stated below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the
Motion to Dismiss [11] filed by Defendant Mike Byrd. Specifically, the Court grants the
motion as to Plaintiff’s official-capacity Section 1983 claims, but denies it in all other
respects. The Court denies the Motion to Dismiss [10] filed by Defendant Jackson
County, Mississippi.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a sexual harassment/hostile work environment case. Plaintiff was an
officer in the Jackson County Sheriff’s Department. She alleges that her boss, Sheriff
James Michael “Mike” Byrd began making unwanted sexual advances toward her in
May 2012, including touching, lewd remarks, and repeated requests for her to have sex
with him. She claims that Byrd threatened to take her job from her if she did not
comply with his demands. After Plaintiff refused to cooperate, Byrd transferred her to
a different station but continued to threaten her or have others threaten her until he
left office in December 2013.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII
against Jackson County, Mississippi, and Mike Byrd in his individual and official
capacities. Each Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss [10, 11], and the motions are ripe
for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC v. La. State, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir.
2010) (punctuation omitted). “To be plausible, the complaint’s factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (punctuation
omitted). The Court must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. But the Court will not accept
as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.”
Id. Likewise, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2010)
(punctuation omitted). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
III. BYRD’S MOTION TO DISMISS [11]
A.
Section 1983 Official Capacity Claims
First, Defendant Byrd argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Section
1983 claims against him in his official capacity.
Claims under § 1983 may be brought against persons in their individual
or official capacity, or against a governmental entity. Personal-capacity
suits seek to impose liability upon a government official as an individual
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while official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. Thus,
an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated
as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally,
for the real party in interest is the entity.
Goodman v. Harris County, 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (punctuation and
citations omitted). Defendant Byrd argues, therefore, that Plaintiff’s official-capacity
claims should be dismissed as redundant, as Jackson County, Mississippi, was also
named as a Defendant.
When a plaintiff asserts official-capacity claims against a government official
under Section 1983, “the real party in interest is the [government] entity.” Id. at 395-96
(official capacity claims subsumed by claims against government entity); cf. Hunt v.
Allison, No. 1:09-CV-131-HSO-JMR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114634, at *45-*46 (S.D.
Miss. Sept. 2, 2010) (claims against county were redundant where claims against
sheriff in official capacity had already been asserted). There is no advantage to
Plaintiff, practical or otherwise, in retaining the official-capacity claims against Byrd
alongside the Section 1983 claims against the County. Furthermore, maintaining both
claims would needlessly clutter the record, and “the real party in interest” is the
County. Goodman, 571 F.3d at 396. The Court grants Defendant Byrd’s motion to
dismiss as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 official-capacity claims.
B.
“Fifth Amendment” Claims
Next, Defendant Byrd argues that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 sexual harassment
claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff asserted them under the Fifth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment’s
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Equal Protection Clause.
Indeed, “sexual harassment in public employment violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” rather than the Fifth Amendment. Lauderdale
v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 166 (5th Cir. 2007). However, the Court
permitted Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint [25], in which she corrected the error
and cited the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, this argument is moot.
C.
Title VII Claims
Finally, Defendant Byrd argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims must be
dismissed because he is not an “employer” as defined by the statute. “Determining
whether a defendant is an ‘employer’ under Title VII . . . involves a two-step process.
First, the defendant must fall within the statutory definition. Second, there must be
an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.” Deal v. State
Farm County Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 117, 118 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1993).
First, “[T]itle VII does not permit the imposition of liability upon individuals
unless they meet [its] definition of ‘employer.’” Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653
(5th Cir. 1994). Title VII defines an “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any
agent of such a person . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). “The term ‘person’ includes one or
more individuals, governments, government agencies, [and] political subdivisions . . .
.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). Therefore, Title VII’s definition of an ‘employer’ includes
individuals, political subdivisions, and their agents. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)-(b).
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Second, “in determining whether an employment relationship exists within the
meaning of Title VII . . . , we apply a ‘hybrid economic realities/common law control
test.’” Deal, 5 F.3d at 118-19.
The right to control an employee’s conduct is the most important
component of this test. When examining the control component, we have
focused on whether the alleged employer has the right to hire and fire the
employee, the right to supervise the employee, and the right to set the
employee’s work schedule. The economic realities component of our test
has focused on whether the alleged employer paid the employee’s salary,
withheld taxes, provided benefits, and set the terms and conditions of
employment.
Id. at 119 (punctuation and citations omitted).
While federal law determines whether a person is an “employer” under Title VII,
“courts can look to state law to understand the nature of the employment relationship.”
Oden v. Oktibbeha County, 246 F.3d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 2001). Looking to Mississippi
law, the Fifth Circuit held that a Mississippi sheriff was his deputy’s “employer” under
Title VII. Id. (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 19-25-19). The Court noted that the sheriff was
“solely responsible for hiring, promoting, and establishing the deputies’ wages.” Id.
Because he “was the elected official who made all decisions concerning promotions
within the Sheriff’s Department, he was” the deputy’s employer under Title VII, and
the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s Title VII judgment against the county and
the sheriff individually. Id. At least one District Judge in this state has interpreted
Oden as holding that the proper Title VII defendant is the sheriff in his official
capacity, rather than the county or the sheriff individually. See Rogers v. Humphrey
County, No. 4:09-CV-37, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103863, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 15,
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2009); Miller v. Choctaw County Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:04-CV-96, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14649, at *8-*9 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 13, 2006).
It is neither necessary nor prudent for the Court to make a definitive ruling on
this issue right now. Neither party has adequately briefed the issue, and determining
Plaintiff’s “employer” under Title VII requires determining facts about “hiring,
promoting, and establishing the deputies’ wages,” as well as “who made all decisions
concerning promotions within the Sheriff’s Department . . . .” Oden, 246 F.3d at 465.
Plaintiff alleged [25] that Defendant Byrd was “her ultimate and final supervisor and
in charge of all supervision, training, and management over all detectives and deputies
of the Jackson County Sheriff’s Department and final policymaker for the Jackson
County Sheriff’s Department.” She also alleged that Defendant Byrd “had the final
power to make decisions regarding promotions and the terms and conditions of
employment at the Jackson County Sheriff’s Department.” These allegations are
sufficient to state a Title VII claim against Defendant Byrd as Plaintiff’s “employer,”
and Defendant Byrd’s motion to dismiss must be denied. If Defendants wish to revisit
this issue later in the case, they are free to do so.1
1
Defendant cited Fifth Circuit decisions including general statements that
“[i]ndividuals are not liable under Title VII in either their individual or official
capacities.” Ackel v. Nat’l Communs., Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 381 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2003); see
also Foley v. Univ. of Houston Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 340 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2003); Smith v.
Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2002). None of these decisions involve
a Mississippi sheriff’s department, however, and the Court questions their utility in
applying the “hybrid economic realities/common law” test explained above. See
Deal, 5 F.3d at 118-19. Furthermore, a bright-line rule that an individual can never
constitute an “employer” under Title VII would contradict the plain language of the
statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)-(b).
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IV. JACKSON COUNTY’S MOTION TO DISMISS [10]
Defendant Jackson County argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s
“Fifth Amendment” claims because “sexual harassment in public employment violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” rather than the Fifth
Amendment. Lauderdale, 512 F.3d at 166. The Court denies the motion [10] as moot.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [25] in which she asserts claims for violations
of the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants in part and denies in part the
Motion to Dismiss [11] filed by Defendant Mike Byrd. Specifically, the Court grants the
motion as to Plaintiff’s official-capacity Section 1983 claims, but denies it in all other
respects. The Court denies the Motion to Dismiss [10] filed by Defendant Jackson
County, Mississippi.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 19th day of August, 2014.
s/Keith Starrett
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The apparently contradictory nature of these authorities provides more
reason to deny Defendant Byrd’s motion to dismiss and allow the parties to address
the issue on a later date. If, however, the parties were to resolve the issue by
stipulation, neither the parties nor the Court would be forced to unravel this
particular knot, and the parties could focus on more substantial matters of
disagreement.
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