Johnson v. 21st Century Centennial Insurance Company et al
Filing
95
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 91 Motion in Limine Signed by Chief District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr on 08/24/2016 (Guirola, Louis)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ELVIS JOHNSON
v.
PLAINTIFF
CAUSE NO. 1:15cv74-LG-RHW
21st CENTURY CENTENNIAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, STATE FARM
MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY, and JOHN DOE
DEFENDANTS
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
MOTION IN LIMINE
BEFORE THE COURT is the [91] Motion in Limine filed by Defendant 21st
Century Centennial Insurance Company (“Defendant”). Having reviewed the
submissions of the parties and the applicable law, the Court is of the opinion that
the Motion should be denied with respect to Defendant’s requests related to
Plaintiff Elvis Johnson’s future medical treatment and written-off medical bills.
The Motion is granted in all other respects.
This diversity action, which was removed to this Court from the Circuit Court
of Stone County, Mississippi, arises from injuries Plaintiff Johnson alleges he
suffered in a hit-and-run automobile accident in 2012. (See Compl. 3, ECF No. 1-4).
Johnson states that he had uninsured motorist coverage through Defendant, and,
thus, Defendant is liable to him “for any and all damages and losses” which he has
sustained. (See id. at 4). Coverage is not in dispute.
Johnson concedes that certain evidence and/or argument should be excluded
from the trial of this action, including evidence of the settlement of Mitchell
Breland’s claim1 and of any limits of available insurance, as well as any reference to
punitive damages being sought or awardable. Johnson opposes the Motion as it
relates to future medical bills, written-off medical bills, and claims handling issues,
and the Court discuss each of these issues in turn below.
Future Medical Treatment
Defendant is attempting to take another bite at the apple with its argument
that “[t]he jury should not be allowed to award the amount of future medical
expenses and should not be allowed to hear the testimony of Dr. Mortiza Shamsnia
[Plaintiff Johnson’s expert] that medical bills in the future can potentially be
expected for tens of thousands of dollars.” (Def. Mem. 2, ECF No. 92). The Court
has already found in a separate [89] Order that the testimony at issue meets the
standards of admissibility set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 495 F.3d
224, 227 (5th Cir. 2007) (“District courts enjoy wide latitude in determining the
admissibility of expert testimony.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The Court reiterates that it is not tasked with determining whether Dr.
Shamsnia’s opinions are correct. But the Court again finds that the alleged
deficiencies in those opinions are more properly addressed through the adversary
system. See United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, More or Less Situated in Leflore
Cnty., Miss., 80 F.3d 1074, 1077-78 (5th Cir. 1996). The jury can consider Dr.
1
Breland was also a plaintiff at one point, but ultimately settled his claim.
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Shamsnia’s testimony regarding future medical treatment and decide whether to
accept or reject it in whole or in part in awarding damages, if any. See, e.g., id.
Written-Off Medical Bills
Defendant requests that the Court exclude “any proof of medical bills which
were ‘written off’ and not paid by any person and not owed by any person.” (Def.
Mem. 3, ECF No. 92). The parties do not dispute that Mississippi law applies to
this issue.
“The collateral source rule bars a tortfeasor from reducing the damages it
owes to a plaintiff ‘by the amount of recovery the plaintiff receives from other
sources of compensation that are independent of (or collateral to) the tortfeasor.’”
Johnson v. Cenac Towing, Inc., 544 F.3d 296, 304 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
“In Mississippi, the collateral source rule provides that compensation or indemnity
for the loss received by plaintiff from a collateral source, wholly independent of the
wrongdoer, as from insurance, cannot be set up by the latter in mitigation or
reduction of damages.” Chickaway v. United States, No. 4:11-cv-00022-CWR, 2012
WL 3236518, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 7, 2012) (citations, quotation marks, brackets
and ellipses omitted).
Defendant argues that written-off medical expenses do not qualify as “actual
economic damages” for purposes of Mississippi Code § 11-1-60, which defines such
damages as, inter alia, “objectively verifiable pecuniary damages arising from
medical expenses and medical care . . . .” It similarly contends that written-off
medical expenses are not “incurred” for purposes of Mississippi Code § 41-9-119,
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which provides in pertinent part that “[p]roof that medical, hospital, and doctor bills
were . . . incurred because of any . . . injury shall be prima facie evidence that such
bills so . . . incurred were necessary and reasonable.” It further argues that
Mississippi’s collateral source rule is somehow inapplicable.
The Court finds these arguments unavailing, and instead agrees with other
courts in this district that have rejected the same arguments Defendant makes
here. See, e.g., Williams v. Manitowoc Cranes, LLC, No. 1:14cv383-HSO-JCG, 2016
WL 146516, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 12, 2016). Mississippi’s collateral source rule
“permits a plaintiff to introduce evidence of medical expenses even if portions of
those expenses were written off by medical providers.” See id. (discussing
Mississippi’s collateral source rule, including Mississippi Supreme Court cases
interpreting the same); Knox v. Ferrer, No. 5:07-cv-6(DCB)(JMR), 2008 WL
4446534, at *1-2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 25, 2008) (denying defendants’ motion to exclude
those portions of medical bills written off by plaintiff’s medical providers); see also
Johnson v. McElroy Truck Lines, Inc., No. 1:14cv26-DAS, 2015 WL 1966432, at *3
(N.D. Miss. May 1, 2015); Foradori v. Captain D’s, LLC, No. 1:03cv669, 2005 WL
6736846, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 29, 2005).
Defendant’s citation to selective law from other jurisdictions does not
convince the Court otherwise. “Because the Mississippi Supreme Court has spoken
on this issue, the authority from other jurisdictions relied upon by Defendant is
neither controlling nor persuasive.” See Williams, 2016 WL 146516, at *6; see also
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Chickaway, 2012 WL 3236518, at *2 n.20 (the majority position, followed by
Mississippi, is that a plaintiff is entitled to claim and recover the full amount of
medical expenses, even written-off expenses).2
Alternatively, again relying on case law from other jurisdictions, Defendant
argues that the Court should rule “that the written off amounts of medical bills are
admissible to show the reasonable amount of Mr. Johnson’s medical bills.” (Def.
Mem. 15, ECF No. 92). “[W]hile Defendant in this case may have the right to
attempt to rebut the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s medical bills, it may only do so
with proper evidence. It follows that evidence which is not admissible is not
proper.” See Williams, 2016 WL 146516, at *3. Defendant’s request to admit
evidence of the written-off amounts is simply “a backdoor attempt to give Defendant
the benefit of any type of write-off from the actual [medical] charges incurred by”
Johnson, which is improper. See id. at *4.
Claims Handling Issues
Defendant also argues that Johnson “should not be allowed to offer proof
regarding the claims handling process in this matter.” (See Def. Mem. 16, ECF No.
2
McGee v. River Region Medical Center, 59 So. 3d 575 (Miss. 2011), did not
overrule well-settled Mississippi law on this issue. In any event, the facts of McGee
are distinguishable from those here. Namely, the McGee court found that the
collateral source rule did not apply because that rule only applied to prohibit
introduction of evidence of payments from collateral sources wholly independent of
the tortfeasor, and the defendant hospital, to whom bills were owed, was also the
alleged tortfeasor in the plaintiff patient’s medical malpractice action. See id. at
580-81; see also generally Chickaway, 2012 WL 3236518 (distinguishing McGee).
That is certainly not the circumstance here.
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92). This includes “arguing or alleging that [Defendant] has breached or violated
any terms of its policy.” (See id.). It also includes offering or adducing evidence
that Defendant’s “corporate trial representative was not involved in the adjusting or
handling of the Plaintiff’s claim.” (See id.).
Johnson has not responded to Defendant’s argument regarding its trial
representative. The Court is of the opinion that Defendant’s decision as to who to
bring to trial as its representative has no bearing on any fact at issue to be decided
by the jury, and thus, will preclude Johnson from offering or adducing evidence
about Defendant’s trial representative’s non-involvement with Plaintiff’s claim.
See, e.g., Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:13cv35-KS-MTP, 2014 WL
1276410, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 27, 2014).
Regarding claims handling in general, Johnson argues that Defendant has
not cited any law in support of its position. However, it is axiomatic that evidence
regarding claims handling – in a case where coverage is not at issue and where
there is no independent cause of action related to the handling of the claim itself –
not only is irrelevant, but also could serve no other purpose but as an impermissible
attempt to inflame the jury. The only issue for the jury to decide is the amount of
damages, if any, sustained by Johnson as a result of the automobile accident. The
Court cannot conceive of any evidence related to the claims handling process that
would have “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence . . . .” See Fed. R. Evid. 401. Thus, such evidence is
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inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Moreover, even though the Court is of the
opinion that such evidence is wholly irrelevant, any minimal relevancy is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Defendant, as well as
the danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
To the extent Johnson argues that this “is not a proper subject for a motion in
limine,” (Pl. Mem. 4, ECF No. 94), he is mistaken. See Bond Pharmacy, Inc. v.
AnazaoHealth Corp., No. 3:11-cv-58-CWR-FKB, 2012 WL 3052902, at *2 (S.D. Miss.
July 25, 2012) (acknowledging that “the most common role of a motion in limine [is]
excluding prejudicial or inadmissible evidence”).
Johnson further contends that “granting this motion would unduly restrict
[his] presentation of his case[,]” and that he has a “tremendous amount of evidence
that would otherwise be admissible.” (Pl. Mem. 4, ECF No. 94). Johnson does not
identify what specific evidence he claims is affected or how it would “otherwise be
admissible.” The Court will instruct the jury that Defendant is Johnson’s
uninsured motorist carrier and that the jury must determine the amount of
damages, if any, to award Johnson as a result of the hit-and-run accident. Beyond
that, there is no relevant or admissible purpose for Johnson to refer to the claims
handling process at all. See, e.g., Smith, 2014 WL 1276410, at *5; Dey v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 1:12cv332-HSO-RHW, 2014 WL 11906645, at *4 (S.D.
Miss. Jan 17, 2014). Nonetheless, this Order does not prohibit Johnson from
introducing claims handling evidence, if he first makes an appropriate showing of
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relevancy outside of the presence of the jury. Unless and until he does so, however,
any evidence regarding claims handling should not be presented to the jury or
mentioned by Johnson’s counsel.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court finds that the Motion in Limine
should be granted in part and denied in part.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the [91] Motion in
Limine filed by Defendant 21st Century Centennial Insurance Company is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Motion is DENIED with
respect to Defendant’s requests related to Plaintiff’s future medical treatment and
written-off medical bills. The Motion is GRANTED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 24th day of August, 2016.
s/
Louis Guirola, Jr.
LOUIS GUIROLA, JR.
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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