Beltran v. Pearl River County et al
Filing
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ORDER granting Defendants' 25 Motion to Dismiss State Law Claims. Signed by District Judge Halil S. Ozerden on 11/23/15 (KWM)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER BELTRAN
v.
PEARL RIVER COUNTY & DAVID
ALLISON in his Official Capacity
as Sheriff of Pearl River County
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PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 1:15cv127-HSO-JCG
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION [25] TO DISMISS STATE LAW CLAIMS
BEFORE THE COURT is a Motion [25] to Dismiss State Law Claims filed by
Defendants Pearl River County (the “County”) and David Allison in his official
capacity as County Sheriff (“Sheriff Allison”). Defendants move the Court to
dismiss Plaintiff Christopher Beltran’s State law claims because Defendants are
immune from liability under Mississippi Code Annotated § 11-46-9(1)(m). This
Motion has been fully briefed.
Having considered the parties’ briefs, the record, and relevant legal
authority, the Court finds that Defendants are immune from liability as to
Plaintiff’s State law claims. Defendants’ Motion is well-taken and will be granted.
Plaintiff’s State law claims will be dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
A.
Factual Background
Plaintiff was an inmate at the Pearl River County Detention Center under
the care of the Pearl River County Sheriff’s Department on April 29, 2014, when he
suffered an injury to his left testicle. Compl. [1]. at ¶ 7–8. Plaintiff was seen by a
nurse practitioner regarding the injury and given antibiotics. Id. at ¶10. Plaintiff
alleges that after he received this medical care, he continued to suffer pain and
swelling, but was not afforded further medical treatment, despite his oral and
written requests to staff at the jail. Id. at ¶ 12.
Upon his release on May 30, 2014, Plaintiff sought treatment for his injury at
Forrest General Hospital’s emergency room in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Id. at ¶13.
Plaintiff’s testicle was surgically removed. Id. at ¶15. Plaintiff alleges that had he
been given proper medical care by Defendants, this surgery would not have been
necessary. Id. at ¶16.
B.
Procedural History
Plaintiff filed his Complaint [1] against the County and Sheriff Allison on
April 17, 2015. Plaintiff alleges 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims that Defendants violated
his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments,
and asserts State law claims for “negligence, gross negligence, trespass, excessive
force, assault, battery, defamation, negligent training, negligent supervision,
malicious prosecution, harassment, conspiracy, outrage, and failure to provide
medical treatment.” Id. at ¶¶ 37, 40. Plaintiff seeks damages for the cost of his
medical bills and for emotional distress. Id. at ¶¶43–44.
Defendants’ Answers [4, 5] raise a number of affirmative defenses, including
sovereign immunity. Cty. Answer [4] at 7–8; Allison Answer [5], at 7. On October
14, 2015, Defendants filed the instant Motion [25] to Dismiss State Law Claims
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
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Defendants argue that they are immune from liability for Plaintiff’s State
law claims under section 11-46-9(1)(m) of the Mississippi Code, which states:
A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and
scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim . . .
...
(m) Of any claimant who at the time the claim arises is an inmate of any
detention center, jail, workhouse, penal farm, penitentiary or other such
institution, regardless of whether such claimant is or is not an inmate of
any detention center, jail, workhouse, penal farm, penitentiary or other
such institution when the claim is filed.
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(m).
Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition [28] sets forth two reasons why Defendants
are not immune from suit under State law. First, Plaintiff argues that Defendants
have waived the immunity defense by participating in the litigation and failing to bring
the motion to dismiss at the earliest possible time. Resp. [28], at 3–8. Second, Plaintiff
asserts that because Defendants failed to follow the specific State mandate to provide
medical care to an inmate, found at section 47-1-57 of the Mississippi Code, general
immunity under section 11-46-9(1)(m) is unavailable. Id. at 9–12.
Defendants’ Reply [32] disputes both of Plaintiff’s arguments against immunity.
First, Defendants contend that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants
have not waived immunity because Defendants pled the immunity defense in their
Answers [4, 5]. Second, Defendants point out that Mississippi courts have already
decided that the State mandate of section 47-1-57 to provide medical care to inmates
does not nullify the immunity preserved in section 11-46-9(1)(m) when an inmate
claims that he was denied medical care during his incarceration. See Harvison v.
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Greene Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 899 So. 2d 922, 925 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). Defendants also
dispute that they violated any duty imposed by section 47-1-57 to provide medical care,
when Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] describes how Plaintiff was “seen by a nurse
practitioner” and “initially given antibiotics.” Compl. [1], at ¶10. Defendants take the
position that because Plaintiff does not allege a total denial of medical care, but instead
takes issue with the “degree or sufficiency” of care, there is no legitimate argument for
nullifying the immunity preserved by section 11-46-9(1)(m). Reply [32], at 8.
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), a plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When
a defendant cannot be liable for the misconduct alleged as a matter of law due to
sovereign immunity, dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate. See
Gallion v. Hinds Cnty., Miss., No. 3:12-cv-736, 2014 WL 4702229, at *1–3 (S.D.
Miss. Sept. 22, 2014).
The Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-1, et seq.,
contains a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for the State and its political
subdivisions. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-5. Overriding this general waiver, section
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11-46-9 preserves sovereign immunity for political subdivisions of the State and
“and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or
duties,” making them exempt from liability for certain types of claims. Miss. Code
Ann. § 11-46-9. Among those exemptions is section 11-46-9(1)(m), which preserves
immunity from suits brought by plaintiffs who were inmates in a detention center
when the cause of action arose. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(m).
B.
Defendants Have Not Waived Sovereign Immunity
The County is a political subdivision of the State of Mississippi, and it is
undisputed that Sheriff Allison was an employee of the County acting within the
course and scope of his employment or duties when Plaintiff’s claim arose. Plaintiff
argues, however, that Defendants are not entitled to immunity as a matter of law
because they waived this defense by not bringing the instant motion to dismiss at
the earliest opportunity. Resp. [28], at 3–8. Plaintiff relies on cases decided under
Mississippi law to support his contention that Defendants waived immunity. Id.
In Reply, Defendants assert that any issues of waiver in a federal case are
decided by applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than State
substantive law. Reply [32], at 2 (citing Arismendez v. Nightingale Home Health
Care, Inc., 493 F.3d 602, 610 (5th Cir. 2007)).
In Arismendez, the Fifth Circuit noted that “the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provide the manner and time in which defenses are raised and when
waiver occurs.” Id. (citing Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of New York v. Blum, 649 F.2d
342, 344 (5th Cir. 1981)). Under the Federal Rules, an affirmative defense (like
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sovereign immunity) is not waived “if the defendant raised the issue at a
pragmatically sufficient time, and the plaintiff was not prejudiced in its ability to
respond.” Pasco ex rel. Pasco v. Knoblauch, 566 F.3d 572, 577 (5th Cir. 2009)
(internal citation omitted). In Skinner v. Hinds Cty., Miss., the Court applied
Arismendez and found that an MTCA immunity defense was not waived, and was
raised in a “procedurally proper and sufficient manner under Rule 8(c)” when the
defendant raised the immunity defense in its answer. No. 3:10-cv-358, 2014 WL
317872, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 29, 2014).
Defendants pled the defense of sovereign immunity in their Answers. Cty.
Answer [4] at 7–8; Allison Answer [5], at 7. As in Skinner, this Court finds that
Defendants preserved their MTCA immunity defenses in a procedurally proper and
sufficient manner under Rule 8(c), such that there has been no waiver of sovereign
immunity.
C.
Section 47-1-57 Does Not Nullify Immunity
Plaintiff argues that section 47-1-57 imposed a ministerial duty to provide
Plaintiff with medical care while he was confined in the County jail, and that
because Defendants failed to fulfill this statutory duty, immunity under section
11-46-9(1)(m) is unavailable. Resp. [28], at 9.
In Harvison, however, the Mississippi Court of Appeals determined that
section 47-1-57 does not give rise to an independent tort action for inmates or
otherwise nullify the immunity preserved by section 11-46-9(1)(m). 899 So. 2d at
925 (“While the duties delineated in Mississippi Code Annotated Sections 47-1-27,
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19-25-35, and 47-1-57 still exist, they do not give rise to a tort action because the
Mississippi Tort Claims Act specifically excludes claims arising under state law
while a person is lawfully incarcerated in a penal facility.”). The Court reasoned
that “‘new legislation must be presumed to have been enacted in light of earlier
enactments,’ and where statutory provisions are in irreconcilable conflict, the more
recently enacted and more specific statute controls over an earlier and more general
statute.” Id. (quoting Parkerson v. Smith, 817 So. 2d 529, 533 (Miss. 2002)). While
section 47-1-57 was adopted in 1848, the MTCA was adopted in 1984, such that its
immunity provisions control over the earlier, more general statute. Id.
Even assuming Plaintiff could establish that Defendants violated section
47-1-57 and failed to provide him with medical care, under Mississippi law this
violation would not create an independent tort action or nullify Defendants’
immunity preserved in section 11-46-9(1)(m). See Harvison, 899 So. 2d at 925.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion [25]
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s State law claims is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims asserted
under State law are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 23rd day of November, 2015.
s/ Halil Suleyman Ozerden
HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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