Mullen v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. et al
Filing
63
ORDER granting 59 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Signed by Chief District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr on 11/04/2015 (Guirola, Louis)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BRENDAN MULLEN
PLAINTIFF
v.
CAUSE NO. 1:15CV158-LG-RHW
BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC., ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING
HLW AVIATION, LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS
BEFORE THE COURT is the Motion [59] to Dismiss filed by Defendant HLW
Aviation, LLC. HLW requests dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), or for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Plaintiff Brenden Mullen has responded, and HLW has replied. After due
consideration of the submissions and the relevant law, it is the Court’s opinion that
it may not exercise personal jurisdiction over HLW in this action. Therefore, the
Motion to Dismiss will be granted on Rule 12(b)(2) grounds. The Court does not
address the remaining arguments.
BACKGROUND
Mullen alleges he was riding as a passenger in a Bell 206L-1 helicopter in the
course of his work for the U.S. Forest Service when “horns sounded and the pilot
said ‘we lost power.’” (1st Am. Compl. 6 (¶21), ECF No. 3). The helicopter crashed
in the De Soto National Forest in Stone County, Mississippi, and Mullen was
severely injured as a result. (Id. (¶¶ 22-23)). Mullen alleges that HLW was in the
business of leasing, operating, maintaining, and servicing helicopters and
component parts, including the helicopter at issue in this case.1 (Id. at 14 (¶67)).
HLW leased the helicopter to T&M Aviation, which was operating the helicopter at
the time of the crash. Mullen brings one claim of negligence against HLW.
HLW is a Georgia Limited Liability Company with its principal place of
business in Lumpkin, Georgia. It seeks dismissal of the negligence claim pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), for lack of personal jurisdiction. Additionally, HLW
requests dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), contending that the factual
allegations of Mullen’s complaint are insufficient to state a negligence claim.
DISCUSSION
When a nonresident defendant presents a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish that in personam
jurisdiction exists. Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 648 (5th Cir. 1994). “The court
may determine the jurisdictional issue by receiving affidavits, interrogatories,
depositions, oral testimony, or any combination of the recognized methods of
discovery.” Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1997). If the
motion is decided without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a
prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists. Luv N’ care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, 438
F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 2006); Kwik–Kopy Corp. v. Byers, 37 F. App’x 90, at *3 (5th
Cir. 2002). In such case, the “court must resolve all undisputed facts submitted by
1
The helicopter was leased by HLW to T&M Aviation, LLC, another named
defendant, pursuant to a Helicopter Lease Agreement that began in 2010 and
automatically renewed annually. (HLW Mot. Ex. A 1, ECF No. 61-1).
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the plaintiff, as well as all facts contested in the affidavits, in favor of jurisdiction.”
Luv N’ care, 438 F.3d at 469.
A federal court sitting in diversity may exercise personal jurisdiction if: (1)
the state’s long-arm statute applies, as interpreted by the state’s courts; and (2)
due process is satisfied under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Allred, 117 F.3d at 281 (quoting Cycles, Ltd. v. W.J. Digby, Inc., 889
F.2d 612, 616 (5th Cir. 1989)). Only if the requirements of both the long-arm
statute and Due Process Clause are met can the court exercise personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant. Id.
I. Mississippi Long-Arm Statute
The Court must first determine whether Mississippi’s long-arm statute
provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over HLW. Jurisdiction is proper
over a defendant if (1) the defendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff to be
performed in whole or in part in Mississippi (the contract prong); (2) the defendant
committed a tort, in whole or in part, against a plaintiff in Mississippi (the tort
prong); or (3) the defendant was “doing business” in Mississippi (the “doing
business” prong). See Bally Gaming, Inc. v. Caldwell, 12 F. Supp. 3d 907, 912 (S.D.
Miss. 2014). The parties agree that the tort prong is applicable here, and that
Mullen’s injury in Mississippi satisfies the requirements of the long-arm statute.
See Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 270-71 (5th Cir. 2006).
II. Due Process
Next, the Court considers whether the exercise of jurisdiction under state law
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would comport with the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
This Clause permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant when (1) that defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits
and protections of the forum state by establishing minimum contacts with the
forum state; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Alpine View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas
Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 214-15 (5th Cir. 2000). Minimum contacts, for the purpose
of satisfying due process, can be established either through contacts sufficient to
assert specific jurisdiction, or contacts sufficient to assert general jurisdiction.
Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647.
Mullen contends that the Court may assert specific, rather than general,
jurisdiction over HLW in this case, on two bases: 1) HLW purposely directed its
activities toward residents of Mississippi; and 2) HLW delivered a product into the
stream of commerce. (Pl. Resp. 5, ECF No. 61).
a. Stream Of Commerce
Under the stream of commerce theory, the Court would be allowed to exercise
personal jurisdiction over HLW if it “delivers its products into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in”
Mississippi. Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 273. However, “mere foreseeability or awareness
[that a product would enter the forum state is] a constitutionally sufficient basis for
personal jurisdiction [only] if the defendant’s product made its way into the forum
state while still in the stream of commerce.” Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716
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F.3d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Luv N’ care, 438 F.3d at 470). Additionally,
“[t]he defendant’s contacts [with the forum state] must be more than ‘random,
fortuitous, or attenuated, or [the result] of the unilateral activity of another party or
third person.’” Id. (quoting ITL Int’l, Inc. v. Constenla, S.A., 669 F.3d 493, 498 (5th
Cir. 2012)).
For purposes of this Motion, HLW’s only connection to this case is the fact
that it leased the helicopter to T&M Aviation. The Fifth Circuit has never applied
the stream of commerce theory to leased products. Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 273-74
(Mississippi court could not assert personal jurisdiction over helicopter lessor when
use of helicopter resulted in death in Mississippi) (citing Bell Helicopter Textron,
Inc. v. HeliQwest Int’l, Ltd., 385 F.3d 1291, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004)).
Even if this Court were somehow persuaded to apply the stream of commerce
theory to this leased helicopter, the helicopter was no longer in the “stream of
commerce” when it made its way into Mississippi - the lease transaction had
already taken place. Furthermore, examination of HLW’s contacts with Mississippi
shows them to be insufficient to support this Court’s assertion of personal
jurisdiction over HLW.
b. HLW’s Contacts With Mississippi
Mullen contends that HLW’s act of leasing the helicopter to a party that
could be expected to fly it in Mississippi shows sufficient contacts to bring HLW into
court in Mississippi. Mullen argues that HLW, in Lumpkin Georgia, leased the
helicopter to T&M Aviation, in Abbeville, Louisiana. Because a direct flight
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between the two locations requires crossing Mississippi, HLW was necessarily
aware that the helicopter would enter Mississippi on its way to Louisiana.
Furthermore, T&M’s location in Louisiana is close to Mississippi, making it likely
that T&M would operate the helicopter in Mississippi. Additionally, Mullen argues
the lease required T&M to “provide evidence to Defendant HLW Aviation that the
geographic areas in which the helicopter was flown were lawful and that insurance
coverage applied.” (Pl. Resp. 7-8, ECF No. 61). T&W was therefore obligated to
“provide evidence of the location of every fire” the helicopter was used to fight. For
all of these reasons, Mullen contends that HLW was aware that the helicopter
would be used in Mississippi, and “if a lessor is aware that a lessee will fly in a
state, the state can exercise jurisdiction over the lessor.” (Id. at 7).
HLW argues, and the Court agrees, that the lease does not specify where
T&M will use the helicopter, nor does it require T&M to inform HLW of where the
helicopter would be used. In support of his position that HLW was aware that the
helicopter would be used in Mississippi, Mullen has identified a recital in the lease
which states that “T&M desires to lease the [helicopter for] the purpose of providing
services consistent with Titles [sic] 14, Part 135 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(hereinafter Contract),” along with HLW’s alleged knowledge that the Contract was
with the U.S. Forest Service. (Def. Mot. Ex. 1, ECF No. 59-1 at 4). Mullen argues
that 1) the regulation concerns on-demand operations; 2) T&M could be expected to
operate the helicopter on-demand in nearby national forests; and 3) the national
forests nearest to Abbeville, Louisiana, encompass land in Mississippi as well as
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Louisiana, and therefore HLW should have been alerted to T&M’s use of the
helicopter fire-fighting in national forests within Mississippi.
Mullen also argues that HLW should have received insurance information
from T&M that would have informed it of the location of T&M’s operations. In the
absence of a supporting citation from Mullen, HLW points to Section 9.2 and 9.3 of
the lease as the likely source of Mullen’s argument. These provisions, however,
merely require T&M to maintain insurance, comply with the terms of the
insurance, and comply with applicable laws and regulations when operating the
helicopter. (Def. Mot. Ex. 1, ECF No. 59-1 at 7). T&M must also provide evidence
of the insurance when required to do so by HLW. (Id.).
Mullen’s chief arguments for jurisdiction go to HLW’s awareness that the
helicopter would be used in Mississippi. But even if HLW was informed or should
have known that the helicopter would be used by HLW for fire fighting operations
in Mississippi, or should have realized that the helicopter would pass through
Mississippi on its way to Louisiana, such awareness is insufficient to support
personal jurisdiction. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295
(1980) (“‘[F]oreseeability’ alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.”).
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State.
Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there.
Id. at 297.
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The Court finds no connection between HLW and the state of Mississippi.
Neither HLW nor T&M has a presence in Mississippi. HLW leased the helicopter to
T&M to provide services to the U.S. Forest Service, presumably wherever the
Forest Service required T&M’s services.2 The language of the lease does not show
that the parties contemplated operation of the helicopter in any particular location.3
The fact that T&M’s services could have been required in Mississippi is tantamount
to purposefully availing oneself of the privilege of conducting business in
Mississippi by HLW. T&M’s use of the helicopter in Mississippi was its own
unilateral action, which cannot establish minimum contacts between HLW and
Mississippi. Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 481 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir.
2007); Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 274. It would be unfair to subject HLW to personal
jurisdiction in Mississippi merely because T&M is a resident of a state adjacent to
Mississippi.4 The Court concludes that specific jurisdiction over HLW is not
2
The contract with the Forest Service was not provided.
3
The Brown v. Astron Enterprises case cited by Mullen is distinguishable on
this basis, as the aircraft in Brown was leased for the express purpose of flying into
a particular state. Brown v. Astron Enters., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1399, 1405 (N.D. Ala.
1997).
4
Mullen cites Worthley v. Rockville Leasecar, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 185 (D. Md.
1971) in support of the proposition that proximity to a forum state can support
jurisdiction. In Worthley, the occupants of an aircraft owned by a Maryland
corporation had permission to fly wherever they desired. The court determined that
a crash in Rhode Island justified the assertion of jurisdiction over the aircraft owner
by Rhode Island, since the proximity of Rhode Island to Maryland made Rhode
Island a foreseeable destination for the aircraft. Id. at 188. As HLW notes,
Worthley was decided before the Supreme Court’s World–Wide Volkswagen decision
foreclosed jurisdiction based merely on foreseeability.
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warranted based on the presence of the helicopter in Mississippi at the time of the
crash. See Eddy v. Printers House (P) Ltd., No. 15-10370, 2015 WL 5771925, at *3
(5th Cir. Oct. 2, 2015); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-99 (holding that an
Oklahoma court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a car retailer when the
retailer’s only connection to Oklahoma was the fact that a car sold in New York
became involved in an accident in Oklahoma).
III. The Request For Discovery
Mullen requests that the Court allow him to conduct jurisdiction-related
discovery in the event the facts available at this stage do not support the assertion
of specific jurisdiction over HLW. He reiterates his position that the contract with
the U.S. Forest Service and the flight over Mississippi to reach T&M’s home in
Louisiana are reasons to believe there are discoverable facts that will establish
jurisdiction. For essentially the reasons stated above, these arguments do not show
a basis to believe jurisdiction over HLW exists in this Court. Accordingly, Mullen’s
request for discovery is denied.
CONCLUSION
Jurisdiction is a threshold matter which must be established before the Court
may proceed to adjudication of the merits of an action. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999). The Court should not proceed further once it
concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Pervasive Software
Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 232 (5th Cir. 2012). Because the
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Court has determined that it lacks personal jurisdiction over HLW in this case,
HLW’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and
Plaintiff’s claims against HLW dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion [59] to
Dismiss filed by Defendant HLW Aviation, LLC, is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims
against HLW Aviation, LLC, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 4th day of November, 2015.
s/
Louis Guirola, Jr.
LOUIS GUIROLA, JR.
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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