Alford v. The City of Wiggins, Mississippi et al
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 56 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 56 Motion for Qualified Immunity; granting 63 Motion for Summary Judgment and Qualified Immunity. Plaintiff's claims against the defendants in their individual capacities are dismissed. Signed by Chief District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. on 3/8/2017 (wld) Modified text on 3/8/2017 (wld).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
DAPHINE DOREENE ALFORD
CAUSE NO. 1:16CV19-LG-RHW
THE CITY OF WIGGINS, MS;
MAYOR JOEL T. MILES; CHIEF OF POLICE
MATT BARNETT; POLICE OFFICERS
RANDY VINSON, DOUGLAS MCBRIDE,
and OFFICERS JOHN DOES 1-5,
Individually and in their official capacities
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BEFORE THE COURT are Motions for Summary Judgment and Qualified
Immunity filed by Defendants Randy Vinson  and Douglas McBride .
Vinson and McBride were police officers for the City of Wiggins, Mississippi when
the events at issue in this civil rights lawsuit occurred. They assert they are
immune from Plaintiff Daphine Alford’s claims against them in their individual
capacities. The issues have been fully briefed. After due consideration, the Court
finds that Vinson and McBride have shown they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Additionally, to the extent Alford alleged state law claims against Vinson and
McBride, the Mississippi Tort Claims Act provides immunity from those claims.
Accordingly, the Motions will be granted and the claims against Vinson and
This case arises out of events occurring in the late evening of January 24,
2013. Alford, a black female, alleges that on that night she was standing on a street
corner in Wiggins, Mississippi, conversing with her male companion. She alleges
she was arrested by Wiggins Police Officers Randy Vinson and Douglas McBride,
both white, even though “[s]he was not a suspect, not acting suspiciously and was
not observed committing any criminal act.” (Compl. 10, ECF No. 1). After her
arrest, she was “crudely, improperly and illegally searched,” whereupon the officers
found “narcotic paraphernalia.” (Id.). She was then “roughly manhandled,”
handcuffed and forced into the police vehicle for transport to the Stone County
Correctional Facility. (Id. at 11).
Upon reaching the Correctional Facility, Alford alleges that Officer Vinson
“intentionally tripped and twisted her off-balance causing her to unexpectedly fall
forward, face first, directly into the pavement with the blunt impact injuring her
head, face, teeth and body.” (Id.). She alleges that Vinson and McBride dragged
her into the Correctional Facility while she loudly cried out from the intense pain.
Inside the Correctional Facility, Alford alleges she was manhandled into a
small jail cell, where she was forced to the floor. She alleges Vinson kneeled on her
face, jaw, and neck to keep her down as she was stripped naked, and Vinson
touched her inappropriately while “the other Wiggins officer watched.” (Id.). Later,
Vinson, who had moved to a different area, returned to the area of the cell,
where Ms. Alford was protesting what they had done to her. When
[Alford] saw Officer Vinson staring at her she became completely
emotionally overcome and outraged by what he had just done to her. A
Corrections Officer then sprayed pepper spray . . . in [Alford’s] face and
body even though she was nude, required medical attention for her
injuries and was not a threat to anyone.
(Id. at 13).
Alford alleges she was only able to wash the pepper spray from her body
using “a dirty cell commode’s unsanitary toilet water.” (Id.). Her pleas for help and
assistance were ignored by “the two Wiggins Officers” while they were nearby
writing up false criminal charges against her. (Id.).
Vinson and McBride have provided evidence concerning the incident in the
form of videos from the patrol car and inside the Stone County Correctional
Facility.1 The patrol car video does not show the officers’ initial contact with Alford,
but once she is in the back of the car her commentary can be heard. She accuses the
officers of bruising her face, calls them “white boy,” “cracker,” and “motherfucker,”
and tells them she had been on crack since she had been in Wiggins. Once the car
arrives at the Correctional Facility, the video shows Alford resisting the officer’s
attempts to make her walk to the receiving door, and his move to bring her to the
ground. He is holding her shoulders as he does so, and she swings down to hit the
ground on her side. The two officers help Alford to her feet and they proceed to the
As Alford is brought through the door, she is clearly resisting and sits down
on the ground. She can be seen struggling against the officers as they clear the
detox cell of an occupant. Two female correctional officers enter the cell wearing
The videos, filed under seal, are exhibits I and J to Vinson’s Motion, and C,
D, N and O to McBride’s Motion.
latex gloves, followed by a third. Shortly thereafter, the two police officers leave.
About five minutes later, the three female correctional officers leave the cell. Alford
appears naked in the door window, and an object can be seen flying past the
window. Five correctional officers gather in front of the door, and one readies what
appears to be a spray can. As the officers enter, Alford pushes her way out of the
cell, but is pulled back in by one of the officers. There is a struggle inside of the cell
involving all five correctional officers and Alford, during which the mattress and
other items are removed. The officers then leave, and it appears that Alford has
been subdued, as she does not appear in the window for the remaining few minutes
of the video.
The officers also provided Alford’s deposition testimony explaining her
version of the events of that night. She testified that she had gone to “The District”
in Wiggins, where drug activity goes on. (Alford Dep. 35-36, ECF No. 56-1). She
went there to buy crack cocaine. (Id. at 38). She was there six hours, during which
time she did crack and drank alcohol. (Id. at 39-40). She was walking and drinking
gin with her friend “Jethro” when officers Vinson and McBride approached them.
(Id. at 43, 47). Vinson spoke to “Jethro” while McBride asked her her name. (Id. at
46). Vinson told McBride not to worry about Alford, because “[s]he’s just an old
nothing crack head.” (Id. at 49). Alford became upset at this comment and cursed
at Vinson (“I probably said something to [the] effect” of I’m going to kick your ass),
“and that’s when the handcuffs came out.” (Id. at 49, 50). The officers forced her to
the patrol car and handcuffed her. (Id. at 50). Vinson searched her and found a
crack pipe in her pocket. (Id. at 51). The officers wanted to inspect her shoes as
well, so as she got into the car she kicked her shoes off toward Vinson. (Id. at 53).
On the drive to the Correctional Facility, Alford testified she was “yelling.
I’m screaming. I’m talking about them. I’m talking about how they should be
ashamed, don’t know how their wives deal with them, all kind of things. They
never said a word the whole time.” (Id. at 58). Officer Vinson took her out of the
car at the Correctional Facility, and [h]e “goes, ‘Stop spitting. Stop spitting.’ And
then all of the sudden, he trips me.” (Id. at 63). She testified she landed on her face
and chipped her teeth. (Id. at 65).
Alford testified that Vinson and McBride forcefully picked her up and brought
her into the female detox room, which she was familiar with because she been in the
room about ten times previously. (Id. at 70-72). She was “agitated because of what
happened to my teeth.” (Id. at 75). Vinson pinned her down in the far corner of the
room with his knee in her jaw, and “I’m thinking my jaw is about to break any
minute.” (Id. at 76). Alford was stripped from the waist down, and told Vinson she
would stop struggling. (Id. at 76-77, 85). Vinson “unpinned” her, and “I just kind of
freaked out. I just grabbed the tray and just started, you know swinging the tray
and trying to defend myself because I didn’t know what they were gonna do next.”
(Id. at 77, 79). “I was just screaming and hollering, doing this number with the tray
(demonstrating). I didn’t hit anybody . . . . I guess by me doing that, [the
corrections officer] just automatically just pulled out her mace.” (Id. at 80-81).
Alford’s claims are pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments for excessive force, and false arrest, detention,
imprisonment, and prosecution. (Compl. 30-31, ECF No. 1). Additionally, she
alleges the officers were engaged in a conspiracy to abuse minorities pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1985. (Id. at 31). She may also have made state law tort claims, although
none are explicitly set out in the Complaint. Vinson and McBride move for
summary judgment on all of the claims, asserting the defense of qualified
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits any party to a civil
action to move for a summary judgment upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
as to which there is no genuine issue of material fact and upon which the moving
party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. A party seeking summary judgment
bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery
on file, together with any affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
The movant need not negate the non-movant’s claims. Instead, the movant need
only show the absence of evidence to support a claim on issues to which the
non-movant bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial. Id. at 323-24. Once the
movant carries its burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show that
summary judgment should not be granted. Id. at 324-25. The non-movant may not
rest upon mere allegations or denials in its pleadings, but must set forth specific
facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986).
II. Qualified Immunity
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known. Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to
make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Thompson v. Mercer, 762
F.3d 433, 436-37 (5th Cir. 2014). Once a defendant raises qualified immunity as a
defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a violation of a clearly established
constitutional right. Harris v. Serpas, 745 F.3d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 2014).
Accordingly, when a defendant pleads qualified immunity as an affirmative defense
and moves for summary judgment, a court must decide: “(1) whether the undisputed
facts and the disputed facts, accepting the plaintiff's version of the disputed facts as
true, constitute a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the defendant's
conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.” Carroll v.
Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 169 (5th Cir. 2015). A court may determine these
questions in any order. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). As to
the second prong, a government official’s acts are not objectively unreasonable
unless all reasonable officials in the defendant’s circumstances would have then
known that the defendant’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights. Carroll, 800 F.3d
I. Probable Cause to Arrest
To prevail on her false arrest claim, Alford “must sufficiently allege (1) that
she was arrested, and (2) the arrest did not have the requisite probable cause.”
Rhodes v. Prince, 360 F. App’x. 555, at *3 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Haggerty v. Tex. S.
Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655-56 (5th Cir. 2004)). “An arrest is unlawful unless it is
supported by probable cause.” Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 402 (5th Cir.
“Probable cause to arrest exists if, at the moment an arrest is made,
the facts and circumstances within the arresting officers’ knowledge
and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect has
committed or is committing an offense,” but “[e]nough evidence to
support a conviction is not required.”
Davis v. Strain, No. 16-30169, 2017 WL 344285, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 2017)
(quoting United States v. Morris, 477 F.2d 657, 663 (5th Cir. 1973)).
Both Vinson and McBride argue that they had probable cause for arresting
Alford, because there is no factual dispute regarding Alford’s criminal behavior of 1)
public drunkeness; 2) consuming crack cocaine; 3) possession of drug paraphernalia;
4) public profanity; and 5) resisting arrest. Any one of these criminal offenses
provided the officers with probable cause to arrest Alford, and she testified that she
committed the crimes. (Alford Dep. 91-92, 114, ECF No. 61-1). Vinson and McBride
are entitled to qualified immunity in regard to the claim of wrongful arrest because
the undisputed facts do not show a constitutional violation.
II. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Claim
Alford’s allegations of excessive force implicate the Fourth Amendment
rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. “All claims that law enforcement officers
have used excessive force – deadly or not – in the course of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard[.]” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
395 (1989). Whether a seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment depends
not only upon whether the seizure itself is reasonable, but also upon how the police
seize the individual. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985). Although the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of the use of excessive force by the police against
seized persons was clearly established prior to the incident at issue in this case, the
Court must ensure that the law is “particularized” to the facts of the case. White v.
Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017). This requires that the Court “identify a case
where an officer acting under similar circumstances as [officers Vinson and
McBride] was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
a. Officer Vinson
1. The Take-Down by Officer Vinson
Alford challenges Vinson’s action of 1) tripping her while escorting her from
the patrol car to the Correctional Facility entrance; and 2) kneeling on her head to
restrain her while she was strip searched. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Alford, but also as depicted by the surveillance video,2 the Court finds
that the use of force applied by Vinson was objectively reasonable given the totality
of the circumstances. An arrest “necessarily carries with it the right to use some
degree of physical coercion.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Here, as Vinson attempted to escort Alford into
the Correctional Facility, she can be seen attempting to move in a different
direction and escape his grasp. Alford’s movements, along with her behavior and
language prior to arriving at the Correctional Facility, made it objectively
reasonable for Vinson to believe that Alford’s non-cooperation posed a threat to
himself and McBride. Bringing Alford to the ground in the controlled manner
shown in the video was an objectively reasonable uses of force given the totality of
the circumstances. See Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 629 (5th Cir.
2. Pinning Alford to the Floor
Alford contends that Vinson used excessive force once she was in the detox
cell by pinning her to the floor with his knee on her head. Vinson argues this was
necessary because 1) Alford was yelling and struggling against him and others as he
brought her to the cell where he would be able to remove her handcuffs and allow
her to cool down; and 2) once in the cell she continued to fight the female
The Court “need not rely on plaintiff’s description of the facts where the
record discredits that description but should instead consider ‘the facts in the light
depicted by the video.’” Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir.
correctional officers who were attempting to strip search her.
“There is no bright-line rule forbidding police officers from using a knee to pin
an arrestee to the ground.” Poole v. Russell, No. CV 14-0611, 2016 WL 6082041, at
*6 (W.D. La. Oct. 18, 2016).
In Castillo v. City of Round Rock, Texas, for example, the Fifth Circuit
held that officers had not used excessive force where they had
restrained plaintiff “in the prone position on the ground, eventually
handcuffing his hands behind his back,” even though (1) one officer and
a bystander “remained on [plaintiff’s] back for four to six minutes;” (2)
the officer “shoved his knee in the back of [plaintiff’s] neck and kept it
there for some five to ten minutes;” and (3) the plaintiff later died of
asphyxiation. Castillo v. City of Round Rock, Texas, 177 F.3d 977, at
*1 (5th Cir. 1999) (unpublished). The Court explained that the
plaintiff had “actively resist[ed] by kicking and yelling” and had
bloodied one officer’s nose “in a manner that a reasonable officer could
perceive as hostile.” Id. at *3. The officers had not acted unreasonably
when they placed the plaintiff in the prone position and
“incapacitat[ed] him as quickly and professionally as possible, by
climbing on top of his back and securing his hands and legs . . . .” Id.
Also, in Deshotels v. Marshall, 454 F. App’x 262 (5th Cir. 2011), the Fifth
Circuit considered the use of force in subduing a burglary suspect. The court found
that officers’ straddling of the suspect, pulling on his arms, kneeling on his
shoulder, and folding of his legs to stop him from kicking were all objectively
reasonable, considering the size of the suspect and his immediate attempts to flee.
Id. at 267-68.
The facts of this case, and the evidence provided by the surveillance video,
establish that a reasonable officer could have believed that Alford was a threat to
herself and the other officers such that it was necessary to pin her to the floor with
a knee while correctional officers searched her to ensure she did not have any
dangerous objects on her body. This was an objectively reasonable use of force
rather than a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
b. Officer McBride
McBride’s actions that are the subject of Alford’s Complaint are that he forced
her to the patrol car and frisked her, pulled her into the patrol car from the opposite
side, and was present during the strip search in the correctional facility. Alford
does not point to any case law clearly establishing that McBride’s actions violated
the Fourth Amendment. McBride points to a number of cases in which actions
similar to his were held not to be constitutional violations. See, e.g., Oliver v. Scott,
276 F.3d 736, 745 (5th Cir. 2002) (strip search of a male inmate in front of female
guards); Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 704 (5th Cir. 1999) (choking occurred
while officer attempted to search detainee’s mouth). Alford has the burden of
demonstrating “that the specific circumstances which the officer encountered would
have led a reasonable officer to understand that his actions were unlawful, in light
of clearly established authority of which a reasonable officer would have known.”
Strickland v. City of Crenshaw, 114 F. Supp. 3d 400, 418 (N.D. Miss. 2015).
Because she has not done so in regard to Officer McBride’s actions, he is entitled to
qualified immunity as to the excessive force claim.
Alford argues that McBride can be liable for violating the Fourth Amendment
because he stood by as Vinson tripped Alford, choked her, and kneeled on her head
to restrain her while she was stripped of clothing. McBride objects that Alford did
not bring a bystander liability claim, and it is improper for her to argue that the
theory applies at this stage. The focus of the bystander liability inquiry is on
whether the bystander officer has “a reasonable opportunity to realize the excessive
nature of the force and to intervene to stop it.” Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 919
(5th Cir. 1995). In resolving whether a plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a bystander
liability claim, a court must also “consider whether an officer ‘acquiesce[d] in’ the
alleged constitutional violation.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 647 (5th Cir.
2013) (citing Hale, 45 F.3d at 919). As the Court found no constitutional violation
by Vinson, McBride can have no bystander liability.
III. Criminal Charges
Alford asserts that the Officers violated her Fourth and/or Fourteenth
Amendment rights because they “filed false felony charges resulting in false
incarceration and improper imprisonment.” (Compl. 31, ECF No. 1). The initiation
of criminal proceedings without probable cause is not a violation of substantive due
process. Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 953 (5th Cir. 2003). “The initiation of
criminal charges without probable cause may set in force events that run afoul of
explicit constitutional protection – the Fourth Amendment if the accused is seized
and arrested, for example, or other constitutionally secured rights if a case is
further pursued.” Id. However, “causing charges to be filed without probable cause
will not without more violate the Constitution.” Id. Here, the Court has explained
that there is no genuine dispute that Vinson and McBride had probable cause to
arrest Alford for the numerous crimes she agrees she committed. Therefore they
had probable cause to initiate criminal charges. Accordingly, to the extent Alford
asserts a constitutional cause of action for false charges or prosecution, Vinson and
McBride have shown they are entitled to qualified immunity.
IV. Individual Immunity - State Law Claims
Although it is not clear in Alford’s Complaint, she may have alleged state law
claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery against Vinson and McBride.
The Mississippi Tort Claims Act provides the exclusive remedy against a
governmental entity or its employee. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-7(1). Thus, “[a]ny
claim filed against a governmental entity and its employees (for monetary relief)
must be brought under [the] statutory scheme” of the MTCA. Stuckey v. Miss. Dep’t
of Transp., No. 3:07-cv-639-TSL-JCS, 2008 WL 1868421, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 24,
2008); Lang v. Bay St. Louis/Waveland Sch. Dist., 764 So. 2d 1234, 1236 (Miss.
Officers Vinson and McBride contend they are immune from suit regarding
any tort claims Alford may be alleging due to two immunity provisions in the
MTCA. McBride asserts immunity under section 11-46-9(1)(c) (actions related to
police protection), and Vinson asserts immunity under section 11-46-7(2) (actions
taken in the course and scope of employment).
Under section 11-46-7(2), “no employee shall be held personally liable for acts
or omissions occurring within the course and scope of the employee’s duties,” and
there is a rebuttable presumption that a given act is within that scope. Miss. Code
Ann. § 11-46-7(7). See Hearn v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Hinds Cty., 575 F. App’x 239, 243
(5th Cir. 2014). However, “an employee shall not be considered as acting within the
course and scope of his employment . . . if the employee’s conduct constituted [ ]
fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation or any criminal offense.” Miss. Code Ann. §
Alford has not adequately rebutted the presumption that Officers Vinson and
McBride were acting within the course and scope of their employment when they
arrested her, brought her to the Correctional Facility, and filed criminal charges
against her. These actions were taken because they were the officers’ job duties;
the decisions to arrest, detain and charge Alford were undertaken in the course and
scope of Vinson and McBride’s employment as police officers for the City of Wiggins.
Vinson and McBride are immune from tort liability under section 11-46-7(2).
Under section 11-46-9(1)(c) of the MTCA, an employee is not liable for any
claim “arising out of any act . . . in the performance or execution of duties or
activities relating to police or fire protection unless the employee acted in reckless
disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity
at the time of injury.” “[R]eckless disregard is synonymous with willfulness and
wantonness and . . . includes an element of intent to harm.” Cunningham ex rel.
Cunningham v. City of W. Point., 380 F. App’x 419, 422 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Foster v. Noel, 715 So. 2d 174, 179 (Miss. 1998)). “[R]eckless disregard” is “a higher
standard than gross negligence and embraces willful or wanton conduct which
requires knowingly and intentionally doing a thing or wrongful act.” Porter v.
Farris, 328 F. App’x 286, 288-89 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting City of Greenville v. Jones,
925 So. 2d 106, 110 (Miss. 2006)). Alford makes an assertion that Vinson “clearly
acted with reckless disregard” for her safety and well-being at a time she was in
handcuffs and not engaged in criminal activity. (Pl. Resp. Vinson Mot. 6, ECF No.
76; Pl. Resp. McBride Mot. 8, ECF No. 77). However, the surveillance video does
not support her characterization of Vinson’s actions. While she was handcuffed,
Alford tried to evade Vinson’s grasp and did not appear to be cooperating with him.
Vinson tripped her as he escorted her into the Correctional Facility, but the video
shows he controlled her fall. The officers then lifted Alford up and she walked into
the doorway of the Correctional Facility between them. No evidence shows reckless
disregard for Alford’s safety. Accordingly, the officers are immune from tort liability
under section 11-46-9(1)(c).
In the context of summary judgment, a police officer is protected by qualified
immunity unless a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether his
actions were objectively reasonable. Byers v. City of Eunice, 157 F. App’x 680, 683
(5th Cir. 2005). Officers Vinson and McBride used the force necessary to safely
arrest and detain a combative Alford, who was admittedly engaging in criminal
activity and under the influence of cocaine and alcohol. “[E]ven law enforcement
officials who reasonably but mistakenly use excessive force are entitled to
immunity.” Wagner v. Bay City, 227 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations and
quotations marks omitted). The Court finds no question of material fact regarding
the reasonableness of Vinson’s or McBride’s actions. It would not be apparent to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the circumstances existing at
the time of Alford’s arrest and detention. The summary judgment motions on the
grounds of qualified immunity will be granted in all respects.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the  Motion
for Summary Judgment and Qualified Immunity filed by Defendant Randy Vinson
and the  Motion for Summary Judgment and Qualified Immunity filed by
Defendant Douglas McBride are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims against the
defendants in their individual capacities are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 8th day of March, 2017.
Louis Guirola, Jr.
LOUIS GUIROLA, JR.
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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