Porter v. Werner et al

Filing 156

ORDER granting 86 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 100 Motion to Dismiss defendants motion 86 . Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert H. Walker on December 20, 2017 (King, Steve)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KEITH LA-DALE PORTER
VERSUS
CHRISTOPHER WERNER et al

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16CV69-RHW
DEFENDANTS

ORDER GRANTING [86] MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Keith La-Dale Porter, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 prisoner civil rights complaint alleging, among other things, inadequate medical care for
injuries sustained prior to his arrest on the evening of August 28, 2015. The Court conducted a
screening hearing on December 13, 2016. Doc. [75]. Defendant Correctional Medical
Associates, Inc. (CMA) has filed a motion for summary judgment. Doc. [86]. With respect to
CMA, Plaintiff alleges that CMA employees were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s injuries.
Plaintiff countered CMA’s motion for summary judgment with what he has titled as a motion to
dismiss. Doc. [100].
CMA is the medical provider of health services for inmates at the Harrison County Adult
Detention Center (HCADC). Doc. [86-1]. Plaintiff was transferred to HCADC on August 29,
2015, following his arrest and booking by the Gulfport Police Department. Doc. [75] at 33-35.
Patricia Perkins conducted a medical questionnaire at the time of transfer. Doc. [92] at 2-5.
Plaintiff’s signature is on the intake form. Id. at 3. At the screening hearing, Plaintiff verified
that his signature is on the intake form. Doc. [75] at 60-61. According to the medical intake
information, Plaintiff did not exhibit any injuries at the time of his arrival at HCADC. Doc. [92]
at 2- 3. There is no indication in the medical records that Plaintiff submitted sick calls or

received any treatment for injuries to his head. See Doc. [92]. At the screening hearing, Plaintiff
testified that he sued CMA simply because it employs the nurses at HCADC. Doc. [75] at 70-71.
Law and Analysis
Rule 56 provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627
F.3d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010). Where the summary judgment evidence establishes that one of
the essential elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action does not exist as a matter of law, all other
contested issues of fact are rendered immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986); Topalin v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1138 (5th Cir. 1992). In making its determinations
of fact on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence submitted by the
parties in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. McPherson v. Rankin, 736 F.2d 175,
178 (5th Cir. 1984).
The moving party has the duty to demonstrate the lack of a genuine issue of a material
fact and the appropriateness of judgment as a matter of law to prevail on its motion. Union
Planters Nat’l Leasing v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1982). The movant accomplishes this
by informing the court of the basis of its motion, and by identifying portions of the record which
highlight the absence of genuine factual issues. Topalian, 954 F.2d at 1131. “Rule 56
contemplates a shifting burden: the nonmovant is under no obligation to respond unless the
movant discharges [its] initial burden of demonstrating [entitlement to summary judgment].”
John v. State of Louisiana, 757 F.3d 698, 708 (5th Cir. 1985). Once a properly supported motion
for summary judgment is presented, the nonmoving party must rebut with “significant probative”
evidence. Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978).

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CMA is a private corporation providing medical care at HCADC. Nevertheless, it may
be sued under § 1983 by a prisoner who has suffered an alleged constitutional injury. See
Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003). Section 1983 does
not create supervisory or respondeat superior liability. Rios v. City of Del Rio, Texas, 444 F.3d
417, 425 (5th Cir. 2006); Williams v. Luna, 909 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1990). Although not
subject to vicarious liability for the constitutional torts of its employees, a private corporation
such as CMA may be held liable under § 1983 when an official policy or custom of the
corporation causes, or is the moving force behind, the alleged deprivation of federal rights. See
Rouster v. County of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437, 453 (6th Cir. 2014); Rice ex rel. Rice v.
Correctional Medical Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir. 2012); Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc.,
195 F.3d 715, 728 (4th Cir. 1999). Based on Plaintiff’s own testimony, his lawsuit against CMA
is based on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Plaintiff admitted that he sued
CMA only because it employs the nurses at HCADC. Doc. [75] at 70-71. Such a theory fails to
state a claim against CMA. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to identify a policy or custom that cause, or
was the moving force, behind Plaintiff’s alleged inadequate medical care.
In his response to CMA’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that Defendant
CMA “failed to see the Plaintiff which resulted into a violation of the Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights by a delay in treatment of never seeing the Plaintiff”. “Defendant” is a corporation. The
corporation cannot examine or treat Plaintiff except through its employees. As explained above,
the corporation cannot be held vicariously liable for the constitutional torts of its employees.
Hence, Plaintiff’s response fails to identify a genuine issue of material fact.
In his response, Plaintiff further asserts that CMA’s failure to provide medical attention
violated CMA’s “Standard of Care” policy. Plaintiff’s argument fails to identify a policy or

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custom that was the moving force behind the alleged deliberate indifference to his medical
condition. To the contrary, Plaintiff identifies a CMA policy to provide adequate care to
inmates. If a CMA employee failed to follow CMA’s own policy, and if the employee was
thereby deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical condition, then CMA still cannot be held
vicariously liable for the constitutional tort of its employee.
Plaintiff alleges that the medical records provided in support of CMA’s motion for
summary judgment are void. He asserts that the records contain the wrong social security
number and birth date, and that his signature was forged. For purposes of CMA’s motion, the
authenticity of the medical records is irrelevant. Plaintiff attempts to sue CMA on the basis of
vicarious liability. He fails to identify or allege a custom or policy that was the moving force
behind the constitutional violation. As such, Plaintiff’s claims against CMA fail regardless of
the authenticity of the medical records. Plaintiff simply fails to identify any wrongdoing on the
part of CMA apart from the alleged conduct of CMA’s employees.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant CMA’s [86] Motion
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Correctional
Medical Associates, Inc. are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s [100] Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 20th day of December, 2017.

/s/ Robert

H. Walker

ROBERT H. WALKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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