Campbell v. Fisher et al

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 30 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 35 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge John C. Gargiulo on 3/9/18. (JCH)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BOBBY JOE CAMPBELL
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-cv-141-JCG

MARSHALL FISHER,
RONALD WOODALL, and KAREN DEESE

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
BEFORE THE COURT are two motions for summary judgment: the Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 30) filed by Defendants Ronald Woodall and
Karen Deese, and the Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Sovereign and
Qualified Immunity (ECF No. 35) filed by Defendant Marshall Fisher. Plaintiff filed
respective responses in opposition to each Motion (ECF No. 40); (ECF No. 41).
Having considered the submissions of the parties, the record as a whole, and
relevant law, the undersigned concludes that the Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 30), filed by Ronald Woodall and Karen Deese, and the Motion for
Summary Judgment Based on Sovereign and Qualified Immunity (ECF No. 35),
filed by Marshall Fisher, will both be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff Bobby Joe Campbell is a prisoner in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) housed at South Mississippi Correctional
Institution (“SMCI”) in Leakesville, Mississippi. He filed his Complaint (ECF No. 1)
on April 27, 2016, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants

violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. Although his Complaint requested an award of damages, (ECF No. 1,
at 4), he later clarified that he seeks only injunctive relief in the form of Courtordered medical care, (ECF No. 30-2, at 35-36). Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in
forma pauperis.
On May 16, 2016, the undersigned issued an Order (ECF No. 6) directing
Plaintiff to provide additional information about how Defendants supposedly
violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 7) to that
Order on June 2, 2016. On December 14, 2016, the Court held an omnibus hearing,1
during which Plaintiff supplemented the allegations in his Complaint and the Court
set case management deadlines. See Minute Entry Dec. 14, 2016; Transcript of
Omnibus Hearing (ECF No. 30-2). Defendants thereafter filed the instant motions
for summary judgment on April 21, 2017 (ECF No. 30) and April 28, 2017 (ECF No.
35), respectively.
B. Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff alleges that in October or November 2014, he suffered a chemical
burn to both of his legs while assisting another inmate pour cleaning chemicals out
of a large drum and into a smaller container. Plaintiff was on kitchen duty and
went to the laundry room to get chemicals for cleaning table surfaces and the floor.
He says the chemicals splashed up on to his legs, ate through his pants, and burned
both of his legs below his knees. He immediately went to the infirmary, where he

The omnibus hearing functioned as a screening hearing pursuant to Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d
179 (5th Cir. 1985).
1

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was seen by either Defendant Karen Deese, a nurse practitioner, or Defendant
Ronald Woodall, a doctor.
In a written filing, Plaintiff explains that he “was initially treated by
Defendant R. Woodall,” (ECF No. 7, at 5), but he testified at the omnibus hearing
that he saw NP Deese when he first went to the infirmary, see (ECF No. 30-2, at 1718). Furthermore, he testified that Dr. Woodall never saw his legs and never spoke
to him about his condition of his legs; Dr. Woodall only responded to his
administrative grievance. See (ECF No. 30-2, at 23). Either Dr. Woodall or NP
Deese cleaned the burns, applied a burn cream, and wrapped his legs. Woodall or
Deese also ordered him an ointment and told him to come back to the infirmary
every three days to have the wrapping changed. Plaintiff thereafter returned to his
work in the kitchen and dining hall.
Plaintiff says that he went to the infirmary every three days as instructed,
and that NP Deese cleaned his burns and re-wrapped his legs each time. He says he
used the ointment as instructed but that this treatment – his use of the ointment
and regular dressing changes – did not heal his legs. Pain regularly persists and he
has scabs on his legs. Plaintiff believes that he should have been referred to a burn
specialist because he has diabetes: he fears that the combination of the burn and his
status as a diabetic (presumably in reference to complications from diabetes that
affect his limbs) may lead to the loss of his legs. However, no medical professional
warned him of such a risk.

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Plaintiff maintains that the prescribed ointment has not done anything to
help his legs heal, but he noted that he also applies cocoa butter and baby oil to his
legs in order to “keep [them] moist.” (ECF No. 30-2, at 29). No medical professional
told him to use cocoa butter or baby oil. Plaintiff does not propose an alternative
treatment that he should have received, but believes that something else could have
and should be done for his legs.
When asked why he is suing each Defendant, Plaintiff explained that he is
suing Marshall Fisher because he is the final policymaker at MDOC and
responsible for the overall safety and well-being of inmates housed in MDOC
facilities. It is worth noting that Plaintiff could not remember why he was suing
Marshall Fisher when questioned at the omnibus hearing. See (ECF No. 30-2, at 2324). Plaintiff stated that he is suing doctor Ronald Woodall because Woodall (1) did
not refer Plaintiff to a burn specialist, (2) continued to prescribe the same ointment
despite Plaintiff’s protests that it was ineffective, and (3) is in charge of care
provided at the clinic. Finally, Plaintiff is suing NP Karen Deese because she
refused to refer him to see a burn specialist even though he expressed fears of losing
his legs. See (ECF No. 1); (ECF No. 7); (ECF No. 30-2).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
a. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment is
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

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material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its
opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as
to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586 (1986). “[T]he nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
“A genuine dispute of material fact means that ‘evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Royal v. CCC & R
Tres Arboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). If the evidence presented by the nonmovant
“‘is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,’ summary judgment is
appropriate.” Cutting Underwater Techs. USA, Inc. v. ENI U.S. Operating Co., 671
F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). In deciding
whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court views the evidence and
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. RSR Corp. v. Int’l
Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010).
b. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner pursuing a civil action seeking redress from
government employees, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104134, 110 Stat. 1321, H.R. 3019 (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections
of the U.S.C.), applies and requires that this case be screened.

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The PLRA provides that “the Court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). Thus, the statute “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a
claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to
pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose
factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32
(1992).
B. Analysis
The Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 30) filed by Defendants
Woodall and Deese argues that Woodall and Deese are entitled to qualified
immunity against Plaintiff’s claims because undisputed record evidence
demonstrates that Plaintiff has received necessary and appropriate medical care; no
constitutional violation has occurred. (ECF No. 31, at 4-5). Plaintiff responds that
summary judgment is inappropriate because material issues of fact remain as to
whether Defendants should have referred him to see a burn specialist. (ECF No. 40,
at 2-5). Moreover, says Plaintiff, he has alleged cognizable claims for deliberate
indifference because Defendants Deese and Woodall “(1) knew that Plaintiff was a
diabetic and that the unhealing burn injuries could result in loss of limbs (legs) or
life; and (2) Defendants failed to respond reasonably to Plaintiff’s serious medical
needs.” Id. at 6.

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Defendant Fisher’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 35) argues that
Fisher is entitled to sovereign immunity, insofar as Plaintiff seeks monetary
damages against him in his official capacities, and that he is otherwise entitled to
qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s claims because Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim against him. (ECF No. 36, at 5-10). Fisher submits that Plaintiff has not
alleged Fisher personally took action or implemented a policy to affect Plaintiff’s
circumstances, and Fisher cannot be held liable under a theory of supervisory
liability. Id. at 7-8). Plaintiff responds that Fisher, as Commissioner of MDOC, is
“responsible for the overall safety and general well-being of Plaintiff, and ensuring
that MDOC policies are followed by MDOC staff members, employees, and agents,”
yet Fisher has not provided a reason for why Plaintiff was denied his request to be
examined by a burn specialist. (ECF No. 41, at 3-6).
Plaintiff disputes whether Defendants’ actions amount to deliberate
indifference towards a substantial risk of serious harm, but he does not dispute that
he received the care documented in his medical records (ECF No. 34). The material
facts are therefore not at issue, and the record is ripe for summary judgment.
Defendants raise the affirmative defenses of sovereign immunity and qualified
immunity. However, the Court need not address Fisher’s arguments concerning
sovereign immunity because Plaintiff clarified that he seeks only injunctive relief.
Accordingly, the Court proceeds to the issue of qualified immunity.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

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established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Accordingly, a government official is entitled
to immunity from suit unless (1) Plaintiff has made allegations sufficient to show a
violation of a constitutional right, and (2) the right at issue was “clearly
established” at the time of the official’s alleged misconduct. Id. at 232 (citing
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). When a government official raises the
defense of qualified immunity to a Section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must provide
Aallegations of fact focusing specifically on the conduct of the individual who caused
the plaintiff=s injury.@ Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999). Defendants
can only be held liable for their own actions or inactions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
liability may not be found by way of a respondeat superior theory. Bustos v. Martini
Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 468 (5th Cir. 2010).
“It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the
conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment.”2 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The Eighth
Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits
deprivations that are not specifically a part of a prison sentence, but are “suffered
during imprisonment.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). This protection requires prison officials to “provide

The Eighth Amendment is made applicable to the State of Mississippi and its agencies by virtue of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991).
2

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humane conditions of confinement,” which includes ensuring that inmates receive
adequate medical care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
Determining the viability of a claim over conditions of confinement requires
an inquiry into the defendant prison official’s state of mind. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302.
Only where the prison official exhibits “deliberate indifference” towards a
“substantial risk of serious harm” will an Eight Amendment violation be found.
Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2006). Thus, a prisoner must
prove (1) an “objective exposure to a substantial risk of serious harm,” (2) the prison
official’s knowledge of that risk, and (3) the prison official’s disregard for that risk.
Id.
The Fifth Circuit has elaborated upon the deliberate indifference standard in
the context of medical care:
Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or
medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate
indifference, nor does a prisoner's disagreement with his
medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances.
Furthermore, the decision whether to provide additional
treatment is a classic example of a matter for medical
judgment. A showing of deliberate indifference requires the
prisoner to submit evidence that prison officials refused to
treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated
him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that
would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious
medical needs.
Id. at 346 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Deliberate indifference
is an extremely high standard to meet.” Id. (citing Domino v. Texas Dep't of
Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001)).

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Having considered Plaintiff’s allegations and the undisputed record, the
Courts concludes that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his constitutional
rights were violated. Regardless of whether Plaintiff has asserted his exposure to a
substantial risk of serious harm and Defendants’ knowledge of that risk, Plaintiff’s
allegations fail to establish any individual defendant’s deliberate indifference
towards Plaintiff’s medical needs.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant
Fisher. “Well settled Section 1983 jurisprudence establishes that supervisory
officials cannot be held vicariously liable for their subordinates' actions.” Mouille v.
City of Live Oak, Tex., 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978)). “Supervisory officials
may be held liable only if: (i) they affirmatively participate in acts that cause
constitutional deprivation; or (ii) implement unconstitutional policies that causally
result in plaintiff's injury.” Id. (citing Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir.
1987)). Plaintiff’s allegations against Fisher state only a claim for vicarious liability.
He describes no actions taken by Fisher.
Moreover, his assertion that Fisher failed to ensure that Dr. Woodall and NP
Deese referred him to a burn specialist must fail because Fisher – the
Commissioner of MDOC – is not a medical professional. Fisher has “no authority or
responsibility to evaluate patients or order any type of medical treatment.” Hunt v.
Barry Telford Unit, TDCJ, No. 5:15CV152, 2017 WL 1100721, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar.
24, 2017). “[P]rison officials who are not medical professionals are entitled to rely on

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the [medical] opinions of medical professionals.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Lee
v. Young, 533 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Significantly, in determining the best
way to handle an inmate's medical needs, prison officials who are not medical
professionals are entitled to rely on the opinions of medical professionals.”); Estes v.
Rahorst, No. 2:11-CV-0023, 2013 WL 5422874, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2013)
(“Defendant Wallace, a clinic administrator, was entitled to rely upon the judgment
of plaintiff’s treating physicians and other medical professionals.”). Even if Fisher
had known about the specialist referral Plaintiff sought, Fisher is not responsible
for the treatment decisions made by Dr. Woodall and NP Deese. Fisher is therefore
entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s claims.
The Court turns next to the alleged deliberate indifference of Dr. Woodall and
NP Deese. Plaintiff’s medical records show that Plaintiff went to the infirmary on
October 10, 2014 for a chemical burn suffered the previous day while “helping out in
the laundry.” (ECF No. 34, at 332). He was seen by a nurse practitioner, Gwendolyn
Woodland, who noted that Plaintiff presented with a first-degree burn to his left
lateral shin but denied any pain in his left leg. Woodland provided wound care,
scheduled future wound care, prescribed a cream for Plaintiff to apply to the burn,
and scheduled a follow up visit for two-weeks’ time. See Id. at 332-34. He was seen
on October 12, 2014 and October 14, 2014 for wound care by two non-party nurses.
Id. at 335-36. Plaintiff did not show up for scheduled wound care on October 18,
2014. Id. at 337. NP Deese then saw him on October 24, 2014 for the follow up visit
and noted that his abrasions were healing and no longer draining. Id.

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On November 10, 2014, Plaintiff was seen by NP Woodland in order to follow
up on Plaintiff’s abnormal lab results. Id. at 343-45. Woodland noted that Plaintiff
had a history of diabetes mellitus dating back to 2006 but was not consistently
taking his related medication. Id. at 344. Woodland cautioned Plaintiff about the
complications of uncontrolled diabetes and instructed Plaintiff to take all of his
medications as prescribed. Id.
Woodland saw Plaintiff again on December 22, 2014 for chronic care. Id. at
349. Woodland diagnosed Plaintiff with having peripheral vascular disease, which
she described as a condition “where there is a block in a main artery to the lower
extremities impeding the blood flow to the feet and legs causing pain in the back of
the legs called claudication.” Id. at 351. Woodland also noted that records indicated
Plaintiff had twice failed to show up for pill call to receive his diabetes medications,
but Plaintiff disputed the accuracy of those records. Id. at 352. Plaintiff was again
warned of the complications that result from uncontrolled diabetes. Id.
On March 30, 2015, Plaintiff met with NP Deese to discuss his lab results. Id.
at 381. Deese assessed Plaintiff’s control of his diabetes to be “poor” and noted that
Plaintiff was “not compliant” with his morning accuchecks (to measure his glucose
levels) and insulin use. Id. at 384. Deese also documented that Plaintiff presented
with “whitish colored maceration” between his third and fourth toes on his right
foot; there was no drainage or erythema. Id. She prescribed Plaintiff Tolnaftate, an
antifungal cream, and scheduled a chronic care follow up for one month’s time. Id.

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at 388. However, Plaintiff was unable to show for his follow-up because of an
institutional lockdown. Id. at 398.
At Plaintiff’s chronic care visit on June 22, 2015, NP Deese noted that
Plaintiff’s right lower leg had “areas of thickened, scaly, crusted skin,” which was
the “healed burn site.” Id. at 412. Deese again noted Plaintiff’s noncompliance with
his diabetes medications and discussed the long term consequences of uncontrolled
diabetes with Plaintiff. Id. Deese prescribed A+D skin ointment for Plaintiff to
apply twice daily. Id. at 415.
On August 7, 2015, Plaintiff went to sick call with complaints of pain and
drainage from his former burn site. Id. at 426-27. He was seen by NP Deese who
observed “[t]hickened, cracked, scaly skin” with a “[l]inear cracked area” of
approximately 0.5cm in length on his right lower leg. Id. at 427. Deese saw a small
amount of crusted drainage, no active drainage, and noted that the skin was
slightly warmer to the touch. Id. She prescribed Bactrim tablets, Lubrisoft lotion,
and Silvadene cream and ordered a schedule of wound care. Id. at 427-29.
Plaintiff had the dressing on his leg changed on August 9, 2015. Id. at 430.
The nurse noted dead skin but no drainage. Id. When his dressing was again
changed on August 11, 2015, no edema or drainage was noted and his skin was
intact and without odor. Id. at 431. No open wound was noted when his dressing
was changed on August 14, 2015 and August 19, 2015. Id. at 432-33. No skin
conditions were noted in Plaintiff’s September 14, 2015 chronic care visit with NP
Deese. Id. at 445. When he was again counseled about his noncompliance with

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maintenance of his diabetes and of the long term effects of uncontrolled diabetes,
NP Deese noted that Plaintiff appeared “apathetic.” Id. at 447.
On September 18, 2015, Plaintiff went to sick call with complaints related to
having suffered a chemical burn seven months prior. NP Woodland noted that
Plaintiff did not appear to be in distress and that both of his legs had healed lesions
– the skin was intact but was very dry and scaly. Id. at 449. Woodland prescribed
the same topical A+D ointment. Id. at 450. He again went to sick call on October 13,
2015, complaining of pain and swelling in his legs and feet, and dry skin on his legs.
Id. at 460. He reported that the prescribed ointment was not relieving his dry skin.
Id. NP Deese prescribed Lubrisoft lotion and directed Plaintiff to elevate his legs
when possible and follow up at sick call as needed. Id. at 462. Deese also ordered
Plaintiff knee-high compression stockings for his leg swelling. Id. at 463.
On November 3, 2015, NP Deese saw Plaintiff for a chronic care visit. Id. at
470. She noted a few areas of “whitish colored maceration between toes of bilateral
feet” and continued poor management of his diabetes – he had “improved with
compliance slightly.” Id. at 472-74. His next chronic care visit was December 9,
2015, wherein NP Deese noted that the skin on his lower legs was “grossly
thickened and scaly with what appears to be scant areas of crusted drainage.” Id. at
492-93.
On December 16, 2015, he was called multiple times by nurses for an Unna
Boot, which is a compression dressing with zinc oxide, but failed to show. Id. at 497.

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His legs were wrapped with Unna Boots on December 17, 2015, and again on
December 22, 2015. Id. at 498-99.
During Plaintiff’s chronic care visit on April 12, 2016, NP Deese noted
“scattered whitish colored areas between some toes” and “thickened, scaly skin” on
his lower legs, but “no areas of excoriation.” Id. at 540-41. He was still noted to be
noncompliant with his diet, regular glucose-level checks, and insulin use. Id. at 543.
Deese prescribed Tolnafate cream and A+D ointment. Id. at 544. On June 14, 2016,
NP Deese noted neuropathy as a complication of Plaintiff’s diabetes, which he
continued to manage poorly. Id. at 573. Deese again prescribed Lubrisoft lotion and
A+D ointment for his lower legs, which she observed to have no open areas of
drainage. Id. at 573, 576.
Plaintiff’s undisputed medical records reflect that he has received
considerable and regular care for his leg condition. He similarly testified to the fact
that he received regular care, but he argues that this care was – and is –
inadequate. However, Plaintiff’s desire to be seen by an outside burn specialist does
not render inconsequential the medical care that he did receive for his skin
condition. Plaintiff’s records demonstrate that the initial wound caused by the burn
healed over the course of several weeks. NP Deese has submitted a sworn affidavit
in which she opines that (1) “Mr. Campbell is a diabetic who suffers from venous
insufficiency,” (2) “most, if not all, of his skin problems were related to his venous
insufficiency,” (3) “he does not need to see an outside specialist,” (4) “he was noncompliant with his diabetic medication and with his treatment for skin problems,”

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and (5) “[w]hen he is compliant with his medications his skin problems will resolve.”
(ECF No. 30-3, at 1-2). NP Deese’s conclusions appear to be supported by Plaintiff’s
medical records, but, regardless, the Court is not in a position to second-guess the
medical judgment of a trained physician. Domino, 239 F.3d at 756 (citing Estelle,
429 U.S. at 107). Moreover, “Plaintiff has no constitutional right to the best medical
treatment available.” Irby v. Cole, No. 403CV141WHBJCS, 2006 WL 2827551 (S.D.
Miss. Sept. 25, 2006) (citing McMahon v. Beard, 583 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1978)).
On this factual record, and against this legal backdrop, the Court must conclude
that NP Deese and Dr. Woodall’s failure to arrange for Plaintiff to see a burn
specialist does not constitute deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs.
The medical records also demonstrate that Plaintiff was never seen by Dr.
Woodall with regard to his skin complaints. Dr. Woodall submitted a sworn
affidavit attesting to the same. See (ECF No. 30-4, at 1) (“[I] have never seen Mr.
Campbell for his skin complaints or any other complaint related to this litigation.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Woodall must also fail because he did not
directly provide care for Plaintiff and cannot be vicariously liable under § 1983.
Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Marshall Fisher, and
because the record demonstrates that neither Karen Deese nor Ronald Woodall
were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs, Defendants Fisher, Deese,
and Woodall are each entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s claims.

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III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 30), filed by Ronald Woodall and Karen Deese, and the Motion
for Summary Judgment Based on Sovereign and Qualified Immunity (ECF No. 35),
filed by Marshall Fisher, should both be GRANTED.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 30), filed by Ronald Woodall and Karen Deese, and the Motion
for Summary Judgment Based on Sovereign and Qualified Immunity (ECF No. 35),
filed by Marshall Fisher, are both GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed
with prejudice.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 9th day of March, 2018.

s/ John C. Gargiulo

JOHN C. GARGIULO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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