Jones v. Colvin

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 16 Motion to Remand. The Commissioner's decision is upheld, and this case is dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball on 3/12/18. (RLW)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

AMANDA DOROTHY JONES

PLAINTIFF

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-cv-254-FKB

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

DEFENDANT

______________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court regarding the appeal by Amanda Dorothy Jones of the
Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying Jones's application for a period of
disability, Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). In
rendering this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court has carefully reviewed the
Administrative Record [13] regarding Jones=s claims (including the administrative decision, the
medical records, and a transcript of the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ")),
Plaintiff=s Motion [16] and Memorandum [17], and Defendant=s Response [18] and
Memorandum [19]. The parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge [14], and the District Judge has entered an Order of Reference [15]. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.
For the reasons discussed in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the undersigned finds
that the Commissioner=s decision should be affirmed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Jones filed her application for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI on February 26, 2014,
and alleged a disability onset date of November 1, 2007, when she was twenty years of age. [13]

at 90, 168.1 In her application, she alleged that she was disabled due to a learning disability;
knee, shoulder, and ankle problems, including chronic pain in those joints; depression;
granuloma annulare; a learning disability; premenstrual dysphoric disorder; depth perception;
short term memory loss; and “tail bone not straight.” Id. at 99, 174. At the time of her
application, she was five feet, three inches tall, and weighed one hundred pounds. Id.
Jones was born on December 29, 1986. Id. at 99. Thus, she was considered a “younger
individual” at the time of her onset date of November 1, 2007, and on the date the ALJ issued his
decision, February 29, 2016. Id. at 24. She first became insured on April 1, 2008, and was last
insured on March 31, 2010. Id. at 90. Jones attended special education classes through the
twelfth grade, and she received a certificate of completion when she finished high school in
2006. Id. at 38, 175. She completed a class on floral design at a local college. Id. at 38-39.
Jones has a brief work history. She worked as a drug store stock clerk from March to
May 2006. Id. at 98. Thereafter, she worked for two months at a grocery store as a clerk in the
in the produce department, where she cut and displayed fruit. Id. at 44-45, 167. From June 2006
to May 2009, she worked as a cleaner for an industrial cleaning company, at which her mother
was her direct supervisor. Id. at 45-47. During the hearing before the ALJ, her mother testified
that Jones would work only one to two days out of a week during her employment at the
cleaning company. Id. at 81. At the hearing, both the claimant and her mother testified that
Jones does not have a driver’s license. Id. at 51-52, 85.
The Social Security Administration denied Jones=s application initially and upon
reconsideration. Jones requested a hearing, which was held on February 12, 2016, in

1

Citations reflect the original pagination of the administrative record.
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Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Id. at 29. At the hearing, she was represented by counsel, and a
vocational expert testified. Id. On February 29, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision finding that
Jones was not disabled. Id. at 14-24. The Appeals Council denied her request for review on
May 11, 2016, id. at 1, and this appeal followed.
II. MEDICAL HISTORY
Although the briefs have summarized Jones’s medical history, a review of Plaintiff’s
medical conditions will aid in the consideration of this case. The records show that Jones had a
history of endometriosis and abdominal pain, for which she underwent a complete hysterectomy
in October 2015. [13] at 426, 437. At the hearing in February 2016, she testified that the
surgery had helped her abdominal pain. Id. at 57.
At the hearing, Jones testified that she was born with birth defects that were the source of
pain in her right knee, right ankle, and right shoulder. Id. at 48-50. She explained that both of
her knees pointed to the right, and that her right shoulder was too big for her body. Id. at 49.
Although a shoulder sprain was first identified on April 10, 2007, Jones did not complain of joint
pain at a routine visit two days later with her treating nurse practitioner, Jodi T. Powell, APRNNPC. Id. at 486-487. At subsequent, routine appointments in April 2011 and March 2014, Jones
reported “no arthralgias,” but complained of shoulder joint pain in March 2014. Id. at 470-471,
478. At a September 2014 routine check up with Powell, Jones complained of generalized joint
pain, and Powell commented that Jones had “scoliosis to the right.” Id. at 464-465. However, in
January 2016, Powell treated Jones for a rib contusion resulting from “rough housing” with
friends. Id. at 458. At the same appointment, Jones denied joint stiffness. Id. at 459.
Powell also initially diagnosed with Jones with seasonal pattern depression in March

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2014, which coincided with the dissolution of her marriage. Id. at 470-472. At that time, Powell
prescribed Lexapro, which she renewed for Jones at a subsequent check up in September 2014.
Id. at 464. At that check up, Jones reported that she thought the Lexapro was helping. Id. After
a routine visit in March 2015, Powell commented that Jones was currently in therapy. Id. at 462.
In September 2014, Jones sought a psychological evaluation from the Pearl River County
Hospital, where a nurse practitioner saw her. Id. at 418. The nurse practitioner diagnosed Jones
with depression, and she noted that Jones’s condition was currently responding to treatment. Id.
at 419. From September 2014 until January 2015, Jones sought treatment on three occasions
from the same nurse practitioner, who prescribed a sleep aid and medication for treatment of
depression, and who commented that Jones’s condition was responding to treatment. Id. at 421,
423, 425. It does not appear that she sought psychological counseling on a regular basis until
February 2016, about the time of her hearing. Id. at 510.
Patsy H. Zakaras, Ph.D., conducted a consultative psychological evaluation of Jones in
July 2014. Id. at 404. Dr. Zakaras described Jones as “polite and cooperative,” with “good
social skills.” Id. at 405. The examiner also described that Jones was oriented in all spheres, and
that her thought processes were logical and goal oriented. Id. Dr. Zakaras administered the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale IV, on which Jones had a verbal comprehension score of 78, a
perceptual reasoning score of 79, a working memory score of 83, a processing speed score of 79,
and a full scale IQ score of 75. Id. at 405. Dr. Zakaras also administered the Wide Range
Achievement Test IV, which showed that Jones functioned on a third grade level in reading and
spelling, and in the upper second grade level in math. Id. Dr. Zakaras diagnosed Jones with a
learning disorder, not otherwise specified. Id. Dr. Zakaras concluded that Jones “seems capable

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of performing simple routine repetitive tasks. She appears capable of following and
understanding simple directions. She appears capable of relating to others and interacting with
others.” Id. at 406. Dr. Zakaras also concluded that Jones “appears capable of very basic money
management but may need some assistance with managing her finances.” Id.
Jones’s treating nurse practitioner, Jodi Powell, and primary care provider, Michael
Casey, M.D., signed a Medical Assessment of Ability to do Work-Related Activities, and a
Physical Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire on September 28, 2014.2 Id. at 407-414.
In the medical assessment, the form reflects that they diagnosed Jones with Axis I: depression,
Axis II: learning disability, Axis III: diffuse joint pain, and Axis IV: divorce. Id. at 407.
Regarding occupational adjustments, they concluded that she would have slight limitations in her
ability to relate to co-workers and interact with a supervisor. Id. at 408. They found that she
would have moderate limitations in her ability to follow work rules, deal with the public, use
judgment, and maintain attention and concentration. Id. They also found that she would have
extreme limitation in dealing with work stresses and functioning independently. Id. The form
indicates that Jones would have an extreme limitation in understanding, remembering, and
carrying out complex job instructions; moderate limitation in understanding, remembering, and
carrying out detailed, but not complex job instructions; and slight limitation in understanding,
remembering, and carrying out simple job instructions. Id. The form indicates that Jones would
have a slight limitation in maintaining personal appearance and moderate limitation in behaving
in an emotionally stable manner, relating predictably in social situations, and demonstrating
reliability. Id. at 409. The form indicates that Jones has delayed processing, and that she cannot

2

Although Dr. Casey is identified as Jones’s primary care provider, and he signed the questionnaires, the records do

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manage benefits in her own best interest. Id.
The Physical Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire indicates that Powell and
Casey diagnosed Jones with depression and a learning disability, and that Jones’s prognosis was
fair. Id. at 410. The form described that she had moderate pain in her right shoulder, knee, and
ankle, that she experienced daily and with activity since 2006. Id. They identified the clinical
findings and objective signs as crepitus to the right knee, right shoulder range of movement, and
slowed speech. Id. The form describes that Jones was being treated with daily Lexapro for
depression, and another medication, which is illegible. Id.
The questionnaire stated that her impairments will last at least twelve months, that she is
not a malingerer, that emotional factors contribute to her symptoms, and that the psychological
conditions of depression and anxiety affect her physical condition. Id. at 411. The form
described that her experience of pain and other symptoms were constantly severe enough to
interfere with her attention and concentration. Id. The questionnaire stated that Jones is
incapable of even a “low stress” job because she is learning disabled and unable to make hard
decisions, and that she had pain in her right knee, shoulder, and ankle. Id. The questionnaire
stated that Jones could walk less than two city blocks due to joint pain. Id.
The questionnaire indicated that Jones could only sit thirty minutes at one time and stand
for fifteen minutes. Id. at 412. Powell indicated that Jones could sit and stand/walk for less than
two hours in an eight-hour day. She also stated that Jones would need to walk around after
fifteen minutes, for five minutes at a time. Id. Powell stated that Jones would not need a job that
permitted shifting positions at will, but would need to take unscheduled breaks to rest for longer

not demonstrate that Dr. Casey examined Jones. See id. at 458-491. He is described as the “referring provider” in

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than ten minutes before returning to work. Id.
Powell estimated that Jones could occasionally lift and carry less than ten pounds
occasionally, but never left and carry more than ten pounds. Id. at 413. According to the form,
Jones could occasionally twist, rarely stoop, and never crouch, climb ladders, or climb stairs. Id.
Although no significant limitations were indicated for repetitive reaching, handling, or
fingering, the nurse practitioner limited the use of hands/fingers/arms to a small percentage of an
eight-hour workday. Id.
The form concluded that Jones’s impairments were likely to produce “good days” and
“bad days,” and that she would miss more than four days per month from work as a result of the
impairments or treatment. Id. at 414. The questionnaire also stated that Jones “is unable to
provide care for herself 100%. She requires assistance to complete tasks.” Id.
Plaintiff also has been diagnosed with a skin condition, granuloma annulare. According
to the Mayo Clinic, it is a “skin condition that most commonly consists of raised, reddish or
skin-colored bumps (lesions) that form ring patterns,” usually on the hands and feet. See
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/granuloma-annulare/symptoms-causes/syc20351319. In most cases, the skin condition is not painful and usually disappears within two
years. Id. It is also treatable with a variety of medications, including corticosteroid creams,
ointments, and injections, as well as oral medications. Id. Jones’s treatment records do not
indicate that she was prescribed medications for this condition.
III. HEARING AND DECISION

Powell’s bills. Id. at 488-491.

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In his February 29, 2016, decision, the ALJ evaluated Jones=s impairments using the
familiar sequential evaluation process3 and found that she has the severe impairments of
depression and anxiety. [13] at 17. The ALJ concluded that Jones’s right shoulder, knee, and
ankle pain, as well as her learning disorder/possible borderline intellectual functioning were not
severe. Id.
At the next step, the ALJ determined that Jones does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. The ALJ found that Jones has the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform light work as defined by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), with the
following limitations: she must never climb ladders, ropes, but she may occasionally climb

3

In evaluating a disability claim, the ALJ is to engage in a five-step sequential process, making
the following determinations:
(1)

whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity (if so, a
finding of “not disabled” is made);

(2)

whether the claimant has a severe impairment (if not, a finding of “not disabled”
is made);

(3)

whether the impairment is listed, or equivalent to an impairment listed, in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (if so, then the claimant is found to be
disabled);

(4)

whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work (if
not, the claimant is found to be not disabled); and

(5)

whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing any other
substantial gainful activity (if so, the claimant is found to be disabled).

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The analysis ends at the point at which a finding of
disability or non-disability is required. The burden to prove disability rests upon the claimant
throughout the first four steps; if the claimant is successful in sustaining his burden through step
four, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558,
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ramps and stairs; she may occasionally reach overhead with right arm and shoulder; and may
perform only simple, routine tasks involving occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers,
and the general public. Id. at 19.
In making the determination of Jones’s RFC, the ALJ concluded that Jones’s medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but her
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of the symptoms were not
entirely credible. Id. at 20. The ALJ gave great weight to the opinions of Dr. Zakaras, the
consulting psychologist. Id. at 21. Citing Jodi Powell’s lack of mental health licensure in the
state of Mississippi and that she is not a medical doctor, the ALJ gave no significant weight to
the opinion of Powell, Jones’s treating nurse practitioner. Id. The ALJ also gave no significant
weight to the opinion of “Michael Coy,” whom the ALJ did not consider as a medical doctor. Id.
The Court interprets “Michael Coy” as Michael Casey, M.D., who is listed as Jones’s primary
care provider. Id. Even so, the ALJ discounted the opinions of Powell and Casey because they
were not consistent with the evidence of record. Id. at 22. The ALJ gave great weight to the
opinions of non-examining, state agency doctors, and some weight to the function report
completed by Jones’s mother. Id.
At step four, the ALJ found that Jones is capable of performing her past relevant work as
a stocker. Id. at 22. At the final step, relying upon the testimony of the Vocational Expert
(“VE”), and considering the extent to which Jones’s limitations erode the unskilled light
occupational base, the ALJ concluded that Jones can perform the jobs of small parts assembler,
bench assembler, and electric worker, all of which are sedentary in exertional demand and

564 (5th Cir. 1995).
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unskilled, with a specific vocational preparation level of 2. Id. at 23. Therefore, the ALJ
determined that Jones was not disabled from November 1, 2007, through the date of the decision,
February 29, 2016. Id. at 24.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court=s review is limited to an inquiry into whether there is substantial evidence to
support the Commissioner=s findings, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971), and
whether the correct legal standards were applied, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006). Accord Falco v.
Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1994); Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990).
The Fifth Circuit has defined the Asubstantial evidence@ standard as follows:
Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. It must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of
the fact to be established, but Ano substantial evidence@ will be found only where
there is a Aconspicuous absence of credible choices@ or Ano contrary medical
evidence.@
Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983). In applying the substantial evidence
standard, the Court must carefully examine the entire record, but must refrain from re-weighing
the evidence or substituting its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d
552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995). Conflicts in the evidence and credibility assessments are for the
Commissioner and not for the courts to resolve. Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir.
1995). Hence, if the Commissioner=s decision is supported by the evidence, and the proper legal
standards were applied, the decision is conclusive and must be upheld by this Court. Paul v.
Shalala, 29 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds, Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S.
103 (2000).
V. DISCUSSION OF THE ALLEGED ERRORS
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AND APPLICABLE LAW
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ=s decision should be reversed and/or remanded based on the
following reasons:
1. The ALJ and/or the Appeals Council committed an error of law in assessing the
existence, severity and/or effect of Amanda’s shoulder, knee, ankle, learning
disability/intellectual disorder, Granular Allaloma, and endometriosis
impairments at step two;
2. That substantial evidence exists to establish the existence, severity and/or
effect of Amanda’s shoulder, knee, ankle, learning disability/intellectual
disorder, Granular Allaloma, and endometriosis impairments at step two;
3. The ALJ committed an error of law in finding that Amanda had past
relevant work as a stocker pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565;
4. Substantial evidence exists that Amanda’s prior job as a stocker was not
past relevant work pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565;
5. The ALJ and Appeals Council committed an error of law by failing to
consider the extent of any limitations caused by all of Amanda’s physicial
and mental impairments in determining Amanda’s residual functional
capacity to engage in work setting; and
6. The Failure by the ALJ and the Appeals Council to follow the applicable
legal standards regarding considering all of Amanda’s impairments; and,
in failing to consider substantial evidence in the consideration constitutes
prejudice for which reversal is warranted.
[17] at 1-2.
A. Did the ALJ and Appeals Council properly consider Jones’s alleged impairments?
Jones argues that the ALJ and the Appeals Council committed an error of law when
assessing the severity of her alleged impairments, and that substantial evidence establishes that
her shoulder, knee, ankle, learning disability/intellectual disorder, granuloma annulare, and
endometriosis impairments are severe. Furthermore, Jones argues that the ALJ erred by ignoring
her nurse practitioner’s and treating doctor’s assessments of her impairments.
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To prove disability resulting from pain, an individual must establish a medically
determinable impairment that is capable of producing disabling pain. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a),
416.929(a)(1997); Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 556 (5th Cir. 1995). Once a medical
impairment is established, the subjective complaints of pain must be considered along with the
medical evidence in determining the individual=s work capacity. Id.
A review of the records demonstrates that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
determination that these conditions were not severe. Although she had a distant history of a
shoulder sprain in 2007, and a recent history of complaints of pain in her shoulders and joints in
2014, interim records substantiate that she made no complaints of joint pain. Furthermore, there
are no radiological or other tests substantiating her claims of pain related to her joints. At the
hearing in February 2016, she testified that her hysterectomy had helped her abdominal pain.
Although she argues that the ALJ failed to consider her skin condition of granuloma annulare, no
medical professional has identified physical restrictions related to it or prescribed medications to
treat it. Furthermore, in March 2014, her skin was negative for rash or bruising. [13] at 256.
With regard to her learning disorder/possible borderline intellectual functioning, the
consulting psychologist found that she was capable of following and understanding simple
directions. Id. at 406. Her school records support this conclusion, finding in 2001 that her
strengths were that she was an “extremely hard worker,” she completed “all assignments in a
timely manner,” and she was “very dependable and friendly.” Id. at 266. Although she
functioned between the second and fourth grade levels at that time, she worked at the school
concession stand and achieved 100 % of her academic and vocational goals. Id. Furthermore,
her activities of daily living, such as personal grooming and hygiene, riding a bike, caring for

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pets, performing household chores, sewing, and shopping, support the ALJ’s conclusion that she
can perform at least simple tasks. See [13] at 192-193; Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 565 n.12
(5th Cir. 1995)(“It is appropriate for the Court to consider the claimant’s daily activities when
deciding the claimant’s disability status.”).
Because the ALJ=s opinion shows that the ALJ considered Jones=s complaints of pain
along with her activities and the medical evidence, the undersigned finds that the record contains
substantial evidence to support the ALJ=s decision and must give considerable deference to the
ALJ=s evaluation of the plaintiff=s credibility and severity of limitations. Wren v. Sullivan, 925
F.2d 123, 128 (5th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion.
The ALJ also did not err by giving “no significant weight” to the opinion of her treating
nurse practitioner, Jodi Powell or to Michael Casey, a doctor who is listed in the medical records
as Jones’s primary care provider. An ALJ must show good cause for giving little or no weight to
the opinion of a treating source. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455–56 (5th Cir. 2000). Good
cause may be shown where the opinion is conclusory, unsupported by the medical evidence, or
otherwise bereft of substantial support. Id. at 456. Furthermore, the treating physician=s opinions
are far from conclusive because the ALJ has the sole responsibility for determining disability
status. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1994).
Under the regulations, a nurse practitioner is not considered an acceptable medical
source. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a). Although a nurse practitioner falls under the category of
“other sources” in § 416.913(d), the ALJ is not obligated to consider evidence offered by those
sources. Furthermore, despite the ALJ’s misidentification of Casey as “Michael Coy,” this error
does not provide a basis for reversal. Although Michael Casey signed the medical assessment

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and the physical residual functional capacity questionnaire, there is no evidence in the record
that the doctor ever examined Jones.
More importantly to the Court, and true to the directive of Newton, substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Powell’s opinions were not consistent with the evidence. In
his opinion, the ALJ discussed the ways the psychological and physical evidence in Powell’s
treatment record did not support her opinions. [13] at 22. The Court’s review of the record
demonstrates that Powell’s picture of Jones, as presented by the medical assessment and the
questionnaire, is at odds with her own records and other evidence in the record. For instance, in
January 2016, Powell evaluated Jones for complaints of rib pain “after rough housing with
friends.” [13] at 458. In May 2014, the claimant’s mother stated that Jones goes biking and
walking, including that she could walk a mile before needing to stop and rest. Id. at 192. At the
hearing, Plaintiff testified that she regularly accompanied her mother while shopping and on
errands. Id. at 66. However, in her September 2014 questionnaire, Powell stated that Jones
could walk less than two blocks due to joint pain. Id. at 411. Accordingly, because the ALJ
showed good cause for giving “no significant weight” to Powell’s opinions, the ALJ did not err,
and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.
B. Did the ALJ commit an error of law and does substantial evidence
support the ALJ’s finding regarding Jones’s past relevant work?
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding that her past light, semi-skilled work as a
stocker qualified as “past relevant work” pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565 because her past
work did not equate to “substantial gainful activity.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565(a). More
specifically, Jones argues that this work should be characterized as an unsuccessful work attempt

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because her wages were insufficient and the job only lasted three months, from March to May,
2006.
Assuming, without deciding, that the ALJ erred when he characterized Jones’s past work
as a stocker as substantial gainful activity, this error was harmless. See Morris v. Bowen, 864
F.2d 333, 334 (5th Cir. 1988). With the assistance of vocational expert testimony, the ALJ
identified three sedentary, unskilled jobs that Plaintiff, with her limitations as recognized by the
RFC, could perform. See Hoelck v. Astrue, 261 Fed. App’x 683, 687 (5th Cir. 2008).
Furthermore, Jones has not satisfied her burden of rebutting the ALJ’s finding that she could
perform the alternative sedentary jobs of small parts assembler, bench assembler, and electrical
worker. See Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1999)(finding that if the
Commissioner determines that a claimant is capable of performing other gainful employment,
the claimant must prove that the claimant cannot in fact perform the alternate work).
C. Did the ALJ and the Appeals Council commit an error of
law in determining her residual functional capacity?
Jones argues that the ALJ and the Appeals Council failed to consider the disabling effect
of each of her ailments and the combined effect of all of her impairments when deciding her
residual functional capacity.
By statute, an ALJ is required to discuss the evidence offered in support of a claimant’s
claim for disability and explain why the claimant is found not to be disabled. Audler v. Astrue,
501 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, the “ALJ is not always required to do an
exhaustive point-by-point discussion.” Id.

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The undersigned has reviewed the medical evidence of record and examined the ALJ’s
opinion. A review of the ALJ’s decision shows that the ALJ fully discussed the evidence of
record and considered Jones’s record-supported impairments in reaching his decision. The ALJ
states that he considered all of her symptoms, her medically determinable impairments, and the
entire case record, and his decision bears this out. Id. at 19-20. The ALJ discussed Jones’s
medical evidence as well as her hearing testimony, pointed out where medical evidence existed
to support her contentions, as well as the lack of medical evidence supporting her contentions.
[13] at 19-22. The undersigned finds that this argument does not provide a basis for remand or
reversal.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff’s Motion to
Remand [16] is hereby denied. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is hereby upheld, and
this case is dismissed with prejudice. A separate judgment will be entered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.
SO ORDERED, this the 12th day of March, 2018.
/s/ F. Keith Ball
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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