Donald v. National Truck Funding, LLC
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 2 Motion to Compel; granting 2 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Halil S. Ozerden on 3/22/17. (JCH)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NATIONAL TRUCK FUNDING, LLC
Civil No. 1:16cv403-HSO-JCG
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION  TO COMPEL ARBITRATION OR, ALTERNATIVELY,
RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE
A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
BEFORE THE COURT is the Motion  to Compel Arbitration or,
Alternatively, Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon
Which Relief Can Be Granted filed by Defendant National Truck Funding, LLC.
This Motion is fully briefed. Having considered the Motion , related pleadings,
the record, and relevant legal authority, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant’s
Motion  should be granted to the extent it seeks to compel arbitration, and the
parties will be ordered to submit the disputed matter to arbitration.
This case will
This dispute arises out of Plaintiff Schlonda Donald’s (“Plaintiff” or “Donald”)
rental of certain trucks from Defendant National Truck Funding, LLC (“Defendant”
or “National Truck”).
Donald “signed four separate rental agreements to purchase
four different models of freightliners with National Truck Funding:
June 30, 2014;
August 8, 2014; and August 12, 2014.” Pl.’s Aff. [6-1] at 1; see also Rental
Agreements [1-2] at 16-41. “In addition to the written Commercial Truck Rental
Agreements, Donald also purchased contract upgrades to hold National Truck liable
for a percentage or the entirety for all covered repairs needed within a designated
Compl. [1-2] at 11.1
The four Commercial Truck Rental Agreements between Plaintiff and
National Truck were each six pages long, and each Agreement contained the
following provisions on the sixth and final page:
XII. JURISDICTION AND RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
Jurisdiction and Governing Law:
Any legal dispute arising for
whatever reason as a result of this Rental Agreement will be resolved in
the Courts of Harrison County, Mississippi, if not arbitrated as
mandated below and will be governed by the laws and legal rules of the
courts of the State of Mississippi. It is agreed that it shall be a bench
trial without a jury . . . .
Arbitration: This will apply to any claim, dispute, or controversy
(whether based upon contract or tort; intentional or otherwise; arising
out of state or federal constitution, statute, common law, or equity, and
whether preexisting, present or future), including initial claims,
counter-claims, cross-claims, and third party claims, arising from or
relating to this Rental Agreement or the relationships which result from
this Rental Agreement, including the validity or enforceability of this
arbitration clause, any part thereof or the entire Rental Agreement.
All claims shall be resolved by binding arbitration pursuant to this
arbitration provision and the applicable rates and procedures of the
arbitration administration selected at the time the claim is filed. The
party initiating the arbitration shall have the right to select one of the
following two arbitration administrators: The National Arbitration
Forum (“NAF”) or The American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). The
arbitrator shall be a lawyer with more than ten years of experience or a
It does not appear that these “contract upgrades” are contained anywhere in the record.
retired or former judge. We agree not to invoke our right to arbitrate
an individual claim you may bring in small claims court in Harrison
County, MS, so long as the claim is pending only in that court. Our
address for service of process under this provision is: National Truck
Funding, LLC, 9140 Canal Rd., Gulfport, MS 39503. Any arbitration
hearing shall take place in the city of Gulfport, Mississippi. National
Truck Funding, LLC and the Customer shall each pay an equal amount
of any arbitration fees and related charges. Each party, however, shall
be responsible for payment of their own respective legal counsel.
This arbitration provision shall survive termination of your account as
well as the repayment of all amounts due and owing on your account, or
your deposits. If any portion of this arbitration provision is deemed
invalid or unenforceable under any state or federal law or statute, it
shall not invalidate the remaining portions of this arbitration provision
or the unaffected portions of the overall Rental Agreement . . . .
Rental Agreements [1-2] at 21, 28, 35, 41.
The foregoing provisions of each Rental Agreement appear in the same font
as the other sections of the respective Rental Agreements. See id.
executed each page of each Rental Agreement, including the last page containing
the arbitration provision, which was also signed by a representative of National
Truck. See id. Immediately above Donald’s signature on the Rental Agreements
as the “Customer” is a provision stating that “[t]he below-signed Customer does
acknowledge that he/she has read this Rental Agreement in its entirety and agrees
to all terms and conditions herein.” Id.
On October 5, 2016, Donald filed a Complaint against National Truck in the
County Court of Harrison County, Mississippi, First Judicial District, Compl. [1-2]
at 9, alleging that “[s]hortly after taking possession of the trucks, Donald suffered
serious mechanical breakdowns, by no fault of Donald’s, making the use of the
trucks for their intended purposes impossible,” id. at 12. According to the
Complaint, “[p]er the language of the contracts, Donald’s necessary repairs were
covered under the additional purchased contract upgrades; however, National Truck
failed to properly remedy the problems.” Id.
In February 2014, “National Truck
repossessed all trucks that were in possession of Donald.” Id.
asserts claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability, breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,
and conversion. Id. at 12-14.
On November 8, 2016, National Truck removed the case to this Court on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction. Notice of Removal  at 1-2. On November 10,
2016, National Truck filed the present Motion  to Compel Arbitration or,
Alternatively, Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon
Which Relief Can Be Granted. National Truck “seeks to compel contractually
agreed-to arbitration between the parties,” and alternatively asks that Donald’s
Complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Def.’s Mot.  at 1-2.
Plaintiff responds that the arbitration agreements are invalid and
unenforceable because they are procedurally and substantively unconscionable
under Mississippi law.
Pl.’s Mem.  at 4-8.
Plaintiff contends that the
arbitration provisions are procedurally unconscionable because “[n]ot only did none
of the Defendant’s employees explain or mention the Arbitration Provision to Mrs.
Donald, she also did not even have an opportunity to examine the Arbitration
Provision herself.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff maintains that the arbitration agreements
appear on a standard, preprinted form drafted by Defendant which is in the same
style and print as the remainder of the Rental Agreements, which supports a
finding of procedural unconscionability.
Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff argues that Donald
has no legal training or knowledge of arbitration and was unaware of the
constitutional rights that she was waiving. Id. at 5.
Plaintiff next asserts that the arbitration provisions are substantively
unconscionable because the Rental Agreements constitute contracts of adhesion and
because Donald did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive her
constitutional right to a jury trial. Id. at 6-8. According to Plaintiff,
Defendants have made no showing that Mrs. Donald was fully aware of
the significance and consequences of the language of the Arbitration
Provision. Furthermore, the Arbitration Provision was pre-printed on a
form contract which was a necessary condition of the sale, and there was
a great disparity in the bargaining power between the parties. Mrs.
Donald was an individual with little to no resources and the Defendant
was a corporation with businesses in multiple states.
Id. at 8. Plaintiff further maintains that she “cannot afford to pay the fees
required to arbitrate this dispute that is before this Court and thus her access to
justice would be denied,” id. at 9, and that “to submit her case to arbitration, she
would have to front at the minimum, roughly $750,” id. at 8.
Relevant legal standards
“Congress enacted the FAA [Federal Arbitration Act] to overcome judicial
resistance to arbitration, and to declare a national policy favoring arbitration of
claims that parties contract to settle in that manner.” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556
U.S. 49, 58 (2009) (quotations omitted).
“To that end, § 2 [of the FAA] provides
that arbitration agreements in contracts ‘involving commerce’ are ‘valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable.’” Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). “[A]ll doubts concerning
the arbitrability of claims should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”
Mut. Fin. Grp., LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2004).
Courts perform a two-step analysis to determine whether parties should be
compelled to arbitrate a dispute. Tittle v. Enron Corp., 463 F.3d 410, 418 (5th Cir.
“First, a court must ‘determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the
dispute in question.’”
Id. (quoting Webb v. Investacorp., Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 258 (5th
This first step “consists of two separate determinations: ‘(1) whether
there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the
dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement.’” Id.
(quoting Webb, 89 F.3d at 258). State law contract principles are applied to
determine if there is a valid agreement to arbitrate. First Options of Chicago, Inc.
v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); Washington Mut. Fin. Grp., LLC, 364 F.3d at
263; Webb, 89 F.3d at 257.
In this case, Mississippi law is the applicable state law.
The second step involves the determination of “whether legal constraints
external to the parties’ agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those claims.”
Tittle, 463 F.3d at 418 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). If no party argues that external legal constraints
have foreclosed arbitration of the claims at issue in the case, the court “need only
conduct the first step of the analysis to resolve the arbitrability question.” Id.
There were valid agreements to arbitrate between Donald and National
Donald argues that the Rental Agreements’ arbitration provisions are
“Unconscionability has been defined as
unconscionable and thus unenforceable.2
an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties, together with
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party[.]” Louisiana
Extended Care Centers, LLC v. Bindon, 180 So. 3d 791, 795 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015)
(quoting Nw. Fin. Miss., Inc. v. McDonald, 905 So. 2d 1187, 1193 (Miss. 2005)).
“There are two forms of unconscionability: procedural and substantive.” Id.; see
also East Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 714 (Miss. 2002). Donald asserts
that the arbitration provisions in question are both procedurally and substantively
The arbitration agreements are not procedurally unconscionable.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that
[p]rocedural unconscionability may be proved by showing a lack of
The Court recognizes that the arbitration provisions in the Rental Agreements state that
they apply to any claim, dispute, or controversy “including the validity or enforceability of
this arbitration clause, any part thereof or the entire Rental Agreement.” Rental
Agreements [1-2] at 21, 28, 35, 41. This delegation language would seem to suggest that
the validity or enforceability of each arbitration provision is a question for the arbitrator.
Neither party, however, has made this argument or sufficiently briefed this issue. Even if
this language could be interpreted as permitting the arbitrator to decide the question of
validity or enforceability of the arbitration provisions, National Truck has voluntarily
submitted this issue to the Court. See Jones v. Singing River Health Servs. Found., No.
16-60263, 2017 WL 65384, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2017); see also, e.g., Def.’s Rebuttal  at 6
(requesting “this Court find the subject Arbitration Provision valid and enforceable”).
National Truck has not asked the Court to enforce the delegation provision. See Rent-ACtr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71 (2010). Even if it had so requested, the result
here would not change, as the Court would nevertheless compel arbitration.
knowledge, lack of voluntariness, inconspicuous print, the use of
complex legalistic language, disparity in sophistication or bargaining
power of the parties and/or a lack of opportunity to study the contract
and inquire about the contract terms.
The indicators of procedural unconscionability generally fall into two
areas: (1) lack of knowledge, and (2) lack of voluntariness. A lack of
knowledge is demonstrated by a lack of understanding of the contract
terms arising from inconspicuous print or the use of complex, legalistic
language, disparity in sophistication of parties, and lack of opportunity
to study the contract and inquire about contract terms. A lack of
voluntariness is demonstrated in contracts of adhesion when there is a
great imbalance in the parties’ relative bargaining power, the stronger
party’s terms are unnegotiable, and the weaker party is prevented by
market factors, timing or other pressures from being able to contract
with another party on more favorable terms or to refrain from
contracting at all.
East Ford, Inc., 826 So. 2d at 714, 715-16 (quotation omitted).
A contract of adhesion is generally defined as “one that is drafted unilaterally
by the dominant party and then presented on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis to the
weaker party who has no real opportunity to bargain about its terms.” Id. at 716.
“Such contracts are usually prepared in printed form, and frequently at least some
of their provisions are in extremely small print.” Id. (quotation omitted).
According to the Mississippi Supreme Court, arbitration agreements are not
inherently unconscionable, and contracts of adhesion are not automatically void.
Id. (citing Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir. 2001)).
The fact that an arbitration agreement is included in a contract of
adhesion renders the agreement procedurally unconscionable only
where the stronger party’s terms are unnegotiable and the weaker party
is prevented by market factors, timing or other pressures from being
able to contract with another party on more favorable terms or to refrain
from contracting at all.
The record does not support a finding of procedural unconscionability
based upon a lack of knowledge.
Donald has presented an Affidavit [6-1] complaining that she was rushed to
sign each of the four Rental Agreements and “never knew there was an arbitration
provision within the agreement.” Pl.’s Aff. [6-1] at 1.
According to Donald,
National Truck never read through the Rental Agreements with her, explained the
Rental Agreements to her, or informed her of the arbitration provisions. Id. at 1-2.
Donald also avers that she has “no legal training or experience.” Id. at 2.
Under Mississippi law, “parties to a contract have an inherent duty to read
the terms of a contract prior to signing.”
Hinds Cty. Econ. Dev. Dist. v. W & G
Properties, LLC, 203 So. 3d 49, 55 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (quotation omitted).
party may neither neglect to become familiar with the terms and conditions and
then later complain of lack of knowledge, nor avoid a written contract merely
because he or she failed to read it or have someone else read and explain it.” Id.
In this case, the arbitration provisions appear on the sixth page of each sixpage Rental Agreement.
They are easily identifiable as they follow a section
heading printed in all capital letters and italicized in bold-faced type, clearly
indicating that the section pertains to “JURISDICTION AND RESOLUTION OF
Rental Agreements [1-2] at 21, 28, 35, 41.
themselves are preceded by the word “Arbitration” and printed in type of equal size
to the print contained in the rest of the Agreement. Id.
In the Court’s view, the
arbitration provisions do not contain any complex, legalistic language. See id.
Other than Donald’s professed lack of legal training or experience, Pl.’s Aff.
[6-1] at 2, the record is devoid of any information regarding the alleged disparity in
the sophistication of the parties.
While Donald avers that she was “rushed” to sign
the Rental Agreements, see id. at 1, there is no indication that she ever inquired of
National Truck about the Rental Agreements’ terms.
Nor has Donald cited any
authority that National Truck was required to “read through the rental agreements
with [her] or explain[ ] the rental agreements,” or verbally advise her of the
arbitration provisions. See id. at 1-2.
Based upon the facts of this particular case,
the Court is not persuaded that Donald’s allegations pertaining to her lack of
opportunity to study the Rental Agreements is sufficient to establish that the
arbitration provisions are procedurally unconscionable. See East Ford, Inc., 826
So. 2d at 715-16.
The record does not support a finding of procedural unconscionability
based upon a lack of voluntariness.
Donald further maintains that the Rental Agreements constitute contracts of
Assuming this is true, Donald has not alleged or shown that she was
“prevented by market factors, timing or other pressures from being able to contract
with another party on more favorable terms or to refrain from contracting at all.”
East Ford, Inc., 826 So. 2d at 716.
The arbitration clauses are not unconscionable
based upon a lack of voluntariness.
In sum, there is insufficient evidence of a lack of knowledge or voluntariness
on the part of a weaker party to support a procedural unconscionability claim.
Donald’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.
The arbitration agreements are not substantively unconscionable.
“Substantive unconscionability may be proven by showing the terms of the
arbitration agreement to be oppressive.” East Ford, Inc., 826 So. 2d at 714.
contract is substantively unconscionable if there is an absence of meaningful choice
on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.” Caplin Enterprises, Inc., 145 So. 3d at
614 (quotation omitted).
In order to determine whether a contract is substantively
unconscionable, a court must “look within the four corners of an agreement in order
to discover any abuses relating to the specific terms which violate the expectations
of, or cause gross disparity between, the contracting parties.” Id.
“Substantive unconscionability is proven by oppressive contract terms such
that there is a one-sided agreement whereby one party is deprived of all the benefits
of the agreement or left without a remedy for another party’s nonperformance or
breach.” Id. (quotation omitted). According to the Mississippi Supreme Court,
“[i]t is not necessary that arbitration agreements contain ‘mutual promises that
give the parties identical rights and obligations, or that the parties must be bound
in the exact same manner.’” Id. (quoting 21 Williston on Contracts § 57:15 (4th ed.
2013)). However, “disparities in the rights of the contracting parties must not be so
one-sided and unreasonably favorable to the drafter . . . that the agreement becomes
unconscionable and oppressive.” Id. (quoting Williston, supra, at § 57:15).
The Court has reviewed the four corners of each of the Rental Agreements
and is of the opinion that the arbitration provisions in question are not
Donald argues that, while the arbitration provisions
appear to afford the parties an equal opportunity to bring a suit in a small claims
court within Harrison County, Mississippi, the provisions are actually “unfair to
Mrs. Donald because there are no situations under this Agreement in which Mrs.
Donald would be within the requisite amount to entertain bringing a suit in a small
Pl.’s Mem.  at 7.
Donald posits that National Truck could bring
suit in small claims court “to recover payments owed to them, which would fall
within the jurisdiction of the small claims court,” id., and that this makes the
arbitration provisions substantively unconscionable, id.
Donald’s argument seems to implicate issues arising outside the four corners
of the Agreements, and Donald has not cited any controlling legal authority which
indicates that the Court could consider such issues. See id. Nevertheless, the
Court does not find this theory persuasive.
Donald has cited no evidence or
authority to support the proposition that any claim Donald would bring against
National Truck would necessarily be beyond the jurisdiction of the small claims
court, while any claim by National Truck would fall within the jurisdictional
maximum of the small claims court.
These contractual provisions do not appear to
be an unconscionable “ploy” by National Truck, as Donald argues. See id.
Nor is Donald’s argument that National Truck “must demonstrate that she
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her constitutional rights” to a jury
trial persuasive. Id. at 7-8 (citing D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174
(1972)). Overmyer did not involve an arbitration provision, but instead considered
the constitutionality under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of a cognovit note3 authorized by an Ohio statute.
The Court has already
determined that the arbitration provisions were not procedurally unconscionable
due to voluntariness or knowledge. To the extent this contention relates to
Donald’s agreeing that this case would be tried as a bench trial if not arbitrated, see
Rental Agreements [1-2] at 21, 28, 35, 41, such waiver is not relevant since National
Truck has sought to compel arbitration.
Donald has not shown that the terms of the Rental Agreements are
oppressive or substantively unconscionable.
The terms of the Rental Agreements
are not so one-sided and unreasonably favorable to the drafter, National Truck, that
the Agreements are unconscionable and oppressive. Caplin Enterprises, Inc., 145
So. 3d at 614. The arbitration provisions are valid under Mississippi law.
The dispute in question falls within the scope of the parties’ arbitration
There is a strong presumption in favor of arbitration. Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); Terminix Int’l, Inc. v. Rice,
904 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (Miss. 2004).
Accordingly, “[a]ny doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration . . . .” Moses H.
Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has “held that arbitration should
not be denied unless it can be said with positive assurance that an arbitration
“The cognovit is the ancient legal device by which the debtor consents in advance to the
holder’s obtaining a judgment without notice or hearing, and possibly even with the
appearance, on the debtor’s behalf, of an attorney designated by the holder.” Overmyer
Co., 405 U.S. at 176.
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation which would cover the dispute at
Neal v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1990) (quotation
In this case, the arbitration provisions encompass
any claim, dispute, or controversy (whether based upon contract or tort;
intentional or otherwise; arising out of state or federal constitution,
statute, common law, or equity, and whether preexisting, present or
future), including initial claims, counter-claims, cross-claims, and third
party claims, arising from or relating to this Rental Agreement or the
relationships which result from this Rental Agreement . . . .
Rental Agreements [1-2] at 21, 28, 35, 41 (emphasis added).
Language of this type is interpreted broadly.
“The Mississippi Supreme
Court has noted that broad terms defining the scope of an arbitration agreement
such as ‘any controversy’ are ‘broad sweeping’ and expansive enough to include most
claims related to the contract in question.” New South Fed’l Savings Bank v.
Anding, 414 F. Supp. 2d 636, 651 (S.D. Miss. 2005) (citing Smith Barney, Inc. v.
Henry, 772 So. 2d 722, 725-26 (Miss. 2001)).
The contracts in this case contain both narrow language, “arising from,” and
broad language, “relating to.” See Rental Agreements [1-2] at 21, 28, 35, 41.
A[C]ourts distinguish ‘narrow’ arbitration clauses that only require arbitration of
disputes ‘arising out of’ the contract from broad arbitration clauses governing
disputes that ‘relate to’ or ‘are connected with’ the contract.” Pennzoil Exploration
& Prod. Co. v. Ramco Energy, 139 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1998).
Circuit has held that such broad arbitration clauses “are not limited to claims that
literally ‘arise under the contract,’ but rather embrace all disputes having a
significant relationship to the contract regardless of the label attached to the
Donald’s claims against National Truck both arise from and relate to
the Rental Agreements containing the arbitration provisions. Accordingly,
the Court concludes that National Truck is entitled to enforce the arbitration
clauses. See id. An order compelling arbitration should issue in this case.
The parties have not argued, nor have they shown, that any legal constraints
external to the parties’ agreements foreclose the arbitration of Donald’s
Other than the contractual defenses asserted by Donald, which the Court has
previously considered and rejected, the parties do not argue that any legal
constraints external to the parties’ arbitration agreements foreclose arbitration of
See Caplin Enterprises, Inc., 145 So. 3d at 614 (holding that
under the legal constraints prong of the arbitration analysis, a court must consider
whether defenses available under state contract law such as fraud, duress, and
unconscionability may invalidate the arbitration agreement). Nor does the Court
find any legal constraints external to the arbitration agreements which foreclose
Arbitration of Donald’s claims against National Truck is appropriate.
This case will be dismissed, rather than stayed.
“Section 3 of the FAA mandates that when an issue is referable to arbitration
pursuant to a written agreement, the district court must ‘stay the trial of the action
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement,
providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 659 (5th Cir.
1995) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3). “If a dispute is subject to mandatory . . . arbitration
procedures, then the proper course of action is usually to stay the proceedings
Ruiz v. Donahoe, 784 F.3d 247, 249 (5th Cir. 2015).
“However, a dismissal may be appropriate ‘when all of the issues raised in
the district court must be submitted to arbitration.’” Id. at 249-50 (quoting Alford
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also Adam
Techs. Int’l S.A. de C.V. v. Sutherland Glob. Servs., Inc., 729 F.3d 443, 447 n.1 (5th
Cir. 2013) (“Although Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act directs district courts
to stay pending arbitration, we are bound by our precedent which states that
dismissal is appropriate ‘when all of the issues raised in the district court must be
submitted to arbitration.’”) (quoting Alford, 975 F.2d at 1164).
All of the issues raised in the Complaint are subject to binding arbitration.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss this case rather than stay it.
To the extent the Court has not addressed any of the parties’ arguments, it
has considered them and determined that they would not alter the result.
National Truck Funding, LLC’s Motion  to Compel Arbitration will be granted,
and the parties will be ordered to submit the disputed matter to arbitration.
case will be dismissed.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, the Motion 
to Compel Arbitration or, Alternatively, Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be Granted filed by Defendant National
Truck Funding, LLC, is GRANTED, and the parties are ordered to submit the
disputed matter to arbitration.
IT IS, FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, this case is
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 22nd day of March, 2017.
s/ Halil Suleyman Ozerden
HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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