Bradley v. Gautier Police Departments et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 37 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 39 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to all claims and all Defendants. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert H. Walker on 11/14/2019 (wld)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JASON BRUCE BRADLEY
VERSUS

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17CV279-RHW

STEPHEN RICHARDSON
and JIM CAZZELL

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jason Bruce Bradley, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 prisoner civil rights complaint alleging various constitutional violations in connection
with an arrest that occurred on December 30, 2014. Plaintiff has sued Defendants Stephen
Richardson and Jim Cazzell in their individual and official capacities. At the time of the
incident, Defendants were officers in the Gautier Police Department. Plaintiff has alleged (1)
illegal arrest and seizure; (2) excessive force; (3) due process violations; (4) Fifth Amendment
violation; and (5) Double Jeopardy clause violation. By order dated April 12, 2018, the Court
dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants City of Gautier and the Gautier Police
Department. Doc. [19]. These claims included alleged violations of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, Plaintiff’s right to counsel, and Plaintiff’s right to an impartial jury. Plaintiff’s only
remaining claims against Officers Richardson and Cazzell are for illegal arrest/seizure and
excessive force incident to the arrest.
The Court conducted a screening hearing on October 18, 2018, at which time the parties
consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge. Defendants Richardson and
Cazzell have filed two motions for summary judgment. Their first motion for summary
judgment raises the defense of qualified immunity. Doc. [37]. The second motion for summary

judgment requests dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint as to all claims. Doc. [39]. Plaintiff has not
filed a response in opposition to either motion.
Factual Background
On December 30, 2014, the Gautier Police Department received a phone call requesting a
welfare check at the residence of Hannah Pittman. The Police Department had been advised that
Plaintiff was also at the residence. Officer Richardson was dispatched to conduct the welfare
check. Prior to arriving, Officer Richardson had been advised that a warrant had issued for
Plaintiff’s arrest. Although Officer Richardson did not know the basis for the arrest warrant, the
record demonstrates that Plaintiff had an outstanding arrest warrant for failure to appear in
Gautier Municipal Court relating to a speeding ticket. At the screening hearing, Plaintiff
admitted that he had received a ticket for speeding in a school zone and that he had been
scheduled to appear in court prior to December 30, 2014. He further admitted that he missed the
court date.
When Officer Richardson arrived at the residence, he knocked on Ms. Pittman’s front
door. She answered the door and seemed distressed, according to Officer Richardson. She was
crying and her hands were shaking. Officer Richardson questioned Ms. Pittman. Plaintiff was
standing behind Ms. Pittman and, according to Officer Richardson, was clearly agitated. At one
point, Plaintiff instructed Ms. Pittman to stop answering Officer Richardson’s questions.
According to Officer Richardson, Plaintiff moved towards the door in what appeared to be an
attempt to shut it. Officer Richardson instructed Plaintiff to sit down on the couch. As Plaintiff
walked towards the couch, Officer Richardson observed what appeared to be a wallet in
Plaintiff’s back pocket. Officer Richardson asked Plaintiff for his driver’s license. Plaintiff
refused and stated he did not have his driver’s license or any identification on him. At the

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screening hearing, Plaintiff admitted that in fact he did have his driver’s license on him at the
time of the encounter with Officer Richardson but that he purposefully refused to comply with
the request to produce it.
Officer Richardson next asked Plaintiff for his name and social security number. At the
screening hearing, Plaintiff admitted that he gave an incorrect name and social security number
to Officer Richardson. Officer Richardson informed Plaintiff he knew his true identity. He
further informed Plaintiff that a warrant had issued for his arrest. According to Officer
Richardson, Plaintiff became agitated and aggressive and began to raise his voice.
At about this time, Officer Jim Cazzell arrived at the residence. Officer Cazzell spoke
with Ms. Pittman, who identified Plaintiff as Jason Bruce Bradley. The Officers observed
Plaintiff sitting on the couch. They informed him a warrant had issued for his arrest and
instructed him to place his hands behind his head. Plaintiff refused to comply. Plaintiff told the
Officers he knew his rights, demanded an attorney, and instructed Ms. Pittman to call an
attorney. At the screening hearing, Plaintiff testified “[t]he officers continued to keep pushing at
me for them to find out who I was, and I really wasn’t giving them no information. I told them I
wanted a lawyer.”
Officer Cazzell instructed Officer Richardson to draw his taser. After drawing his taser,
Officer Richardson informed Plaintiff he would use the taser if Plaintiff remained noncompliant.
Officer Richardson attempted to fire the taser, but it malfunctioned. The Officers then attempted
to handcuff Plaintiff. Plaintiff resisted efforts to handcuff him. At the screening hearing,
Plaintiff admitted he was not giving the Officers anything he had and that he “scuffled” with the
Officers. The Officers eventually wrestled Plaintiff to the ground and placed him in handcuffs.
Plaintiff stated the incident “all happened so quick”. Plaintiff further testified that officers put

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their knees in his back while they were handcuffing him. Plaintiff was transported to the Gautier
Police Department for booking. While being booked, Plaintiff complained of back pain. He was
transported by ambulance to Ocean Springs Hospital. At the screening hearing, Plaintiff testified
he could not remember what the doctor told him about his back injury. According to the medical
records, Plaintiff’s back revealed mild tenderness, but he was in no acute distress. A chest x-ray
proved unremarkable, and there was no indication of visible injuries. He was diagnosed with
back pain “secondary to fighting”. He received a Toradol injection and a muscle relaxant pill.
Plaintiff testified that he has problems off and on with his lower back to this day.
After booking, Plaintiff was charged with resisting arrest and presenting false identifying
information, in violation of Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-9-73 and 97-9-79. On January 5, 2015, The
Gautier Municipal Court found Plaintiff guilty of speeding in a school zone. On January 26,
2015, Plaintiff was tried and convicted of resisting arrest and presenting false identifying
information. At the screening hearing, Plaintiff admitted to being convicted on these three
charges. He also admitted he did not appeal the convictions for resisting arrest and presenting
false identification. As a result of these convictions, the Jackson County Circuit Court revoked
Plaintiff’s supervised release and sentenced him to serve the balance of a 2004 conviction and
sentence for sexual battery. Plaintiff was placed in custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections (MDOC). MDOC medical records are silent regarding back pain related to the
December 30, 2014, encounter with Officers Richardson and Cazzell. At the screening hearing,
Plaintiff admitted that the only medical record referencing back pain associated with the incident
would be from Ocean Springs Hospital. He further admitted that MDOC doctors did not
attribute any of his back pain to the December 2014 incident.

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Law and Analysis
Standard of Review
Rule 56 provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627
F.3d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010). Where the summary judgment evidence establishes that one of
the essential elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action does not exist as a matter of law, all other
contested issues of fact are rendered immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986); Topalin v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1138 (5th Cir. 1992). In making its determinations
of fact on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence submitted by the
parties in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. McPherson v. Rankin, 736 F.2d 175,
178 (5th Cir. 1984).
The moving party has the duty to demonstrate the lack of a genuine issue of a material
fact and the appropriateness of judgment as a matter of law to prevail on its motion. Union
Planters Nat’l Leasing v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1982). The movant accomplishes this
by informing the court of the basis of its motion, and by identifying portions of the record which
highlight the absence of genuine factual issues. Topalian, 954 F.2d at 1131. “Rule 56
contemplates a shifting burden: the nonmovant is under no obligation to respond unless the
movant discharges [its] initial burden of demonstrating [entitlement to summary judgment].”
John v. State of Louisiana, 757 F.3d 698, 708 (5th Cir. 1985). Once a properly supported motion
for summary judgment is presented, the nonmoving party must rebut with “significant probative”
evidence. Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978).

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Illegal Arrest/Seizure
Plaintiff alleges that Officers Richardson and Cazzell performed an illegal arrest or
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Based on his testimony at the screening hearing,
Plaintiff primarily complains that the Officers did not display an arrest warrant during the
encounter and arrest. At issue is whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in
effecting the arrest of Plaintiff.
Qualified immunity analysis is a two-step inquiry. Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307,
312 (5th Cir. 2001). First, the Court must determine whether the Plaintiff has alleged a violation
of a constitutional right. Id. Second, if the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation, the
Court must decide whether the conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established
law. Id. The relevant inquiry is whether, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation
he confronted. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the officer’s actions are objectively
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him, without regard to underlying
intent or motivation, then he is entitled to qualified immunity. Ramirez v. Knoulton, 542 F.3d
124, 128-29 (5th Cir. 2008). Because qualified immunity has been deemed a question of law, the
Supreme Court has directed lower courts to adjudicate qualified immunity claims on summary
judgment. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
To prevail on a § 1983 claim for false arrest, Plaintiff must show that he was arrested
without probable cause. Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2001). Probable cause is
present “when the totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at
the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had
committed or was committing an offense.” Vance v. Nunnery, 137 F.3d 270, 276 (5th Cir. 1998)

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(quoting United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1996)). A law enforcement official
who reasonably but mistakenly concludes that probable cause is present is entitled to immunity
from liability. Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000).
In this case, Defendants are insulated from liability because Plaintiff was arrested
pursuant to a facially valid arrest warrant. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). “Where
an arrest is made under authority of a properly issued warrant, the arrest is simply not a false
arrest.” Smith v. Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 1982). Prior to arriving at the residence,
Officer Richardson was informed that Plaintiff had an outstanding arrest warrant. Defendants
provided a copy of the arrest warrant in conjunction with their summary judgment motion.
Although Plaintiff argues the arresting officers did not display the arrest warrant, nowhere in his
testimony does he dispute the validity of the arrest warrant.
Defendants also possessed probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for giving false identifying
information and resisting arrest. The Officers’ affidavits demonstrate probable cause. They
stated that Plaintiff provided them with a false name and social security number. They also
stated that Plaintiff resisted efforts to place him in handcuffs. Plaintiff’s testimony essentially
corroborates the Officers’ affidavits. Plaintiff admitted that he refused to provide the arresting
officers with correct identifying information. In fact, he admitted that he gave the Officers an
incorrect name and social security number. Plaintiff admitted to “scuffling” with the Officers
when they attempted to place him in handcuffs. Based on the foregoing, the Officers decision to
arrest Plaintiff was objectively reasonable
To the extent that Plaintiff alleges an improper arrest or conviction with respect to the
charges against him, he has not satisfied the dictates of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)
because he has not alleged that his conviction has been invalidated. Plaintiff entered a guilty

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plea on the speeding violation. He was tried and convicted on both of the charges stemming
from his encounter with the Officers on December 30, 2014. At the screening hearing, he
admitted he was tried and found guilty for resisting arrest and giving false identifying
information. Plaintiff made vague references to the federal courts “looking into” or
“investigating” the underlying convictions; however, he has not presented any competent
summary judgment to refute Defendants’ contention that his claim is barred by Heck.
Excessive Force
Plaintiff did not specifically allege in his complaint that Officers Richardson and Cazzell
used excessive force in arresting him. He testified that he sustained a lower back injury resulting
from the “scuffle” with the Officers during the arrest. This injury apparently occurred when the
officers put their knees in Plaintiff’s back while placing Plaintiff in handcuffs. At issue is
whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity based on the reasonableness of their use
of force in arresting Plaintiff.
In order to state a claim for excessive force, the plaintiff must establish (1) an injury (2)
which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the
excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable. Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir.
2007). When determining whether a defendant used excessive force, the core inquiry is whether
the force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm. Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 838 (5th Cir. 1998). Some of the
relevant objective factors in the inquiry regarding the application of force include (1) the extent
of the injury suffered; (2) the need for the application of force; (3) the relationship between the
need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the defendant; and (5)
any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response. Id. at 838-39. An officer is

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protected by qualified immunity even when he reasonably, but mistakenly, believed the
circumstances justified using more force than in fact was needed. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204-05.
Here, the essential facts are not in dispute. The affidavits of the Officers and Plaintiff’s
testimony demonstrate that he refused to comply with direct orders from the officers. According
to the Officers, they instructed Plaintiff to put his hands behind his head, but he refused to
comply. Plaintiff does not offer any testimony or evidence to dispute this allegation. The
Officers then handcuffed Plaintiff. According to the Officers, Plaintiff resisted their efforts to
place him in handcuffs. Plaintiff admits he “scuffled” with the Officers during this encounter.
Plaintiff does not offer any evidence disputing whether he resisted the Officers attempt to
handcuff him. According to Plaintiff, the Officers put their knees into his back while placing
handcuffs on him. Other than the Officers putting their knees in his back, Plaintiff does not
allege any other specific act of force against him. Ultimately, Plaintiff was charged, tried, and
convicted of resisting arrest as a result of this “scuffle” with the Officers. Based on the
foregoing, the Court concludes that the Officers used a reasonable amount of force in a goodfaith effort to maintain order; therefore, they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Due Process
Throughout his complaint, Plaintiff alleges in vague terms that his due process rights
were violated. To the extent his due process claims implicate the judicial proceedings against
him arising out of the December 30, 2014 incident, the Court previously dismissed these claims.
Plaintiff’s due process claims do not relate directly to any conduct by Officers Richardson and
Cazzell. In fact, Plaintiff does not allege any specific facts to support a claim that Officers
Richardson and Cazzell violated his due process rights.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’ [37] [39] Motions
for Summary Judgment are GRANTED and that Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to all claims and all Defendants.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 14th day of November 2019.

/s/ Robert H. Walker
ROBERT H. WALKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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