Deroche v. Hancock County, Mississippi et al
Filing
26
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 10 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granting 12 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Signed by District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr on 10/18/2018 (Guirola, Louis)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SHAYLYNN DEROCHE,
Individually and as Wrongful
Death Beneficiary and as
Survivor of Wendy Caspolich
PLAINTIFF
v.
CAUSE NO. 1:18CV215-LG-RHW
HANCOCK COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI,
HANCOCK MEDICAL CENTER,
and JOHN DOES 1-5
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER CONCERNING HANCOCK
COUNTY’S MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
BEFORE THE COURT are the [10] Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
as to State Law Claims and the [12] Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to
Certain Federal Claims filed by the defendant Hancock County, Mississippi. The
parties fully briefed the Motions. After reviewing the submissions of the parties,
the record in this matter, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the plaintiff’s
state law claim for failure to train and supervise subordinates should be dismissed,
but all other state law claims should remain pending at this time. Therefore,
Hancock County’s Motion concerning the plaintiff’s state law claims is granted in
part and denied in part. The Court further finds that the plaintiff’s federal claim
for denial of the due process right to family association should be dismissed. In
addition, the plaintiff’s attempt to assert Section 1983 claims based on respondeat
superior is without merit. As a result, the Court finds that Hancock County’s
Motion concerning the plaintiff’s federal law claims should be granted.
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BACKGROUND
On February 27, 2017, the plaintiff’s mother, Wendy Caspolich, was a
passenger in a vehicle pulled over by Hancock County deputies. Ms. Caspolich
attempted to hide narcotics that were located in the vehicle “by placing them in her
mouth and eventually swallowing them.” (Compl. 3, ECF No. 1-2.) The Hancock
County deputies arrested Ms. Caspolich and the other occupants of the vehicle for
possession of paraphernalia. According to the Complaint, “[p]rior to, during, and
after being booked into the Hancock County Jail, Ms. Caspolich and others informed
the deputies that Ms. Caspolich had swallowed the narcotics and that she was in
need of medical assistance.” (Id. at 4.) The plaintiff claims that Hancock County’s
employees did not respond to Ms. Caspolich’s request for medical assistance even
though she was in and out of consciousness during booking.
County employees placed Ms. Caspolich in a holding cell, and the plaintiff
claims that Ms. Caspolich’s condition continued to deteriorate, causing her cellmate
to bang on the cell door and ask for medical assistance. The plaintiff claims that
County employees ignored the cellmate’s request and told the cellmate to quit
making so much noise. Eventually, County employees attempted to take Ms.
Caspolich’s blood pressure but were unable to get a reading. They then left Ms.
Caspolich in the cell. County employees moved Ms. Caspolich’s cellmate to another
location, because she continued to make noise while asking for medical assistance
for Ms. Caspolich.
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At approximately 2:24 a.m., jail employees released Ms. Caspolich for
medical reasons and drove her to Hancock Medical Center, where she was later
pronounced dead as a result of a drug overdose.
The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Hancock County and Hancock Medical
Center.1 She has attempted to assert Section 1983 claims against Hancock County
for infliction of cruel and unusual punishment by denying medical care and for
violation of her due process right to family association. She asserts that her Section
1983 claims are to some extent based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. She
also attempts to assert the following state law claims: negligence, gross negligence,
infliction of emotional distress, negligence per se, and failure to train and/or
supervise subordinates. Hancock County filed the present Motions to Dismiss all of
the plaintiff’s state law claims as well as the plaintiff’s federal claim for denial of
the due process right to family association and plaintiff’s federal claims based on
respondeat superior.
DISCUSSION
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) provides, “After the pleadings are closed -- but early
enough not to delay trial -- a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
Courts evaluate Rule 12(c) motions using the same standard as a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413,
418 (5th Cir. 2008). “‘[T]he central issue is whether, in the light most favorable to
The plaintiff’s separate claims against Hancock Medical Center are not at issue in
the present Motions.
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the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief.’” Id. (quoting Hughes v.
Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278 F.3d 417, 420 (5th Cir. 2001)). To survive a motion to
dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556).
I. STATE LAW CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO TRAIN AND SUPERVISE
SUBORDINATES AND FEDERAL CLAIM FOR DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
RIGHT TO FAMILY ASSOCIATION
The plaintiff concedes that the Court should dismiss her claims for failure to
train and supervise subordinates and denial of due process right to family
association.
II. PLAINTIFF’S REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS
Hancock County argues that the plaintiff’s state law claims are barred by the
inmate exception and the police function exception to the waiver of immunity set
forth in the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA).
A. INMATE EXCEPTION
The MTCA provides:
A governmental entity and its employees acting within
the course and scope of their employment or duties shall
not be liable for any claim . . . [o]f any claimant who at the
time the claim arises is an inmate of any detention center,
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jail, workhouse, penal farm, penitentiary or other such
institution . . . .
Miss. Code. Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(m). This exception to the waiver of sovereign
immunity applies to wrongful death claims. Webb v. DeSoto Cty., 843 So. 2d 682,
684 (¶8) (Miss. 2003). The Mississippi Supreme Court interprets the term “inmate”
broadly to include pretrial detainees. Hinds Cty. v. Burton, 187 So. 3d 1016, 1024
(¶26) (Miss. 2016).
“Inmate” is defined as “a person confined to a prison,
penitentiary or the like.” Black’s Law Dictionary 788 (6th
ed. 1990). There is no restriction that the inmate must
remain confined to the prison. The inmate remains an
inmate while being transported, while participating in
public service work programs or while on leave if a pass is
granted.
Love v. Sunflower Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 860 So. 2d 797, 800 (Miss. 2003) (quoting
Wallace v. Town of Raleigh, 815 So.2d 1203, 1207-08 (¶16) (Miss. 2002)).
The plaintiff disputes application of the inmate exception, because her
“claims involve the County’s actions, or lack thereof, before and after Ms. Caspolich
was an inmate.” (Pl.’s Resp. 4, ECF No. 15.) Thus, the plaintiff argues that her
claims arose before Ms. Caspolich was an inmate in the jail.
In Hinds County v. Burton, the plaintiff argued that his false imprisonment
claim against Hinds County “arose at a time when he was not an inmate but was in
the process of being booked.” by Hinds County at its Raymond Detention Center.
Hinds County v. Burton, 187 So. 3d 1016, 1024 (Miss. 2016). After noting that the
plaintiff in Burton was not arrested by Hinds County employees and that all of the
plaintiff’s claims arose while the plaintiff was at the Raymond Detention Center,
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the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the plaintiff was an inmate and that
Hinds County was immune from liability for the plaintiff’s false imprisonment
claim. Id.
Thus, it appears that the pertinent question in the present case is whether
the claim arose while Ms. Caspolich was at the Hancock County jail or before she
arrived at the jail. If her claim arose after she arrived at the jail, she was an
inmate as that term is used in the MTCA, but if her claim arose before she arrived
at the jail, she was not an inmate. In her Complaint, the plaintiff alleges, “Prior to,
during, and after being booked into the Hancock County Jail, Ms. Caspolich and
others informed the deputies that Ms. Caspolich had swallowed the narcotics and
that she was in need of medical assistance.” (Compl. 4, ECF No. 1-2.) Since the
plaintiff has alleged that the deputies were notified that Ms. Caspolich needed
medical care before beginning the booking process at the jail, she has alleged a
plausible claim, because her claims may have arisen before she arrived at the jail.
B. POLICE FUNCTION EXCEPTION
The police function exception to the MTCA waiver of immunity provides:
A governmental entity and its employees acting within
the course and scope of their employment or duties shall
not be liable for any claim . . . [a]rising out of any act or
omission of an employee of a governmental entity engaged
in the performance or execution of duties or activities
relating to police or fire protection unless the employee
acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of
any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of
injury.
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Miss. Code. Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(c). The Mississippi Supreme Court has explained
that:
“[r]eckless disregard” . . . denotes more than mere
negligence, but less than an intentional act. Our case law
indicates “reckless disregard” embraces willful or wanton
conduct which requires knowingly and intentionally doing
a thing or wrongful act. Moreover, reckless disregard
usually is accompanied by a conscious indifference to
consequences, amounting almost to a willingness that
harm should follow. Reckless disregard occurs when the
conduct involved evinced not only some appreciation of
the unreasonable risk involved, but also a deliberate
disregard of that risk and the high probability of harm
involved.
Miss. Dep’t of Wildlife, Fisheries, & Parks v. Webb, 248 So. 3d 772, 777 (Miss. 2018)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Hancock County argues that the plaintiff failed to allege that the deputies
acted with reckless disregard for Ms. Caspolich’s safety and well-being. The Court
disagrees. The plaintiff claims that the deputies were informed that Ms. Caspolich
had swallowed narcotics but failed to provide her with medical attention. These
allegations are sufficient to state a claim for reckless disregard at this stage of the
litigation.
III. PLAINTIFF’S FEDERAL CLAIMS BASED UPON RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR
In support of her federal claims, the plaintiff asserts that Hancock County is
vicariously liable for the acts of its deputies, and that Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), does not apply to this case. The plaintiff has
not cited any authority that supports this assertion and Monell remains in effect in
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the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Littell v. Houston Ind. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 622 (5th
Cir. 2018). As a result, the plaintiff’s attempt to assert Section 1983 claims based
on respondeat superior must fail.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the [10] Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings as to State Law Claims filed by the defendant
Hancock County, Mississippi is GRANTED as to the plaintiff’s state law claim for
failure to train and supervise subordinates and DENIED in all other respects.
IT IS, FURTHER, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the [12] Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings as to Certain Federal Claims filed by the defendant
Hancock County, Mississippi, is GRANTED. The plaintiff’s claim for denial of the
due process right to family association should be dismissed. In addition, the
plaintiff’s attempt to assert Section 1983 claims based on respondeat superior is
without merit.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 18th day of October, 2018.
s/
Louis Guirola, Jr.
LOUIS GUIROLA, JR.
UNITED STTES DISTRICT JUDGE
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