Rush v. Jackson County et al
Filing
146
ORDER granting Defendants James McCoy, Cendall Huynh, Jamie Weeks, Jeremy Bobo, Chad Vidrine, and Kristofer Gray's Motions 98 100 102 104 108 110 for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Halil S. Ozerden on 09/29/2021 (BTC)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KAYLA RUSH, individually and as
Daughter and Next Friend of Cindy M.
Arnold
v.
JACKSON COUNTY, by and through
its Board of Supervisors, d/b/a Jackson
County Adult Detention Center, et al.
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PLAINTIFF
1:19-cv-946-HSO-RPM
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS [98][100][102][104][108][110] FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BEFORE THE COURT are the following Motions for Summary Judgment: (1)
Motion [98] for Summary Judgement filed by Defendant James McCoy (“McCoy”);
(2) Motion [100] for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Cendall Huynh
(“Huynh”); (3) Motion [102] for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Jamie
Weeks (“Weeks”); (4) Motion [104] for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant
Jeremy Bobo (“Bobo”); (5) Motion [108] for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant
Chad Vidrine (“Vidrine”); and (6) Motion [110] for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendant Kristofer Gray (“Gray”). These Motions are fully briefed.
After due consideration of the Motions, the related pleadings, the record, and
relevant legal authority, the Court finds that Defendants’ Motions
[98][100][102][104][108][110] should all be granted and Plaintiff Kayla Rush’s
claims against Defendants James McCoy, Cendall Huynh, Jamie Weeks, Jeremy
Bobo, Chad Vidrine, and Kristofer Gray should be dismissed with prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
A.
Factual background
On September 8, 2018, Cindy M. Arnold (“Arnold”) was arrested by the
Jackson County Sheriff’s Office for violation of a protective order and was
transported to the Jackson County Adult Detention Center (“JCADC”) in
Pascagoula, Mississippi. 1st Am. Compl. [29] at 10-11. Arnold was booked into the
JCADC by Defendant Officer Cendall Huynh who performed a medical intake
screening. Id. at 11. Arnold informed Officer Huynh that she was a diabetic and
that she had “seizures, epilepsy, heart problems, and a blood clot in her leg.” Ex. 8
[118-8] at 4. Arnold also advised Officer Huynh that she took medications, but she
could not provide him with their names. Id. Officer Huynh noted that Arnold
appeared to be under the influence of an unknown substance. Id.
When Officer Huynh completed the booking process, he attempted to escort
Arnold to pre-classification, id. at 3, but she was non-compliant and refused to walk,
which forced Officer Huynh to place Arnold in hand restraints and house her in an
isolation cell, id. Specifically, Arnold refused to pick up her jail issued mat and was
“verbally aggressive” toward Officer Huynh. Ex. 3 [118-3], Officer Huynh’s MBI
Interview, at 7:25:40-7:26:30. Arnold was eventually transferred to JCADC’s A-Pod
and placed in cell A512. Ex. 9 [125-9] at 3.
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Plaintiff alleges that on September 9, 2018, Arnold’s medical condition was
ignored by the JCADC’s jailors, 1st. Am. Compl. [29] at 12-14, and that she was not
provided with insulin or any other medication despite her repeated requests, id. 1213. Arnold was also allegedly deprived of food. Id. at 14. The pleadings assert that
Arnold appeared to have scattered her breakfast tray across her cell and Defendant
Officer Jamie Weeks allegedly did not offer her a tray of food at lunch time. Id.
According to the summary judgment record, Defendants contend that after
lunch on September 9, Officer Weeks responded to a call from Arnold’s cell and
Arnold stated that she needed to go to the hospital. Ex. 9 [124-9] at 3. Officer Weeks
notified the onsite medical staff and escorted Nurse Luerether Willis to Arnold’s
cell, id., but Arnold was uncooperative during both Nurse Willis’s initial and
subsequent visits, id; Ex. 7 [124-7] at 4. Arnold refused to allow Nurse Willis to take
her blood-sugar, and Nurse Willis indicated that she did not believe Arnold was
suffering from a blood-sugar related issue based on her behavior. Ex. 7 [124-7] at 4.
At 5:00 p.m. on September 9, Defendant Corporal Kristofer Gray observed
Arnold “naked on her bunk, with her legs spread, and she appeared to be
masturbating.” Ex. 9 [126-9] at 3. Between 5:00 and 7:00 p.m., Officer Christy Maas
responded to a call from Arnold’s cell where she observed Arnold naked and sitting
on the floor, but she did not believe Arnold was in “any medical distress.” Ex. 2
[112-2] at 3. At the 10:00 p.m. headcount, Officer Jeremy Bobo knocked on Arnold’s
cell door several times but got no response. Ex. 6 [123-6] at 3. Officer Bobo observed
Arnold lying on a mat on the floor of her cell under her bunk, but because she
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appeared to still be naked, he did not enter the cell. Id. Instead, he contacted Officer
Maas, a female officer, to check on Arnold. Id. Officer Bobo did not confirm that
anyone entered Arnold’s cell, but believed that someone told him that Arnold was
eventually responsive. Id.
At approximately 11:40 p.m., Officer Chad Vidrine was making his first
post-10:00 p.m. headcount round and claims that he observed Arnold through her
cell window take a deep breath. Ex. 9 [125-9] at 3-4. A little after midnight on
September 10, 2018, Officer Vidrine saw Arnold’s hand move while making his
second post-headcount round. Id. at 4. At approximately 1:45 a.m., Officer Vidrine
peered into Arnold’s cell and saw no movement. Id. He asserts that he immediately
contacted Officer Maas, who was making rounds on the upper tier, to assist him and
called central control to open the cell door. Id. Officers Vidrine and Maas then
entered Arnold’s cell and pulled her out from under her bed. Id. They checked for a
pulse and could not detect one. Ex. 3 [125-3], Officer Maas’s MBI Interview, at
6:11:50-6:13:05. Shortly thereafter, Corporal Amanda Shepperson arrived and
directed them to begin chest compressions, which they continued doing until
paramedics arrived. Ex. 3 [125-3], Corporal Shepperson’s MBI Interview, at 7:08:097:08:15; Ex. 9 [125-9] at 4. Arnold was pronounced dead shortly thereafter. Ex. 9
[125-9] at 4.
B.
Procedural history
Plaintiff Kayla Rush (“Plaintiff” or “Rush”), as the daughter and wrongful
death beneficiary of Cindy Arnold (“Arnold”), initiated this suit on September 6,
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2019, advancing four causes of action against ten Defendants, including Officer
Cendall Huynh, Officer Jamie Weeks, Officer Chad Vidrine, and Sergeant James
McCoy. Compl. [1]. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint [29] on February 10,
2020, naming three additional Defendants, including Officer Jeremy Bobo and
Corporal Kristofer Gray. 1st Am. Compl. [29].
The First Amended Complaint alleges that Arnold died in the JCADC on
September 10, 2018, as a result of Defendants’ failure to provide medical assistance.
See id. at 10-17. With respect to Defendant Officers Jamie Weeks, Jeremy Bobo,
Chad Vidrine, and Corporal Kristofer Gray, the First Amended Complaint alleges
that each “were corrections officers working in Zone 5 of the Lockdown Unit where
[Arnold] was detained” and that “each breached, ignored, or did not follow jail
protocol for doing inmate status rounds.” 1st Am. Compl. [29] at 12. Plaintiff claims
that Defendant Officer Cendall Huynh was the officer who booked Arnold in to the
JCADC and conducted a medical intake screening exam which revealed Arnold had
various health conditions. Id. at 11. Finally, with respect to Defendant Sergeant
James McCoy, the First Amended Complaint asserts that he was the Shift Sergeant
on duty at the JCADC. Id. at 6. According to Plaintiff, each Defendant
“demonstrated deliberate indifference to [Arnold’s] serious medical needs.” Id. at 17.
Defendants Sergeant James McCoy, Officer Cendall Huynh, Officer Jamie
Weeks, Officer Jeremy Bobo, Officer Chad Vidrine, and Corporal Kristofer Gray
(collectively “Defendants”) have filed separate Motions for Summary Judgment on
grounds of qualified immunity. Mot. [98]; Mot. [100]; Mot. [102]; Mot. [104]; Mot.
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[108]; Mot. [110]. Plaintiff has responded to each Motion and takes the position
that she has set forth evidence demonstrating that there are genuine issues of
material fact as to whether each Defendant violated clearly established law and
whether each Defendant acted reasonably. See generally, Resp.
[117][118][124][123][125][126]. Each Defendant has filed a Rebuttal memorandum
to Plaintiff’s Responses. 1 Mem. [129][131][136][134][138][140].
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Relevant legal standards
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Westfall v.
Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 2018). If the movant carries this burden, “the
nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little v. Liquid Air. Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1994) (en banc). “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome
of the action.” Daniels v. City of Arlington, Tex., 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001).
In their Rebuttal memoranda Defendants object to the evidence offered by Plaintiff in support of
her Responses [118][124][123][125][126] in Opposition to each of their Motions
[100][102][104][108][110]. Specifically, they contend that the Jackson County Sheriff’s Department’s
Investigative Report, the JCADC Booking Sheets, the Interviews conducted by Mississippi Bureau of
Investigation (“MBI”) Officer Stephen Beale, Arnold’s medical records, and the MBI Investigative
Report are all inadmissible evidence. See, e.g., Mem. [130] at 2 (arguing that only one of Plaintiff’s
exhibits is admissible); see also Ex. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 [118-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7]. The Court
concludes that even if it considers this evidence in support of Plaintiff’s Responses, this would not
alter the Court’s conclusions.
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“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make
reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). The qualified immunity analysis involves two
prongs: (1) “whether an official’s conduct violated a constitutional right of the
plaintiff,” and (2) “whether the right was clearly established at the time of the
violation.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). A good faith
assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual summary judgment burden of
proof, id. (citing Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005)), and the
plaintiff bears the burden of “establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether the
official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law . . . but all
inferences are drawn in his favor,” id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has explained that
the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis encompasses “two separate
inquiries: whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly
established at the time of the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the
defendant was objectively unreasonable in the light of that clearly established law.”
Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998) (Hare II). A right is
clearly established if every “reasonable officer would understand that what [she] is
doing violates that right.” Baldwin v. Dorsey, 964 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). The Supreme Court has
cautioned, however, that the clearly established right must not be defined at too
high a level of generality. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742.
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The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution affords
pretrial detainees the right to receive medical care. Baldwin, 964 F.3d at 326;
Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Pretrial detainees have a
constitutional right to medical care . . . .”). In order to prove a violation of this right,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant acted with deliberate indifference to
the pretrial detainee’s serious medical needs. Domino v. Tex. Dept. of Crim. Just.,
239 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2001). An official is deliberately indifferent when he is
“aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Hyatt v. Thomas, 843
F.3d 172, 177 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
For the latter part of this test, a prison official acts with deliberate indifference
“only if . . . he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious bodily harm and
. . . he disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”
Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
487). When an official’s actions and decisions “are merely inept, erroneous,
ineffective, or negligent” they do not rise to level of deliberate indifference. Alton v.
Texas A & M Univ., 168 F.3d 196, 201 (5th Cir. 1999).
With respect to the right to receive medical care, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that prison officials “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would
evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Domino, 239 F.3d at 756
(quoting Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985)). “Unsuccessful
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medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice do not constitute
deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner's disagreement with his medical
treatment, absent exceptional circumstances.” Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346.
B.
Analysis
1.
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Sergeant James McCoy
Plaintiff asserts that Sergeant McCoy, as the night shift supervisor during
Arnold’s detention, allegedly “demonstrated deliberate indifference to . . . [Arnold’s]
serious medical needs” and through his actions caused Arnold to suffer pain,
discomfort, disfigurement, and death. 1st Am. Compl. [29] at 6, 17-18; Resp. [117] at
14. In an Interrogatory propounded by Sergeant McCoy, Plaintiff was asked to
provide a “full and complete description of all conduct or action[s] which you claim
constituted such a [constitutional] violation.” Ex. 1 [98-1] at 5. Plaintiff’s sworn
response was as follows:
[o]n information and belief, Defendant McCoy is named in the 1st
Amended Complaint as a CO or supervisor who knew or should have
had knowledge of the treatment of the Decedent and the denial of
her medical needs in such a manner that violated the clearly
established laws on providing adequate care for pe [sic] pre-trial
detainees. McCoy either had contact or directed other CO’s who had
contact with . . . Arnold and with the Jail nursing staff. McCoy’s acts
are described in the 1st Amended Complaint.
Id.
Sergeant McCoy argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because
Plaintiff “has failed to offer any evidence that [he] participated in any acts that
caused the alleged constitutional deprivation of . . . Arnold’s rights” and “[e]ven if
Plaintiff could establish a constitutional violation . . . he would nevertheless be
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entitled to qualified immunity because his actions were objectively reasonable.”
Mot. [98] at 2.
In response to Sergeant McCoy’s properly supported Motion, Plaintiff has not
submitted competent summary judgment evidence of any personal interaction
between Arnold and Sergeant McCoy. Instead, the majority of Plaintiff’s Response
[117] in Opposition recounts allegations against other JCADC employees. Resp.
[117] at 1-13. The only mention of Sergeant McCoy is that he was “the night shift
supervisor of the JCADC” and “was responsible for the direction and duties of the
12 deputies under his supervision.” Id. at 14. Plaintiff’s Response [117] also, for the
first time, makes the vague and conclusory claim that Sergeant McCoy failed “to
implement and enforce the policy of the jail” and that he is “responsible for the nonperformance of his subordinates.” Id. The only relevant evidence Plaintiff cites in
her Response [117] is Sergeant McCoy’s answers to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories. See
Ex. 8 [117-8]. Based on this evidence, Plaintiff argues that she has demonstrated “a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the wrongful conduct of the [j]ail and
staff violated clearly established law.” Id. at 14-15.
Based upon the summary judgment record, Plaintiff has not demonstrated
that Sergeant McCoy acted with deliberate indifference to Arnold’s rights, and he is
entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiff has not pointed the Court to any evidence
in the record that Sergeant McCoy had any personal knowledge of Arnold’s medical
conditions or of any other facts from which he should have been aware of a
substantial risk to Arnold’s health. There is no evidence in the summary judgment
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record indicating that Sergeant McCoy was aware of Arnold’s medical conditions
during her detention, and Plaintiff has not set forth any evidence of any particular
acts or omissions on his part that would establish deliberate indifference.
During discovery Plaintiff was asked to describe the specific conduct by
Sergeant McCoy that purportedly violated Arnold’s rights and she responded with
conclusory assertions and referred to the allegations in the First Amended
Complaint [29]. Ex. 1 [98-1] at 5. This is insufficient at the summary judgment
stage because “conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions
are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant’s burden.” Bargher v. White, 928 F.3d 439,
444 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1429 (5th Cir. 1996)). None of the other evidence in the record points to Sergeant
McCoy playing any role in the medical care, or the lack of, that Arnold received. As
such Plaintiff has not carried her summary judgment burden of demonstrating a
material fact question for trial on whether Sergeant McCoy acted with deliberate
indifference to Arnold’s constitutional rights.
Further support for this conclusion is found in Sergeant McCoy’s sworn
response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories. See Ex. 8 [117-8]. Sergeant McCoy stated
that he “did not interact with . . . Arnold during [her detention], and was not aware
of her having a medical emergency until she was discovered unresponsive” on
September 10, 2018. Id. at 7. Plaintiff has presented no competent evidence to
contest the veracity of these statements. Reaves Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Sunbelt Fruit
& Vegetable Co., Inc., 336 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the court may
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give credence to the moving party’s evidence “that is uncontradicted and
unimpeached”). Viewing the summary judgment record as a whole in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Sergeant McCoy violated Arnold’s clearly established rights.
Nor has Plaintiff shown that Sergeant McCoy can be held liable as a
supervisor under § 1983. She argues in her Response [117] that Sergeant McCoy is
responsible for the purported violations of jail policy by various Jackson County
deputies, Resp. [117] at 14, but as a supervisory official Sergeant McCoy cannot be
held vicariously liable for the actions of subordinates, see Thompson v. Upshur
Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001). In his role as a supervisor, Sergeant McCoy
can only be held liable if “he affirmatively participated in the acts that cause the
constitutional deprivation,” or “he implements unconstitutional policies that
causally result in the constitutional injury.” Gates v. Tex. Dept. of Protective and
Regul. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff has produced no competent summary judgment evidence that
Sergeant McCoy affirmatively participated in the events in question, or that he
qualified as a policymaker or instituted any policies at all. In addition, Plaintiff did
not advance a supervisory claim against Sergeant McCoy in her complaint and has
only now raised this claim in her Response. See 1st Am. Compl. [29] at 17 (asserting
only a failure to provide adequate medical treatment claim against Sergeant
McCoy); Resp. [117] at 14. The Fifth Circuit has held that “[a] claim which is not
raised in the complaint but, rather, is raised only in response to a motion for
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summary judgment is not properly before the court.” Cutrera v. Bd. of Supervisors
of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Fisher v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 895 F.2d 1073, 1078 (5th Cir. 1990)). As such Sergeant McCoy is entitled to
summary judgment on any supervisory liability claim. Id. at 114.
2.
Plaintiff’s claims against other officers
a.
Officer Cendall Huynh
The First Amended Complaint [29] alleges that Officer Huynh was
deliberately indifferent to Arnold’s serious medical needs based upon his
interactions with Arnold when he booked her into the jail. 1st Am. Compl. [29] at
17. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that when Officer Huynh booked Arnold, he
conducted a medical intake screening which revealed that she was a Type 1 insulindependent diabetic. Id. at 11. Plaintiff claims that “[d]espite this knowledge, . . .
Arnold was deprived of medication necessary to treat her diabetes.” Id. In an
Interrogatory propounded by Officer Huynh, Plaintiff was asked to give a “full and
complete description of all conduct or action[s] which you claim constituted such a
[constitutional] violation,” to which she responded by merely referring to the
allegations in the First Amended Complaint [29] and stating that Officer Huynh
“had contact with . . . Arnold and the jail nursing staff.” Ex. 1 [100-1] at 5.
Officer Huynh seeks summary judgment on grounds that Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that he acted with deliberate indifference to Arnold’s constitutional
rights and, even if she has, he acted reasonably under the circumstances. Mem.
[101] at 7-8. In support of his Motion, Officer Huynh submitted his sworn responses
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to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories in which he detailed his interactions with Arnold. See
Ex. 2 [100-2]. According to Officer Huynh, he asked Arnold the standard intake
questions about her medical history and any current medical issues. Id. at 3. Arnold
informed Officer Huynh that she was a diabetic and that she had “seizures,
epilepsy, heart problems, and a blood clot in her leg.” Ex. 2 [100-2] at 4. She also
advised Officer Huynh that she took medication, but she was unable to provide him
with the names of any of her medications. Id. Officer Huynh noted that Arnold
appeared to be under the influence of an unknown substance and that he had “to
ask her the same question several times in order to obtain any information.” Id.
Officer Huynh completed the booking process and attempted to escort Arnold to
pre-classification, but she was non-compliant and refused to walk, which forced him
utilize hand restraints and place her in an isolation cell. Id. The record indicates
that this was the extent of Officer Huynh’s direct contact with Arnold.
In response, Plaintiff raises two issues which she asserts create a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Officer Huynh violated a clearly established
right and whether he acted unreasonably. Resp. [118] at 14-15. Plaintiff first argues
that Officer Huynh omitted facts from his response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories by
failing to mention that he observed Defendant Corporal Kristofer Gray tap on
Arnold’s cell during the 10:00 p.m. headcount on September 9. Resp. [118] at 14; Ex.
6 [118-6] at 3. During the subsequent death investigation conducted on behalf of the
Jackson County Sheriff’s Department, Officer Huynh told Sergeant Tracy Odom
that he was present in A-Pod where Arnold was detained during the 10:00 p.m.
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headcount as an observer and witnessed Defendant Gray tap on Arnold’s cell
window. Ex. 6 [118-6] at 3. Plaintiff maintains that Corporal Gray’s actions were a
violation of jail policy and that Officer Huynh did not report this violation or take
any other corrective action. Resp. [118] at 14.
Plaintiff also contends that Officer Huynh purposely chose not to view
Arnold’s medical records when he booked her into the JCADC. Id. In an interview
conducted by Agent Stephen Beale of the Mississippi Bureau of Investigation,
Officer Huynh stated that he did not view Arnold’s jail medical history during the
booking process, but instead started “a new medical.” Ex. 3 [118-3], Officer Huynh’s
MBI Interview, at 7:23:35-7:23:50. Arnold had been incarcerated at the JCADC on
several prior occasions, and her jail medical records indicated that she was a Type 1
diabetic and had received medication for this issue during her previous periods of
confinement. Ex. 5 [118-5] at 7-20, 104-120 (detailing her diagnosis and medical
treatment for her diabetes during two different periods of confinement at the
JCADC). Plaintiff contends that Officer Huynh’s failure to review Arnold’s jail
medical records led to Arnold’s condition going “unrecognized” by the JCADC. Resp.
[118] at 14-15.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that Officer Huynh
acted with deliberate indifference to Arnold’s constitutional rights because she has
not produced sufficient evidence that Officer Huynh acted with wanton disregard
for Arnold’s serious medical needs. See Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346. “A serious medical
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need is one for which treatment has been recommended or for which the need is so
apparent that even laymen would recognize that care is required.” Id. at 354 n.12.
Although Arnold did inform Officer Huynh that she suffered from several
medical conditions, including diabetes, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that
at the time Officer Huynh interacted with Arnold there was any indication that any
medical care was required. Ex. 8 [118-8] at 4. Arnold appeared to be in an
intoxicated state during the booking process, but the summary judgment record is
uncontested that Officer Huynh did not otherwise recognize any indicators that
Arnold was in medical distress. Id. Furthermore, the record appears uncontroverted
that Officer Huynh had no prior personal knowledge of Arnold’s health conditions or
of any prescription medications she took. Id.
At most, the evidence set forth by Plaintiff demonstrates that Officer Huynh
acted negligently, which is insufficient to prove deliberate indifference. Grogan v.
Kumar, 873 F.3d 273, 278 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346). In this
context the Fifth Circuit has defined negligence as acting “without the due care a
reasonable person would use.” Hyatt, 843 F.3d at 178. Officer Huynh admitted that
he did not review Arnold’s jail medical history, but nothing in the record indicates
that he did so with the subjective intent to harm Arnold. In fact, the record
indicates that Officer Huynh took steps to ensure that the medical staff were made
aware of Arnold’s conditions. Ex. 8 [118-8] at 3-4. He entered Arnold’s medical
information into JCADC management system so that the medical staff could access
it and provide her with the proper medication. Id. Even if a reasonable person
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would have inquired further and reviewed Arnold’s previous medical history, this
alone is insufficient to establish that Officer Huynh was aware of a “substantial risk
of serious bodily harm and . . . disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.” Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346.
Nor does Officer Huynh’s alleged failure to follow protocol rise to the level of
deliberate indifference. The Fifth Circuit has held that “violations of prison rules do
not alone rise to the level of constitutional violations and, therefore, such claims are
not actionable under § 1983.” Scheidel v. Sec’y of Pub. Safety & Corr., 561 F. App’x
426, 427 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Hernandez v. Estelle, 788 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir.
1986)). Thus, even if Plaintiff were able to produce evidence of a specific jail policy,
which she has not, that Officer Huynh violated by failing to report Corporal Gray’s
alleged procedural violation, this would not rise to the level of deliberate
indifference. Officer Huynh is entitled to summary judgment.
b.
Officer Jamie Weeks
Plaintiff alleges that Officer Weeks was “a corrections officer working in Zone
5 of the Lockdown Unit at the [JCADC]” where Arnold was detained and that he
“breached, ignored or did not follow jail protocol for doing inmate status rounds.” 1st
Am. Compl. [29] at 12. She further claims that Officer Weeks was responsible for
distributing lunch trays to inmates in the Lockdown Unit and was informed by
prison inmate Olivia Reynolds that Arnold “probably needed to eat something
because her blood sugar was low, and the [Correctional Medical Associates] agents
were not giving her insulin.” Id. at 14. Despite this warning, the First Amended
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Complaint [29] claims that Officer Weeks “did not knock on . . . Arnold’s cell or give
her a lunch tray,” which constituted deliberate indifference to Arnold’s
constitutional rights. Id. at 17.
Officer Weeks moves for summary judgment on grounds that “Plaintiff has
failed to offer any evidence that [he] participated in any acts that caused the alleged
deprivation of . . . Arnold’s rights” and “[e]ven if Plaintiff could establish a
constitutional violation . . . he would nevertheless be entitled to qualified immunity
because his actions were objectively reasonable.” Mot. [102] at 2. Officer Weeks
described his interactions with Arnold in response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories as
follows:
[w]hen I went on duty, I was assigned to the area of the jail in which
that zone is located. Ms. Arnold was ringing the intercom system
stating that she needed to go to the hospital. I immediately notified
the onsite medical staff of her request. I escorted the on-duty nurse
to Ms. Arnold’s cell for her to assess Ms. Arnold. Due to her erratic
behavior, the nurse deemed Ms. Arnold uncooperative and stated
she would return when Ms. Arnold calmed down. Another deputy
and I escorted the nurse to Ms. Arnold additional times but Ms.
Arnold remained uncooperative.
Ex. 9 [124-9] at 3. Officer Weeks argues that his conduct does not demonstrate
deliberate indifference to Arnold’s medical needs, but rather it “evince[s] care and
an attempt to get [Arnold] medical assistance that she was requesting.” Mem.
[103] at 8.
In response, Plaintiff raises three issues which she maintains create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Weeks violated Arnold’s clearly
established rights. Resp. [124] at 14-17. She first points out that Officer Weeks was
identified as the jailor who did not give Arnold her lunch tray on September 9. Id;
18
Ex. 4 [124-4], Inmate Reynolds’ MBI Interview at 2:10-2:22. Inmate Reynolds stated
that she informed Officer Weeks that “[Arnold] probably needed her food. She has
been saying that she needed her insulin.” Ex. 4 [124-4], Inmate Reynolds’ MBI
Interview at 2:08-2:13. Inmate Reynolds also stated that Officer Weeks did not give
Arnold a food tray, because she was asleep. Id. at 2:15-2:20. Plaintiff asserts that
this is “an issue of medical significance” because Arnold “was a known diabetic.”
Resp. [124] at 17.
Next, Plaintiff contends that Officer Weeks’s statement to Sergeant Odom
and his sworn response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories regarding how many times he
escorted the nurse to Arnold’s cell are inconsistent. Id. at 15. Officer Weeks stated
in his sworn response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory 6 that he escorted the nurse to
Arnold’s cell on multiple occasions. Ex. 9 [124-9] at 3. However, in his interview
with Sergeant Odom he stated that he was only with the nurse once. Ex. 6 [124-6]
at 4.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Officer Weeks’s position that Arnold remained
uncooperative after the initial nurse visit is contradicted by Inmate Reynolds. Resp.
124] at 17. According to Inmate Reynolds, Arnold was not being belligerent or
combative when the nurse was escorted to her cell subsequent to the nurse’s initial
visit, and that it was the nurse who decided not to provide treatment to Arnold. Ex.
4 [124-4], Inmate Reynolds’ MBI Interview at 5:08-5:23.
While the foregoing may create some factual disputes, they are not material
ones sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Deliberate indifference is a high
19
standard which requires Plaintiff to show that Officer Weeks was “subjectively
aware of a substantial risk of serious harm and failed to take reasonable measures
to abate this risk.” Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996)
(Hare I). Plaintiff has not presented competent summary judgment evidence that
Officer Weeks was aware of a substantial risk to Arnold’s health or that he
deliberately disregarded this risk.
The record is undisputed that before their interactions on September 9,
Officer Weeks had no prior knowledge of Arnold’s health conditions. Ex. 9 [124-9] at
4. As such, the only evidence that Officer Weeks had any knowledge of Arnold’s
condition consists of Inmate Reynolds’ statements and Arnold’s request for medical
attention. Ex. 4 [124-4], Inmate Reynolds’ MBI Interview at 2:08-2:13; Ex. 9 [124-9]
at 3. When Inmate Reynolds informed Officer Weeks that Arnold “probably needed
her insulin,” Arnold was sleeping and there was no other indication to Officer
Weeks of any medical distress at that time. Ex. 4 [124-4], Inmate Reynolds’ MBI
Interview at 2:08-2:13. Even when Arnold later informed Officer Weeks that she
needed to go the hospital, she was being “belligerent and difficult” and refused to
allow the nurse to either take her blood sugar or blood pressure. Ex. 6 [124-6] at 4;
Ex. 7 [124-7] at 4. Nothing about this behavior would signal to Officer Weeks that
there was a substantial risk to Arnold’s life. The record evidence is insufficient to
establish that, as a non-medically trained individual, Officer Weeks knew that
Arnold was suffering from an excessive risk to her health or that he deliberately
disregarded that risk. See Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676-77 (5th Cir. 2019)
20
(holding that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a constitutional violation where
the record lacked evidence that the defendant was subjectively aware of a
substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate).
Moreover, the record indicates that when Officer Weeks received information
that Arnold was requesting medical treatment, he escorted the on-duty jail nurse to
Arnold’s cell, but it is undisputed that Arnold was not cooperative. Ex. 9 [124-9] at
3; Ex. 4 [124-4], Inmate Reynolds’ MBI Interview, at 6:15-6:20 (describing Arnold as
“pretty aggravated” during the nurse’s first two visits to Arnold’s cell). Officer
Weeks took steps to ensure that a licensed medical professional saw to Arnold’s
needs. See, e.g., Ex. 9 [124-9] at 3 (“[o]lny the medical staff may provide inmates
with prescription medication.”). As Officer Weeks argues, his actions demonstrate
that he attempted “to get [Arnold] medical assistance that she was requesting.”
Mem. [103] at 8; see also Mayfield v. King, No. 9:16-CV-20, 2017 WL 4295256, at *4
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2017) (finding that the plaintiff failed to state claim against
jailors who followed protocol by contacting the jail’s medical personnel who was
responsible for administering medication). The fact that he was unable to prevent
the ultimate harm is insufficient to establish liability on his part. Longoria v. Tex.,
473 F.3d 586, 593 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844).
Nor does Officer Weeks’s alleged failure to provide Arnold with a lunch tray
rise to the level of deliberate indifference. At most, Officer Weeks’s actions in this
regard were negligent because he did not purposefully deprive Arnold of her food,
but elected not to give her a lunch tray because she was sleeping. Ex. 4 [124-4],
21
Inmate Reynolds’ MBI Interview at 2:08-2:13. Assuming Officer Weeks arguably
should have taken additional steps to ensure that Arnold received her food, his
failure to do was merely negligent which is insufficient for § 1983 liability. See, e.g.,
Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that the defendants’
actions “in not taking further steps to treat” the deceased after examining him was
merely negligent conduct).
Finally, Plaintiff’s arguments with respect to the reliability of Officer Weeks’s
statements do not create material fact issues sufficient to preclude summary
judgment. Whether Officer Weeks escorted the nurse to Arnold’s cell once or
multiple times, and whether Arnold was combative when the nurse was escorted to
Arnold’s cell after the initial visit, are not material in determining whether Officer
Weeks himself acted with deliberate indifference to Arnold’s serious medical needs.
Plaintiff has not shown the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Defendant Weeks violated Arnold’s clearly established rights and he is
entitled to summary judgment.
c.
Officer Jeremy Bobo
The First Amended Complaint [29] alleges that Officer Jeremey Bobo was “a
corrections officer working in Zone 5 of the Lockdown Unit at the [JCADC]” where
Arnold was detained and that he “breached, ignored or did not follow jail protocol
for doing inmate status rounds.” 1st Am. Compl. [29] at 12. Plaintiff alleges that
Officer Bobo saw Arnold during the 10:00 p.m. headcount “in distress or
22
unresponsive and took inadequate or no steps to assist her,” and that this violated
JCADC protocol. Id. at 15-16.
In response to an Interrogatory propounded by Plaintiff, Officer Bobo
described his first encounter with Arnold as follows:
[t]he first was on 10/08/18 [sic], when she first came in, she was
taken down to the BISO cell and placed there because she was
severely agitated and was causing a disturbance in the booking area.
She was also causing problems with other inmates in the
preclassification area.
Ex. 9 [123-9] at 3. Officer Bobo described his second encounter with Arnold in a jail
incident report prepared shortly after Arnold’s death:
[o]n Sunday, September 9, 2018 at approximately 2200 hours, I . . .
was calling out names for 2200 hour headcount when I came to A
(Adam) 512 the cell of Inmate Arnold, Cindy. When I tried to wake
her up with a knock on her cell door window, I tried a couple of times,
I got no response from her so I first looked in at her and could see
her laying on a mat on the floor of her cell and she look to not have
her jump suit pulled up so I called to Deputy Maas, Christy #228 to
come down and check on her.
I continued on with the head count, and I did not see if anyone
entered the cell but I did hear LCD (Lead Correctional Deputy)
Gray, Kristoffer #207 knock on her cell door several times, after I
had finished with the other inmates I did ask before leaving the day
room if inmate Arnold had responded and I got a yes.
Ex. 3 [104-3] at 2. Officer Bobo argues that his actions do not establish that he acted
with deliberate indifference to Arnold’s constitutional rights. Mem. [105] at 8.
Plaintiff raises two arguments which she maintains reveal a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Officer Bobo violated a clearly established right. Resp.
[123] at 14-17. She first asserts that Officer Bobo intentionally chose not to check on
Arnold during the 10:00 p.m. headcount because she “was nude and he was
frustrated with her unresponsiveness.” Id. at 15; Ex. 6 [123-6] at 3. Plaintiff
23
theorizes that if Officer Bobo had opened Arnold’s cell door, rather than asking a
female officer to check on her, “he would have found . . . Arnold in severe diabetic
distress, gotten her help and she probably would not have died.” Resp. [123] at 15.
Plaintiff next asserts that Officer Bobo’s response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory
18 is “self-serving and inconsistent” with his statement to Sergeant Odom. Id.
Interrogatory 18 asked Officer Bobo to describe any violations of jail policy or
procedure by jail or medical personnel during Arnold’s detention. Ex. 9 [123-9] at 8.
Officer Bobo’s sworn response was that he “did not witness any violations of policy
or procedure of the ADC concerning the stay of . . . Arnold.” Id. Plaintiff takes the
position that this answer is inconsistent with Officer Bobo’s statement to Sergeant
Odom, because in that statement Officer Bobo purportedly admitted to violating jail
policy. Resp. [123] at 16; Ex. 6 [123-6] at 3. Specifically, Officer Bobo told Sergeant
Odom that he did not get a response from Arnold when he knocked on her cell door
during the 10:00 p.m. headcount and that he was not sure if any one ever saw
Arnold. Ex. 6 [123-6] at 3. He also stated that he “should have opened the cell door
himself and checked on [Arnold].” Id. Plaintiff contends that these actions during
headcount were violations of jail policy rendering his Interrogatory response
inconsistent. Resp. [123] at 16.
First, Plaintiff has not directed the Court to, nor has it located any evidence
that, Officer Bobo had any personal knowledge of Arnold’s medical issues. This is
insufficient to show Officer Bobo was subjectively aware of a substantial risk of
24
serious harm to Arnold and that he disregarded that risk. See Hyatt, 843 F.3d at
177.
The competent summary judgment evidence with respect to Officer Bobo
reflects that he in fact had very limited interaction with Arnold, and nothing that
occurred during those interactions would allow him to draw an inference that
Arnold was in medical distress. Specifically, Officer Bobo observed Arnold shortly
after she arrived at the JCADC and noted that she was in an agitated state. Ex. 9
[123-9] at 3. The next time Officer Bobo saw Arnold was not until the 10:00 p.m.
headcount, when she was lying on the mat in her cell. Ex. 6 [123-6] at 2. Although
he did not get a response from Arnold during the headcount, he was later told that
she did respond to another officer. Id. Nothing about these interactions would be
sufficient to alert Officer Bobo that Arnold was potentially facing a medical crisis.
Plaintiff asserts, without citation to any evidence, that Arnold was “in medical
distress” during the 10:00 p.m. headcount and that if Officer Bobo had acted
“[Arnold] probably would not have died.” Resp. [123] at 15. These unsubstantiated
assertions are insufficient to carry Plaintiff’s burden at this stage. Freeman v. Tex.
Dept. of Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854, 860 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that “the
nonmovant cannot satisfy [their summary judgment] burden with conclusory
allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.”).
Officer Bobo’s failure to personally check on Arnold during the headcount is
likewise insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Plaintiff characterizes
Officer Bobo’s decision as intentional, Resp. [123] at 15, and he acknowledged in
25
retrospect that he should have checked on Arnold personally, Ex. 6 [123-6] at 3, but
at most this is evidence of negligence which will not support liability under § 1983.
Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d 508, 514 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that negligence is
insufficient to support a finding of liability under § 1983). As the Court has stated,
nothing in the summary judgment record indicates that Officer Bobo was
subjectively aware of Arnold’s medical condition. Without any awareness of an
excessive risk to Arnold’s health, Officer Bobo’s failure to act does not establish
deliberate indifference on his part. Cleveland, 938 F.3d at 676 (citing Farmer, 511
U.S. at 837-38).
Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that Officer’s Bobo’s response to Plaintiff’s
Interrogatory 18 is self-serving and inconsistent with his other statements does not
create a material fact question for trial. Plaintiff argues that Officer Bobo violated
jail policy during the 10:00 p.m. headcount, but she has not cited to the specific jail
policy that Officer Bobo purportedly violated. Resp. [123] at 16. Plaintiff merely
relies on Officer Bobo’s statement that, in retrospect, he should have checked on
Arnold during the headcount to prove that he violated jail policy. Id. Even if Officer
Bobo did violate jail policy this would not create a genuine issue of material fact
because “violations of prison rules do not alone rise to the level of constitutional
violations.” Scheidel, 561 F. App’x at 427. Officer Bobo is entitled to summary
judgment.
26
d.
Officer Chad Vidrine
The First Amended Complaint [29] alleges that Officer Chad Vidrine was “a
corrections officer working in Zone 5 of the Lockdown Unit at the [JCADC]” where
Arnold was detained and that he “breached, ignored or did not follow jail protocol
for doing inmate status rounds.” 1st Am. Compl. [29] at 12. According to the
pleadings, Officer Vidrine allegedly had to be ordered to begin CPR and was present
when Arnold was pronounced deceased. Id. at 15-16.
Officer Vidrine detailed his interactions with Arnold on the evening of
September 9 and the early morning of September 10 in response to an Interrogatory
propounded by Plaintiff, as follows:
[t]o the best of my recollection, I did not interact with Ms. Arnold
until I was working in A-Pod the night of September 9, 2018, when
Ms. Arnold was housed in cell A512 in zone A5 in A-Pod. Before
lockdown that evening, I attempted to talk with Ms. Arnold from
outside her cell to see if she would put her jumpsuit on, which she
had been refusing to wear. Ms. Arnold looked me in the eye but did
not respond. I asked Ms. Arnold if she was alright, to which she
didn’t respond either. Determined to get some sort of response, I
repeated the question until Ms. Arnold turned to her left, waved
dismissively at me, and walked further into her cell. On my first
round after headcount (at approximately 2340 hours), I saw Ms.
Arnold take a deep breath as I observed her through the cell window.
On my second round after headcount (approximately 0040 hours), I
saw Ms. Arnold’s hand move as I looked through her cell window.
On my third round after headcount (approximately 01:45 hours), I
did not see any movement from Ms. Arnold, so I called for Deputy
Maas, who was making rounds on the upper tier. I called for central
control to open Ms. Arnold’s cell door and I entered her cell with
Deputy Maas. Central control called for the nurse to meet us at the
cell, and as we were waiting for the nurse, Deputy Maas and I pulled
Ms. Arnold out from under her rack where she had been sleeping.
When the nurse arrived, she checked Ms. Arnold’s vitals. With no
pulse being detected, Deputy Maas and I started chest compressions
and continued doing them, switching off when necessary, until the
27
emergency medical technicians arrived, took over the scene, and we
were thereafter advised to stop compressions.
Ex. 9 [125-9] at 3-4. In support of his Motion [108] for Summary Judgment, Officer
Vidrine argues that his actions show “concern, not deliberate indifference” and that
Plaintiff has failed to put forth “any specific facts in support of her allegations that
[he] violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Mem. [109] at 8.
Plaintiff responds that there are two issues which create a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether Officer Vidrine violated clearly established law.
She first contends that Officer Vidrine’s statements about his checks on Arnold are
self-serving and highly suspect. Resp. [125] at 14-15. According to Plaintiff,
Sergeant Odom interviewed Officer Vidrine as part of his investigation into Arnold’s
death and his statements to Sergeant Odom closely match his sworn Interrogatory
response referenced above. Resp. [125] at 10-11; Ex. 6 [125-6] at 3. But Officer
Vidrine also told Sergeant Odom that “at approximately 1820hrs an inmate buzzed
the monitor and told them that Arnold was in her cell on the ground shaking.” Ex. 6
[125-6] at 3. According to Officer Vidrine, Officer Christy Maas checked on Arnold
and informed Officer Vidrine that Arnold was “okay.” Ex. 3 [125-3], Officer Vidrine’s
MBI Interview, at 6:30:00-6:32:00. In addition, as part of his investigation Sergeant
Odom discovered that Officer Vidrine had logged rounds that he did not perform.
Ex. 6 [125-6] at 3. Plaintiff contends that this is evidence that Officer Vidrine’s
statements about his checks on Arnold are thus “self-serving” and “highly suspect.”
Resp. [125] at 15.
28
Plaintiff also argues that Officer Vidrine’s Interrogatory answers, taken as a
whole, “are self-serving, demonstrably false and inconsistent with his statement
given contemporaneously at the time of Arnold[’]s death.” Id. Specifically, she points
to his response to Interrogatory 18 which asked Officer Vidrine to describe any
violations of jail policy or procedure by jail or medical personnel during Arnold’s
detention. Ex. 9 [123-9] at 8. Officer Vidrine’s sworn response was that he “did not
witness any violations of policy or procedure of the ADC concerning the stay of . . .
Arnold.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that this statement is false because Officer Vidrine
violated jail policy by logging rounds that he did not perform. Resp. [125] at 16.
The foregoing is insufficient to create a material fact question as to whether
Officer Vidrine violated Arnold’s clearly established constitutional rights because
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence showing that Officer Vidrine was
subjectively aware of and deliberately indifferent to Arnold’s serious medical needs.
Plaintiff alleges in the First Amended Complaint [29] that Officer Vidrine
had to be ordered to perform CPR. See Grafton v. Bailey, No. 13-2940, 2018 WL
2325410, at *10 (W.D. La. May 22, 2018) (acknowledging that the failure to perform
CPR “could raise a jury question of deliberate indifference”). However, she has
presented insufficient evidence at the summary judgment stage to support this
claim, as the competent summary judgment evidence reflects that Officer Vidrine
did not completely fail to perform CPR. When Officer Vidrine and Officer Maas
found Arnold unresponsive they radioed for medical assistance and then checked
Arnold’s pulse. Ex. 3 [125-3], Officer Maas’s MBI Interview, at 6:11:50-6:13:05
29
(stating that both officers checked Arnold’s pulse and did not detect one). Officer
Vidrine began chest compressions shortly thereafter when Corporal Amanda
Shepperson arrived with the Automated External Defibrillator and told him to
begin CPR. Ex. 9 [125-9] at 4; Ex. 6 [125-6] at 2; Ex. 3 [125-3], Corporal
Shepperson’s MBI Interview, at 7:08:09-7:08:15. Plaintiff has presented no evidence
to dispute this version of events.
The undisputed evidence further reflects that there was only a short period of
time between when Officer Vidrine discovered that Arnold was unresponsive and
when he began CPR. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that a delay in medical care
“can result in liability where there has been deliberate indifference, in that the
officers were subjectively aware of the risk of serious harm but disregarded it.”
Aguirre v. City of San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 421 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted)
(affirming a district court’s grant of qualified immunity to officers who did not begin
CPR for 4 minutes and 30 seconds after discovering the inmate unresponsive). But a
plaintiff must point to evidence that the officers “knew [their measures] were
insufficient and intentionally failed to do more out of indifference to [the inmate’s]
well-being.” Id. (emphasis in original). Plaintiff here has made no such showing,
and the delay 2 in starting CPR is not sufficient to prove that Officer Vidrine acted
with deliberate indifference to Arnold’s serious medical needs. See, e.g., Garza v.
City of Donna, No. 7:16-CV-00558, 2017 WL 6498392, at *14 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 15,
While the exact timeframe is unclear, from both Officer Vidrine’s and Officer Maas’s accounts not
much time elapsed between when they found Arnold unresponsive and when they began chest
compressions. Ex. 9 [125-9] at 4; Ex. 6 [125-6] at 2; Ex. 3 [125-3], Officer Maas’s MBI Interview, at
6:11:50-6:14:31.
2
30
2017) (holding that a thirty-second failure to administer CPR was insufficient
evidence to prove that defendant was deliberately indifferent); Hyatt v. Callahan
Cnty., No. 1:14-CV-169-C, 2015 WL 12964681, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2015) aff’d
sub nom. Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding that defendant did
not act with deliberate indifference even though he did not perform CPR for
approximately 10 minutes after discovering that the inmate had hung himself);
Stogner v. Sturdivant, No. 10-125-JJB-CN, 2010 WL 4056217, at *4 (M.D. La. Oct.
14, 2010) (finding that the defendants were not deliberately indifferent to the
inmate’s medical needs where they waited around 2 minutes to begin CPR on the
inmate after finding him unconscious).
Viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, there is arguably a fact question regarding whether Officer Vidrine
actually performed all of the rounds that he claimed to have performed. Ex. 6 [1256] at 3. However, the evidence is nevertheless insufficient to conclude that Officer
Vidrine was subjectively aware of a substantial risk to Arnold’s health and that he
disregarded that risk. Even if Officer Vidrine did not perform all of the rounds he
claims to have performed, nothing in the record indicates that he had any
knowledge of Arnold’s medical conditions before he found her unresponsive. He
acknowledged that he was aware from what other officers had told him that they
believed Arnold was “intoxicated” when she arrived at the JCADC. Ex. 3 [125-3],
Officer Vidrine’s MBI Interview, at 6:37:15-6:37:20. He was also aware that Officer
Christy Maas personally checked on Arnold after an inmate informed Officer
31
Vidrine and Officer Maas that Arnold was lying on the ground shaking. Ex. 7 [1257] at 2. However, at that time Arnold apparently informed Officer Maas that she
was “okay,” and this information was relayed to Officer Vidrine. Id. 3 The record
appears uncontested that this is the extent of the information provided to Officer
Vidrine about Arnold’s condition until he found her unresponsive in her cell.
Without any subjective knowledge of a risk to Arnold’s health, Officer Vidrine
cannot be said to have been deliberately indifferent to Arnold’s medical needs and
he is therefore entitled to summary judgment. Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545,
549 (5th Cir. 2001) (“To prove deliberate indifference, a pretrial detainee must show
that the state official knew of . . . an excessive risk to the inmate’s health . . . .”).
e.
Corporal Kristofer Gray
Finally, with respect to Corporal Gray, the First Amended Complaint [29]
claims that he was a “corrections officer working in Zone 5 of the Lockdown Unit at
the [JCADC]” where Arnold was detained, and that he “breached, ignored or did not
follow jail protocol for doing inmate status rounds.” 1st Am. Compl. [29] at 12.
Plaintiff further alleges that Officer Gray shined his flashlight into Arnold’s cell
during the 10:00 p.m. headcount, but he “did not enter the cell or request any
medical assistance for . . . Arnold.” Id. at 15.
Corporal Gray interacted with Arnold on a few occasions, and he described
these events in response to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories as follows:
[o]n the night of September 9, 2018, at approximately 1700 hours, I
observed Cindy Arnold naked on her bunk, with her legs spread, and
Officer Vidrine stated that “[i]nmate was the one that reported Arnold was in her cell shaking” and
that “Maas responded to the cell and Arnold told Maas that she was ok[ay].” Ex. 7 [125-7] at 2.
3
32
she appeared to be masturbating. Shortly after midnight, when
Deputies Christy Maas and Chad Vidrine radioed that they needed
a nurse in A5 day room, I reported to the area and observed both
deputies administering CPR/First Aid to Ms. Arnold.
Ex. 9 [126-9] at 3. Sergeant Odom interviewed Corporal Gray shortly after the
incident and he described another interaction with Arnold that occurred during the
10:00 p.m. headcount:
LCD Gray stated that Deputy Jeremy Bobo was actually doing the
count, and he was just observing.
...
He stated Deputy Bobo asked him to check on Arnold because she
was nude, under the bunk, and not getting up. LCD Gray stated he
went over to the cell but never looked inside, he stated he tapped on
the window with his flashlight. He stated the reason for not looking
in the cell was because he did not want to see her nude again. LCD
Gray stated that he knows the proper procedure for headcount, but
he did not follow the procedure that night. He stated they normally
have inmates come out of their cell to be counted.
Ex. 6 [126-6] at 2-3. Corporal Gray moves for summary judgment and argues that
there is no evidence which indicates that he was deliberately indifferent to Arnold’s
serious medical needs. Mem. [111] at 7.
Plaintiff raises what she claims are two issues that create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Corporal Gray violated a clearly established right. Resp.
[126] at 14-17. Plaintiff first points to Corporal Gray’s statement about the 10:00
p.m. headcount and argues that he intentionally failed to check on Arnold during a
period in which she was in medical distress by choosing not to follow jail procedure.
Id. at 14-16.
Plaintiff further maintains that Corporal Gray’s response to her
Interrogatory 18 is “either an obvious mistake, or possibly a grave untruth.”
33
Specifically, this Interrogatory asked Corporal Gray to describe any violations of jail
policy or procedure by jail or medical personnel during Arnold’s detention. Ex. 9
[126-9] at 8. Corporal Gray’s sworn response was that he “did not witness any
violations of policy or procedure of the ADC concerning the stay of . . . Arnold.” Id.
Plaintiff contends that this is inconsistent with Corporal Gray’s admission to
Sergeant Odom that he did not follow proper procedure during the 10:00 p.m.
headcount. Resp. [126] at 17. As such, Plaintiff argues that, as a whole, Corporal
Gray’s Interrogatory answers “are self-serving, likely a falsehood, and directly
contradict” the statements given shortly after Arnold’s death. Id.
Plaintiff essentially claims that Corporal Gray was deliberately indifferent to
Arnold’s medical needs because he failed to follow the headcount procedure. 1st Am.
Compl. [29] at 15; Resp. [126] at 14-17. The Fifth Circuit has held that a failure to
follow policy or procedure is negligent conduct and is insufficient to support a
finding of deliberate indifference. Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff’s Dept., 228 F.3d
388, 398 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a deputy’s failure to follow the inmate check
policy was negligent conduct); Estate of Pollard v. Hood Cnty., Tex., 579 F. App’x
260, 265 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that the jailors’ failure to comply with the 15minute checks policy for suicidal inmates was negligent conduct); see also Fuentes v.
Gomez, No. 2:16-CV-390, 2018 WL 322161, at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2018 Jan. 8, 2018)
(holding that the jailors’ failure to require the inmate to present himself during roll
call in violation of the jail’s roll call policy was negligent conduct). Although
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of the actual headcount procedure that
34
Corporal Gray purportedly violated, Corporal Gray’s admission that he did not
follow the proper headcount procedure during the 10:00 p.m. headcount would at
most only establish that he was negligent. This does not create a material fact
question for trial.
Furthermore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Corporal Gray was
subjectively aware of an excessive risk to Arnold’s health. Plaintiff infers that
Arnold was in medical distress during the 10:00 p.m. headcount, because she
reportedly did not respond to Officer Bobo and was lying on the floor naked under
her bunk. Resp. [126] at 16; Ex. 9 [126-9] at 3. This by itself is insufficient to show
that Corporal Gray was subjectively aware that Arnold was experiencing a medical
emergency. Plaintiff must prove “objective exposure to a substantial risk of serious
harm.” Gobert, 463 F.3d at 345. She has not satisfied this burden because Corporal
Gray’s observations during the 10:00 p.m. headcount were not sufficient to make
him aware that Arnold had serious medical needs. The Fifth Circuit has held that
evidence that a jailor did not check on an inmate after observing him naked and in
an unusual position was not enough to show subjective deliberate indifference. Gray
v. Tunica Cnty., Miss., 100 F. App’x 281, 282 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (holding
that a jailor was not deliberately indifferent when he did not enter an inmate’s cell
after observing him “unclothed and in a ‘frog-like’ position”). Based on the summary
judgment record, the information available to Corporal Gray was insufficient to
place him on notice of a serious medical risk or show that he acted with deliberate
indifference to that risk.
35
III. CONCLUSION
To the extent the Court has not addressed the parties’ remaining arguments,
it has considered them and determined that they would not alter the result.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, Defendants
James McCoy, Cendall Huynh, Jamie Weeks, Jeremy Bobo, Chad Vidrine, and
Kristofer Gray’s Motions [98][100][102][104][108][110] for Summary Judgment are
GRANTED, and Plaintiff Kayla Rush’s claims against Defendants James McCoy,
Cendall Huynh, Jamie Weeks, Jeremy Bobo, Chad Vidrine, and Kristofer Gray are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff Kayla Rush’s claims against
Defendants Jackson County, Comprehensive Medical Associates, Inc., and Nurse
Violet Smith will proceed.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 29th day of September, 2021
s/ Halil Suleyman Ozerden
HALIL SULEYMAN OZERDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
36
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