Graves et al v. Toyota Motor Corporation et al

Filing 233

ORDER denying Defendants' 183 Motion in Limine to Exclude Any References to Toyota's "State of Mind." Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on January 10, 2012 (dsl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION

WAYNE AND MARY GRAVES, FOR AND ON
BEHALF OF W.A.G., A MINOR
VERSUS

PLAINTIFFS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:09cv169KS-MTP

TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION AND
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, USA, INC.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendants’ Seventh Motion In Limine to
Exclude Any References to Toyota’s “State of Mind” [#183]. The court having reviewed
the motion, the response, the briefs of counsel, the authorities cited, the pleadings and
exhibits filed, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises finds that the motion
should be denied. The court specifically finds as follows:
This is a product liability action encompassing the commonly referred to rollover
and roof crush claims. The accident occurred on December 31, 2008 on U.S. Highway
84 in Jones County, Mississippi. This single vehicle crash involved sixteen year-old
W.A.G., who was operating a 1995 Toyota 4Runner. As W.A.G. approached the
intersection of Highway 84 and Rose Lane, the physical evidence and eyewitness
testimony establish that W.A.G. steered his vehicle to the left and that the vehicle began
to yaw and then roll over multiple times. Although W.A.G. was wearing his seat belt and
remained inside the vehicle during the rollover, as a result of the rollover and roof crush,
W.A.G. was rendered quadriplegic.

Defendants Toyota Motor Corporation and Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.
(“Toyota”), have moved this court in limine for an order barring any references to
Toyota’s “state of mind” by Plaintiffs, their counsel, their witnesses, and specifically
Stephen Forrest, from voir dire to verdict. Plaintiffs have designated Stephen Forrest to
testify as an expert regarding roof design of the subject 1995 Toyota 4Runner. Toyota
asserts that Forrest opines that the roof was defectively designed, and in support of
those opinions, he comments on and criticizes documents produced by Toyota in
discovery. Toyota also argues that Forrest makes various assumptions and
suggestions as to Toyota’s “state of mind” throughout the report.
Toyota recognizes that Forrest, as an expert for Plaintiffs, may address
information contained in Toyota documents and provide opinions regarding the design
of the subject 1995 4Runner based on those documents. They also concede he may
have comments regarding what he perceives as deficiencies in those documents.
However, Toyota asserts that Forrest cannot act as a mouthpiece for Toyota, offering
his opinions as to what Toyota was thinking or what it knew or did not know when it
designed, tested and manufactured the subject vehicle.
The court notes, once again, that Toyota has chosen to attack Mr. Forrest’s
opinions by way of an in limine motion rather than having filed a timely Daubert motion.
This is true of many of the in limine motions that have been filed on behalf of Toyota.
This practice violates the rules of this court regarding such motions to exclude expert
testimony and is subject to denial for that reason alone. However, as with the other
untimely motions to limit expert testimony styled as in limine motions, the court will delve
into the merits of the motion to ascertain if there is any basis to support it.
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Plaintiffs respond that they designated Stephen Forrest to testify on the roof
design/roof crush claim, including the applicability of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (“FMVSS”) 216 and the relevant testing conducted by Toyota. They contend
the opinions of Forrest are based upon his training and experience as an engineer in
this particular area as well as his review of internal documents produced by Toyota
concerning FMVSS 216 testing and certification, or lack thereof, of the 1995 4Runner
vehicle.
Specifically, Forrest has provided certain opinion testimony concerning the
testing, applicability of the then existing FMVSS 216 and Toyota’s compliance with this
safety standard, all of which are issues in this case and relevant to whether the vehicle
was defectively designed and appropriately tested. Toyota has characterized these
opinions of Forrest as “state of mind” comments and has requested exclusion.
According to Toyota, these opinions are inadmissible as they are not based upon
personal knowledge, are not relevant and alternatively, inadmissible as the prejudicial
effect of these opinions outweigh the probative value.
Plaintiffs argue the opinions of Forrest are based upon his review of the Toyota’s
internal documents relating to testing of the roof structure, internal engineering
standards and actions undertaken, as well as the absence of testing protocol, in
subsequent years in light of the adoption and implementation of FMVSS 216. As
Toyota has recognized, Forrest may offer his opinions regarding its testing procedures,
soundness of internal engineering standards and apparent knowledge based upon
those documents as to the applicability of certain safety standards.

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Plaintiffs are entitled to offer expert witness testimony concerning not only the
appropriateness of Toyota’s FMVSS 216 testing on this particular vehicle but whether it
complied with the appropriate standards. Plaintiffs argue they are further entitled to
discuss Toyota’s alleged actions and inactions regarding testing of subsequent year
models under the same applicable standard and revision to Toyota’s internal
engineering standards to the extent that testing indicates either a lack of knowledge or a
conscious decision to disregard. The court agrees that such is admissible to the extent
it is directly applicable to the 1995 4Runner at issue and is rationally and reasonably
related to the facts of this case. The court disagrees with Toyota’s characterization that
this testimony amounts to “state of mind” type evidence. Much depends on the actual
offer of proof at trial. If Plaintiffs get too far afield and delve into subsequent years
testing or data, the court may revisit this issue upon proper objection by Toyota.
However, Forrest’s opinions are relevant to the roof crush issue presented in this
litigation, and, while prejudicial to Toyota, they are not unduly so.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’ Seventh
Motion In Limine to Exclude Any References to Toyota’s “State of Mind” [#183] is
denied.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 10th day of January, 2012.
s/Keith Starrett
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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