Eaton v. Magee et al
Filing
51
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 39 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on June 27, 2012. (aba)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION
MICHAEL SHAINE EATON
PLAINTIFF
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:10-cv-112-MTP
SHERIFF BILLY MAGEE AND
FORREST COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the court on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
[39]. Having reviewed the submissions of the parties and the applicable law, the undersigned finds
that the motion should be GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Michael Shaine Eaton, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed his civil
rights complaint [2] on May 10, 2010. As set forth in his complaint and as clarified during his
Spears1 hearing, Plaintiff asserts claims against Sheriff Billy McGee2 and Forrest County,
Mississippi (“the County”) for unconstitutional conditions of confinement and denial of due
process. See Omnibus Order [29]. Plaintiff’s claims occurred while he was housed at the Forrest
County Jail (the “Jail”) as a pre-trial detainee from June 23, 2009 to September 10, 2009. He is
currently incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institution in Glenville, West Virginia. See
Change of Address dated March 8, 2012 [47].
1
Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff’s Spears hearing occurred on
March 31, 2011.
2
Defendant Sheriff Billy McGee is erroneously referred to as Sheriff Billy Magee in the
pleadings.
1
Plaintiff was housed in Cell Block 44 of the Jail from June 23, 2009 to September 10,
2009, approximately two and a half (2 ½) months. See Ex. 27 to Motion [39-27]. Sheriff McGee
admits the Jail was overcrowded during that time. Affidavit of Sheriff McGee [39-23] at 2.
Throughout his incarceration, the cell block housed inmates exceeding its maximum capacity of
sixteen (16) with the most prisoners at once being twenty-nine (29) and the fewest being eighteen
(18). See Ex. 19 to Motion [39-19]; Ex. 18 to Motion [39-18] at 1-2. Plaintiff alleges that, in fact,
there were thirty-three (33) inmates housed in the cell block at the same time. See Omnibus
Transcript [50] (Hereinafter “Tr. [50]”) at 11.
The Defendants deny that there were ever thirty (30) people or more housed in the cell
block at once. Affidavit of Donnell Brannon [39-24] at 1-2, Affidavit of Ron Taylor [39-25] at 12. Plaintiff claims that because of this overcrowding, he was forced to sleep on the floor and that
people stepped on him during the night resulting in a knee injury. Affidavit of Plaintiff [46-11] at
1, Tr. [50] at 12, 16. Plaintiff further alleges that the living conditions in the Jail were unsanitary
because of the overcrowding. He claimed the showers were contaminated with black mold, and
there were insufficient bathroom facilities for the number of inmates: two (2) toilets and one (1)
shower. Tr. [50] at 12-13.
Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that he requested administrative relief through the Jail’s grievance
policy but was routinely denied any due process. Plaintiff alleges that there was no formal
grievance procedure in place, Plaintiff’s Response [45] at 3, and that he asked for grievance forms
on several occasions but “none were given.” Tr. [50] at 14.
The Inmate Handbook outlines the Jail’s grievance policy. See Ex. 20 to Motion [39-20]
at 14. Plaintiff claims he did not receive a copy of the inmate handbook. Plaintiff’s Memorandum
2
[46-11] at 3. Plaintiff claims that he addressed the majority of his attempts at administrative relief
to corrections officers named “Mike Crunch” and “Pat,” Tr. [50] at 14, but the Defendants deny
that anyone by those names was employed at the Jail at the time, Affidavit of Donnell Brannon
[39-24] at 1, Affidavit of Ron Taylor [39-25] at 1.
STANDARD
This court may grant summary judgment only if, viewing the facts in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party, the movants demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164
(5th Cir. 1995). If the movants fail to discharge the burden of showing the absence of a genuine
issue concerning any material fact, summary judgment must be denied. John v. Louisiana, 757
F.2d 698, 708 (5th Cir. 1985). The existence of an issue of material fact is a question of law that
this court must decide, and in making that decision, it must “draw inferences most favorable to the
party opposing the motion, and take care that no party will be improperly deprived of a trial of
disputed factual issues.” John, 757 F.2d at 708, 712.
There must, however, be adequate proof in the record showing a real controversy
regarding material facts. “Conclusory allegations,” Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871,
902 (1990), unsubstantiated assertions, Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1994), or
the presence of a “scintilla of evidence,” Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th
Cir. 1994), is not enough to create a real controversy regarding material facts. “[T]he mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In the absence of
3
proof, the court does not “assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary
facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s claims are before the court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, Section
1983 “neither provides a general remedy for the alleged torts of state officials nor opens the
federal courthouse doors to relieve the complaints of all who suffer injury at the hands of the state
or its officers.” White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680, 683 (5th Cir. 1981). Rather, "[i]t affords a
remedy only to those who suffer, as a result of state action, deprivation of ‘rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States." White, 660 F.2d at 683
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
It is well-settled that Section 1983 does not “create supervisory or respondeat superior
liability.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Thompkins v. Belt,
828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted) (“Under § 1983, supervisory officials
cannot be held liable for the actions of subordinates under any theory of vicarious liability.”). “To
state a cause of action under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts reflecting the defendants’
participation in the alleged wrong, specifying the personal involvement of each defendant.” Jolly
v. Klein, 923 F. Supp. 931, 943 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (citing Murphy v. Kellar, 950 F.2d 290, 292
(5th Cir. 1992)). Thus, supervisory prison officials may be held liable for a Section 1983 violation
only if they either were personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or if there is a
“sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional
violation.” Thompkins, 828 F.2d at 304; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009)
(“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that
4
each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.”).
Moreover, “[f]or purposes of liability, a suit against a public official in his official capacity
is in effect a suit against the local government entity he represents.” Mairena v. Foti, 816 F.2d
1061, 1064 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that in order for a
local governmental entity to have liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove that a policy,
custom or practice of that local government entity was the “moving force” behind the
constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
Specifically, in order for Defendants to be liable, Plaintiff must show the existence of a policy,
practice or custom of Forrest County “adopted or maintained with objective deliberate
indifference to [his] constitutional rights,” and he must show that such policy proximately caused
the constitutional deprivation of which he complains. See Grobowski v. Jackson Cty. Public
Defenders Office, 79 F.3d 478, 479 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Moreover,
municipal liability cannot be predicated on a theory of respondeat superior, and “[i]solated,
unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability.” Pietrowski v.
City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff alleges a claim for inadequate living conditions against Sheriff McGee and the
County. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the Jail was overcrowded, that he was forced to sleep on
the ground with uncomfortable bedding, that the showers were dirty and covered in black mold,
and that two toilets and one shower were not enough for the number of inmates housed in the cell
block. Plaintiff alleges that because of the above living conditions he suffered aches and pains, was
5
sleep deprived, and received a knee injury from being stepped on during the night. See Affidavit of
Plaintiff [46-11]; Tr. [50] at 17.
“The constitutional rights of a pretrial detainee . . . flow from both the procedural and
substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hare v. City of Corinth, 74
F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996). Thus, conditions of confinement may "constitute deprivations of
liberty without due process if they amount to punishment of the detainee." Mayfield v. Ellett, 102
F.3d 549 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Harris v. Angelina County, 31 F.3d 331, 334 (5th Cir.1994)).
“A pretrial detainee’s due process rights are said to be as least as great as the Eighth Amendment
protections available to a convicted prisoner.” Hare, 74 F.3d at 639 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
The Fifth Circuit applies the Bell3 test when evaluating a pretrial detainee’s challenges to
"general conditions, practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial confinement." Mayfield v. Ellett,
102 F.3d 549, 1996 WL 670432, at *5 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Hare, 74 F.3d at 643; Grabowski
v. Jackson County Pub. Defenders Office, 47 F.3d 1386, 1392 (5th Cir. 1995). Under the
reasonable relationship test set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), “a pretrial detainee
cannot be subjected to conditions or restrictions that are not reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental purpose.” Hare, 74 F.3d at 640. However, “the Constitution is not concerned with
a de minimis level of imposition on pretrial detainees.” Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 540
(5th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 177 F. App’x 377 (5th Cir. Dec. 21, 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1055
(2006) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)); see also Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d
846, 849 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Constitution does not protect against conditions of
3
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
6
confinement “which cause mere discomfort or inconvenience”); Holloway v. Gunnell, 685 F.2d
150, 156 (5th Cir. 1982) (serving time in prison “is not a guarantee that one will be safe from
life’s occasional inconveniences.”).
However, when a pretrial detainee challenges a jail official’s "episodic acts or omissions,
the Bell test is inapplicable, and hence the proper inquiry is whether the official had a culpable
state of mind in acting or failing to act." Mayfield, 1996 WL 670432, at *5 (quoting Hare, 74
F.3d at 643) (adopting a standard of subjective deliberate indifference as the measure of
culpability for pretrial detainees’ claims of episodic acts or omissions)). Thus, liability for an
episodic act or omission attaches only when a prison official’s failure to act amounts to subjective
deliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee’s rights. See Edward v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 778
(5th Cir. 2000); Hare, 74 F.3d at 648.
“Overcrowding of persons in custody is not per se unconstitutional.” Collins v.
Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 540 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-50
(1981)). Rather, the Constitution only prohibits the “imposition of conditions of confinement on
pretrial detainees that constitute ‘punishment.’” Collins, 382 F.3d at 540 (quoting Hamilton v.
Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1996)).
In his affidavit, McGee “acknowledge[s] overcrowding” due to the age and condition of
the building, but states that “[n]o inmate is required to sleep on the floor without a mat due to
overcrowding.” Affidavit of Billy McGee [39-23] at 2. He further states a new building is under
construction to “remedy any overcrowding conditions.” Id.
Plaintiff has failed to show that the overcrowding of the Jail amounted to punishment and
was not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose. See Collins, 382 F.3d at 5457
46 (holding that while the jail exceeded capacity during the plaintiffs’ stay, the plaintiffs failed to
show that the alleged “unsuitable conditions” amounted to punishment in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment[,] and reasoning that the inability to get judges to the jail on a Sunday
combined with the bad weather conditions were “legitimate, practical concerns reasonably related
to the overcrowding conditions . . . [that] easily [met] the deferential, rational basis Bell test”);
see also Hye v. Broadus, No. 1:08-cv-220-HSO-JMR, 2009 WL 3259130, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Oct.
8, 2009) (holding that plaintiff “failed to establish that the overcrowding at the JCADC is not
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest such as balancing an overwhelming
number of detainees with a finite amount of available housing”).
Plaintiff complains that he was forced to sleep on the floor with at first a piece of mat then
a full mat. Tr. [50] at 12. Plaintiff does not enjoy a constitutional right to an elevated bed. See
Mann v. Smith, 796 F.2d 79, 85 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that the court was unaware of any
authority for the proposition that the Constitution requires elevated beds for prisoners); Hye,
2009 WL 3259130, at *9 (holding that pretrial detainees do not have a constitutional right to an
elevated bed). The Defendants admit that not all mats issued to inmates are of the same quality.
See Affidavit of Donnell Brannon [39-24] at 2; Affidavit of Ron Taylor [39-25] at 2. Further,
although Plaintiff might have been more comfortable with a thicker mattress, there is no
constitutional right to comfort. “The fact that a detention interfered with a prisoner's desire to live
as comfortably as possible does not convert the conditions of confinement into punishment.” Lee,
98 F. App’x at 288 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 537, 539).
Plaintiff claims that his knee was injured due to being stepped on while sleeping on the
floor. Tr. [50] at 16. However, he did not seek medical treatment for his knee at the Jail, not did
8
he report any problems with his knee or seek any medical attention related to his knee in the seven
months immediately after he left the Jail. Tr. [50] at 30-31. This injury did not result in any
permanent damage, and he retained full use of his knee. See Ex. 22 to Motion [39-22] at 3-4.
Plaintiff has failed to establish that requiring him to sleep on the floor on an uncomfortable mat
amounted to punishment and was not reasonably related to the legitimate governmental purpose
of finding a place for all inmates to sleep in a Jail that was over-capacity. See Collins, 382 F.3d at
545-46.
Plaintiff’s claim that the bathroom and shower area are unsanitary and contain black mold
fails to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. There are no medical records indicating that
Plaintiff has suffered any lasting harm related to the “unsanitary” conditions of the Jail’s
bathrooms.4 See Tr. [50] at 20 (Plaintiff is not claiming any respiratory problems). Further, the
sworn affidavits of Sheriff McGee, Administrator Donell Brannon, and Sergeant Ron Taylor
indicate that the inmates receive cleaning supplies every morning and are required to maintain the
cleanliness of their bathrooms and shower. Affidavit of Billy McGee [39-23] at 2, Affidavit of
Donnell Brannon [39-24] at 2, Affidavit of Ron Taylor [39-25] at 2. Plaintiff asserts that he did
not receive any cleaning supplies and that it is part of the Jail’s policy not to provide adequate
cleaning supplies. Tr. [50] at 16. Plaintiff further claims that there were insufficient bathroom
facilities for the number of inmates housed in the cell block. Tr. [50] at 12-13. Plaintiff has failed
to show that such conditions amount to punishment and are not reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental purpose. See Lee v. Hennigan, 98 F. App’x 286, 287-88 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming
4
There are records showing where Plaintiff received treatment for a fungal infection. See
Ex. 15 to Motion [39-15]. But there is not indication that the infection was caused by the mold.
9
dismissal of claim regarding the unsafe condition of shower facilities, where plaintiff failed to
allege “the shower design [was] punitive and not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
objective”); see also Carter v. Lowndes County, 89 F. App’x 439, No. 03-60188, 2004 WL
393333, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 2004) (dismissing conditions of confinement claim for solitary
confinement in an unsanitary cell and denial of shower privileges, where plaintiff failed to show
that conditions amounted to punishment and were not incident to some other legitimate
governmental purpose); Mahmoud v. Bowie, 234 F.3d 29, No. 99-31255, 2000 WL 1568178, at
*2 (5th Cir. Sept. 14, 2000) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim for unsanitary shower conditions, holding
that such claim was conclusional and/or de minimis and did not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation).
To the extent Plaintiff alleges any of the above claims as episodic acts against Sheriff
McGee, the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that Sheriff McGee acted with the
requisite subjective deliberate indifference. See Hare, 74 F.3d at 643) (adopting a standard of
subjective deliberate indifference as the measure of culpability for pretrial detainees’ claims of
episodic acts or omissions); Edward, 209 F.3d at 778.
Plaintiff fails to offer competent summary judgment evidence to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether his constitutional rights were violated. Accordingly, Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
Denial of Due Process
Plaintiff asserts that the Jail does not have a grievance policy, or if it does, it is inadequate.
10
He claims that he repeatedly requested grievance forms5 but was denied and spoke with Sgt.
Taylor about filing grievances and was told to write them down. Tr. [50] at 14. He adds that he
turned in his written grievances but received no response to them.6 Id. He claims that “[n]o
grievance policies were made available to [him] by sign, handbook, or staff” while at the Jail.
Affidavit of Plaintiff [46-11] at 3. Defendants argue that Plaintiff was given a copy of the Inmate
Handbook [39-20] upon his arrival. See Ex. 26 to Motion [39-26] (showing that Plaintiff was
given one “Rulebook” along with other facility property); see also Affidavit of Billy McGee [3923] at 1 (stating that every inmate is given a copy of the handbook according to policy).
Even if the Defendants did violate a policy by failing to give Plaintiff a copy of the
grievance procedure, such conduct fails to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See
Hernandez v. Estelle, 788 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the mere failure of a
prison official to follow the prison’s own regulation or policy does not amount to a constitutional
violation); McGowan v. Peel, No. 3:06cv659-DPJ-JCS, 2007 WL 710154, at *1-*2 (S.D. Miss.
March 6, 2007). Further, Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to a grievance procedure,
and has no due process liberty interest right to having his grievance resolved to his satisfaction.
See Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374-75 (5th Cir. 2005); Jones v. Shabazz, No. H-06-1119,
2007 WL 2873042, at *21 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2007). Accordingly, this claim must be
dismissed. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot show that he was prejudiced by the lack of an adequate
grievance procedure. Defendants have not raised Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust in their motion, and
5
Plaintiff claims to have made these requests to Officers Mike Crunch and Pat. Tr. [50] at
14. Defendants deny that anyone with these names was employed at the Jail at the time. Affidavit
of Donnell Brannon [39-24] at 2, Affidavit of Ron Taylor [39-25] at 2.
6
See supra note 5.
11
the court considered Plaintiff’s claims on their merits.
Although Defendants have raised the defense of qualified immunity, “if it becomes evident
that the plaintiff has failed to state or otherwise to establish a claim, then the defendant is entitled
to dismissal on that basis.” Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Siegert v.
Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-33 (1991)); see also Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234, 236 (5th Cir.
1999). Because the court finds that the Plaintiff's claims are not cognizable as constitutional
claims, it declines to address the issue of whether the Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity. Wells, 45 F.3d at 93.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court finds that Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [39] should be GRANTED. Accordingly,
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:
1.
That Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [39] is granted and this action is
dismissed with prejudice.
2.
A separate judgment in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 will be
filed herein.
SO ORDERED this the 27th day of June, 2012.
s/ Michael T. Parker
United States Magistrate Judge
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