Gulf Coast Bank and Trust Company v. Stinson

Filing 23

ORDER denying Plaintiff's 22 Motion to Extend Scheduling Deadlines. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on May 10, 2012. (Cochran, Ronald)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION

GULF COAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11cv88-KS-MTP

SAM WILLIAM STINSON

DEFENDANT
ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s [22] Unopposed Motion to Extend
Scheduling Deadlines. The motion suggests an extension of “90 days or such time as the Court
deems appropriate.” The [14] Case Management Order was entered February 22, 2012. For the
reasons which follow, this [22] motion must be denied.
The only reason given for the proposed extension is that a Settlement Conference was held
on April 23, 2012 and “[t]he parties are working to resolve the claims as discussed in the Settlement
Conference and additional time is needed to do so.” A settlement was not reached at that
conference.
That the parties hope to settle does not constitute good cause to amend the scheduling order.
Rivera v. County of Willacy, 2007 WL 1655303, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 6, 2007) (“[A]lthough the
Court finds the parties’ settlement efforts commendable and encourages the continuation of their
negotiations, the mere possibility of settlement does not meet the standard of good cause for
amending the Court’s scheduling order. Furthermore, the parties provide no explanation as to why
their settlement discussions will prevent them from meeting the deadlines established in the
scheduling order.”) (internal citation omitted); Moreno v. Poverty Point Produce, Inc., 243 F.R.D.
275, 276 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (where parties were engaged in serious settlement negotiations, “[t]he
mere possibility that the parties may settle this case at some future time . . . is too speculative for this

Court to base a decision to extend the deadlines a second time on that basis alone.”). Were it
otherwise, this Court would be faced with moving deadlines after every settlement overture with no
progress being made to prepare the case for trial.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:
Plaintiff’s [22] Unopposed Motion to Extend Scheduling Deadlines is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this the 10th day of May, 2012.
s/Michael T. Parker
United States Magistrate Judge

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