Cedatol v. Russell Corporation et al

Filing 161

ORDER granting Defendant Russell Brands, LLC's 150 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 152 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on May 30, 2013 (dsl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION
SHANNON CEDATOL

PLAINTIFF

V.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11-CV-120-KS-MTP

RUSSELL BRANDS, LLC; et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the Motion for Summary
Judgment [150] filed by Defendant Russell Brands, LLC. Defendant’s alternative
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [152] is moot.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a product liability case. Plaintiff was an employee at Sumrall Recycling,
a recycling plant in Sumrall, Mississippi. She operated a conveyor belt that carried
bottle caps into a grinder. One day she noticed that some bottle caps were falling from
the top of the conveyor belt to the lower portion of it. She decided to catch the falling
caps by sticking her arm into a 4-inch gap between the conveyor’s frame and belt –
between the top and bottom of the conveyor belt, amidst the rollers which turn the belt,
while the conveyor was operating at full speed. A roller caught her hand and pulled her
arm into the machine. She was severely injured.
Plaintiff asserted various claims under the Mississippi Product Liability Act
(“MPLA”),1 including claims for design defects, manufacturing defects, and warning
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MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (2012).

defects. Defendant Russell Brands, LLC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [150],
which is ready for the Court’s review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56 provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Sierra Club, Inc.
v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010). “Where the
burden of production at trial ultimately rests on the nonmovant, the movant must
merely demonstrate an absence of evidentiary support in the record for the
nonmovant’s case.” Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir.
2010) (punctuation omitted). The nonmovant “must come forward with specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (punctuation omitted). “An issue is
material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Sierra Club, Inc., 627
F.3d at 138. “An issue is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Cuadra, 626 F.3d at 812.
The Court is not permitted to make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009). When deciding
whether a genuine fact issue exists, “the court must view the facts and the inference
to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Sierra
Club, Inc., 627 F.3d at 138. However, “[c]onclusional allegations and denials,
speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic
argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue
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for trial.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
A.

MPLA Claims
Defendant presented several arguments in its motion. It is only necessary for

the Court to address one of them. Summary judgment in Defendant’s favor is
appropriate because Plaintiff assumed the risk of inserting her arm into the conveyor
belt.
The MPLA codified the common-law defense of “assumption of the risk:”
In any action alleging that a product is defective pursuant to paragraph
(a) of this section, the manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if the
claimant (i) had knowledge of the product that was inconsistent with his
safety; (ii) appreciated the danger in the condition; and (iii) deliberately
and voluntarily chose to expose himself to the danger in such a manner
to register assent on the continuance of the dangerous condition.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(d) (2012). “Assumption of the risk applies where a person
freely and voluntarily chose to encounter a dangerous condition. [It] arises from a
mental state of willingness, or a mental state approaching consent.” Green v. Allendale
Planting Co., 954 So. 2d 1032, 1041 (Miss. 2007). “Whether an injured party assumed
a particular risk of harm is . . . measured by a subjective standard. The injured party’s
conduct must be judged in light of his own knowledge rather than what he ‘should have
known.’” Alexander v. Conveyors & Dumpers, Inc., 731 F.2d 1221, 1223-24 (5th Cir.
1984).
Plaintiff’s deposition testimony indicates that she had knowledge of and
appreciated the danger posed by the pinch point between the roller and the bottom
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conveyor belt, and that she deliberately and voluntarily chose to expose herself to that
danger. Plaintiff believed that it would be safe for her to insert her hand into the gap
as long as she kept her hand close to the top belt. She stated: “I thought I was not in
any danger, being that I was at the top part, you know, the worst that could happen
would be to go to the lift away from the wheel, if I were to touch the belt.” But she
acknowledged that the pinch point between the roller and bottom belt posed a
significant danger: “The bottom part, yes, is extremely dangerous.” She admitted that
she tried to avoid touching the bottom belt for that reason.
Plaintiff argues that she did not perceive any danger because she believed she
was safe as long as she kept her hand near the upper belt. The illogic of this argument
is evident. If Plaintiff had not perceived any danger, she would not have tried to avoid
the bottom belt – which she admitted she knew was “extremely dangerous.” The
Mississippi Supreme Court has acknowledged that one may knowingly and voluntarily
expose one’s self to a danger while also guarding against it. Green, 954 So. 2d at 1041
(one who voluntarily exposes herself to a “known and appreciated danger . . . may not
recover for injuries sustained thereby, even though [she] was in the exercise of
ordinary care or even of the utmost care.”). There is no genuine dispute of material fact
on this point: Plaintiff knew that the bottom belt and roller posed an extreme danger,
but she knowingly and voluntarily stuck her arm into the conveyor belt. “[O]ne who
voluntarily attempts a rash, imprudent, and dangerous undertaking is to be presumed
to have assumed the risk incidental thereto.” Id. Summary judgment, therefore, is
appropriate.
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B.

Negligence
Plaintiff asserted general negligence claims alongside her MPLA claims. They

arise from the same alleged breaches of duty as her MPLA claims. Although this sort
of alternative pleading is permissible, the general negligence claims are still product
liability claims governed by the MPLA. McSwain v. Sunrise Med., Inc., 689 F. Supp.
2d 835, 845 (S.D. Miss. 2010). For the same reasons stated above, the Court finds that
summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff’s general negligence claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants the Motion for Summary
Judgment [150] filed by Defendant Russell Brands, LLC. Defendant’s alternative
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [152] is moot.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 30th day of May, 2013.
s/Keith Starrett
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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