Knight v. Millsap et al
Filing
47
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 38 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Forrest County Board of Supervisors and Sheriff Billy McGee are hereby dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on August 22, 2012. (KM)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION
STEVEN MICHAEL KNIGHT
PLAINTIFF
VS.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11cv161-MTP
JASON MILLSAP, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [38] filed by
the Defendants. Having reviewed the submissions of the parties and the applicable law, the
court finds that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [38] should be granted in part and
denied in part.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Steven Michael Knight, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed his
Complaint [1] pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August 3, 2011. Plaintiff’s claims occurred
while he was housed at the Forrest County Jail (the “Jail”) awaiting trial on a felony charge and a
revocation hearing on a probation violation. He is currently incarcerated at the Wilkinson
County Correctional Facility. Through his complaint, and as clarified during his Spears1
hearing, Plaintiff alleges a claim against Defendants Officer Jason Millsap, Officer Joseph
Corley, Sheriff Billy McGee, and the Forrest County Board of Supervisors for excessive force.
See Omnibus Order [27]. Specifically, he claims that in April of 2011, Officer Corley and
Officer Millsap assaulted him for no reason. He claims they hit him in the face, slammed him on
1
Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff’s Spears, or omnibus
hearing took place on November 17, 2011. See Transcript (“Tr.”) [46].
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the ground, and continued to assault him after he was restrained. As a result, he suffered
injuries. He claims he wrote letters and sent grievances to Sheriff Billy McGee regarding the
incident, and he failed to do anything.
Plaintiff further claims Sheriff McGee and the Forrest County Board of Supervisors are
responsible for Officer Corley’s and Officer Millsap’s actions. He claims he is not the first
inmate that has been assaulted by these officers and that Sheriff McGee and the Board are aware
of the prior assaults. He claims it is a pattern and practice that they are aware of and that Sheriff
McGee and the Board actually condone it. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for his medical
bills and for his pain, suffering and emotional distress. He further requests that the officers
involved in the alleged assault be terminated from their positions.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This court may grant summary judgment only if, viewing the facts in a light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, the Defendants demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161,
1164 (5th Cir. 1995). If the Defendants fail to discharge the burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue concerning any material fact, summary judgment must be denied. John v.
Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 708 (5th Cir. 1985). The existence of an issue of material fact is a
question of law that this court must decide, and in making that decision, it must “draw inferences
most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and take care that no party will be improperly
deprived of a trial of disputed factual issues.” John, 757 F.2d at 708, 712.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s claims are before the court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, Section
2
1983 “neither provides a general remedy for the alleged torts of state officials nor opens the
federal courthouse doors to relieve the complaints of all who suffer injury at the hands of the
state or its officers.” White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680, 683 (5th Cir.1981). Rather, "[i]t affords a
remedy only to those who suffer, as a result of state action, deprivation of ‘rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States." White, 660 F.2d at 683
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Qualified Immunity
Sheriff Billy McGee, Officer Joseph Corley, and Officer Jason Millsap claim they are
entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiff’s claims against them in their individual capacity.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’" Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808,
815 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity
protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
The Defendants are “entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff demonstrates that
(1) the defendant violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and (2) the defendant's actions were
objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the violation.” Porter
v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410–11 (5th
Cir. 2007)). In the recent decision of Pearson, the Supreme Court receded from its holding in
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (setting forth original two-prong test above), holding that
“while the sequence [of the two-prong test] set forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it should
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no longer be regarded as mandatory.” Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818. “Ultimately, a state actor is
entitled to qualified immunity if his or her conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the
legal rules that were clearly established at the time of his or her actions.” McClendon v. City of
Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
“The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily
excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use
of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The “core judicial inquiry” when
deciding whether an excessive force claim violates the Eighth Amendment is “whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.2 Thus, a prison official’s “excessive physical force against
a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment when the inmate does not suffer serious
injury.” Id. at 4; see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1177 (2010) (reversing district
court’s dismissal of prisoner's excessive force claim based entirely on its determination that his
injuries were "de minimis," reasoning that it was “at odds with Hudson's direction to decide
excessive force claims based on the nature of the force rather than the extent of the injury”).
Some of the relevant objective factors in the inquiry of the application of excessive force
include: “1) the extent of the injury suffered; 2) the need for the application of force; 3) the
relationship between the need and the amount of force used; 4) the threat reasonably perceived
by the responsible officials; and 5) any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful
2
The analysis for an excessive force claim is the same whether it is brought by a pretrial
detainee or a convicted inmate. See Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1446-47 (5th Cir.
1990).
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response.” Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 838-39 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s sworn Spears testimony reflects that in April of 2006, after he completed a
urinalysis sample, he asked Officer Corley if he could get his cell phone so he could retrieve
some phone numbers. When Officer Corley returned, Plaintiff claims Corley went into a “rage”
because another inmate gave Plaintiff a cookie. He claims Officer Corley called Officer Millsap,
who is known for “beating people,” for back-up. Officer Millsap ordered Plaintiff to remove his
t-shirt and when Plaintiff tried to comply Millsap “knocked” him in the face, “busted” his head,
and continued to kick him, stomp on him, and bust his head open after he was handcuffed.3 Tr.
[46] at 18-21. He further testified that Officer Millsap and Officer Corley hit him with their
radios after he was restrained, and that Officer Corley tried to break his arm by bending it behind
his back after he was restrained. Id. at 21.
The record reflects that Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Calvin Washington at the Jail
immediately following the altercation. Dr. Washington noted that Plaintiff had contusions
and/or abrasions to his forehead, ear, and scalp. Plaintiff complained of a headache and
discomfort with flexion of the neck. Dr. Washington ordered a CT of the head and an x-ray of
the cervical spine and prescribed Plaintiff pain medication and an antibiotic. See Exs. 7-9, 11 to
Motion [38]. Plaintiff was taken to Forrest General Hospital; the CT scan and x-rays were
normal. See Ex. 10 to Motion [38]. Plaintiff also testified that he was urinating blood for a
month as a result of the assault. Tr. [46] at 20.
The affidavits of Officer Corley and Officer Millsap reflect that on April 6, 2011,
3
Plaintiff claims that the assault was captured by video surveillance, but Defendants
represent that there is no video of the incident.
5
Plaintiff became irate and charged Officer Millsap after Plaintiff was ordered to remove his tshirt (which was considered contraband and against Jail policy). The affidavits state that Officer
Corley grabbed Plaintiff from behind and that Corley and Millsap took Plaintiff to the ground
and handcuffed him. Officer Millsap then escorted Plaintiff to another floor. See Exs. 15 and 16
to Motion [38]. The affidavits are silent as to the amount of necessary force applied during the
altercation or whether Plaintiff was kicked or hit after he was restrained.
It was clearly established at the time of the incident that inmates have a constitutional
right to be free from the use of excessive force. See Anthony v. Martinez, 185 F. App'x 360, 363
(5th Cir. 2006); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). Based on Plaintiff’s sworn allegations
in his complaint, his sworn Spears testimony, his response in opposition to the motion, and the
evidence before the court, Plaintiff has sufficiently raised genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Officer Corley and Officer Millsap applied excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment and whether their conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly
established law at the time of the incident. See Goffney v. Sauceda, No. 08-20233, 2009 WL
2029812, at *3 (5th Cir. Jul. 13, 2009) (holding that plaintiff raised a genuine issue of fact as to
whether excessive force was used following his arrest, accordingly summary judgment and the
related issue of qualified immunity were improper); Payne v. Dickerson, No. 08-60416, 2009
WL 1616661, at *1 (5th Cir. Jun. 9, 2009) (affirming district court’s holding that officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff’s excessive force claim, where plaintiff alleged the
violation of a clearly established constitutional right not to be subjected to excessive force by
police officers and where plaintiff made sufficient allegations that he suffered more than a de
minimis injury as a result of the alleged excessive use of force); Watts v. Smart, 328 F. App'x
291, 293–94 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that genuine issues of material fact prevented summary
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judgment on qualified immunity issue, where plaintiff raised genuine issues as to whether the
force applied by the officers was excessive and whether their conduct was objectively
reasonable). Accordingly, the court concludes that Officer Millsap and Officer Corley are not
entitled to qualified immunity at this time.4
It is undisputed that Sheriff McGee was not personally involved in the alleged assault.
Plaintiff first testified that he named Sheriff McGee as a Defendant because “he is responsible
for [Corley and Millsaps’] actions.” Tr. [46] at 22. It is well-settled that Section 1983 does not
“create supervisory or respondeat superior liability.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 & n.6
(5th Cir. 2002); see also Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Under § 1983,
supervisory officials cannot be held liable for the actions of subordinates under any theory of
vicarious liability.”) (citations omitted). Thus, Sheriff McGee is not vicariously liable for the
actions of Officers Corley and Millsaps. Supervisory prison officials may be held liable for a
Section 1983 violation only if they either were personally involved in the constitutional
deprivation or if there is a “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful
conduct and the constitutional violation.” Thompkins, 828 F.2d at 304; see also Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and §
1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's
own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).
Plaintiff claims he is not the first inmate that has been assaulted by these officers and that
Sheriff McGee was aware of the prior assaults. He claims Officers Corley and Millsap use
4
By concluding that genuine issues of material fact remain as to Plaintiff’s excessive
force claim against Officer Millsap and Officer Corley in their individual capacities, the court in
no way determines that such claim will ultimately be meritorious.
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excessive force on inmates at the Jail on a regular basis, and that it is a pattern and practice that
Sheriff McGee condones. He claims he has personally seen “a bunch” of assaults by Officer
Millsap and has seen letters and grievance forms from other inmates to the Sheriff regarding
same, and the Sheriff fails to take any action to stop it. Tr. [46] at 22-24.
In his affidavit, Sheriff McGee denies Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the custom and
practice of officers assaulting inmates at the Jail, and states that force is only used to maintain
order or for the protection of the staff or other inmates. See Ex. 17 to Motion [38-17]. He states
that his officers are properly trained and supervised and he found no evidence that Officers
Corley or Millsap used excessive force or violated policy. See Exs. 17 and 14 to Motion [38].
The court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that Sheriff McGee violated his
constitutional rights. Specifically, he has failed to show a “sufficient causal connection”
between Sheriff McGee’s alleged wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional violation.
Thompkins, 828 F.2d at 304. Even assuming Plaintiff could meet the first prong of the qualified
immunity test cited above, he has failed to submit competent summary judgment evidence to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sheriff McGee’s actions and/or inactions
were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. Accordingly, the court finds
that Sheriff McGee is entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiff’s claims against him in his
individual capacity.
Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff claims that Sheriff McGee and the Forrest County Board of Supervisors are
responsible for Officer Corley’s and Officer Millsap’s actions. As stated above, Plaintiff claims
that the assault of inmates by these officers is an ongoing pattern and practice that both the
Sheriff and the Board are aware of and actually condone. Tr. [46] at 22-24.
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“For purposes of liability, a suit against a public official in his official capacity is in
effect a suit against the local government entity he represents.” Mairena v. Foti, 816 F.2d 1061,
1064 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s claim against Sheriff McGee in his official
capacity is treated as a claim against Forrest County. Brooks v. George Cnty., Miss., 84 F.3d
157, 165 (5th Cir. 1996). Likewise, Plaintiff’s claim against the Board of Supervisors is in effect
a suit against Forrest County. See Roebuck v. Diamond Detective Agency, No. 3:10CV331TSL–
MTP, 2011 WL 4737583, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 6, 2011). In order for a local governmental
entity to have liability under Section 1983, Plaintiff must prove that a policy, custom or practice
of that local government entity was the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Plaintiff’s “description of a policy or
custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation, moreover, cannot be
conclusory; it must contain specific facts.” Spiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep't, 130 F.3d
162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Rivera v. Salazar, 166 F. App'x 704, 706 (5th Cir. 2005);
Barrett v. Kocher, 127 F. App'x 697, 698 (5th Cir. 2005).
As stated above, Sheriff McGee denies the existence of such a policy, custom or practice
and states that force is only used to maintain order or for the protection of the staff or other
inmates. See Ex. 17 to Motion [38-17]. Defendants also attach to their Motion [38] the Jail’s
policy on excessive force, which provides that “when physical force is permissible, Correctional
Officers may only utilize the amount of force necessary to eliminate the threat they are facing . . .
[and] to bring the inmate into compliance with the Officer’s order(s).” See Ex. 14 to Motion [3814] at 6.
Plaintiff’s allegations that there is a policy, custom, or practice of Forrest County to
condone excessive force and/or assaults by the Jail’s officers are conclusory in nature and
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insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Spiller, 130 F.3d at 167. Moreover, Plaintiff has
failed to show direct causation, “i.e., that there was a direct causal link between the policy and
the violation.” James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations and
quotations omitted); see also Walker v. Harris Cnty., No. 11–20235, 2012 WL 1570673, at *3
(5th Cir. May 4, 2012) (“Absent summary judgment evidence that the deputy who arrested her
had any knowledge of the alleged county policy of not disciplining deputies, it was impossible
for Walker to establish the required causal link.”). Indeed, Plaintiff offers no specific dates or
other details of prior assaults by these officers or any details that such practice is condoned. In
his opposition to Defendants’ Motion[38], Plaintiff merely attaches the same exhibits attached to
Defendants’ Motion and an excerpt from his complaint.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against the Forrest County Board of
Supervisors and his claims against Billy McGee in his official capacity, and to the extent they
are alleged his claims against Officers Corley and Millsap in their official capacities, should be
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court finds that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [38] should be granted in part and denied in part as set forth herein. Accordingly,
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:
1.
That Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [38] is granted in part and
denied in part.
2.
Defendants’ Motion [38] is GRANTED as to the Forrest County Board of
Supervisors and Sheriff Billy McGee. The Forrest County Board of Supervisors
and Sheriff Billy McGee are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
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3.
Defendants’ Motion [38] is DENIED as to Joseph Corley and Jason Millsap for
Plaintiff’s claims against them in their individual capacities. Defendants’ Motion
is GRANTED as to Joseph Corley and Jason Millsap for Plaintiff’s claims against
them in their official capacities, to the extent such claims are alleged.
4.
The court will set the remaining claims for trial and pretrial conference under
separate order.
SO ORDERED this the 22nd day of August, 2012.
s/ Michael T. Parker
United States Magistrate Judge
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