Henry, Jr. v. King et al
Filing
35
ORDER granting 32 Motion to Dismiss; denying 28 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on 3/12/2013 (KW)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION
WILLIE E. HENRY, JR.
PLAINTIFF
V.
CASE NO. 2:11-CV-166-KS-MTP
RON KING, et al.
DEFENDANTS
ORDER
Plaintiff, an inmate, seeks summary judgment on his claim that prison officials violated
his constitutional rights when they conducted a search of his property while he was not present.
Defendants argue that the search was legal and move for the case to be dismissed based on
Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity. Because the Fourth Amendment does
not apply within the confines of a prison cell and because there was no due process violation,
this case should be dismissed.
CASE BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Willie E. Henry, Jr., proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed his
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this Court on August 11, 2011. Mr. Henry is
currently serving a 15-year sentence in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections
(“MDOC”). The events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred while Henry was housed at South
Mississippi Correctional Institute (“SMCI”) in Leakesville, Mississippi. The Defendants in this
case are SMCI Superintendent Ron King and SMCI Warden Hubert Davis.1
1
The Plaintiff originally named Brenda Sims as a Defendant, but chose not to pursue his
claims against her. With the Plaintiff’s consent, the Court dismissed Sims from the case on May
15, 2012.
1
Through his complaint and as clarified by his testimony at the Spears2 hearing, the
Plaintiff alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when SMCI officers illegally
conducted a “shakedown” of his holding cell and seized his property on March 10, 2011. The
Plaintiff asserts that he and other inmates were taken outside during the search. When they
returned to the housing unit, the Plaintiff discovered that his radio (valued at $20.00), his
headphones (valued at $10.00), and two new packs of his batteries (valued at $9.00 total) were
missing. Henry unsuccessfully attempted to obtain relief pursuant to the MDOC Administrative
Remedy Program (“ARP”) and then filed the instant lawsuit.
In this civil rights action, the Plaintiff asserts that the “shakedown” violated the Fourth
Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. He specifically asserts
that Superintendent King and Warden Davis are responsible for allowing searches to be
conducted of an inmate’s property when that inmate is not present. He seeks replacement of his
property and punitive damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights.
Both parties have filed dispositive motions. The Plaintiff moves for summary judgment,
asserting that the Defendants are liable for allowing SMCI officers to conduct “illegal property
searches...outside the provisions of the Fourth Amendment.” Doc. [28]. He submits receipts
from his purchase of the property allegedly seized during the shakedown at issue. In response,
the Defendants move to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against them in
their official capacity under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As to
2
Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that a plaintiff’s testimony
offered during an omnibus hearing supercedes allegations made in the pro se complaint),
overruled on other grounds, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831, 104
L.Ed. 2d 338 (1989).
2
the remaining claims, the Defendants seek dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim. They further argue that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and
qualified immunity on the claims. Doc. [32].
DISCUSSION
The Court will first address the Defendants’ 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss the claims for
monetary damages.3 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) “should be granted only if it appears certain
that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle [him] to
relief.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Home Builders
Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)).
Any claim for money damages against Superintendent King and Warden Davis in their
official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. A lawsuit “against a state official that is
in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.”
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984). Any cause of action
“against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is
a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989). “[A]n unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal court by her own
citizens as well as by the citizens of another state.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100.
Henry’s official capacity claim against Superintendent King and Warden Davis is
essentially a claim against the State of Mississippi. Because Mississippi has not consented to
3
“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the
court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the
merits.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Hitt v. City of
Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977)).
3
suit in this Court or otherwise waived its immunity, neither it nor the Defendant MDOC
employees can be held liable for money damages.4 Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claim seeking
monetary damages from the Defendants in their official capacity is dismissed. Further, the claim
seeking injunctive relief against the Defendants in their official capacity is also dismissed
because the Plaintiff has not shown that an unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice of the
MDOC was the “moving force” behind the alleged violation of his constitutional rights.5
The Defendants also move to dismiss the claims asserted against them in their individual
capacity. “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed when a plaintiff fails to allege
sufficient facts that, taken as true, state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Amacker v.
Renaissance Asset Mgmt. LLC, 657 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2011). “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain...factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
The Defendants argue that they cannot be held liable for the alleged violation of Henry’s
constitutional rights because, as state employees, they are entitled to qualified immunity. This
“entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like absolute
immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v.
4
See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Eleventh
Amendment bars claims for money damages asserted against prison officials in their official
capacities).
5
See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (stating that a local
government can only be responsible under § 1983 when its policy or custom is the moving force
of a constitutional violation). Assuming the Plaintiff had alleged that such a policy or custom
exists, his claim would still be dismissed because, as detailed below, the Plaintiff did not suffer a
constitutional deprivation.
4
Forsyth, 427 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The doctrine of qualified immunity holds “public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and…[protects them] from harassment,
distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
In resolving whether a government employee is immune from suit, the Court must decide
whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff show that the employee violated a constitutional right
and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the employee’s alleged misconduct.
Id. at 231-232. Qualified immunity applies unless the employee’s conduct violates “clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Id. at 231 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
The Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the Plaintiff has not shown
that his constitutional rights were violated. Henry complains that the March 10, 2011, search of
his housing unit was unconstitutional because it was conducted outside of his presence and it
resulted in the loss of his property. It is well established that prisoners have no legitimate
expectation of privacy in a prison cell; therefore, the Fourth Amendment proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply to the search at issue in this case. See Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed. 2d 393 (1984).
While Henry may have been deprived of his property under the color of state law, that
deprivation did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
adequate post-deprivation remedies were available.6 Under the Parratt/Hudson doctrine, “a state
6
Neither negligent nor intentional deprivations of property violate a prisoner’s right to
due process when there is an adequate state tort remedy available. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
5
actor’s random and unauthorized deprivation of a plaintiff’s property does not result in a
violation of procedural due process rights if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation
remedy.” Brooks v. George County, Miss., 84 F.3d 157, 165 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Caine v.
Hardy, 943 F.2d 1406, 1412 (5th Cir. 1991)).
At the omnibus hearing, Henry testified that shakedowns are performed outside the
presence of inmates only at SMCI Compound 2, where he was housed on March 10, 2011.
Henry testified that inmates are present during searches at SMCI’s other compounds as well as
during searches conducted at other prisons where the Plaintiff had been housed. Henry does not
allege that officers performed the shakedown pursuant to an MDOC policy or that the
Defendants acted in accordance with an MDOC policy.7 Rather, he suggests that the
Defendants, who did not conduct the search at issue, created an environment wherein it was
acceptable for officers to search an inmate’s property while the inmate was not present.
Therefore, it appears that the search at issue was “random and unauthorized” and thus the
Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights were not violated so long as adequate state postdeprivation remedies exist. Brooks, 84 F.3d at 165.
Under Mississippi law, any person who has been deprived of his property may pursue an
action for replevin or for claim and delivery.8 The burden is on the Plaintiff to show that the
available post-deprivation remedies are inadequate. Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94-95
7
See Smith v. Epps, 326 F. App’x 764, 765 (5th Cir. 2009) (plaintiff’s allegation that
prison officials violated his due process rights pursuant to an MDOC policy precludes the court
from applying the Parratt/ Hudson doctrine).
8
See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 11-37-101 et seq. (replevin); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-38-1 et
seq. (claim and delivery).
6
(5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). However, Henry does not argue that the remedies available
under Mississippi law are insufficient. Further, the Fifth Circuit has held that Mississippi’s postdeprivation remedies for civil in forma pauperis litigants satisfy due process. Nickens v. Melton,
38 F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1994). As such, any claim the Plaintiff may have for deprivation of
property can be pursued under state law. To the extent the Plaintiff alleges that the March 10,
2011, shakedown violated the Due Process Clause, his claim fails. Since the facts do not show
that there was a constitutional violation, the Court finds that the Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity.
In light of the Court’s finding that the Defendants are immune from liability in this case,
the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [28] is denied. The motion is also denied because
the Plaintiff fails to offer sufficient evidence in support of summary judgment. Rule 56(a)
“mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The
moving party bears burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of [the record evidence] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323.
Henry does not provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that he is entitled to summary
judgment. He relies on the allegations contained in the complaint, his testimony at the omnibus
hearing, and a printout of his inmate commissary purchase history. The printout shows that the
Plaintiff purchased an AM/FM radio, a headphone, and several packs of batteries from the prison
7
commissary. See Doc. [29-1]. The printout does not establish, nor can it establish, that the
Defendants violated Henry’s constitutional rights. Although Henry alleges that his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated, he has not established that there was a constitutional
deprivation. Therefore, because the Plaintiff fails to submit sufficient summary judgment
evidence, his motion is denied.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [32] is granted and
the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [28] is denied. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, a
separate judgment will be entered.
SO ORDERED, this the 12th day of March, 2013.
/s/MICHAEL T. PARKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?