Young v. Howard Industries

Filing 45

ORDER granting in part and denying in part Defendant's 37 Motion to Dismiss. The Court grants the motion with respect to Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claims arising from his termination and alleged shoulder injury, but it denies the motion in all other respects. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on November 20, 2013 (dsl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION
TIMOTHY YOUNG

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12-CV-6-KS-MTP

HOWARD INDUSTRIES

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a Title VII retaliation case. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss [37]. For
the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. The
Court grants the motion with respect to Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claims arising
from his termination and alleged shoulder injury, but it denies the motion in all other
respects.
A.

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claims for

(1) sexual harassment, (2) hostile work environment, (3) intentional infliction of
emotional distress, (4) physical injury, and (5) retaliatory discharge because Plaintiff
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
First, Plaintiff has not asserted any Title VII claim arising from sexual
harassment, a hostile work environment, or the intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant subjected him to a series of adverse
employment actions in retaliation for a Charge of Discrimination filed with the EEOC
in 2010, in which he alleged that Defendant had subjected him to sexual harassment

and a hostile work environment. In the present case, though, Plaintiff has not asserted
any Title VII claims for sexual harassment, hostile work environment, or intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
But Plaintiff did allege that Defendant subjected him to conditions which caused
serious physical injury and later terminated him in retaliation for filing the 2010
Charge of Discrimination. Of course, “an employee may not base a Title VII claim on
an action that was not previously asserted in a formal charge of discrimination to the
EEOC, or that could not reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination.” Filer v. Donley, 690 F.3d 643, 647 (5th Cir. 2012). The “question is
whether the charge has stated sufficient facts to trigger an EEOC investigation, and
to put an employer on notice of the existence and nature of the charges against him.”
Simmons-Myers v. Caesars Entm’t Corp., 515 F. App’x 269, 272-73 (5th Cir. 2013).
As for Plaintiff’s termination, he alleges that Defendant terminated him after
he had filed the operative EEOC Charge [33-1] in May 2011. Therefore, Plaintiff could
not possibly have exhausted his administrative remedies for a Title VII retaliation
claim arising from termination in the May 2011 EEOC Charge, and the record does not
contain any later Charge.1
Finally, Plaintiff alleged in his Amended Complaint that he “tore his shoulder
in the course and scope of his employment” on March 18, 2011, and that the injury

1

It is possible to amend an EEOC Charge, but the record does not show that
Plaintiff did so. See Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 879 (5th
Cir. 2003).
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“resulted from [his] having to work harder and faster after his EEOC mediation.”
Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “intentionally subjected [him] to
conditions which caused serious physical injury” in retaliation for his previous EEOC
complaint.
Plaintiff’s latest EEOC Charge [33-1] – filed approximately two months after his
alleged shoulder injury – contains no allegation of an injury to Plaintiff’s shoulder, or
of any other physical injury. Plaintiff was required to “inform the . . . EEOC of the
particular facts of the case that demonstrate he has suffered an . . . injury . . . .”
Fitzgerald v. Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 121 F.3d 203, 208 (5th Cir.
1997). The focus is on the “pertinent facts of his complaint and injury.” Id. Without
allegations of the shoulder injury, the charge is insufficient “to trigger an EEOC
investigation, and to put [Defendant] on notice of the existence and nature” of a Title
VII retaliation claim arising from it. Simmons-Myers, 515 F. App’x at 272-73.
B.

Statute of Limitations
In the Amended Complaint [33], Plaintiff asserted a new state-law claim of

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant argues that this claim is barred
by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff contends that the IIED claim relates
back to his original Complaint pursuant to Rule 15(c).2
“An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading
when . . . the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,

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reply.

Defendant did not address the applicability of Rule 15(c) in its initial brief or
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transaction, or occurrence set out – or attempted to be set out – in the original
pleading.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B). In the Amended Complaint [33], Plaintiff alleged
that Defendant forced him to work overtime and refused to increase his pay in
retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint. He claimed that these actions, among others,
constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff made similar
allegations in his original Complaint [1]. He claimed that Defendant retaliated against
him for filing an EEOC complaint by forcing him to work overtime and denying pay
raises, causing “Plaintiff to suffer damage to his emotional . . . well being.” Therefore,
the Court finds that the IIED claim arises from conduct set out – or which Plaintiff
attempted to set out – in his original Complaint, and it relates back to the original date
of filing.
Under Mississippi law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is
subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Jones v. Fluor Daniel Servs. Corp., 32 So.
3d 417, 423 (Miss. 2010) (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-35); see also Roebuck v. Dothan
Sec., Inc., 515 F. App’x 275, 277 (5th Cir. 2013). According to Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge
[33-1], the latest date upon which Defendant could have caused emotional distress was
April 25, 2011. Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint [1] on January 17, 2012 – within the
one-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, his IIED claim is not time-barred.
C.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants in part and denies in part

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [37]. The Court grants the motion with respect to
Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claims arising from his termination and alleged
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shoulder injury, but it denies the motion in all other respects.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 20th day of November, 2013.
s/Keith Starrett
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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