Sanderson Farms, Inc. et al v. Southeast Laborers' District Council on Behalf of Laborers' Local Union No. 693 et al

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 3 Motion to Remand to State Court. This case shall be remanded to the Circuit Court of Jones County, Mississippi. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on 2/8/13 (scp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION

SANDERSON FARMS, INC.
AND SANDERSON FARMS, INC.
(Processing Division)
VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12cv165-KS-MTP

SOUTHEAST LABORERS’ DISTRICT
COUNCIL ON BEHALF OF LABORERS’
LOCAL UNION NO. 693, ET AL.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [3], and
the Court considering the motion, response, the pleadings and applicable law herein finds that
the motion should be sustained for the hereinafter stated reasons.
I. BACKGROUND
The Plaintiffs, Sanderson Farms, Inc., and Sanderson Farms, Inc., (Processing Division)
(hereinafter “Sanderson”) operate poultry processing plants in Collins and Hazlehurst,
Mississippi and at least some of the workers in these facilities are represented by Southeast
Laborers’ District Council on behalf of Laborers’ Local Union No. 693 and Laborers’
International Union of North America Local Union No. 693 (hereinafter referred to as “The
Union”).
The Union has two representatives, Frank McLaurin and Sherri Jones, who are officers of
the Union and are routinely on Sanderson’s premises as part of their duties as employees and/or
officers of the Union. Sanderson alleges that beginning in early 2011 and continuing through
sometime in 2012, that McLaurin and Jones acting individually and as employees of the Union,
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made malicious statements and took actions that were maliciously calculated and intended to
cause injury to Sanderson. The gravamen of the First Amended Complaint is that one or more of
the Defendants committed a number of intentional torts, with the malicious intent to “damage
Sanderson’s business, its reputation, employee relationships and standing in the community.”
The original Complaint was filed in the Circuit Court of Jones County, Mississippi, on
August 10 of 2012, and the First Amended Complaint on August 28, 2012. This action was
removed by all Defendants on September 19, 2012, alleging that the removal was appropriate
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 185.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party may remove an action from state court to this court if the action could have
originally been filed here. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). This Court has original jurisdiction over “all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
1331.1 “The removing party bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that
removal was proper.” Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir.
2002) (citing cases). “Because removal raises significant federalism concerns, the removal
statute is strictly construed ‘and any doubt as to the propriety of removal should be resolved in
favor of remand.’” Gutierrez v. Flores, 543 F.3d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing In re Hot-Hed,
Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2007)).

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Defendants have asserted that removal was proper because the court possessed original
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1337, which provides that the court has “original jurisdiction
of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce....” 28
U.S.C. § 1337(a). “There is no distinction ... between the ‘arising under’ requirements for § 1337
and § 1331.” Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 772 n. 2 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Richardson v. United Steelworkers of America, 864 F.2d 1162, 1168 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1989)).
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“Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal court does not have federal question
jurisdiction unless a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded
complaint.” Elam v. Kan. City S. Ry.,635 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2011).
However, “[a]n exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule arises when Congress ‘so
completely preempt[s] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of
claims is necessarily federal in character.’” Id. (quoting Gutierrez, 543 F.3d at 252). Therefore,
“[u]nder the ‘complete preemption’ doctrine, ‘what otherwise appears as merely a state law
claim is converted to a claim ‘arising under’ federal law for jurisdictional purposes because the
federal statute so forcibly and completely displaces state law that the plaintiff’s cause of action is
either wholly federal or nothing at all.’” Id. (quoting New Orleans & Gulf Coast R. Co. v.
Barrois, 533 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2008).
III. DISCUSSION
The Union, McLaurin and Jones in their opposition to Motion to Remand [22] accept
their burden on removal and admit that the First Amended Complaint alleges only four separate
Mississippi tort claims. However, Movants claim that a closer review of the allegations in the
context of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and the parties’ collective bargaining
agreements reveals that Sanderson’s actions involve substantial questions of federal law.
Movants claim that it is not possible to adjudicate the tort claims outside of the context of the
NLRA because the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) sets forth certain rights and
obligations that the Movants have in representing the workers and that the acts complained of by
Sanderson came about as a result of Movants fulfilling their contractual and representational
duties.

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Sanderson counters the position of Movants by arguing that their well-pleaded Complaint
is totally devoid of any federal claims and consists of totally state tort claims and that even if it is
necessary to interpret some part of the CBA, that it is only ancillary and does not require the
court to investigate the merits of the actions involving federal law.2
The law is clear that Plaintiffs’ state law causes of action are not automatically preempted
by the NLRA or the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). Section 301(a) of the NLRA
states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties. 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (emphasis added).
However, preemption occurs only when resolution of a state law claim depends upon the
meaning of the CBA, “or when resolution of the state law claim is ‘inextricably intertwined with
consideration of the terms of the labor contract.’” Owen v Carpenters District Counsel, 161 F.3d
767, 773 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-406,
108 S. Ct. 1877, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1988) and Allis-Chalmers Corp. v Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213,
105 S. Ct. 1904, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1985)).
The Respondents’ position is that McLaurin and/or Jones were merely acting in
their positions to insure the health and safety of the union members. However, at page 3 of
Respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Remand [22], they state:

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Some of Sanderson’s causes of action involve complaints made to OSHA and USDA by
Defendants and the Union seems to argue that in order to defend Sanderson’s claims that it will
be necessary for the court to interpret OSHA and USDA complaint procedures.
4

In relevant part, each of the collective bargain agreements state:
The company shall maintain safe, sanitary, and healthy working
conditions at all times, and employees will be required to
cooperate in maintaining such conditions. Any complaints
regarding the safety or health shall be processed through the
grievance and arbitration provisions of the Agreement. (Emphasis
added).
The complaints made by Sanderson allege matters that are far removed from the
grievance and arbitration provisions involved. The facts set forth in the well pleaded complaint
clearly set out a case that is not preempted. “[N]ot every dispute concerning employment, or
tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement is pre-empted by § 301
or other provisions of the federal labor law.” Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. 202, 211.
The state tort claims are independent actions and are clearly set out in the well-pleaded
complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court holds that the Motion to Remand is well-taken
and this case shall be remanded to the Circuit Court of Jones County. Mississippi.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED on this, the 8th day of February, 2013.

s/ Keith Starrett
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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