Johnson v. King et al
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION dismissing Plaintiff's habeas corpus claims from this Section 1983 case without prejudice. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are dismissed a legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sect ion 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). The dismissal of Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are with prejudice until the Heck conditions are met. A separate Final Judgment shall be entered. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on April 22, 2013 (dsl)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
HATTIESBURG DIVISION
JOSEPH L. JOHNSON, #150899
VERSUS
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12-cv-183-KS-MTP
RONALD KING and JOHNNIE DENMARK
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause is before the Court, sua sponte, for consideration of dismissal. Plaintiff
Johnson, an inmate of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), currently
incarcerated at the Walnut Grove Correctional Facility, filed this pro se Complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis in this case.
The named Defendants are Ronald King, Superintendent of South Mississippi Correctional
Institution (SMCI) and Johnnie Denmark, Warden of SMCI. Upon liberal review of the
Complaint and subsequent pleadings, the Court has reached the following conclusions.
I.
Background
On June 21, 2012, Plaintiff was issued a rule violation report (RVR) by Warden
Denmark. Plaintiff was found guilty of the violation. Plaintiff claims that MDOC failed to
follow their own procedures because his hearing regarding the RVR was held in the middle of
July as opposed to being held within seven working days. Resp. [9] at 1. Plaintiff claims that
the delay in his disciplinary hearing combined with the fact that he was not allowed to call
witnesses violated his Due Process rights. Plaintiff further complains that Superintendent King
failed to investigate his grievance regarding the RVR and incorrectly denied his appeal in the
prison administrative remedy program. It appears the punishment imposed as a result of the
guilty finding was either a review of Plaintiff’s custody level or a reduction in his custody level.
Plaintiff was unable to verify the exact punishment imposed including if he lost any “good-time”
sentence credits. See Resp. [18]; Orders [8, 13, 17]. Although it appears unlikely that
Plaintiff’s term of imprisonment for gratification of lust is eligible for “good-time” credits, the
Court will consider Plaintiff’s claims as if he did lose sentence credits as a result of this
disciplinary conviction. As relief, Plaintiff is requesting that the RVR be “removed from [his]
records,” that he be awarded monetary damages and that he be transferred back to SMCI.
Compl. [1] at 4; Resp. [9] at 2.
II.
Analysis
The in forma pauperis statute mandates dismissal “at any time” if the Court determines
an action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or “is frivolous or malicious.”
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). The Fifth Circuit deems a complaint to be frivolous “if it lacks
an arguable basis in law or fact or if there is no realistic chance of ultimate success.” Henthorn
v. Swinson, 955 F.2d 351, 352 (5th Cir. 1992). Since the Court has permitted Plaintiff Johnson
to proceed in forma pauperis in this action, his Complaint is subject to the case screening
procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
A. Habeas Corpus Claims
Initially, the Court notes that the appropriate legal vehicle to attack unconstitutional
prison administrative procedures or conditions of confinement is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Cook v.
Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice Transitional Planning Dep’t, 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994). In
contrast, habeas corpus provides the exclusive federal remedy available to a state prisoner
challenging the fact or duration of his confinement and seeking a speedier or immediate release
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from incarceration. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005)(internal quotations omitted)(finding a “prisoner in state custody
cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement”). Plaintiff must
pursue claims that affect his eligibility for, or entitlement to, accelerated release through habeas
corpus. Cook, 37 F.3d at 166 (citing Johnson v. Pfeiffer, 821 F.2d 1120, 1123 (5th Cir. 1987)).
Since the restoration of sentence credits would result in the Plaintiff receiving an accelerated
release from incarceration, he “cannot . . . recover good-time credits lost in a prison
disciplinary proceeding” in a § 1983 civil action. Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th
Cir. 1998)(en banc). Instead, Plaintiff must pursue any request for restoration of sentence
credits through a petition for habeas corpus relief. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641,
648 (1997)(holding that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a claim for restoration of
good-time credits). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff has asserted a habeas corpus claim for the
restoration of sentence credits, his claim will be dismissed from this § 1983 case, without
prejudice.
B. Section 1983 Claims
In order to have a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must allege facts
showing that a person, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege
or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Bryant
v. Military Dep’t of Miss., 597 F.3d 678, 686 (5th Cir. 2010)(citation omitted). An inmate does
not have a constitutional right to serve a sentence in any particular institution, or to be
transferred or not transferred from one facility to another. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S.
238, 249-50 (1983); Tighe v. Wall, 100 F.3d 41, 42 (5th Cir.1996). Nor does an inmate have a
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constitutional right to receive a certain custodial classification while incarcerated. Neals v.
Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir.1995); see also Parker v. Currie, 359 F. App’x 488, 490
(5th Cir. 2010)(holding an inmate’s “mere disagreement with a [custodial] classification is
insufficient to establish a constitutional violation”). Furthermore, the classification of prisoners
in certain custody levels is well within the broad discretion of prison officials and should be
“free from judicial intervention.” McCord v. Maggio, 910 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (5th
Cir.1990)(citations omitted). Likewise, the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause do
not extend to “every change in the conditions of confinement” which are adverse to a prisoner.
Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 767-68 (5th Cir. 1997). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks
restoration of a certain custody level or a transfer back to SMCI, he is not entitled relief.
As set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a prisoner cannot bring a § 1983
action based on a conviction until that conviction “has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged
by executive order, or otherwise declared invalid in a state collateral proceeding or by the
issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus, if a favorable judgment would necessarily imply the
invalidity of the prisoner’s conviction or the length of his confinement.” Clarke, 154 F.3d at
189 (internal quotations omitted)(citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87). A prison disciplinary
decision that results in a change to the prisoner’s sentence is considered a conviction for
purposes of Heck. Id. Therefore, a prisoner’s claims for declaratory relief and money damages
based on alleged defects in his disciplinary process are barred by the Heck doctrine because such
claims would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed.” Edwards, 520 U.S.
at 648. If the Court were to find in Plaintiff’s favor and determine that his prison disciplinary
conviction was invalid and should be vacated, it would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the
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punishment imposed,” meaning it would necessarily imply the invalidity of any loss of goodtime credits that he may have suffered. Id. Since the rule set forth in Heck v. Humphrey and
Edwards v. Balisok apply to Plaintiff’s claims, he must demonstrate that his disciplinary
conviction has been invalidated as a prerequisite for this case to proceed under § 1983.
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the complained of disciplinary action has been
invalidated.1 As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims seeking expungement of his
disciplinary conviction and monetary damages are not cognizable at this time. See e.g., Evans v.
Baker, 442 F. App’x 108, 110 (5th Cir. 2011)(finding dismissal under Heck and Edwards of
inmate’s § 1983 complaint seeking expungement of adverse disciplinary proceedings to be
proper even after inmate withdrew his claim to have good-time credits restored).
Furthermore, an inmate does not have a federally protected liberty interest in having a
prison grievance investigated or resolved to his satisfaction. Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371,
373-74 (5th Cir. 2005); Staples v. Keffer, 419 F. App’x 461, 463 (5th Cir. 2011)(finding
prisoner “does not have a constitutional right to a grievance procedure at all” therefore claims
that appeals within the prison system were “arbitrarily and capriciously denied” are not
cognizable). As such, Plaintiff’s claims related to how his grievance or appeal of this guilty
finding was handled within the prison administrative remedy program are not cognizable.
Finally, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under § 1983 based on his claim that MDOC
policy and procedure was violated by this RVR and resulting disciplinary process. These
allegations, without more, simply do not rise to a level of constitutional deprivation. See Guiden
1
On two separate occasions, Plaintiff was ordered to specifically state if the complained of RVR
has been invalidated by any of the means set forth in Heck. See Orders [8, 13]. Plaintiff has submitted a
copy of the response from the prison administrative remedy program which denied his appeal of the
disciplinary action. See Attach. to Resp. [14-1].
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v. Wilson, 244 F. App’x 980, 981 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Hernandez v. Estelle, 788 F.2d 1154,
1158 (5th Cir 1986)) (“A violation of a prison rule by itself is insufficient to set forth a claim of a
constitutional violation.”).
III.
Conclusion
As discussed above, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting habeas corpus claims, they will be
dismissed from this § 1983 case without prejudice.2 Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are dismissed as
legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i) and
(ii).3 The dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are with prejudice until the Heck conditions are
met. See Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996)(finding claims are properly
“dismissed with prejudice . . . until the Heck conditions are met”).
A Final Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 22nd day of April, 2013.
s/Keith Starrett
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2
As stated above, it is not entirely clear if Plaintiff lost any good-time credits to seek habeas relief
and the Court does not reach a determination of the viability of any possible habeas claims; nonetheless,
the Clerk is directed to mail Plaintiff a packet of habeas corpus forms for state inmates challenging their
imprisonment under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
3
See Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1996)(finding Heck barred claims are legally
frivolous); Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996)(holding “[u]nder Heck, Johnson
cannot state a claim” until his conviction is invalidated); Morris v. Cross, 476 F. App’x 783, 785 (5th
Cir. 2012)(finding inmate’s claim that he was denied adequate investigation into his grievance was
properly dismissed as frivolous).
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