Stark v. University of Southern Mississippi et al
Filing
135
ORDER denying Plaintiff's 104 Motion for Stay of Discovery; denying Plaintiff's 112 Motion to Strike ;and finding as moot Plaintiff's 114 Motion to Stay Response. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on April 3, 2014 (dsl)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
DIANE STARK
V.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13cv31-KS-MTP
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI,
JEFF HAMMOND, INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFICIALLY,
DR. MARTHA SAUNDERS, INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFICIALLY;
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF STATE INSTITUTIONS OF
HIGHER LEARNING
DEFENDANTS
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant Dr. Martha Saunders’ Motion for
Stay of Discovery [104]; the Plaintiff Diane Stark’s Motion to Strike Motion to Dismiss
(“Motion to Strike”) [112]; and the Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Response to Motion to
Dismiss Until Order Rendered Regarding Motion to Strike (“Motion to Stay Response”)
[114]. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the record, and the applicable
law, the Court finds that:
1)
Dr. Saunders’ Motion for Stay of Discovery [104] should be denied;
2)
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike [112] should be denied; and
3)
Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Response [114] should be denied as moot.
Background
Plaintiff asserts numerous federal and state law claims relating to her former
employment with the University of Southern Mississippi (“USM”) as the Senior
Associate Athletics Director for Internal Affairs. On November 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed suit
against USM, Jeff Hammond,1 and Dr. Saunders2 in the Circuit Court of Forrest County,
Mississippi. (See State Compl. [1-2 at ECF p. 4].) The Complaint asserts the following
claims for relief under state law: intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent
infliction of emotional distress; breach of implied contract; constructive discharge;
outrage; negligence; menace; promissory estoppel; equitable estoppel; and detrimental
reliance. It is alleged, inter alia, that Hammond made the workplace intolerable, that
USM and Dr. Saunders ratified Hammond’s conduct, that USM breached a contractual
obligation to compensate the Plaintiff through June of 2012, and that the Plaintiff was
wrongfully terminated as a result of reporting Hammond’s misconduct.
On February 6, 2013, the Plaintiff filed an amended pleading in the state court,
adding federal claims under Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act. (See State Am. Compl. [5 at ECF p. 74].) These federal claims center upon
alleged gender discrimination.
On February 15, 2013, Hammond removed the proceeding to this Court. (See
Notice of Removal [1].) Subject matter jurisdiction is asserted under Title 28 U.S.C. §
1331 based on the federal claims alleged in the Plaintiff’s amended state court pleading.
On February 18, 2013, USM and Dr. Saunders joined in and consented to the removal.
(See Doc. No. [3].)
On July 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint [38] in this Court, adding
1
Hammond was USM’s Interim Athletics Director at certain times relevant to the
Plaintiff’s employment.
2
Dr. Saunders was the President of USM at certain times relevant to the Plaintiff’s
employment.
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the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning as a Defendant. The
Amended Complaint also includes a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
deprivations of Plaintiff’s Equal Protection and Due Process rights, as well as her rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. (See Am.
Compl. [38] at ¶ 7.)
On August 26, 2013, Dr. Saunders filed her Motion to Dismiss [62] pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dr. Saunders sought the dismissal of all
claims asserted against her in her individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Court subsequently granted the motion in part and denied it in part. (See Mem. Op. &
Order [131].) The following of the Plaintiff’s claims brought against Dr. Saunders in her
individual capacity under § 1983 were dismissed without prejudice: (i) First Amendment
retaliation claim; (ii) Equal Protection unequal pay claim; (iii) Procedural Due Process
claim based on the existence of an alleged oral contract; (iv) Procedural Due Process
claim based on McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So. 2d 603 (Miss. 1993); and
(v) Substantive Due Process claim. Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process claim based on
USM’s employee handbook and Equal Protection failure to promote claim survived past
the pleading stage.
On January 22, 2014, Dr. Saunders filed her Motion to Dismiss as to State Law
Claims [100] pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Dr. Saunders seeks the dismissal of all state
law claims asserted against her in both her individual and official capacities.
On January 27, 2014, Dr. Saunders filed her Motion for Stay of Discovery [104].
Dr. Saunders asks that all discovery against her be stayed pending resolution of her
Motion to Dismiss [62] and Motion to Dismiss as to State Law Claims [100]. The Motion
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for Stay of Discovery [104] was filed prior to the Court’s March 25, 2014 Order [131],
addressing the Motion to Dismiss [62].
On February 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Strike [112]. This motion is
aimed at Dr. Saunders’ Motion to Dismiss as to State Law Claims [100].
On February 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Stay Response [114]. Plaintiff
asks that her time to respond to Dr. Saunders’ Motion to Dismiss as to State Law
Claims [100] be stayed until the Court rules on the Motion to Strike [112].
Dr. Saunders’ Motion for Stay of Discovery [104]
Neither Dr. Saunders’ Motion to Dismiss [62] nor Motion to Dismiss as to State
Law Claims [100] necessitates a stay of discovery at this time. Dr. Saunders’ request
for the dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims was principally based on the defense of
qualified immunity. This defense severely limits the availability of discovery since
“qualified immunity serves to terminate a claim against a public official as soon as
possible in a judicial proceeding, even before discovery.” Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss.,
135 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S. Ct.
1789, 114 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1991)). However, the Court’s Order [131] held that Dr.
Saunders was not entitled to qualified immunity on certain of the Plaintiff’s § 1983
claims at the pleading stage. Discovery can proceed as to the remaining § 1983 claims
even though the issue of qualified immunity may be revisited at the summary judgment
stage or at trial. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed.
2d 411 (1985) (“Even if the plaintiff’s complaint adequately alleges the commission of
acts that violated clearly established law, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment
if discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether
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the defendant in fact committed those acts.”) (emphasis added); Heitschmidt v. City of
Houston, 161 F.3d 834, 840 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that “discovery can proceed on
remand” after determining that the district court erred in granting the defendants’ motion
to dismiss based on qualified immunity); cf. Watkins v. Hawley, No. 4:12cv54, 2013 WL
3357703, at *1 (S.D. Miss. July 3, 2013) (ruling that a stay of all discovery pending
resolution of the defendants’ request for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity was inappropriate).
The issue of qualified immunity aside, district courts possess “broad discretion in
all discovery matters.” Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 270 (5th
Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). A district judge may exercise that discretion to stay
discovery upon a showing of “good cause” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(c)(1). See Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l AFL-CIO, 901 F.2d 404, 435 (5th Cir.
1990). The existence of a motion to dismiss favors a stay under Rule 26 where
discovery is unnecessary to resolve the motion and the grant of the motion would
dispose of the case, avoiding the effort and expense associated with discovery
altogether. See id. at 435-36.
Dr. Saunders’ request for the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s state law causes of
action fails to establish good cause for a stay of discovery. The grant of the Motion to
Dismiss as to State Law Claims [100] will not dispose of the Plaintiff’s federal claims
against Dr. Saunders, or the Plaintiff’s federal and state law claims against the other
Defendants. It would be inefficient and imprudent to stay all discovery as to Dr.
Saunders based on a motion that is not dispositive of her status as a party Defendant.
Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Saunders “is a vital witness” in this case also suggests that
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she may be exposed to discovery regardless of her party status. (Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of
Resp. to Mot. for Stay of Disc. [110] at p. 7.) As a result, the Court’s resolution of Dr.
Saunders’ pending dismissal motion will not “preclude the need for the discovery
altogether thus saving time and expense.” Landry, 901 F.2d at 436.
Furthermore, a stay of discovery pending resolution of Dr. Saunders’ Motion to
Dismiss as to State Law Claims [100] will almost certainly result in undue delay. If the
Court were to issue a stay and subsequently deny the dismissal motion, the resolution
of the Plaintiff’s federal and state law claims against Dr. Saunders, via summary
judgment or trial, would be further delayed while the parties went back and conducted
discovery on the claims. Even if the Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s state law claims, her
remaining federal causes of action would likely necessitate some additional discovery.
The Court is not inclined to further delay proceedings by issuing an unnecessary stay
given the length of time this action has been pending. Accordingly, Dr. Saunders’
Motion for Stay of Discovery [104] will be denied.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike [112]
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Saunders’ Motion to Dismiss as to State Law Claims
[100] should be stricken because it violates the Court’s Local Uniform Civil Rules.
Plaintiff’s argument focuses on Local Uniform Civil Rule 16. The Rule states in
pertinent part:
(3)
Immunity Defense or Jurisdictional Defense
(A)
A motion to compel arbitration, an immunity defense or a
jurisdictional defense must be raised by a separate motion as
expeditiously as practicable after service of process. A motion
asserting lack of jurisdiction must be filed at least seven days
before the Case Management Conference or the movant will
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be deemed to have waived the stay provision of subsection
(B).
(B)
Filing a motion to compel arbitration, an immunity defense or
jurisdictional defense motion stays the attorney conference and
disclosure requirements and all discovery not related to the
issue pending the court’s ruling on the motion, including any
appeal. Whether to permit discovery on issues related to a
motion asserting an immunity defense or jurisdictional defense
is a decision committed to the discretion of the court.
L.U.Civ.R. 16(b)(3)(A)-(B). Plaintiff contends that the subject motion is untimely
because it was filed several months after she served the Amended Complaint [38].
Plaintiff’s motion is not well taken. The portion of Dr. Saunders’ dismissal motion
stating that she is immune from all of the Plaintiff’s state law claims under the
Mississippi Tort Claims Act arguably falls under the scope of Rule 16. However, the
Court finds nothing in the text of the Rule authorizing the Court to strike the motion
based on untimeliness. Reading the above-quoted sections of the Rule in toto, the
Court finds that the penalty for any late filing of an applicable motion is a waiver of the
provision authorizing a stay of proceedings as to discovery and the attorney conference
and disclosure requirements. The docket reflects that the parties served their initial
disclosures and that counsel conferred in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(f) several months ago. Further, a stay of discovery as to Dr. Saunders is
not being entered for the reasons discussed in the previous section of this opinion.
Therefore, enforcing the penalty provision of Local Uniform Civil Rule 16 at this stage of
the litigation would amount to a nullity. The Court further notes that Dr. Saunders
moved for the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s state law claims within the deadline for “[a]ll
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motions other than motions in limine” under the Case Management Order [12]. As a
result, the Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike [112] will be denied.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Response [114]
The Plaintiff has responded in opposition to Dr. Saunders’ Motion to Dismiss as
to State Law Claims [100]. (See Doc. Nos. [115], [116].) As discussed above, the
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike [112] will be denied. It necessarily follows that the Plaintiff’s
request for an extension of time to respond to Dr. Saunders’ dismissal motion until the
Court rules on the Motion to Strike should be denied as moot.
Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Dr. Saunders’ Motion for
Stay of Discovery [104] is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike
[112] is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay
Response [114] is denied as moot.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 3rd day of April, 2014.
s/Keith Starrett
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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