Green v. Logan's Roadhouse, Inc. et al
Filing
81
ORDER denying Defendant's 58 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on December 16, 2014 (dsl)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
PHILLIPPI GREEN
PLAINTIFF
V.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-CV-238-KS-MTP
LOGAN’S ROADHOUSE, INC.
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [58].
I. BACKGROUND
This is a premises liability case arising from a bar fight at Logan’s Roadhouse
in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Plaintiff, a customer of Logan’s, was injured by another
customer, and he contends that Logan’s breached its duty to exercise reasonable care
and protect him from a foreseeable injury at the hands of another patron.
Plaintiff’s sister, Selena Green, and his girlfriend, Rhonda Browne, went to
Logan’s to get dinner and wait for Plaintiff to get off from work. They were seated in
the bar area, along with one other group of people – the group including the assailant,
Phillip Prater. The facts surrounding these events are disputed, but it is clear that
Prater left his wallet on a table while he went outside, and the money that was inside
it ended up in Green’s possession. Logan’s staff called the police. An officer responded,
took the money from Green, and returned it to Prater. Prater declined to press charges,
and the officer left.
Plaintiff arrived and joined his sister and girlfriend. Again, the facts are
disputed, but there was a verbal exchange between Plaintiff’s table and Prater’s table.
The volume and tone of that exchange is disputed, as are the specific words that were
exchanged. Regardless, Plaintiff and Prater ended up fighting, and Prater put Plaintiff
in a choke hold. The same police officer that had responded to the first call returned
to the restaurant and broke up the fight.
Plaintiff was injured, and he subsequently filed this lawsuit against Logan’s,
alleging that it breached its duty to exercise reasonable care and protect him from a
foreseeable injury at the hands of another customer. Defendant filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment [58], which is ripe for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56 provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Sierra Club, Inc.
v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010). “An issue is
material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Sierra Club, Inc., 627
F.3d at 138. “An issue is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626
F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 2010).
The Court is not permitted to make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009). When deciding
whether a genuine fact issue exists, “the court must view the facts and the inference
to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Sierra
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Club, Inc., 627 F.3d at 138. However, “[c]onclusional allegations and denials,
speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic
argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue
for trial.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
To prevail, Plaintiff must demonstrate the basic elements of a negligence claim:
“(1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3)
damages; and (4) a causal connection between the breach and the damages, such that
the breach is the proximate cause of the damages.” Double Quick, Inc. v. Lymas, 50 So.
3d 292, 298 (Miss. 2011); see also Lyle v. Mladinich, 584 So. 2d 397, 398-99 (Miss.
1991). Defendant argues that Plaintiff can not establish three of the elements of his
premises liability claim: duty, breach, and causation. It also argues that Plaintiff has
insufficient evidence to support a claim for punitive damages.
A.
Duty – Foreseeability
The parties agree that Plaintiff was a business invitee. “[A] proprietor (or owner
or operator) of a business owes a business patron or invitee the duty to maintain the
premises in a reasonably safe or secure condition.” Lyle, 584 So. 2d at 399. This duty
encompasses “negligent or wrongful attacks on the invitee by other patrons.” Id.
“Although not an insurer of an invitee’s safety, a premises owner owes a duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee from reasonably foreseeable injuries at
the hands of another.” Lymas, 50 So. 3d at 298 (quoting Simpson v. Boyd, 880 So. 2d
1047, 1051 (Miss. 2004)); see also Lyle, 584 So. 2d at 399; Grisham v. John Q. Long
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V.F.W. Post, No. 4057, Inc., 519 So. 2d 413, 416 (Miss. 1988) (owner liable where he
had cause to anticipate the wrongful act of an unruly patron).
“Generally, criminal acts can be intervening causes which break the causal
connection with the defendant’s negligent act, if the criminal act is not within the
realm of reasonable foreseeability.” Lymas, 50 So. 3d at 298 (citing O’Cain v. Harvey
Freeman & Sons, Inc., 603 So. 2d 824, 830 (Miss. 1991)). “In premises liability cases,
foreseeability may be established by proving that the defendant had (1) actual or
constructive knowledge of the assailant’s violent nature, or (2) actual or constructive
knowledge that an atmosphere of violence exists on the premises.” Id. (citing Corley v.
Evans, 835 So. 2d 30, 38-39 (Miss. 2003)); see also Crain v. Cleveland Lodge 1532,
Order of Moose, Inc., 641 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Miss. 1994) (applying standard to
tavern/bar fight). Ultimately, “[w]hether something is or is not within the realm of
reasonable foreseeability depends upon the facts of the case and the duty which the
plaintiff asserts for the particular defendant. An independent intervening cause is one
that could not have been reasonably foreseen by the defendant while exercising due
care.” O’Cain, 603 So. 2d at 830. Reasonable foreseeability is generally an issue for the
trier of fact. Id.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no evidence demonstrating that it had
“actual or constructive knowledge of [Prater’s] violent nature” or of “an atmosphere of
violence . . . on the premises.” Lymas, 50 So. 3d at 298. The Court disagrees. The record
contains a variety of evidence to support Plaintiff’s claim that a physical confrontation
was foreseeable for at least some period of time before the fight actually began.
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Plaintiff’s sister, Selena Green, testified [63-10] that Prater and his companions
were loud, belligerent, and visibly intoxicated ten minutes or more before Prater placed
Plaintiff in a choke hold. She testified that they used racial slurs, threatened physical
violence, and repeatedly challenged Plaintiff’s group to “come outside.” She also
testified that Defendant’s assistant manager, Gigi Beard, was standing close enough
to hear and see everything that was happening.
Rhonda Browne, Plaintiff’s girlfriend, testified [63-9] that Defendant’s
employees were close enough to observe Prater’s group using racial slurs, loudly
challenging Plaintiff, and acting belligerently. She said that Prater was visibly
intoxicated, and that she and the other members of Plaintiff’s group repeatedly asked
Defendant’s employees to call the police prior to the physical altercation.
Plaintiff likewise testified [63-2] that Prater’s group was loud, aggressive, and
apparently intoxicated. He said that Prater began using racial slurs several minutes
prior to the physical altercation, and that Prater repeatedly challenged him to “come
outside.” Plaintiff said that Beard, the assistant manager, was close enough to observe
everything.
It is undisputed that Prater had been drinking before the physical altercation
began. Defendant’s server [63-11] and bartender [63-13] testified that Prater had
ordered two mixed drinks and two beers, and Prater admitted [63-7] that he had been
drinking. Prater also testified [63-7] that Defendant’s employees observed the “heated
argument” between himself and Plaintiff’s party.
Testimony from Defendant’s employees also demonstrates that a fight was
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foreseeable. Leslie Perez, Defendant’s bartender, testified [63-13] that there was a lot
of “back and forth” between the parties, and that the verbal confrontation became
progressively louder before things turned physical. She heard Prater use a racial slur,
and that “made [her] snap to attention” because she “knew it was going to be real bad.”
Perez also testified that Beard was close enough to hear what was said. Additionally,
Joseph McClendon, a cook, testified [63-16] that Beard asked him and the other
kitchen staff to come out front because a fight was about to happen.
Defendant’s assistant manager, Gigi Beard, testified [63-3] that she stayed close
to the two parties after the police officer left the first time because she was concerned
that an issue could arise and wanted to make sure that “everything stayed calm.” She
said Prater’s group was “agitated that their money was stolen.” After the parties began
exchanging words, she “knew at that point, [she] was probably fixing to have to call the
police to come back.” She stated: “When things got a little bit louder, at that point I
knew something else needed to happen, and that’s when I picked up my phone.”
Officer Tammy Hoadley, who responded to both calls, testified [63-12] that she
had instructed Prater’s party to finish their meal and leave because she believed that
something could happen if both parties remained. She said, “the attitude of [Plaintiff’s
party] and the attitude of the other group was off. When you work the street long
enough, you pretty much know when you’re going to end up going back.”
Finally, Plaintiff’s expert witness, John Tisdale, testified [63-4] and provided a
report [58-5] in which he stated that the fight was “clearly foreseeable.” He cited the
aggressive manner and use of racial slurs by the “agitated and intoxicated Prater
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table.” He noted that Defendant’s employees “were aware of the verbal exchanges,
threats, and racially charged remarks of Prater and the ongoing verbal dispute.” He
specifically noted Beard’s awareness of the “escalating and dangerous” situation and
the complaints made to her by Plaintiff’s party.
All of this evidence tends to support Plaintiff’s claim that a physical
confrontation was foreseeable for at least some period of time before the fight actually
began. Therefore, a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding the duty element
of Plaintiff’s negligence claim.
B.
Breach – Reasonable Person Standard
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no evidence that it breached any duty
owed to him. “Ordinarily, breach is determined in reference to the ‘reasonable person’
standard of care. In other words, when a person fails to act as would a reasonable
person under the same or similar circumstances, that person is said to have breached
the applicable standard of care.” Davis v. Christian Bhd. Homes of Jackson, Miss., Inc.,
957 So. 2d 390, 404 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). Whether Defendant breached its duty “is an
issue for the fact-finder to resolve.” Lyle, 584 So. 2d at 400.
As noted above, Plaintiff presented evidence that his party requested assistance
from Defendant’s employees numerous times before the confrontation turned physical.
Both Selena Green [63-10] and Rhonda Browne [63-9] testified that they asked
Defendant’s employees to call the police before the fight started, and Gigi Beard
testified that she did not call the police until moments before the fight started.
Additionally, Selena Greene and Rhonda Browne testified that Defendant’s employees
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gathered around to watch the fight, and that they laughed, taunted, and cheered in
encouragement of Prater. Green specifically testified that some of Defendant’s
employees said “f— them n––ers up” and “f— ‘em up, kill that n—er.”
In the Court’s opinion, this evidence is sufficient to create a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether Defendant’s employees acted as a “reasonable person would
under the same or similar circumstances . . . .” Id.
C.
Causation
Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no evidence that its alleged breach
of duty caused Plaintiff’s injuries. “The proximate cause of an injury is that cause
which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by an efficient intervening cause
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate
cause arises when the omission of a duty contributes to cause the injury.” Grisham, 519
So. 2d at 417; see also Lyle, 584 So. 2d at 400; Crain, 641 So. 2d at 1192.
A reasonable juror – if he or she believed the testimony of Selena Green [63-10]
and Rhonda Browne [63-9] – could find that Defendant’s failure to call the police
sooner contributed to Plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff also provided an expert’s opinion [58-5]
that Beard’s failure to defuse the situation through a variety of available methods
contributed to Plaintiff’s injury. This evidence is sufficient to create a genuine dispute
of material fact regarding causation. Cf. May v. V.F.W. Post #2539, 577 So. 2d 372, 376
(Miss. 1991) (to show causation, plaintiff required to present evidence that defendant’s
fulfilling its alleged duty would have prevented attack).
D.
Punitive Damages
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Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to support
a claim for punitive damages. Under Mississippi law, punitive damages are available
where “the claimant . . . prove[s] by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence
which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or
committed actual fraud.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(a).
As noted above, Selena Greene and Rhonda Browne testified that Defendant’s
employees gathered around to watch the fight, and that they laughed, taunted, and
cheered in encouragement of Prater. They also testified that Defendant’s employees
ignored their requests for help, despite Prater’s loud, belligerent, racially-charged
threats prior to the physical altercation. In fact, Selena Green testified that
Defendant’s bartender was laughing at the verbal exchange. In the Court’s opinion,
this evidence is sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Defendant “acted with actual malice, [or] gross negligence with evidence a willful,
wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others . . . .” MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-165(1).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [58].
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 16th day of December, 2014.
s/Keith Starrett
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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