Eddy v. Mingo et al
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - Plaintiff's habeas corpus claims are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are dismissed with prejudice until the Heck conditions are met. A Final Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion and Order will be entered. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on 6/24/2014 (scp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
ROY DEAN EDDY, #43931
PLAINTIFF
VERSUS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-cv-28-KS-MTP
DERRICK MINGO, ANTHONY COMPTON,
AND JOSEPH COOLEY
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court, sua sponte, for consideration of dismissal. Plaintiff Eddy, an
inmate of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), filed this pro se Complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis in this case. The
Defendants are: Derrick Mingo, Warden at Marion-Walthall County Regional Correctional Facility;
Anthony Compton, Director of Private and Regional Prisons for MDOC; and Joseph Cooley, Legal
Claims Adjudicator for MDOC. Plaintiff challenges a prison disciplinary action resulting in the loss of
privileges and earned time.1 After reviewing the Complaint, Attachment, and Responses, in conjunction
with the relevant legal authority, the Court has come to the following conclusions.
I.
Background
On April 30, 2013, Plaintiff was found guilty of a prison rule violation report (RVR #0976420)
for testing positive for the use of methamphetamine. Plaintiff maintains that a prescription medication he
was taking at the time of the RVR causes false positives for methamphetamine. As punishment for the
disciplinary conviction, he lost visitation and telephone privileges for 90 days and he claims he lost 61
days of earned time.2 Plaintiff states that his attempts to appeal this disciplinary action were denied by
each Defendant.
1
“[A]n inmate may receive an earned time allowance . . . for each thirty days served if the department
[MDOC] determines that the inmate has complied with the good conduct and performance requirements of the
earned time allowance program.” Miss. Code Ann § 47-5-138 (5).
2
The copy of the RVR that Plaintiff filed states the punishment imposed was loss of visitation and
telephone privileges for 90 days, however, Plaintiff maintains throughout his pleadings that he also lost 61 days of
earned time as a result of the RVR. See Attach. [ECF No. 7].
Plaintiff asserts various complaints regarding the disciplinary process, which he claims violates
MDOC policy and his constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Mingo,
Compton and Cooley failed to confer with his desired witnesses which were medical staff at the prison
who could confirm that he was taking a medication that could cause a false positive. He complains that
each Defendant ignored the evidence establishing his innocence thereby failing to properly investigate his
appeal. Plaintiff argues that each Defendant should have reversed the guilty finding. As relief, Plaintiff
is requesting monetary damages and expungement of the disciplinary proceedings from his prison record
which presumably would result in the restoration of his lost earned time.
II.
Analysis
The in forma pauperis statute mandates dismissal “at any time” if the Court determines an action
“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or “is frivolous or malicious.” See 28 U.S.C. §
1915 (e)(2)(B). The Fifth Circuit deems a complaint to be frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law
or fact or if there is no realistic chance of ultimate success.” Henthorn v. Swinson, 955 F.2d 351, 352 (5th
Cir. 1992). Since the Court has permitted Plaintiff Eddy to proceed in forma pauperis in this action, his
Complaint is subject to the case screening procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
A. Habeas Corpus Claims
Initially, the Court notes that the appropriate legal vehicle to attack unconstitutional prison
administrative procedures or conditions of confinement is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Cook v. Tex. Dep’t of
Criminal Justice Transitional Planning Dep’t, 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994). In contrast, habeas
corpus provides the exclusive federal remedy available to a state prisoner challenging the fact or duration
of his confinement and seeking a speedier or immediate release from incarceration. Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Plaintiff must pursue claims that affect his eligibility for, or entitlement to,
accelerated release through habeas corpus. Cook, 37 F.3d at 166 (citing Johnson v. Pfeiffer, 821 F.2d
1120, 1123 (5th Cir. 1987)).
The restoration of 61 days of earned time or sentence credits to an inmate would result in the
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inmate receiving an accelerated release from incarceration. Therefore, Plaintiff must pursue any request
for the restoration of his earned time through a petition for habeas corpus relief. See Edwards v. Balisok,
520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (holding that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a claim for restoration
of good-time credits); Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (finding inmate
“cannot . . . recover good-time credits lost in a prison disciplinary proceeding” in a § 1983 civil action).
To the extent Plaintiff is asserting habeas corpus claims for the restoration of 61 days of earned time, his
claims will be dismissed from this § 1983 case, without prejudice.
B. Section 1983 Claims
A civil rights action under § 1983 is the appropriate or available remedy for a prisoner’s damages
claim. In order to obtain relief under § 1983, a plaintiff “must allege facts showing that a person, acting
under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the United
States Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Bryant v. Military Dep’t of Miss., 597 F.3d 678, 686
(5th Cir. 2010)(citation omitted). An inmate is not entitled to constitutional protections when his prison
privileges are restricted as punishment for a disciplinary violation. Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765,
767-68 (5th Cir. 1997)(finding restriction on prison privileges is merely a change in the conditions of an
inmate’s confinement); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995)(noting that discipline by
prison officials falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law). The Fifth
Circuit has specifically addressed the loss or restriction of most prison privileges and determined that
protection under the Due Process Clause is not available. See Lewis v. Dretke, No. 02-40956, 2002 WL
31845293, at *1 (5th Cir. 2002)(holding restrictions on commissary, telephone, recreation, and library
privileges as well as attendance at religious services, along with 15 days of solitary confinement, resulting
from allegedly false disciplinary charges does not implicate due process); Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504,
508 (5th Cir. 1999)(finding loss of visitation session insufficient to implicate a liberty interest). In sum,
Plaintiff does not have a constitutionally protected right to any privileges associated with his
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incarceration. Therefore, loss of visitation and telephone privileges for 90 days does not entitle Plaintiff
to relief under § 1983.
Furthermore, in order to recover damages for unconstitutional imprisonment that would
necessarily imply the invalidity of an inmate’s sentence, he must demonstrate that the conviction or
sentence has previously been invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). The Heck
doctrine applies to § 1983 claims by state prisoners challenging the validity of disciplinary actions and the
loss of good-time credits. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 648. In Wilkinson v. Dotson, the Supreme
Court reviewed the cases leading up to and following Heck and it clarified that
a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) -- no matter the relief
sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state
conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) -- if success in that action
would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.
544 U.S. 74, 78-82 (2005).
Plaintiff maintains that his disciplinary process was invalid, and he seeks the expungement of his
disciplinary conviction along with monetary damages. If the Court were to find in Plaintiff’s favor and
determine that his prison disciplinary conviction was invalid and should be expunged, meaning his loss of
61 days of earned time was invalid, such a finding “would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of
[Plaintiff’s] confinement or its duration.” Id. at 82. Therefore, Plaintiff may only proceed with these
claims under § 1983, if he proves that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Specifically,
“plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called
into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
Plaintiff confirmed that his disciplinary action has not been overturned or invalidated by any of
the means set forth in Heck. See Order [9]; Resp. [10]. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s § 1983
claims for money damages and expungement of his disciplinary conviction is not cognizable at this time.
See e.g., Evans v. Baker, 442 F. App’x 108, 110 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding dismissal under Heck and
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Balisok of inmate’s § 1983 complaint seeking expungement of adverse disciplinary proceedings to be
proper even after inmate withdrew his claim to have good-time credits restored).
In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not have a federally protected liberty interest in
having a prison grievance investigated or resolved to his satisfaction. Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371,
373-74 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Mahogany v. Miller, 252 F. App’x 593, 595 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding
inmate does not have protected liberty interest in filing grievances). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims related to
how his grievances were handled by Defendants Mingo, Compton and Cooley are frivolous. See Morris
v. Cross, 476 F. App’x 783, 785 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding inmate’s claim that he was denied adequate
investigation into his grievance was properly dismissed as frivolous); Staples v. Keffer, 419 F. App’x
461, 463 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding prisoner “does not have a constitutional right to a grievance procedure
at all” therefore claims that appeals within the prison system were “arbitrarily and capriciously denied”
are not cognizable).
As a final point, the Court notes that Plaintiff submitted a pleading [ECF No.11] entitled
“Mississippi Department of Corrections Disciplinary System Policy Number 18-01,” detailing MDOC
policies relevant to inmate discipline and pointing out alleged violations of the policies in his disciplinary
process by either the reporting employee, the hearing officer or the investigator. In conclusion, Plaintiff
states, “It would seem with all the violations noted above” that “the staff did not receive enough training
on said procedures” and that he “feels” any “lapse of training would be the responsibility of personnel
above them in rank, i.e., Warden Derrick Mingo, Assistant Director of Regional and Private Prisons,
Anthony Compton, et al.” [ECF No. 11] at 8. Allegations that MDOC policy and procedure was violated
by the complained of rule violation report and resulting disciplinary process, without more, simply does
not rise to a level of constitutional deprivation. See Guiden v. Wilson, 244 F. App’x 980, 981 (5th Cir.
2009) (citing Hernandez v. Estelle, 788 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir 1986)) (“A violation of a prison rule by
itself is insufficient to set forth a claim of a constitutional violation.”). Likewise, in the absence of a
constitutional violation, Plaintiff cannot establish liability for a prison official’s purported failure to
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properly supervise or train their subordinates. See Brown v. Hill, No. 09-2170, 2010 WL 5582936, *7
(W.D. La. Nov. 24, 2010) (discussing requirements for supervisory liability and finding lack of
constitutional deprivation precludes inmate from establishing § 1983 liability for failure to train), report
adopted, 2011 WL 126910 (W.D. La. Jan. 14, 2011). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to
hold Defendants Mingo and Compton liable for failing to properly train the officers involved in his
disciplinary process, he is not entitled to relief under § 1983.
III.
Conclusion
As discussed above, Plaintiff’s habeas corpus claims will be dismissed from this § 1983 case
without prejudice.3 Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are dismissed as legally frivolous and for failure to state a
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). The dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are
with prejudice until the Heck conditions are met. See Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir.
1996)(finding claims are properly “dismissed with prejudice . . . until the Heck conditions are met”).
A Final Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion and Order will be entered.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 24th day of June, 2014.
s/ Keith Starrett
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3
The Court does not reach a determination of the viability of any possible habeas claims; nonetheless, the
Clerk is directed to mail Plaintiff a packet of habeas corpus forms for state inmates challenging their imprisonment
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
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