Williams et al v. Rogers et al

Filing 25

ORDER granting Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's 17 Motion for Summary Judgment. Additionally, Plaintiffs may file an amended motion for default judgment as to Defendant Rogers within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order. If Plaintiffs do not file an amended motion for default judgment in that time period, the Court will dismiss their claims against Rogers without prejudice for their failure to prosecute and comply with the Court's order. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on October 1, 2015 (dsl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
ELMER WILLIAMS, et al.
V.

PLAINTIFFS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-116-KS-MTP

BRANDON ROGERS, et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
For reasons provided below, the Court grants Defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment [17].
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from an automobile accident. Plaintiff Elmer Williams was
driving a vehicle; Defendant Brandon Rogers was his passenger. Rogers was
intoxicated, and he dropped a lit cigarette on the floor of the vehicle. Williams
attempted to find the cigarette and ran off the road. The vehicle rolled over several
times, injuring Williams. At the time of the accident, Williams was insured under an
automobile insurance policy issued by Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company. State Farm paid Williams $5,000 in medical benefits, exhausting
his medical payments coverage. It also paid him $23,236.50 in property damage
benefits.
Williams and his wife filed a Complaint [1-2] in the Circuit Court of Forrest
County, Mississippi, which was removed [1] to this Court. Plaintiffs asserted claims
of negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Rogers; and claims
of breach of contract, breach of the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing, and

bad faith against State Farm. On May 11, 2015, State Farm filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment [17], which the Court now considers.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56 provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Sierra Club, Inc.
v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010). “An issue is
material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Sierra Club, Inc., 627
F.3d at 138. “An issue is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626
F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 2010).
The Court is not permitted to make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009). When deciding
whether a genuine fact issue exists, “the court must view the facts and the inference
to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Sierra
Club, Inc., 627 F.3d at 138. However, “[c]onclusional allegations and denials,
speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic
argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue
for trial.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Breach of Contract
Plaintiffs contend that State Farm breached the insurance policy by failing to
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pay him additional bodily injury benefits under the policy’s uninsured motorist (“UM”)
coverage. In Mississippi, a party asserting a breach of contract must prove 1) the
existence of a valid and binding contract, and 2) that the opposing party has broken,
or breached it. Business Communs., Inc. v. Banks, 90 So. 3d 1221, 1224-25 (Miss. 2012).
It is undisputed that a valid insurance contract existed between the parties. The Court
must determine whether Plaintiff presented evidence that State Farm breached it.
The Court’s ultimate goal in applying an insurance policy is to “render a fair
reading and interpretation of the policy by examining its express language and
applying the ordinary and popular meaning to any undefined terms.” Corban v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 20 So. 3d 601, 609 (Miss. 2009). “In Mississippi, insurance policies
are contracts, and as such, they are to be enforced according to their provisions.” Id.
First, where an insurance policy is plain and unambiguous, a court must
construe that instrument, like other contracts, exactly as written. Second,
it reads the policy as a whole, thereby giving effect to all provisions.
Third, it must read an insurance policy more strongly against the party
drafting the policy and most favorably to the policy holder. Fourth, where
it deems the terms of an insurance policy ambiguous or doubtful, it must
interpret them most favorably to the insured and against the insurer.
Fifth, when an insurance policy is subject to two equally reasonable
interpretations, a court must adopt the one giving the greater indemnity
to the insured. Sixth, where it discerns no practical difficulty in making
the language of an insurance policy free from doubt, it must read any
doubtful provision against the insurer. Seventh, it must interpret terms
of insurance policies, particularly exclusion clauses, favorably to the
insured wherever reasonably possible. Finally, although ambiguities of
an insurance policy are construed against the insurer, a court must
refrain from altering or changing a policy where terms are unambiguous,
despite resulting hardship on the insured.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lake Caroline, Inc., 515 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2008); see
also Corban, 20 So. 3d at 609; Guidant Mut. Ins. Co. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 13
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So. 3d 1270, 1281 (Miss. 2009); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Martin, 998 So. 2d
956, 963 (Miss. 2008). The Fifth Circuit has also highlighted the following principles
applicable to UM claims:
First, the Mississippi Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that courts
should liberally construe the provisions of the UM Act to effectuate the
remedial and humanitarian purposes of the Act. Second, uninsured
motorist provisions within automobile insurance policies must be
interpreted from the standpoint of the insured. Third, if the provisions of
the UM Act provide broader protection than the uninsured motorist
policy, then the terms of the Act become part of the policy, providing the
insured a statutory level of monetary protection. Fourth, although the
Mississippi Supreme Court has not always closed its judicial eye to the
insurance law of other jurisdictions, the court has more recently
suggested that courts interpreting Mississippi uninsured motorist law
should be “guided by [the terms of Mississippi’s] uninsured motorist
statute, not the jurisprudence of foreign jurisdictions.
Boatner v. Atlanta Specialty Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 1248, 1253-54 (5th Cir. 1997).
The policy’s [18-4] UM coverage provides:
1.

Under Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage (Bodily Injury),
we will pay compensatory damages for bodily injury an insured
is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an
uninsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be:
a.

sustained by an insured; and

b.

caused by an accident that involves the operation,
maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle as a
motor vehicle.

This provision mirrors the requirements to recover on a UM policy under Mississippi
law: “(1) the insured must be legally entitled to recover damages for bodily injury or
death; (2) from the owner or operator; (3) of an uninsured motor vehicle.” USAA v.
Shell, 698 So. 2d 96, 98 (Miss. 1997) (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-11-101). The Court
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will assume that Williams is “legally entitled to recover damages for bodily injury”
from Rogers, and that Williams’ vehicle meets the statutory and policy definitions of
an “uninsured motor vehicle.”
Plaintiffs argues that Rogers – Williams’ intoxicated passenger – became the
“operator” of the vehicle when Williams leaned down to retrieve the cigarette that
Rogers had dropped on the floor. In Plaintiffs’ own words: “Rogers became the operator
of the vehicle as the only person who could see where the car was going and navigate
the steering wheel with his left hand. Defendant Rogers was at fault in causing the
accident by failing to keep a proper lookout and failing to control the vehicle . . . .”
In support of this argument, Plaintiffs cite language from the Mississippi
Supreme Court’s decision in USAA v. Shell, 698 So. 2d 96 (Miss. 1997). There, the
estate of a driver who had been murdered by a hitchhiker argued that the hitchhiker
became the “operator” of the vehicle when he pulled a gun on the driver and told him
where to drive. Id. at 98-99. The Court noted:
“There is considerable authority to the effect that the word ‘operate,’ as
used in the coverage or exception provisions of automobile policies, means
to regulate and control the actual operation of the car, that is, to have
charge of it as the driver.” 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobile Insurance § 127. The
definition further notes that “there is also authority to the effect that the
terms are not limited to such direct physical control of the vehicles,” such
that one has been found to be an operator when exercising some control
over a vehicle though not sitting in the driver’s seat. The few cases
defining “operator” are highly fact-specific and focus on the degree of
control exerted by the one alleged to be the operator and the vehicle, not
as the estate would try to persuade us, by the control exerted over the
driver of the vehicle. At least one court, therefore, has defined “operator”
as synonymous with “driver.”
Id. at 99 (some citations omitted). The Court concluded that “neither the law nor the
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evidence supports the estate’s claim that” the hitchhiker became the “operator” of the
vehicle when he pulled a gun on the driver. Id. at 100.
Even if the Court assumes that the Mississippi Supreme Court would buy
Plaintiffs’ theory of UM liability – in which a designated driver can relinquish control
of his moving vehicle to an uninsured drunk passenger and recover from his own UM
coverage – Plaintiffs provided no evidence that Rogers exerted control over the vehicle.
To be clear: the record contains no evidence whatsoever that Rogers “regulate[d] or
control[led] the actual operation of the car,” had “charge of it as the driver,” or
exercised any control over the vehicle’s operation. Id.
Both the policy and the UM statute require that Williams’ injuries be caused by
the “owner or operator” of an uninsured motor vehicle. It is undisputed that Rogers did
not own the vehicle, and Plaintiffs provided no evidence that Rogers was the operator
of the vehicle at the time of the accident. Accordingly, the Court finds that State Farm
did not breach the policy. Plaintiffs are not entitled to UM benefits under the terms of
either the policy or the statute.
B.

Breach of Implied Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
There can be no breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing without a

breach of the underlying contract. See, e.g. Daniels v. Parker & Assocs., Inc., 99 So. 3d
797, 801 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012); Frye v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 915 So. 2d 486,
492 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005); Ishee v. Fannie Mae, No. 2:13-CV-234-KS-MTP, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15223, at *42 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 6, 2015); Willis v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 2:13CV-60-KS-MTP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155004, at *42 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 31, 2014); Gum
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Tree Prop. Mgmt., LLC v. Coleman, No. 1:12-CV-181-SA-DAS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
38306, at *12-*13 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 24, 2014). Therefore, as Defendant State Farm did
not breach the policy, the Court likewise finds that it did not breach the implied duty
of good faith and fair dealing.
C.

Bad Faith
To prove a bad faith claim, Plaintiffs “must show that the insurer denied the

claim (1) without an arguable or legitimate basis, either in fact or law, and (2) with
malice or gross negligence in disregard of the insured’s rights.” United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. Wigginton, 964 F.2d 487, 492 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Essinger v. Liberty
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 264, 271 (5th Cir. 2008); Jenkins v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 794
So. 2d 228, 233 (Miss. 2001). Both elements are “questions of law to be decided by the
trial judge.” Jenkins, 794 So. 2d at 233.
Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence that State Farm acted “with malice or
gross negligence in disregard of the insured’s rights.” Wigginton, 964 F.2d at 492.
Likewise, Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence to show that Defendant’s denial
of UM coverage was “without an arguable or legitimate basis, either in fact or law.” Id.
Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate as to their bad faith claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court grants Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment [17].
On November 24, 2014, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default
Judgment [13] as to Defendant Rogers, based on Plaintiffs’ failure to provide any
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substantive discussion of the Mississippi law applicable to those claims. Rogers has
still not appeared, and Plaintiffs have not re-urged or amended their motion for default
judgment. Although the Court’s order did not explicitly say so, its denial of the motion
for default judgment was without prejudice. Therefore, Plaintiffs may file an amended
motion for default judgment within fourteen days of the entry of this order. If Plaintiffs
do not file an amended motion for default judgment within that time period, the Court
will dismiss their claims against Rogers without prejudice for their failure to prosecute
and comply with the Court’s order. See EastWest Bridge v. Tech. Partners FZ, LLC, No.
3:11-CV-2417-L, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121128, at *17 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2015).
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 1st day of October, 2015.
s/Keith Starrett
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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