Barnes v. Carpenter et al

Filing 19

ORDER denying Defendants' 4 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on November 13, 2014 (dsl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
LESLIE BARNES

PLAINTIFF

V.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-144-KS-MTP

MARK CARPENTER, et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a personal injury case arising from an automobile accident. Plaintiff is
the wrongful death beneficiary of Carmen Corey, who was injured and killed in an
automobile accident. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Mark Carpenter caused the
accident while operating a vehicle within the scope of his employment by Defendants
Alvin Rickels and Alvin Rickels, LLC. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss [4]
Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies
the motion.
A.

Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a claim “must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC v. La. State, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir.
2010) (punctuation omitted). “To be plausible, the [counterclaim’s] factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (punctuation
omitted). The Court must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe the
[counterclaim] in the light most favorable to the [defendant].” Id. But the Court will
not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal

conclusions.” Id. Likewise, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 417 (5th
Cir. 2010) (punctuation omitted). Legal conclusions may provide “the [counterclaim’s]
framework, [but] they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 664, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
Plaintiff demanded punitive damages. Punitive damages are available where a
tortfeasor “acted with actual malice, [or] gross negligence which evidences a willful,
wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others . . . .” MISS. CODE ANN. 11-165(1)(a). “In the automobile context, the Supreme Court of Mississippi has been
extremely reticent to permit punitive damages in cases involving the mere commission
of traffic violations.” Dawson v. Burnette, 650 F. Supp. 2d 583, 585-86 (S.D. Miss.
2009). However, the Court has indicated that punitive damages may be available
where a driver/tortfeasor operates his vehicle while under the influence of an
intoxicant. See, e.g. James W. Sessums Timber Co. v. McDaniel, 635 So. 2d 875, 879-80
(Miss. 1994) (trial court did not err by providing punitive damage instruction where
evidence showed that driver/tortfeasor had BAC of 0.24% at time of accident); McGrew
v. State, 469 So. 2d 95, 97 (Miss. 1985) (driving under the influence of alcohol may be
considered conduct evincing a willful and wanton disregard for the safety of others and
of human life).
Plaintiff provided a single factual allegation that could plausibly support a claim
for punitive damages. She alleged [3] that Defendant Carpenter “was operating his
automobile at a time that he knew or should have known that his ability to do so was
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impaired.” Plaintiff could have provided more specific facts about Carpenter’s alleged
impairment. Although she failed to do so, this slim allegation is enough to state a
plausible claim for punitive damages, and it gives Defendants enough notice to file a
response and conduct discovery. Indeed, Defendants have responded [6, 9], and they
denied the allegation that Carpenter’s ability to operate a vehicle was impaired.
B.

Rule 12(e)
Alternatively, Defendants argue that Plaintiff should be required to provide a

more definite statement. Rule 8 requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). “A complaint which
contains a bare bones allegation that a wrong occurred and which does not plead any
of the facts giving rise to the injury, does not provide adequate notice.” Walker v. S.
Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1990). “If a complaint is ambiguous or
does not contain sufficient information to allow a responsive pleading to be framed, the
proper remedy is a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e).” Sisk v. Tex.
Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 644 F.2d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1981).
Rule 12(e) provides:
A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a
responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that
the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be
made before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects
complained of and the details desired. If the court orders a more definite
statement and the order is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of the
order or within the time the court sets, the court may strike the pleading
or issue any other appropriate order.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). The Fifth Circuit has cautioned, though:
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In view of the great liberality of [Rule 8], permitting notice pleading, it is
clearly the policy of the Rules that Rule 12(e) should not be used to
frustrate this policy by lightly requiring a plaintiff to amend his
complaint which under Rule 8 is sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss. It is to be noted that a motion for more definite statement is not
to be used to assist in getting facts in preparation for trial as such.
Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1959). The Court
possesses “considerable discretion” when evaluating a Rule 12(e) motion. DVI Bus.
Credit Corp. v. Crowder, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1009 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
Again, Plaintiff could have provided more facts, but the Complaint is barely
sufficient for Defendants to reasonably prepare a response. They can either admit or
deny that Carpenter’s ability to drive was impaired at the time of the accident. In fact,
that is exactly what they’ve done; they denied that Carpenter’s ability to drive was
impaired [6, 9].
For all of the reasons stated above, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss [4].
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 13th day of November, 2014.
s/Keith Starrett
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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