Guillory v. Jones County Jail et al

Filing 63

ORDER granting 46 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker on March 23, 2016. (jg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
ROBERT P. GUILLORY, # 8167

PLAINTIFF

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:14-CV-00157-MTP

SHERIFF ALEX HODGE, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants‟ Motion for Summary Judgment [46].
Having considered the Motion, applicable law, and case record, the Court finds that the Motion [46]
should be granted and this action should be dismissed with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
On September 22, 2014, Plaintiff Robert P. Guillory, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
filed his Complaint [1] pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This lawsuit arises from
events that took place while Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at Jones County Jail.1 In his complaint
and as clarified in his testimony at the Spears2 hearing, Plaintiff asserts claims against Major Randy
Johnson, Sheriff Alex Hodge, and Captain David Hare for violations of his First Amendment right
to free exercise of religion, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”),
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). He also asserts claims against Toria Crosby
for denying him access to legal materials.3 As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and
injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring that the jail accommodate his religion and expand
the law library.

1

Plaintiff is currently housed as a post-conviction inmate at the East Mississippi Correctional
Facility.
2
Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff‟s hearing occurred on April 29, 2015.
3
Originally, Angela Guthrie was also named as a defendant. Plaintiff alleged that she denied him
access to legal materials; however, the claims against her were dismissed with prejudice and those
issues are no longer before the Court. See Judgment Dismissing Defendant Angela Guthrie [39].
1

FACTS
According to Plaintiff, in August of 2014, he was placed in disciplinary confinement for sixty
days after he was involved in a physical altercation with an officer at the jail. Allegedly, during that
sixty-day period, Plaintiff was detained with two other inmates in a cell designed to house one
inmate. Plaintiff claims that the crowded condition of the cell denied him the right to freely exercise
his religion.
Plaintiff is a Muslim, and he alleges that the crowded condition of the cell made it difficult
for him to perform Salat, an Islamic prayer ritual. According to Plaintiff, Salat is performed five
times a day and involves standing and kneeling. Plaintiff alleges that, with little room in the cell, he
was forced to either kneel next to the toilet or risk disturbing the other inmates who were lying on
the floor. Plaintiff also claims that the crowded condition of the cell made it difficult for him to
perform Wudu, an Islamic ritual involving washing parts of the body with water. Plaintiff alleges that
he had to step over the other inmates to get to a water source. On August 12, 2014, Plaintiff
requested move to a private cell, but Major Randy Johnson informed him that no private cells were
available. See Plaintiff‟s Request [1-2]. He also alleges the Defendant Alex Hodge failed respond to
these grievances.
Further, Plaintiff alleges he asked Captain David Hare if a family member could bring him
certain religious items, including a Koran, a Kufi cap, and a prayer rug. Plaintiff was allowed a copy
of the Koran, but denied the other items. See Captain Hare Note [1-4]. However, Plaintiff was able
to buy the other items from the canteen. Plaintiff also requested from Captain Hare that the County
“honor [his] month of fasting” as part of Ramadan. See Plaintiff‟s Request [1-3]. Captain Hare
responded that Plaintiff would be provided meals as normal and that if Plaintiff chooses “not to eat
that was [his] business.” Id. According to Plaintiff, Captain Hare should have allowed him to eat
meals before sunrise and after sunset during the thirty-day fasting period. In addition, Plaintiff

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alleges that Captain Hare should have allowed Plaintiff to partake in a feast at the end of the fasting
period.
Plaintiff also complains that, during the sixty days when he was held in disciplinary
confinement, he wrote Toria Crosby requesting legal books. Plaintiff alleges that Crosby, as his case
manager, had a duty to provide him legal books, but she failed to send him the books. According to
Plaintiff, he sought the books in order to seek a restraining order against the officer with whom he
previously had a physical altercation.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A motion for summary judgment will be granted only when “the record indicates that there
is „no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.‟” Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The Court must view “the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. However, the nonmoving party “cannot
defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or „only a scintilla
of evidence.‟” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical Center, 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)). In the absence of proof, the Court
does not “assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” Little, 37
F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted).
ANALYSIS
Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff requests injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring Defendants to
accommodate the religious month of Ramadan and expand the law library. Plaintiff, however, is no

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longer housed at the Jones County Jail, but at East Mississippi Correctional Facility.4 Because of his
transfer, any claim for injunctive relief is moot.5
The transfer of an inmate from an allegedly offending institution generally renders his claims
for injunctive relief moot. See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002). In order for Plaintiff‟s
claim for injunctive relief to remain viable, he must establish a “demonstrated probability” or a
“reasonable expectation” that he will be transferred back. Id; see also Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660,
665 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that “any suggestion of relief based on the possibility of transfer back . .
. is too speculative to warrant relief”); Davis v. Wall, 1995 WL 136204, at *2 n.3 (5th Cir. March 9,
1995) (holding that an inmate‟s claim for injunctive relief relating to his religious rights was rendered
moot by his transfer to another facility). Nothing on the record suggests that Plaintiff may be
transferred back to the Jones County Jail. Thus, Plaintiff‟s claims for injunctive relief will be
dismissed as moot.
Defendants Johnson, Hodge, and Hare - Religious Claims Under the First Amendment and
RLUIPA
Plaintiff claims that Hodge and Johnson denied his request for more cell space, which
impeded his religious practice, and that they further denied him religious items. He also claims that
Hare did not accommodate the religious month of Ramadan.
According to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), “[n]o Federal civil action may be
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional
injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(e). Plaintiff in bringing these Section 1983 First Amendment claims and RLUIPA claims for
compensatory damages does not allege that he suffered a physical injury that was more than de minimis.
4

See Notice of Change of Address [60].
A Federal court is obligated to raise issue of mootness, sua sponte, if facts suggest mootness
notwithstanding silence of parties with respect to that issue. Dailey v. Vought Aircraft Co., 141 F.3d
224, 227 (5th Cir. 1998).
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See id.; Mayfield v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 605–06 (5th Cir.2008)(prisoner's claims
for compensatory damages against prison officials in their official capacity on claims alleging First
Amendment and RLUIPA violations and were barred by the PLRA provision prohibiting actions for
mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury); see
also Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374–75 (5th Cir.2005) (extending physical injury requirement to
First Amendment claims); Alexander v. Tippah Cnty. Miss., 351 F.3d 626, 631 (5th Cir.2003) (noting
that the alleged physical injury must be more than de minimis); RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc2(e)(“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to amend or repeal the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (including provisions of law amended by that Act).”).
Plaintiff does allege that he suffered some “fatigue, constipation, and muscle spasms.” See
Motion Opposing Summary Judgment [52] at 2. However, this Court finds these alleged injuries to
be no more than de minimis. See Alexander v. Tippah Cty., Miss., 351 F.3d 626, 631 (5th Cir. 2003)
(agreeing with district court that nausea and vomiting were de minimis injuries). Plaintiff also
complains of a neck injury that occurred “before this . . .started.” See Motion Opposing Summary
Judgment [52] at 6. As this injury was not caused by any alleged violation of the First Amendment or
RLUIPA, this injury cannot be used to meet the physical injury requirement of the PLRA. Plaintiff
has submitted no proof of any of these alleged injuries, or proof that they were somehow connected
to the alleged First Amendment or RLUIPA violations; therefore, Plaintiff does not meet the
physical injury requirement of the PLRA.
Indeed, while Plaintiff does not specifically ask for emotional damages, injuries from these
alleged events could only be mental or emotional, because he did not allege a physical injury that was
more than de minimis. In fact, Plaintiff states he experienced “emotional stress, mental anguish, and
anxiety.” Id. at 2. The compensatory damages Plaintiff requests could only stem from some sort of an

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emotional injury.6 To the extent Plaintiff seeks compensation for injuries alleged to have resulted
from First Amendment and RLUIPA violations, his claim is barred by the physical injury
requirement of § 1997e(e). See Mayfield, 529 F.3d at 605–06; see also Geiger 404 F.3d at 374–75; see also
Carter v. Hubert, 452 F. App'x 477, 479 (5th Cir. 2011). Additionally, as discussed above, Plaintiff‟s
claim for injunctive relief is moot. Therefore, Plaintiff‟s First Amendment and RLUIPA claims
against Defendants Johnson, Hodge, and Hare will be dismissed.
Individual Defendants RLUIPA
RLUIPA does not authorize a private cause of action for compensatory or punitive damages
against defendants in their individual capacities. See Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316,
331 (5th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims against any defendant in
their individual capacity under RLUIPA, those claims will be dismissed.
Defendant Toria Crosby - Denial of Access to Legal Materials
Plaintiff claims that Toria Crosby denied his access to legal materials to file a temporary
restraining order against officers in another action. The United States Supreme Court has held that
prisoners have a fundamental constitutional right to “adequate, effective, and meaningful” access to
the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977). Before an inmate may prevail on his claim,
however, he must demonstrate that he suffered “actual prejudice,” i.e. that the denial of access
“hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996); Ruiz v. United
States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998) (without proving actual injury, the plaintiff cannot prevail
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The Fifth Circuit agrees with the “majority of the other federal circuits that have addressed this
issue in holding that it is the nature of the relief sought, and not the underlying substantive violation,
that controls: Section 1997e(e) applies to all federal civil actions in which a prisoner alleges a
constitutional violation, making compensatory damages for mental or emotional injuries nonrecoverable, absent physical injury.” Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Clarke
v. Stalder, 121 F.3d 222, 227 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1997) (suggesting in dictum that monetary relief but not
injunctive relief “might be difficult” in light of § 1997e(e)'s physical injury requirement in a § 1983
suit alleging a First Amendment violation), vacated for reh'g en banc, 133 F.3d 940 (5th Cir. 1997).

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on an access-to-courts claim); Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057, 1063 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
civil rights claim cannot be based on “minor and short-lived impediments to access” in the absence
of actual prejudice).
In this case, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant Toria Crosby hindered his ability
to pursue a legal claim. Moreover, the Court also notes that Plaintiff has communicated extensively
with the Court in this matter and in Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-156-MTP. Plaintiff in his other action
was able to file for a preliminary injunction. Thus, because Plaintiff has failed to bring forth any
evidence that he suffered any “actual injury,” thus, his claim against Defendant Crosby will be
dismissed.
RFRA Claims
Plaintiff also asserts claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. However, RFRA only applies to the federal government and its actors. See
Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, 697 F.3d 279, 289 (5th Cir. 2012). All defendants are state
or local actors; therefore, this claim will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Defendants‟ Motion for Summary
Judgment [45] should be granted.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1.

Defendants‟ Motion for Summary Judgment [45] is GRANTED and this action is
dismissed with prejudice.

2.

A separate judgment in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 will be
filed herein.

SO ORDERED, this the 23rd day of March, 2016.
s/ Michael T. Parker
United States Magistrate Judge

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