Browning v. Jefferson Davis Co. MS School District

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 14 Motion for Default Judgment. Plaintiff is given two weeks from the date of this Order to amend her complaint. Failure to state a claim upon amendment will result in a dismissal of this action without prejudice. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on 2/1/2016 (scp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLINE C. BROWNING
V.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-CV-65-KS-MTP

JEFFERSON DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Charline C. Browning’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for
Default Judgment [14]. After considering the record and the applicable law, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s motion should be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her original Complaint [1] on April 29, 2015, but never served Defendant
Jefferson Davis County School District (“Defendant”) with a copy. Plaintiff then filed her Amended
Complaint [10] on October 5, 2015, and properly served Defendant on December 10, 2015.
Defendants’ answer was due on or before December 31, 2015. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. No answer was
filed by this date. Therefore, the Clerk properly entered Default [16] on January 26, 2016. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55(a).
In her Amended Complaint [10], Plaintiff claims that she was “discriminated against by the
defendant by not interviewing [her] when [she] applied for a teaching position in June, 2013 [sic].”
(Amended Complaint [10] at p. 1.) She was told that Defendant would not interview her because
her teaching license was set to expire soon. She claims that she was also “retaliated against because
[she] had filed previous EEOC complaints from 2008-2013.” (Amended Complaint [10] at p. 1.)
It is unclear under which legal theory Plaintiff is pursuing her claims as no claims are specified.

II. DISCUSSION
By their default, Defendants admitted Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact. Nishimatsu
Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975). Therefore, in addressing
a motion for default judgment, the Court accepts the factual allegations of the Complaint [1] as true.
The entry of a default, however, “does not in itself warrant the court in entering a default judgment.
There must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.” Id. In the case at hand,
there is no such sufficient basis in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [10] to justify judgment being
entered.
While a pro se complaint is held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers” Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1972)), it must still comply with
procedural standards. Payton v. United States, 550 F.App’x 194, 195 (5th Cir. 2013). To state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570,
127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; see also In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 624 F.3d
201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010) (“To be plausible, the complaint’s ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A
complaint containing mere “labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements” is
insufficient. Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, Miss., 681 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). However, “detailed factual allegations” are not required. Iqbal,
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556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955). Although
courts are to accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, courts are not required “to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as factual
allegation.” Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted).
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [10] summarily accuses Defendant of discrimination and
retaliation. However, Plaintiff’s own allegations contradict her discrimination claim. Plaintiff
introduces the affidavit of Sametra Chisolm, the principal of the elementary school at which Plaintiff
attempted to gain employment, in support of her claim. This affidavit states that Plaintiff was told,
in order to be interviewed, she had to renew her teaching license. (Affidavit [10-1] at ¶ 4.) As a
teaching license is a requirement for a teaching job, such a request cannot be said to be
discriminatory in nature. Furthermore, the conclusory allegation of retaliation for previously filed
EEOC complaints is not enough to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore,
because Plaintiff has failed to state any claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court will deny
her Motion for Default Judgment [1]. Furthermore, as the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint [10] does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Plaintiff is given two weeks
from the entry of this order to amend her complaint in order to cure her defective pleadings. Failure
to adequately amend her complaint will result in her claims being dismissed without prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default
Judgment [8] is denied. Plaintiff is given two weeks from the date of this order to amend her
complaint. Failure to state a claim upon amendment will result in a dismissal of this action without
prejudice.
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SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 1st day of February, 2016.

s/ Keith Starrett
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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