Laird v. Sunbelt Management Co. et al
Filing
101
ORDER denying 55 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for the reasons set out in the order. Signed by District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on June 1, 2016. (SP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
MARK LAIRD
PLAINTIFF
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15cv67-DPJ-FKB
SUNBELT MANAGEMENT CO. and
WOODBRIAR ASSOCIATES, LTD
DEFENDANTS
ORDER
This premises-liability case is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment [55]. Because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to Plaintiff’s
premises-liability status, the motion is denied.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
On October 3, 2014, while on the premises of Briarwood Apartments (“Briarwood”) in
Prentiss, Mississippi, Plaintiff Mark Laird suffered a gunshot wound to the back of the head.
Laird sued Defendants Sunbelt Management Co. and Woodbriar Associates, Ltd, the entities that
own and operate Briarwood, asserting claims for negligence and gross negligence. Defendants
have moved “for partial summary judgment seeking an adjudication of the Plaintiff’s premises
liability status at the time of the subject incident as that of a licensee, and the duty owed to him
by the Defendants as being to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring him.” Defs.’ Mem.
[57] at 2. The Court has personal and subject-matter jurisdiction and is prepared to rule.
II.
Standard
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) when the
evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. “‘[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the nonmoving party’s case . . . mandates the entry of summary judgment’ for the
moving party.” U.S. ex rel. Farmer v. City of Houston, 523 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)).1
The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
The nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. In reviewing the evidence, factual
controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, “but only when . . . both parties have
submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam).
III.
Analysis
“[P]remises liability is a theory of negligence that establishes the duty owed to someone
injured on a landowner’s premises as a result of ‘conditions or activities’ on the land.” Doe v.
Jameson Inn, Inc., 56 So. 3d 549, 553 (Miss. 2011) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 961 (7th
ed. 2000)) (footnote omitted). Mississippi courts considering a premises-liability case undertake
a three-step analysis under which this Court must determine: “(1) the status of the injured party,
that is, whether [the plaintiff] was a trespasser, licensee, or invitee; (2) the duty the landowners .
1
In his response, Plaintiff asserts that he “has been denied an opportunity to depose both
the property and regional manager of the apartment complex to this point, and discovery is
ongoing and therefore this motion is premature.” Pl.’s Mem. [61] at 1–2. But “under Rule
56(d), deferring summary judgment and ordering discovery is appropriate only if the ‘nonmovant
shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to
justify its opposition.’” Mendez v. Poitevent, No. 15-50790, 2016 WL 2957851, at *7 (5th Cir.
May 19, 2016) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)). Plaintiff has presented no such affidavit or
declaration and has failed to explain why he could not respond to the motion without additional
discovery.
2
. . owed to [the plaintiff] based upon h[is] particular status; and (3) whether the landowners
breached their duty of care to [the plaintiff].” Little by Little v. Bell, 719 So. 2d 757, 760 (Miss.
1998). At this juncture, Defendants have placed only the first two steps of the analysis in issue.
As to Laird’s status on the premises, Defendants assert that Laird was a licensee at the
time of the shooting. While the determination of a plaintiff’s status may present a jury question,
see Adams ex rel. Adams v. Fred’s Dollar Store of Batesville, 497 So. 2d 1097, 1100 (Miss.
1986), if “the salient facts are not disputed, it is proper for the Court to determine [the plaintiff’s]
status . . . as a matter of law,” Handy v. Nejam, 111 So. 3d 610, 612 (Miss. 2013). In this case,
Defendants assert the undisputed facts show Laird was a licensee at the time of the shooting.
Laird, on the other hand, contends that he was an invitee or, at a minimum, that fact questions
remain as to his status.2
The general and well-recognized rule in Mississippi is that an invitee is a person
who goes upon the premises of another in answer to the express or implied
invitation of the owner or occupant for their mutual advantage. On the other
hand, a licensee is one who enters upon the property of another for his own
convenience, pleasure or benefit pursuant to the license or implied permission of
the owner.
Clark v. Moore Mem’l United Methodist Church, 538 So. 2d 760, 762–63 (Miss. 1989) (citations
omitted). While a landowner owes an invitee “the duty to keep the premises reasonably safe and
when not reasonably safe to warn only where there is hidden danger or peril that is not plain and
open,” a landowner owes a licensee only “a duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring
him.” Little, 719 So. 2d at 760.
2
Laird has not filed a cross-motion seeking to establish invitee status.
3
Laird raises two theories in support of his argument for invitee status. He first alleges
that he lived with his girlfriend Carolyn Longino at Briarwood at the time of the shooting.
Alternatively, he claims invitee status because “he entered the premises to bestow a benefit on an
established resident . . . .” Pl.’s Mem. [61] at 6. Because Laird has created a question regarding
his permanent-resident status, the Court will focus on that issue.
A rent-paying tenant would obviously qualify as the landlord’s invitee. See Price v. Park
Mgmt., Inc., 831 So. 2d 550, 551 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (“It is well settled that a landlord owes
his tenants a duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and that this duty extends
to protecting tenants from the foreseeable criminal acts of others.”). But there is no evidence in
the present record that Laird was a rent-paying tenant in October 2014. Laird testified that he
never signed a lease with Defendants, and both he and Carolyn Longino testified that she never
added Laird as an additional tenant on her lease with Briarwood. Laird Dep. [55-1] at 20–21, 23;
Longino Dep. [55-2] at 76.
Laird argues that he is nevertheless entitled to invitee status because he lived with
Longino at Briarwood. The Mississippi Court of Appeals has held that a long-term resident at an
apartment complex—even if not listed on a tenant’s lease—is an invitee. Davis v. Christian
Bhd. Homes of Jackson, Miss. Inc., 957 So. 2d 390, 400 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (“[W]e find the
permanent nature of Lucius’s residence at CBA prior to his death . . . indicative of invitee
status.”). The court of appeals’s decision in Davis was based on two prior Mississippi Supreme
Court opinions. Id. (citing Lucas v. Miss. Hous. Auth. No. 8, 441 So. 2d 101 (Miss. 1983);
Turnipseed v. McGee, 109 So. 2d 551 (Miss. 1959)). Both parties acknowledge Davis as
providing the applicable standard.
4
Defendants distinguish Davis, asserting that the undisputed facts show Laird was not a
“permanent . . . residen[t]” at Briarwood prior to the shooting. Davis, 957 So. 2d at 400. While
there is strong factual support for Defendants’ argument, the record as a whole, viewed in the
light most favorable to Laird, presents a fact question.
Laird testified that on October 3, 2014, and for the six months prior thereto, he was living
with Longino in Briarwood Apartment A-8. Laird Dep. [55-1] at 16–17. And while he testified
that, due to the stormy nature of his relationship with Longino, he sometimes stayed elsewhere,
Laird maintained that prior to October 2014, he “lived there with Caroline.” Id. at 83; see
generally id. at 83–87. Laird’s testimony on this point conflicts with that of Longino, who
testified that for the seven to nine months prior to the shooting, Laird “didn’t even live with [her]
period.” Longino Dep. [55-2] at 82. And the police report of the shooting incident, as well as
Laird’s state-issued identification, list Laird’s address at locations other than Briarwood.3 But
the Court may not weigh the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, and Laird has
submitted competent summary-judgment evidence that he was a permanent resident at
Briarwood at the time of the shooting. See C.R. Pittman Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of
Hartford, 453 F. Appx 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Although arguably ‘self-serving,’ the
affidavits are not wholly conclusory, are based on personal knowledge, and create a fact issue as
to the cause of the damage to the equipment.”). This evidence creates a fact issue as to Laird’s
premises-liability status, so Defendants’ motion is denied.
3
Laird has submitted additional affidavits in support of his position that he was a
Briarwood permanent resident at the time of the shooting. See Longino Aff. [60-2]; Berry Aff.
[60-3]; Rogers Aff. [60-4]. None of those affidavits suggest the length of time Laird resided at
Briarwood prior to the shooting, diminishing their relevance.
5
IV.
Conclusion
The Court has considered all of the parties’ arguments. Those not specifically addressed
would not have changed the outcome. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment [55] is denied.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 1st day of June, 2016.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6
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