Hartzog et al v. Hackett et al

Filing 86

ORDER denying Defendants' 80 Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge's Order; and finding as moot Defendants' 84 Motion to Stay Proceedings. The Court directs the parties to contact the chambers of the Magistrate Judge to schedule a teleconference to discuss the entry of a new scheduling order. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on September 26, 2016 (dsl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
JOANN SANDERS HARTZOG, et al.
V.

PLAINTIFFS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-CV-2-KS-MTP

J. M. HACKETT, et al.

DEFENDANTS
ORDER

Defendants filed an Appeal [80] of the Magistrate Judge’s Order [69 granting
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend [55]. For the reasons below, the Court denies
the Appeal [80].
Under Rule 72, a party may file an objection to a Magistrate Judge’s order
within fourteen days of being served. For nondispositive matters, the District Judge
“must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is
clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a); see also 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(A). This standard of review is “extremely deferential” to the Magistrate
Judge’s order. Shukh v. Seagate Tech., LLC, 295 F.R.D. 228, 235 (D. Minn. 2013). “A
decision is contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case
law or rules of procedure.” Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when “the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” Thomas v. Hoffman-La Roche, inc., 126 F.R.D. 522, 524 (N.D. Miss.
1989). “As in other appeals, the court may affirm a correct order of the magistrate
judge on grounds that he did not cite or that were not raised before him.” Griffin v.
Raytheon Co. Long Term Disability Plan No. 558, No. 3:04-CV-2179, 2005 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 18720, 2005 WL 4891214, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2005).
Defendants argue that the Magistrate Judge erred in granting Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Leave to Amend [55]. Rule 16(b) “governs amendment of pleadings after a
scheduling order’s deadline to amend has expired.” Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Servs., 551
F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2008).
Rule 16(b) provides that once a scheduling order has been entered, it may
be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent. It requires
a party to show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the
diligence of the party needing the extension. As to post-deadline
amendment, a party must show good cause for not meeting the deadline
before the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a) will apply to the district
court’s denial of leave to amend. Four factors are relevant to good cause:
(1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for leave to amend; (2)
the importance of amendment; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the
amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such
prejudice.
Id. (punctuation and citations omitted).
Once a movant has shown good cause under Rule 16(b), the Court applies Rule
15(a)’s more liberal standard. Id. Rule 15 provides that “a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court
should freely give leave when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). The Court
considers five factors when addressing a motion for leave to amend: “1) undue delay,
2) bad faith or dilatory motive, 3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous
amendments, 4) undue prejudice to the opposing party, and 5) futility of the
amendment.” Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004). “A court must
have a substantial reason to deny a party’s request for leave to amend.” Stem v. Gomez,
813 F.3d 205, 215 (5th Cir. 2016).

First, Defendants argue that the Magistrate Judge erred by applying Rule 15(a),
rather than Rule 16(b). But the Magistrate Judge plainly applied Rule 16(b)’s good
cause standard before applying Rule 15(a)’s more liberal standard, as required by the
authorities cited above.
Next, Defendants disagree with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiffs
satisfied Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” standard.1 First, Plaintiffs explanation for the delay
in seeking an amendment was less than satisfactory. Although Plaintiffs claim that
they just became aware that Josh Earls and Devin Mullins have firsthand knowledge
of the events leading to this suit, Defendants idenitified Earls and Mullins in their
initial disclosures [60-1] on March 15, 2016, over three weeks before the amendment
deadline. Defendants also produced an investigative report [60-1] which includes
references to Earls and Mullins interacting with the decedent during the relevant time
period, and a written statement from Mullins himself regarding the events in question.
Accordingly, the first factor in Rule 16(b)’s good cause analysis weighs against allowing
an amendment.
The second factor, however, weighs in favor of the amendment. Earls and
Mullins were directly involved with the events that led to this action. According to
Defendant Hackett’s investigative report [60-1], Earls and Mullins directly observed
and interacted with the decedent on the night of the events in question. Likewise,
Mullins’ written statement [60-1] confirms his own involvement.

1

Defendants apparently do not contend that the Magistrate Judge erred in
his subsequent Rule 15(a) analysis. Accordingly, the Court will not address it in this
order.

As for the prejudice to the Defendants, some slight prejudice may exist,
depending on whether the amendment would cause Defendants to incur additional
expenses in defending against Plaintiffs’ claims. However, the Court notes that
Defendants have not demonstrated that they will necessarily incur any expenses that
they would not have incurred if the amendment had been granted earlier in the case.
Furthermore, any purported prejudice related to the short time left before the
discovery period expires can be cured by an extension of the discovery deadline, which
the Magistrate Judge explicitly noted in his order.
For these reasons, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that
Plaintiffs had shown good cause for their failure to timely seek leave to amend was not
clearly erroneous or contrary to law. At least two of the four factors weigh in favor of
granting the amendment. This type of motion routinely falls within a gray area where
the Court would have sufficient basis for a ruling in either direction. This is such a
case. Therefore, the Court can not conclude that the Magistrate Judge’s decision was
clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
The Court denies Defendants’ Appeal [80] of the Magistrate Judge’s Order [69]
granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend [55]. Defendants’ Motion to Stay [84]
the Magistrate Judge’s previous order [69] is denied as moot. The Court orders the
parties to contact the chambers of the Magistrate Judge to schedule a teleconference
to discuss the entry of a new scheduling order.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, on this, the 26th day of September, 2016.
s/Keith Starrett
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE