Smith et al v. Ramirez et al

Filing 87

Memorandum Opinion and ORDER denying 81 Motion for New Trial. The Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial 81 . Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on 7/1/19. (cb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
ROSE MARY SMITH, et al.
v.

PLAINTIFFS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-CV-164-KS-MTP

STARR INDEMNITY & LIABILITY COMPANY

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
For the reasons provided below, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for a New
Trial [81].
A.

Background
This is an insurance dispute. Plaintiff Rose Mary Smith was in an automobile

accident caused by an uninsured motorist. At the time of the accident, Smith was
insured under an insurance policy issued by Defendant, Starr Indemnity & Liability
Company, which provided up to $1,000,000.00 in uninsured motorist coverage.
Defendant did not dispute coverage. Rather, it disputed the amount of Smith’s
injuries caused by the accident.
The Court held a three-day jury trial. Plaintiffs sought payment for Rose Mary
Smith’s physical injuries and medical bills, Rodney Smith’s loss of consortium, and
economic losses in Plaintiffs’ business. During closing argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel
asked the jury to award Plaintiffs $5,000,000.00 in damages. The jury awarded
Plaintiffs $37,000.00 – $12,000.00 for Rose Mary Smith’s past medical bills,
$25,000.00 for Rose Mary Smith’s noneconomic damages, and nothing for her future

medical bills, her lost wages, and her husband’s loss of consortium. See Jury Verdict,
Smith v. Starr Ind. & Liab. Co., No. 2:17-CV-164-KS-MTP (S.D. Miss. May 6, 2019),
ECF No. 80. Unsatisfied with the verdict, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for New Trial [81],
which the Court now addresses.
B.

Discussion
Rule 59 provides that the “court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or

some of the issues – and to any party – as follows: (A) after a jury trial, for any reason
for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court
. . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1). Plaintiffs made two arguments in favor of their motion.
First, Plaintiffs argue that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the
evidence because the jury “obviously” based their verdict on the testimony of
Defendant’s expert, Dr. David Gandy, which Plaintiffs contend was flawed in several
respects. “A trial court should not grant a new trial on evidentiary grounds unless
the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.” Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d
1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 1998). The Court “must affirm the verdict unless the evidence –
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict – points so strongly and
overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court believes that reasonable men
could not arrive at a contrary conclusion.” Id. (punctuation and citations omitted).
Plaintiffs’ argument rests upon an erroneous assumption. Plaintiffs assume
that the jury must have credited Dr. Gandy’s testimony, arguing that there is no other
explanation for the verdict. To the contrary, the jury could have simply disbelieved
2

Plaintiffs and their witnesses. Plaintiffs had the burden of proving the amount of
their damages caused by the accident. Architex Ass’n, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 27
So. 3d 1148, 1157 (Miss. 2010) (“The burden of proving coverage rests with the
insured.”). The jury has sole discretion to credit or discredit any evidence as it deems
appropriate. Montano v. Orange County, Tex., 842 F.3d 865, 874 (5th Cir. 2016).
Therefore, the jury could have rejected Plaintiffs’ $5,000,000.00 demand because they
did not find Plaintiffs’ evidence credible.
Regardless, if the jury credited Dr. Gandy’s testimony, that was their
prerogative. Id. Plaintiffs filed no motions challenging Gandy’s qualifications or the
relevancy or reliability of his testimony. See FED. R. EVID. 702. Plaintiffs crossexamined Gandy. They argued in closing that the jury should disregard Gandy’s
testimony. Plaintiffs have not identified any erroneous or prejudicial ruling by the
Court related to Gandy’s testimony. In fact, Plaintiffs made no contemporaneous
objection to Gandy’s testimony. Moreover, they had a chance to present a rebuttal
witness to his testimony but chose not to do so.
Reasonable persons could believe Dr. Gandy’s testimony and conclude, based
on all the evidence presented at trial, that Plaintiffs were only entitled to $37,000.00.
Likewise, reasonable persons could disbelieve much of Plaintiffs’ evidence and
conclude that they were only entitled to $37,000.00. All the nits that Plaintiffs picked
out of Gandy’s testimony were fodder for cross-examination and closing argument,
rather than grounds for exclusion or granting a new trial. Bottom line: Plaintiffs have
3

not provided the Court with any basis to conclude that the jury’s verdict was against
the great weight of the evidence.
Plaintiffs’ also argue that the Court should grant them a new trial because
Juror No. 1’s husband is employed by First South Farm Credit Company and was
“actively involved in negotiations with [Plaintiff Rose Mary Smith] in determining
whether First South Farm Credit would purchase an office owned by [Smith] in Jones
County, Mississippi,” and “the negotiations resulted in his company purchasing the
property.” Exhibit B to Motion at 1, Smith v. Starr Ind. & Liab. Co., No. 2:17-CV-164KS-MTP (S.D. Miss. May 24, 2019), ECF No. 81-2. Smith claims that she “was not
aware of the family relationship at the time that the jury was questioned and,
therefore, was not aware of the prior dealings” with Juror No. 1’s husband. Id.
During voir dire, Juror No. 1 identified herself by name and stated where she
lived and what she did for a living. She also identified her husband by name and
stated that he worked for First South Farm Credit. Later, the Court asked the panel
if anyone knew the Plaintiffs, was related to them, or had any sort of connection to
them or their business. Juror No. 1 did not respond affirmatively to the Court’s
question. Later, in chambers, Plaintiffs did not challenge Juror No. 1 for cause or use
a peremptory challenge to strike her from the panel.
To obtain a new trial, Plaintiffs “must first demonstrate that a juror failed to
answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct
response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. The motives for
4

concealing information may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror’s
impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial.” McDonough Power
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S. Ct. 845, 78 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1984).
Therefore, “[e]ven when a juror’s non-disclosure is dishonest as opposed to mistaken,
his behavior is not a basis for reversal unless the dishonesty appears to be rooted in
bias or prejudice.” United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 535, 555 (5th Cir. 2001). “[A]
finding of juror bias is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that
are peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” Thomas v. Ogletree Deakins Nash
Smoak & Stewart, P.C., 80 F. App’x 324, 2003 WL 22490286, at *1 (5th Cir. 2003).
First, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Juror No. 1 “failed to answer
honestly a material question on voir dire . . . .” Greenwood, 464 U.S. at 556. Plaintiffs
have not provided the Court with any reason to conclude that Juror No. 1 knew who
Rose Mary Smith was, or that her husband had been involved in a business
transaction with Smith. In fact, Smith claims to have “had face-to-face negotiations”
with Juror No. 1’s husband, yet she claims that she “was not aware of the family
relationship at the time that the jury was questioned,” despite Juror No. 1 clearly
stating her husband’s name and employer during voir dire. If Smith did not recognize
Juror No. 1 after she provided her husband’s name and employer, why would Juror
No. 1 recognize Smith? Plaintiffs apparently want the Court to assume that Juror
No. 1 knows every person with whom her husband conducts business. The Court
declines to do so.
5

Next, even if Juror No. 1 knew who Rose Mary Smith was and failed to divulge
that information, 1 Plaintiffs have not proven that the alleged dishonesty was “rooted
in bias or prejudice.” Bishop, 264 F.3d at 555. According to Rose Mary Smith’s
affidavit, Juror No. 1’s husband’s employer purchased a property from her. She did
not claim that the negotiations were acrimonious or otherwise indicate that she was
dissatisfied with the transaction. Therefore, the Court has no basis to conclude that
Juror No. 1 was motivated by bias or prejudice against Plaintiffs.
C.

Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for a New Trial [81].
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 1st day of July, 2019.
/s/

Keith Starrett
KEITH STARRETT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

To be clear, the undersigned judge does not believe that Juror No. 1 intentionally hid the fact that
her husband’s employer had purchased a property from Plaintiff Rose Mary Smith. There was no
indication of dishonesty or subterfuge during voir dire. But, more importantly, she clearly identified
her husband by name and employer – a poor strategy if she intended to deceive Plaintiffs.

1

6