Ducksworth v. City of Laurel, Mississippi et al

Filing 64

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 59 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by District Judge Keith Starrett on 2/7/2024. (CE)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION
MEKALE DUCKSWORTH

V.

PLAINTIFF

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-cv-114-KS-MTP

CITY OF LAUREL,
MISSISSIPPI, et al.

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I.

BACKGROUND
This cause comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees [59]. Defendant

has filed a Response [62]. Plaintiff has filed a Reply [63]. Accordingly, having reviewed the
parties’ submissions, the relevant rules and legal authorities, and otherwise being duly advised in
the premises, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion is granted in
part and denied in part.
A. Facts
This case arises from an incident between Mekale Ducksworth (“Plaintiff”) and several
defendant police officers. After the incident, the defendant police officers arrested Plaintiff. The
City charged him with failure to comply with an officer’s order or direction. Defendant Landrum
submitted an affidavit in which he claimed Plaintiff “unlawfully and willfully refuse[d] to comply
with the commands of Officer Justin Landrum . . . by failing to leave [Rainforest Car Wash] when
asked to do so….” [21-4]. Landrum later admitted at Plaintiff’s trial that the affidavit was
inaccurate, and that he had not, in fact, commanded Plaintiff to leave the premises. [21-5], at p.

46-47, 50. Defendant Landrum also submitted an Offense/Incident Report and a Use of Force
Report in which he stated that the car wash’s attendant told the officers that Plaintiff “refused to
leave the car wash . . . .” [21-2], at p. 3, 11. At Plaintiff’s trial, Landrum admitted that any
statements from his reports that Plaintiff “refused to leave the car wash when the staff asked him
to leave” were inaccurate. [21-5], at p. 50. He likewise admitted that the attendant said Plaintiff
could stay “if he behaves like he is doing now.” Id. at 51. A municipal judge ultimately found
Plaintiff not guilty.
After the trial, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the individual officers and the City of
Laurel, asserting a variety of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. In his Complaint [1-2],
Plaintiff alleges seven causes of action. The first six (Unlawful Seizure, First Amendment, False
Imprisonment, Excessive Force, Equal Protection, Race Discrimination) are related to the original
incident with the police officers. Id. at p. 16-23. The seventh, Fabrication or Misrepresentation of
Evidence, arises from Defendant Landrum’s false statements. Id. at p. 23. This case was tried
before a jury in June 2023. The Plaintiff won on his claim for fabrication of evidence but lost all
other claims, and the jury awarded $5,000.00 in damages. [45]. Plaintiff now requests $79,033.26
in attorney’s fees and $983.26 in expenses. [59-1], [60].
II.

DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard and Applicable Law
42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b) provides

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982,
1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or section 12361 of
Title 34, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs….
To be a prevailing party, the party must “‘succeed on any significant issue in litigation which

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achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit . . . .’” E.E.O.C. v. Clear Lake
Dodge, 60 F.3d 1146, 1153 n.9 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
(1983)).
“The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The product of the hours worked multiplied by the hourly rate is the
“lodestar.” Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 205 F.3d 222, 232 (5th Cir. 2000).
The Court may then adjust the lodestar based on twelve factors. See Migis v. Pearle Vision,
Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998); Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 205 F.3d at 231-34. The twelve
factors for the Court to consider are:
(1) the time and labor required for the litigation; (2) the novelty and difficulty of
the questions presented; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly;
(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the
case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and
the result obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10)
the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Migis, 135 F.3d at 1047; Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974) (abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989)). “[T]he court
should give special heed to the time and labor involved, the customary fee, the amount involved
and the result obtained, and the experience, reputation and ability of counsel.” Migis, 135 F.3d at
1047. The Supreme Court said, “‘the most critical factor’ in determining the reasonableness of a
fee award in a civil rights suit ‘is the degree of success obtained.’” Id. (quoting Farrar v. Hobby,
506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992)). “[T]he district court has discretion in determining the amount of a fee
award.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.
B. Analysis

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Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees at a rate of $250 per hour for 316.50 hours. [60] at p. 4, 6.
This hourly rate is supported by affidavits, [59-2], [59-3], [59-4], [59-5], [59-6], [59-7], and not
contested by Defendant, see [62]. The Court finds this is a reasonable hourly rate. As to the factor
“results obtained,” the Supreme Court explained,
In some cases a plaintiff may present in one lawsuit distinctly different claims for
relief that are based on different facts and legal theories. In such a suit even where
the claims are brought against the same defendants—often an institution and its
officers, as in this case—counsel’s work on one claim will be unrelated to his work
on another claim. Accordingly, work on an unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed
to have been ‘expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved.’ The
congressional intent to limit awards to prevailing parties requires that these
unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and
therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35 (quoting Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D. ¶ 9444, 5049, 1974
WL 180, *3 (C.D. Cal. 1974)). In other words,
“[w]here the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects
from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be
excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee.” However, when claims
for relief involve common facts or are based on related legal theories, much of
counsel’s time will be devoted to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to
allocate the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis.
Canaski v. MID Mississippi Properties, Inc., 2017 WL 4531690, *7 (S.D. Miss. 2017) (first
quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440 and then citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435).
Here, Plaintiff had seven counts in his initial complaint. [1-2] at p. 12-25. The first six
related to the underlying incident with the police. Id. The seventh, fabrication of evidence, was
based upon Defendant Landrum’s false statements. Id. at 23. During Plaintiff’s trial in state court,
Defendant Landrum admitted to submitting false statements. [21-5] at p. 46-47, 50. Following trial
in this Court, Plaintiff won only on the fabrication of evidence claim, and the jury awarded
$5,000.00 in damages. [45].
Based upon the Court’s understanding of the facts of this case as well as its discretion in
awarding attorney’s fees, the Court finds that a reduction in attorney fees by 75% is proper. The
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counts in the Complaint can easily be divided into counts arising from the original incident with
police and the one count arising from Defendant Landrum submitting false statements. Plaintiff
cannot be awarded fees based on his unsuccessful and unrelated claims. Moreover, a reduction by
75% is consistent with the Fifth Circuit in Migis, 135 F.3d at 1041. In that case, the Fifth Circuit
held that an attorney’s fee award of six and one-half times the amount of damages awarded was
excessive. Id. at 1048. Here, a 75% reduction will equal $19,758.32 in attorney’s fees, which is
about 4 times the amount of damages awarded.
As to the other factors, the Court finds that none of them warrant a further adjustment of
attorney’s fees. Up to this point, the Court has already considered factors one, three, five, eight,
and nine. As to the sixth factor, “‘the contingent nature of the case cannot serve as a basis for
enhancement of attorneys’ fees,’ and thus the contingent nature of [the] fee agreement here does
not affect the award.” Canaski, 2017 WL 4531690 at *7 (quoting Shipes v. Trinity Industries, 987
F.2d 311, 323 (5th Cir. 1993)) Plaintiff admits factors four and seven are inapplicable in this case.
[60] at p. 4. As to the remaining factors, the Court notes “Plaintiff has the burden of proving his
entitlement to an award for attorney’s fees just as he would bear the burden of proving a claim for
any other money judgment.” Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir.
1974). The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden as to all remaining factors.
Plaintiff also requests $983.26 in expenses for Johnson, Ratliff & Waide, PLLC. [60] at p.
7. Defendant did not contest this amount or the itemization. See [62]. The Fifth Circuit said, “[t]he
trial court ‘has wide discretion with regard to the costs in a case and may order each party to bear
his own costs.’” Migis, 135 F.3d at 1049 (quoting Hall v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 937 F.2d
210, 216 (5th Cir. 1991)). Because this Court has discretion in awarding costs and Defendant did
not contest the amount or itemization of the expenses, the Court awards $983.26 in expenses.

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III.

CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that, for the reasons stated herein,

the Motion for Attorney Fees [59] filed by Plaintiff is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN
PART. Plaintiff is awarded $19,758.32 in attorney’s fees and $983.26 in expenses for a total of
$20,741.58.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 7th day of February, 2024.

/s/ Keith Starrett
KEITH STARRETT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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