Haag v. Infrasource Corporation Services LLC et al

Filing 42

Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 16 MOTION for Judgment Confiriming the Arbitration Awards, denying 35 MOTION for Sanctions, denying 19 MOTION to Vacate Arbitration Award, denying 30 MOTION for Sanctions. Signed by District Judge Tom S. Lee on 3/5/12 (LWE)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
FRED M. HAAG

PLAINTIFF

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:07CV387TSL-MTP

INFRASOURCE CORPORATE SERVICES, LLC
F/K/A INFRASOURCE CORPORATE SERVICES, INC.
AND DAVID R. HELWIG, INDIVIDUALLY

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the court on the motion of defendants
Infrasource Corporate Services, LLC, f/k/a Infrasource Corporate
Services, Inc. and David R. Helwig for judgment affirming the
arbitration award, pursuant to § 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.

In opposition to the motion,

plaintiff Fred M. Haag filed a “combined motion to lift stay and
vacate and/or modify the arbitration award,” pursuant to 9 U.S.C.
§§ 10 and 11, which is opposed by defendants.

Finally, before the

court are the parties’ competing motions for sanctions under Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are opposed.1
Having considered the parties’ memoranda, the court concludes that
defendants’ motion for judgment affirming the arbitration award is

1

In some respects, the briefing on plaintiff’s motion for
sanctions amounted to an effort to supplement the briefing on the
substantive motions. As neither party sought leave to do so, the
court did not consider these new arguments and certainly did not
consider evidence not presented to the arbitrator in reaching its
decision on the substantive motions.

well taken and should be granted and that the remaining motions
are due to be denied.
In July 2007, plaintiff filed suit against defendants, his
former employers, asserting various causes of action related to
his April 2007 termination.

Following the court’s September 17,

2007 order granting defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, Haag
proceeded to arbitration on claims for breach of contract and for
stock options.

His principal claim was that defendants breached

his “Management Agreement” by refusing to allow him the severance
wages and benefits due upon termination under the terms of the
agreement.

Defendants, on the other hand, maintained that during

his tenure, Haag had improperly received a housing allowance and
had additionally improperly requested and received various other
expenses (including but not limited to a per diem allowance,
automobile allowance, and air fare), to which he knew or should
have known he was not entitled; that this amounted to “gross
misconduct” under his Management Agreement’s definition of
“cause”;2 and that as a result of his termination for “cause,” he
2

In a May 7, 2007 letter detailing the reasons for his
termination, InfraSource asserted that Haag
knowingly authorized reimbursement of expenses and
company-paid perks for [his] own benefit without
approval, including a $500/week per diem for [him]self,
an automobile allowance of $1,000 per month, a housing
allowance of $1,216 per month and personal airline
travel expenses in excess of $18,000. At the same time,
[Haag] [was] receiving these unauthorized payments, [he
was] submitting expense statements and being reimbursed
for business-related expenses, frequently without the
2

had no right under the terms of the agreement to the severance
benefits or stock options prescribed by the agreement.3
On August 2, 2011, the arbitrator dismissed Haag’s claims
upon finding there was “cause” for Haag’s termination.

The

arbitrator recited the facts, as follows:
Claimant entered into an employment contract with
Respondent entitled “Management Agreement” on August 30,
2004. The management agreement provided that Claimant
would be employed in the position of Senior Vice
President-Electrical, or in such other executive
capacity or capacities at the same level of seniority as
may be determined from time to time by the CEO of
Infrasource. However, Respondent decided to assign
Claimant to troubleshoot its largest customer, Exelon,
in the fall of 2004, to which Claimant never objected.
Subsequently, Claimant’s former employer filed suit
against Claimant for breaching his covenant not to
compete by joining Infrasource. As part of the
settlement of that litigation, the parties agreed that
Claimant would not serve as “Senior Vice PresidentElectrical” and would remain on the Exelon engagement
until his obligations under the covenant expired. In
approvals required per the Company’s Delegation of
authority.
...
[E]ven after being reprimanded for not abiding by these
policies, [Haag] continued to misappropriate company
funds and paid [him]self and others amounts which were
not authorized and in violation of company policies.
...
Additionally, [Haag] received a housing allowance even
though [he was] living in an apartment which was paid
for by another employee who was being reimbursed for
such expense.
3

Haag had originally sued for wrongful termination, in
addition to breach of contract, but eventually dropped that claim,
acknowledging that under Pennsylvania law, which governed the
parties’ agreement by virtue of a choice-of-law provision therein,
defendant had the right to terminate his employment for a good
reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.
3

August of 2005, Haag became President of Infrasource
Transmission Services “ITS”.
In 2006, Infrasource conducted an internal audit of
its employee reimbursements for living expenses to
insure that their policies and procedures complied with
IRS laws and regulations. On or about November 13,
2006, Respondent’s Director of Organizational
Development, Martha A. Christinziano, sent Claimant an
e-mail inquiring into his relocation expenses. Claimant
responded that he rented a house for a year at $1000 per
month and he was reimbursed for this expense. He
further stated that “As of September 2006, I pay for all
of my personal expenses and housing now.” Subsequently,
Claimant met with Respondent’s Chief Financial Officer,
Craig York, who confronted him about his investigation
into Claimants’s reimbursement for expenses and provided
him a spreadsheet which indicated that he received
reimbursement for housing expenses after 2006. In
addition, York also inquired about Claimant’s
reimbursement for plane tickets to Mississippi where he
maintained a home. Subsequently, Claimant met with his
supervisor Peter Walier, Executive Vice PresidentElectric, and Craig York regarding the improper expense
reimbursements. Claimant then later attempted to
correct the problem by tendering a check to Respondent
in the amount of $12,129.30.
On April 1, 2007, Walier met with Claimant and
offered him the choice to resign instead of being
terminated for cause for gross misconduct under the
provisions of the management agreement. Thereafter, on
April 26, 2007, Claimant provided notice to the
Respondent of his intent to terminate his management
agreement for good reason contained in the same
agreement. On May 7, 2007, Respondent’s general counsel
sent Claimant a letter indicating that he was terminated
for cause for gross misconduct that was incapable of
being cured.
In his “discussion,” after noting the Management Agreement’s
definition of “cause” as “the willful engaging by executive in
gross misconduct materially and demonstrably injurious to the
company,” the arbitrator wrote the following:
4

The facts are not in dispute that Claimant submitted
improper requests for expense reimbursements, and but
for the company-wide audit, the Respondent would have
never discovered the problem. Claimant was in a key
position of leadership in the company and should have
been held to the highest standards of conduct. If there
was any question in his mind about the propriety of his
request, he should have discussed it with Chief
Financial Officer Craig York or his immediate supervisor
Peter Walier. The fact that Claimant tendered a
reimbursement check to the company of $12,129,30
confirms that he knew or should have known that the
funds he received were improper. The letter from
Respondent’s General Counsel Lofton of May 7, 2007
indicates that the final audit disclosed that Claimant
had misappropriated in excess of $80,000. Certainly
this conduct constitutes gross misconduct that is
materially and demonstrably injurious to the company.
Subsequently, on October 4, 2011, the arbitrator issued a decision
addressing and denying Infrasource’s counterclaim for fraudulent
misrepresentation, by it which to sought to recover monies alleged
to have been wrongfully obtained by Haag.

As it pertained to the

housing allowance, the arbitrator concluded that while Haag’s
improper receipt of housing expenses amounted to cause for his
termination, InfraSource had failed to carry its burden to show
fraud by the higher clear and convincing evidence standard.

With

respect to the other alleged business expenses (e.g., airline
tickets, and per diem and car allowances), he determined that due
to the vagueness of the parties’ contract regarding reimbursement
for business expenses and to InfraSource’s failure to provide
specific guidelines as to business expenses, Infrasource could not

5

prove by clear and convincing evidence that Haag’s claim for such
expenses was fraudulent.
Defendants have moved for judgment confirming the award
pursuant to § 9 of the FAA, and plaintiff has moved to vacate the
award pursuant to FAA § 10, or alternatively for modification
pursuant to FAA § 11.

The party moving to vacate the arbitral

award bears the burden of proof.

See In re Arbitration Between

Trans Chem. Ltd. & China Nat'l Mach. Import & Export Corp., 978 F.
Supp. 266, 303 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (Lake, J.), aff'd, 161 F.3d 314
(5th Cir. 1998).

The FAA provides the means for enforcing

arbitral awards by way of a judicial decree confirming, vacating,
modifying or correcting an award.

See Hall St. Assocs., LLC. v.

Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405, 170 L. Ed. 2d
254 (2008).

Section 9 directs that a court “must” confirm an

arbitration award “unless” it is vacated, modified or corrected
See Schlobohm v. Pepperidge

“as prescribed” in §§ 10 and 11.

Farm, Inc., 806 F.2d 578, 580 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1986).
Section 10(a) of the FAA establishes the only grounds on
which a court may vacate and set aside an arbitration award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in
the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
6

material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced;
or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a).

Section 11 provides the only grounds for

modification of an award:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation
of figures or an evident material mistake in the
description of any person, thing or property referred to
in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not
submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting
the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not
affecting the merits of the controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to
effect the intent thereof and promote justice between
the parties.
9 U.S.C. § 11.
The court’s review of an arbitration award made under the FAA
is “extraordinarily narrow” and “exceedingly deferential,”
Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391,
393 (5th Cir. 2003).

The court must “defer to the arbitrator's

decision when possible.”

Am. Laser Vision, P.A. v. Laser Vision

Inst., L.L.C., 487 F.3d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

See also Anderman/Smith Operating Co.

v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 918 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir. 1990)

7

(court “will defer to the arbitrators' resolution of the dispute
whenever possible”).

And, as the Supreme Court made clear in Hall

Street Associates, supra, vacatur or modification is available
only on the limited grounds set forth in §§ 10 and 11.
at 588, 128 S. Ct. at 1405.

552 U.S.

No nonstatutory bases exist for

vacating or modifying an award, and parties may not contract to
expand judicial review beyond the bases set forth in the statutes.
Id., 128 S. Ct. at 1405 (reasoning that “[a]ny other reading opens
the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can
‘rende[r] informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more
cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process,’ and bring
arbitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process”)
(citation omitted).
In Anderman/Smith Operating Co. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline
Co., the court observed that where parties have bargained for an
arbitration process which would determine the facts and construe
disputed contract provisions, there is no injustice in holding
them to their bargain.

918 F.2d 1215, 1219 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing

Manville Forest Prod. Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int't Union,
831 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir. 1987)).

Consistent with the parties’

choice, therefore, it is for the arbitrator, not the court, to
decide the merits of the parties’ dispute; and it is for the
arbitrator, not the court to find the facts and to decide and
apply the law.

This point was highlighted by the court in
8

Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2004),
rev’d on other grounds, Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon,
562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009), when it stated:
“Courts are not authorized to review the arbitrator's
decision on the merits despite allegations that the
decision rests on factual errors or misinterprets the
parties' agreement.” Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509, 532 U.S. 1015, 121
S. Ct. 1724, 149 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2001) (citing United
Paperworkers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484
U.S. 29, 36, 108 S. Ct. 364, 98 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1987)).
“If ‘an arbitrator is even arguably construing or
applying the contract and acting within the scope of his
authority,’ the fact that ‘a court is convinced he
committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his
decision.’” Id. (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 38, 108 S.
Ct. 364). “[E]ven ‘serious error’ on the arbitrator's
part does not justify overturning his decision, where,
... he is construing a contract and acting within the
scope of his authority.” Id. at 510, 121 S.Ct. 1724
(quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 38, 108 S.Ct. 364).
“Established law ordinarily precludes a court from
resolving the merits of the parties' dispute on the
basis of its own factual determinations, no matter how
erroneous the arbitrator's decision.” Id. (citing
Misco, 484 U.S. at 40, n.10, 108 S. Ct. 364). “When an
arbitrator resolves disputes regarding the application
of a contract, and no dishonesty is alleged, the
arbitrator's ‘improvident, even silly, factfinding’ does
not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to
enforce the award.” Id. (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 39,
108 S.Ct. 364). “ ‘[C]ourts ... have no business
weighing the merits of the grievance [or] considering
whether there is equity in a particular claim.’” Id.
(quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 37, 108 S.Ct. 364).
Kergosien, 390 F.3d at 357-358.

See also Hamel–Schwulst v.

Country Place Mortg. Ltd., No. 10–60143, 2010 WL 5421299 (5th Cir.
Dec. 30, 2010) (“[C]ourts do not vacate an arbitration award based
on the merits of a party's claim.”) (citing United Paperworkers

9

Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987));
Apache Bohai Corporation LDC v. Texaco China BV, 480 F.3d 397, 401
(5th Cir. 2007) (holding that an award may not be vacated or
modified for a mere mistake of fact or law) (citing Brabham, 480
F.3d at 380).
Although an award may not be vacated or modified based on a
mere mistake of fact or law, in Valentine Sugars, Inc. v. Donau
Corp., the Fifth Circuit, citing § 11(a) as allowing for vacating
an award “[w]here there was an evident material ... mistake in the
description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the
award,”4 held that
“where the record that was before the arbitrator
demonstrates an unambiguous and undisputed mistake of
fact and the record demonstrates strong reliance on that
mistake by the arbitrator in making his award, it can
fairly be said that the arbitrator ‘exceeded [his]
powers or so imperfectly executed them’ that vacation
may be proper.”
981 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting National Post Office v.
United States Postal Serv., 751 F.2d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 1985)(in
turn quoting FAA § 10(a)(4)).

In the case at bar, Haag argues

that the arbitrator’s decision reflects that he “strongly relied”
on an “unambiguous and undisputed mistake of fact” in making his
award and thereby “exceeded [his] powers or so imperfectly
executed them” that vacation is proper according to the Fifth

4

In fact, however, § 11(a) governs modification, not
vacation, of an arbitral award.
10

Circuit’s holding in Valentine.

Specifically, he argues that the

arbitrator mistakenly found that “[t]he facts [were] not disputed
that Claimant submitted improper requests for expense
reimbursement, and but for the company-wide audit, [Infrasource]
would have never discovered the problem.”

He maintains that the

record contained no evidence that he admitted submitting improper
reimbursement requests; and he contends that since the arbitrator
strongly relied on this mistaken finding in making his award, then
in keeping with Valentine, the award must be vacated.

For their

part, defendants initially take the position that Valentine is no
longer valid in light of Hall Street, a position the court
rejects.5

But they argue alternatively that even under Valentine,

5

In response to plaintiff’s motion, defendants
principally argue that the judicially-created nonstatutory ground
for relief from an arbitral award adopted in Valentine Sugars,
Inc. v. Donau Corp. 981 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 1993), did not
survive the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street Associates,
LLC. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405, 170 L.
Ed. 2d 254 (2008). However, it is clear the Fifth Circuit did not
consider that it was creating or adopting a nonstatutory basis for
relief in Valentine but rather that it was recognizing that an
arbitrator “exceed[s] his powers or so imperfectly execute[s]
them”–which is a statutory basis for vacatur–when he strongly
relies on an unambiguous and undisputed mistake of fact in making
his decision. See Valentine, 981 F.2d at 214 (describing this as
circumstance in which “it can fairly be said that the arbitrator
‘exceeded [his] powers or so imperfectly executed them’ that
vacation may be proper”) (quoting National Post Office v. United
States Postal Serv., 751 F.2d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 1985)); see also
Bradham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 376 F.3d 377, 384 (5th Cir.
2004) (explaining that Valentine “simply restates the wellestablished essence test” which is not a nonstatutory ground for
vacatur). Moreover, the Fifth Circuit appears to view Valentine
as surviving Hall Street. See Woods v. P.A.M. Transport
11

the arbitrator’s award must be confirmed because the arbitrator’s
award is “rationally inferable” from the facts before him.
In Valentine, the court held that an “unambiguous” and
“undisputed” mistake of fact, upon which the arbitrator strongly
relied in rendering his award, may support vacating the award.
Valentine, 981 F.2d at 214.

The court “interpret[ed] the term

‘undisputed’ to mean [a court] should look to see whether there is
any rational basis for disputing the truth of the fact.”

Id.

Haag insists that nothing in the arbitration record supported the
arbitrator’s assertion that “the facts are not in dispute that
Claimant submitted improper requests for expense reimbursements.”
To the contrary, the evidence before the arbitrator conclusively
established that he was initially granted a monthly housing
allowance of $1213, which payments went directly to his and his
wife’s checking account via direct deposit without any request
being submitted by him.

He maintained throughout the arbitration

proceeding that effective July 2006, upon the completion of
company paperwork effecting a transfer of his apartment lease to a
coworker, he assumed the monthly housing payments to him had
ceased, and only after being confronted in November 2006 about his
continued receipt of a housing allowance did he learn from his

Inc.-L.U., 440 Fed. Appx. 265, 269-270, 2011 WL 3831306, 3 (5th
Cir. Aug. 23, 2011) (post-Hall Street opinion quoting Valentine
and citing arbitrator’s strong reliance on unambiguous and
undisputed mistake of fact as grounds for modification of award).
12

wife (who handled the couple’s finances) that monthly housing
allowance deposits were still being made to his account.

Haag

insists that in view of Haag’s evidence that he did not submit
requests for reimbursement of housing expenses and did not know he
was receiving housing expense payments, then the arbitrator’s
finding that the facts were not in dispute that he had submitted
improper expense requests was an “unambiguous and undisputed
mistake of fact.”
In the court’s opinion, however, the arbitrator’s finding
that the facts were not in dispute that Haag submitted improper
requests for expense reimbursements was not an unambiguous mistake
of fact.

Haag interprets the arbitrator’s challenged statement as

finding as a fact that Haag admitted he submitted improper
requests for reimbursement of housing expenses only.

However, it

is hardly clear that the arbitrator’s finding was intended to be
limited to housing expenses.

The arbitrator’s awards, considered

separately and/or collectively, are not entirely clear, and
certainly leave room for an interpretation that does not involve
any unambiguous and

undisputed mistake of fact.

See Six Flags

Over Texas, Inc. v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local
No. 116, 143 F.3d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[i]f an
arbitration award is ambiguous, we resolve all doubts in favor of
arbitration”) (citing Valentine, 981 F.2d at 213); see also
Valentine, 981 F.2d at 213 (stating that “[i]n determining whether
13

the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction, we resolve all doubts in
favor of arbitration) (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S. Ct. 927, 941, 74 L. Ed.
2d 765 (1983)).
It was undisputed that plaintiff submitted requests for
reimbursement for expenses other than housing expenses.
Defendants maintained that Haag was not entitled to reimbursement
for many of these other expenses; that he knew or should have
known that he was not entitled to receive payment for these
expenses; and that his requests therefore were improper.
Ultimately, the arbitrator appears to have found, at least
implicitly, that Haag’s requests for reimbursement for these other
expenses were improper.

For example, he referenced the final

audit cited in defendants’ termination letter, which audit, the
arbitrator observed, disclosed that Haag misappropriated in excess
of $80,000.

The arbitrator wrote, “Certainly this conduct

constitutes gross misconduct that is materially and demonstrably
injurious to the company.”

(Emphasis added).

This $80,000 figure

indisputably included significant expenses other than housing
expenses.

Although ultimately, in ruling on InfraSource’s

counterclaims, the arbitrator concluded that InfraSource had
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Haag had
defrauded the company by seeking and recovering expenses beyond
housing expenses to which he was not entitled, the arbitrator does
14

appear to have found that these expenses were not properly
recoverable, and that Haag’s submission of requests for
reimbursement were improper.

Thus, it is undisputed that Haag

submitted requests for reimbursements, which the arbitrator
appears to have found based on the undisputed facts of record to
have been improper.

So interpreted, Valentine affords Haag no

basis for relief from the arbitral award since Haag cannot show
that the arbitrator made an unambiguous and undisputed mistake of
fact.
Even if the court assumed for the same of argument that Haag
had made this showing, he still has not sustained his burden to
establish a basis for relief from the award.

In Valentine, the

court concluded that an arbitrator’s award must be affirmed if the
proponent of the award “can provide any rational explanation for
the award inconsistent with [the opponent’s] theory that the award
had to be based upon [the alleged mistake of fact].”

981 F.2d at

214 (citing Anderman/Smith Co. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 918
F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir. 1990) (award must be affirmed if it is
“rationally inferable from the agreement”).

If the court cannot

determine with certainty that the arbitrator relied on the
unambiguous and undisputed mistake of fact, the award must be
affirmed.

Id. (emphasis added).

Even in the absence of a finding that it was undisputed that
plaintiff had submitted improper requests for expense
15

reimbursement, the arbitrator’s conclusion that there was cause
for his termination is rationally inferable from the facts before
the arbitrator.

Before the arbitrator, InfraSource pointed to a

November 2006 e-mail from Haag to Martha Christinziano,
InfraSource’s Director of Organizational Development, where in a
response to her inquiry regarding his expenses, Haag represented
that, as of September 2006, he was paying all of his personal and
housing expenses.

This representation was later shown to be

untrue when an audit revealed that he was continuing to receive
payments for housing and other expenses.

Moreover, the finding

which appears to have been ultimately determinative to the award
was that Haag, a key employee held to a higher standard, “knew or
should have known that the funds he received were improper.”

This

finding was based on the record as a whole, as evidenced by the
arbitrator’s discussion of the evidence, and not merely on a
putative finding that plaintiff did not dispute that he had
submitted improper requests for reimbursement.6
For the foregoing reasons, the court cannot conclude that the
arbitrator exceeded his powers in granting InfraSource’s motion
for summary judgment.

Accordingly, as InfraSource has provided a

rational explanation for the award inconsistent with Haag’s

6

Indeed, had the arbitrator based his decision on an
admission by plaintiff that he submitted improper requests, the
remainder of his discussion of the evidence would have been
unnecessary and superfluous.
16

theory, its motion to affirm the arbitrator’s decision will be
granted and Haag’s combined motion to lift stay and vacate and/or
modify the arbitration award will be denied.7
Based on the foregoing, it is ordered that defendants’ motion
to affirm the arbitrator’s decision is granted and Haag’s combined
motion to lift stay and vacate and/or modify the arbitration award
is denied.
SO ORDERED this the 5th day of March, 2012.

/s/ Tom S. Lee___________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7

In light of the court’s conclusion that at the present
time, Valentine remains viable, defendants’ motion for sanctions
will be denied. This being said, however, the court is also not
persuaded that the defendant’s “inaccurate reading” of plaintiff’s
“combined motion to lift stay and vacate and/or modify the
arbitration award” warrants the imposition of sanctions against
InfraSource. Accordingly, the parties’ dueling motions for
sanctions are denied.
17