Bailey et al v. Monitronics International, Inc. et al
Filing
339
ORDER granting 329 Motion to Extend Deadline; granting in part and denying in part 330 Motion to Compel; granting in part and denying in part 331 Motion to Compel Signed by District Judge Henry T. Wingate on 8/6/14 (TRS)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
MEL BAILEY INDIVIDUALLY AND
ON BEHALF OF THE WRONGFUL
DEATH BENEFICIARIES OF MARIE
H. BAILEY, DECEASED, AND THE
ESTATE OF MARIE H. BAILEY,
DECEASED, BY AND THROUGH MEL
BAILEY, EXECUTOR
PLAINTIFFS
V.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-CV-158-HTW-LRA
MONITRONICS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
DEFENDANT
ORDER
Before the court are three motions filed by plaintiffs, Mel Bailey, individually and
on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Marie H. Bailey, and the Estate of Marie
Bailey (collectively referred to as “Bailey”): a motion to extend the discovery deadline
[docket no. 329]; a motion to compel responses to interrogatories [docket no. 330]; and
a motion to compel responses to requests for production of documents [docket no. 331].
Defendant, Monitronics International, Inc. (“Monitronics”) opposes the motions to
compel.
Because there is no opposition to the motion to extend the discovery deadline,
this court hereby grants that motion [docket no. 329]. Having considered the motions to
compel responses, this court hereby grants in part and denies in part the motions to
compel [docket nos. 330 and 331]. This court orders Monitronics to respond to
Interrogatory Nos. 5 and 16 and Request No. 2. This court declines to compel
responses to Interrogatory Nos. 4, 6, 7, 8, and 15 and Requests Nos. 1, 4, 6, and 7.
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I.
Procedural Background
On June 17, 2013, this court entered an order [docket no. 289] overturning the
Magistrate Judge’s order limiting discovery [docket no. 154] and reopening discovery.
Regarding discovery, this court stated:
Accordingly, this court allows plaintiffs to investigate
Monitronics involvement with the NFPA:
Monitronics’ stance on its contractual relationship with
Kingdom Security and Rexford Alarm Service as to
whether Monitronics’ had an obligation to ensure
compliance with NFPA 72.
Whether Monitronics had an obligation to ensure
compliance with NFPA 72 once it purchased Bailey’s
contract.
Whether Monitronics was personally or constructively
aware whether the placement of the smoke detector in
Bailey’s home complied with NFPA 72 standards.
Whether Monitronics had any obligation under NFPA 72
to change the location of any improperly placed smoke
detector.
Whether Monitronics owed any additional duty to Bailey
after she informed a representative of her eyesight
problems.
What requirements under NFPA 72 did Monitronics
impose on itself and its dealers?
Whether Monitronics considered NFPA 72 as a
governing standard for its contracts.
Whether Monitronics had any obligation to enforce NFPA
72 under the contract with Bailey.
The general intent of this order is to allow the plaintiffs to
explore in discovery Monitronics’ view of its obligations
under NFPA 72 and its obligations to Bailey. The questions
proposed herein are not all inclusive, and plaintiffs may ask
additional questions aimed towards discovering Monitronics’
obligations and duties under NFPA 72.
Order, docket no. 289.
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On June 21, 2013, Bailey propounded interrogatories [docket no. 292] and
requests for production of documents [docket no. 292]. On July 24, 2013, Monitronics
submitted its responses [docket nos. 299 and 300].
Monitronics objects to Interrogatories 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16. These objections
are largely based upon Monitronics’ claim that these Interrogatories are outside the
scope of the court’s June 17, 2013, are burdensome, and are not calculated to discover
admissible evidence.
Monitronics also objects to Requests 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7. These objections, like
those to the Interrogatories, are largely based upon Monitronics’ claim that that these
Requests are outside the scope of the court’s June 17, 2013, are burdensome, and are
not calculated to discover admissible evidence.
In response to Monitronics’ objections, Bailey filed the instant motions to compel
[docket no. 330 and 331], asking this court to order Monitronics to provide responses.
II.
Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatories
A. Interrogatory No. 4
Interrogatory No. 4 queried:
When did Monitronics first become aware that improper
configuration of telephone line seizure was one of the
common mistakes made during the installation of an alarm
system, and describe how Monitronics became aware of this
information?
Monitronics originally objected to this this Interrogatory, saying it was “outside the scope
of permissible discovery” under the court’s June 17, 2013 order because the discovery
request does not pertain to Monitronics’ view of its obligations under NFPA 72 and its
obligations to Marie Bailey. Further, Monitronics stated that Interrogatory No. 4 was
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overly broad, unduly burdensome, ambiguous, and not reasonably calculated to lead to
discovery of admissible evidence. Monitronics also objected to the Interrogatory’s
assertion that improper line seizure is a “common mistake.”
In the motion to compel, Bailey stated that during discovery Monitronics
produced a slide show that described improper configuration of telephone line seizures
as a “common mistake.” Bailey also noted that Monitronics has admitted that improper
configuration of telephone line seizures is a mistake that authorized dealers make.
Bailey claims it merely wishes to know when Monitronics became aware of this problem.
Bailey further says that this inquiry is within the scope of permissible discovery, because
Bailey contends NFPA 72 obligated Monitronics to properly install this line seizure.
Monitronics replies that it has already answered this question: Monitronics does
not believe that improper line seizure is a “common mistake.” During his Rule 30(b)(6)1
deposition on behalf of Monitronics, Robert Sherman (“Sherman”) testified that he
wasn’t aware that Monitronics had determined that the lack of telephone line seizure
was a “common mistake.” When presented with a copy of the slide show, Sherman
said that he did not know the context in which the slide show was presented. Sherman
suggested that the slide show might have been dealer specific. Further, Monitronics
1
Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Notice or Subpoena Directed to an Organization. In its notice or subpoena, a party
may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association,
a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity
the matters for examination. The named organization must then designate one or more
officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to
testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on which each person designated will
testify. A subpoena must advise a nonparty organization of its duty to make this
designation. The persons designated must testify about information known or reasonably
available to the organization. This paragraph (6) does not preclude a deposition by any
other procedure allowed by these rules.
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argues that it would be unnecessarily burdensome to determine the first time that it
became aware that any dealer was improperly configuring a telephone line seizure.
This court agrees with Monitronics that this Interrogatory is not within the scope
of this courts’ ordered discovery. The Interrogatory deals with Monitronics awareness of
a problem, not with Monitronic’s view that it had an obligation, under its contracts or
NFPA, to address that problem. Therefore, this court declines to compel a response.
B. Interrogatory No. 5
Interrogatory No. 5 asked:
Identify the names, last known addresses, and telephone
numbers of those employees of Monitronics who conducted
random quality inspections of accounts purchased by
Monitronics from the time the inspection program began up
to the present.
Monitronics originally objected to this interrogatory on the grounds that it was outside
the scope of permissible discovery under the court’s order because the Interrogatory did
not pertain to Monitronics’ view of its obligations under NFPA 72 and its obligations to
Bailey. Monitronics further contended that the Interrogatory was not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
In the motion to compel, Bailey argues that it requested this information in order
to question the inspectors regarding the standards that they utilized in the field.
Specifically, Bailey wishes to ask how the inspectors determined the correct placement
of smoke detectors. Bailey says he wants to determine what steps Monitronics took to
insure compliance with local codes and standards, and with what codes and standards
Monitronics required its dealers to comply. Bailey admits that he is aware of two
inspectors: Jess Fleming (“Fleming”) and Don Postel (“Postel”). Postel, however, did
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not begin working as an inspector for Monitronics until after the accident. Therefore,
Postel, would not know anything about the inspection process during the time of Marie
Bailey’s service. Bailey’s Interrogatory attempts to discover other inspectors who might
have knowledge of the standards by which Monitronics judged its dealers.
In response, Monitronics argues that Bailey had knowledge of Fleming and
Postel before the close of the original discovery period, yet Bailey failed to depose
them. Because of this failure, Monitronics argues that Bailey should not be allowed to
follow up on this line of questioning.
The point of this court’s June 17, 2013, order was to permit additional discovery
on the question of how Monitronics viewed its obligations to Bailey, either under
contract or under NFPA 72. This court views Interrogatory No. 5 as reasonably
calculated to lead to evidence on this point. Bailey wishes to question those individuals
who were actually in the field and discover what standards Monitronics applied in
determining if systems were installed in a “workmanlike manner.” Such discovery may
lead to admissible evidence regarding Monitronics obligations under NFPA 72 or the
contract. Therefore, this court compels Monitronics to respond.
C. Interrogatory No. 6 and Interrogatory No. 7
Interrogatory No. 6 inquires:
How many accounts were monitored by Monitronics in the
State of Mississippi during the following time periods, and of
those accounts, how many were subject to quality
inspections:
(a) January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997;
(b) January 1, 1998 to December 31, 1998;
(c) January 1, 1999 to December 31, 1999;
(d) January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000;
(e) January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2001;
(f) January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002;
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(g) January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003;
(h) January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004;
(i) January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005;
(j) January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006;
(k) January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2007;
(l) January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008?
Interrogatory No. 7 asks:
On average, how many accounts were monitored by
Monitronics nationwide during the following time periods and
of those accounts, how many were subject to quality
inspections during those time periods?
(a) January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997;
(b) January 1, 1998 to December 31, 1998;
(c) January 1, 1999 to December 31, 1999;
(d) January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000;
(e) January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2001;
(f) January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002;
(g) January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003;
(h) January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004;
(i) January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005;
(j) January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006;
(k) January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2007;
(l) January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008?
Monitronics originally objected to both interrogatories on the grounds that they
were outside the scope of the court’s June 17, 2013 order because they did not pertain
to Monitronics’ view of its obligations under NFPA 72 and its obligations to Marie Bailey.
Further, Monitronics argued that the interrogatories were overly broad, unduly
burdensome, vague, ambiguous, and not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible
discovery. Monitronics said that, in order to respond to the requests, it would have to
review each account that it monitored in the entire nation during an eleven-year time
frame.
In his motion to compel, Bailey argues that this interrogatory addresses
Monitronicss obligation under the Alarm Monitoring Purchase Agreement (“AMPA”) and
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the Maintenance Service Agreement (“MSA”) to conduct inspections on the work
performed by authorized dealers. According to Bailey, the AMPA imposed a duty for
the seller to arrange for on-site inspections. Also according to Bailey, the MSA said that
Monitronics would “evaluate all such Work to determine that the Work done by the
Subcontractor meets workmanlike standards and whether the work is in conformity with
the instructions given by Monitronics and in accordance with the terms and conditions of
the agreement.” Bailey contends that this Interrogatory is targeted towards discovering
the frequency with which Monitronics complied with its own requirements.
In response, Monitronics argues that these two Interrogatories are not within the
scope of the court’s ordered discovery. Monitronics notes that this discovery is intended
to discover the frequency with which Monitronics complied, not with Monitronics views
on its obligations under NFPA 72 or its obligations to Marie Bailey. This court agrees
with Monitronics. This court re-opened discovery to address Monitronics’ views of its
obligations under NFPA and its contracts. It has already been established that
Monitronics never inspected the alarm system in Marie Bailey’s residence. Monitronics
also has admitted that it did not inspect every residence. Discovering the frequency
with which Monitronics inspected the systems does not address how Monitronics
viewed its obligations to Bailey or its other customers. Therefore, this court declines to
compel a response to these interrogatories.
D. Interrogatory No. 8
Interrogatory No. 8 queries:
Of those accounts that were subject to a quality inspection
by Monitronics, how many accounts had issues involving no
telephone line seizure, or the improper configuration of
telephone line seizure.
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Monitronics originally objected to this request because Monitronics believed that the
request was outside the scope of permissible discovery under the court’s July 13, 2013
order. Monitronics also considered the Interrogatory overly broad, unduly burdensome,
vague, ambiguous, and not reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible
evidence. Monitronics further stated that in order to comply with the Interrogatory, it
would have to review each inspection that occurred over an eleven-year period.
In his motion to compel, Bailey contends that the reports could easily be scanned
using special technology that could search the documents for specific data. Bailey also
contends that if Monitronics does not want to expend the time and money to review
these documents, Monitronics could simply turn the documents over to Bailey, who
would take on the job of reviewing them.
Monitronics rejects Bailey’s offer to review the documents himself because
Monitronics claims the inspection reports contain sensitive information that would need
to be redacted prior to turning them over. Further, Monitronics says that discovery
related to the number of times inspectors discovered improper configuration of
telephone lien seizure does not related to Monitronics views of its obligations under
NFPA 72 or its obligations to Marie Bailey.
This court agrees with Monitronics. Through this Interrogatory, Bailey is
attempting to quantify an installation problem. The Interrogatory is not calculated to
discover evidence regarding Monitronics views on its obligations, merely how often it
encounters a problem. Therefore, this court declines to compel a response.
E. Interrogatory No. 15
Interrogatory No. 15 requests:
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From January 1, 2003, until March 1, 2008, did Monitronics
monitor any accounts in the State of Mississippi that had a
monitored fire alarm system which did not have an
automated and supervised monthly test signal programmed
into the respective control panel’s digital alarm
communicator transmitter (DACT). If the answer is yes, how
many such accounts were monitored by Monitronics in the
State of Mississippi during this time period?
Monitronics initially objected to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it was outside the
scope of permissible discovery. Monitronics also contended that the request was overly
broad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of
admissible evidence.
Bailey argues that NFPA 72 requires every DACT to transmit a monthly test
signal. Bailey claims that beginning in 1993, NFPA 72 required that every DACT in a
one or two family residence “transmit a test signal to its associated receiver at least
monthly.” Failure to receive this signal, according to NFPA 72, should be treated as
“trouble signal.” Upon receiving the trouble signal, the central station is supposed to
immediately contact the subscriber. Bailey contends that this information is within the
scope of discovery because it addresses whether Monitronics had an obligation under
NFPA 72 to ensure compliance or had imposed a requirement on itself to ensure
compliance.
In response, Monitronics contends that this issue has already been addressed in
its Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, in which it admitted that the DACT in Bailey’s residence
was not programed to transmit the automated monthly test signal. Further, Monitronics
provided an extensive response explaining why it does not believe it is obligated to
provide the DACT service under various NFPA regulations. Monitronics also provided
an affidavit outlining the projected cost of complying with this Interrogatory. Monitronics
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contends that the cost of recovering data from old software, reviewing all of the data,
and redacting the data would cost approximately $80,000.00.
This court agrees that this Interrogatory is outside the scope of permitted
discovery. Although a borderline issue, Bailey is attempting to discover if Monitronics
was complying with a particular provision, not whether Monitronics believed it was
bound by that provision. Although discovery is intended to be broad, the Rule
26(b)(2)(C)2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to limit the extent of
discovery “if the burden or expense” of the discovery would outweigh its potential
benefit. Monitronics has averred that producing these documents will cost
approximately $80,000.00. Monitronics has admitted that the DACT was not programed
to transmit a monthly test signal, and provided a lengthy explanation of its view of its
obligation to provide this service. This court is not persuaded that the benefit knowing
the exact number of systems with a programmed DACT will outweigh Monitronic’s
projected costs. Therefore, this court declines to compel this Interrogatory.
F. Interrogatory No. 16
Interrogatory No. 16 asked Monitronics to:
2
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
When Required. On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of
discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be
obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information
by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,
considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources,
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues.
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Identify any “reliable authority that any of your expert
witnesses intend to refer to at trial in support of their
testimony.
Monitronics initially objected to this Interrogatory because Monitronics said the request
fell outside the scope of permissible discovery. Monitronics also objected because
Bailey’s experts have not fully disclosed their opinions.
Bailey, in his motion to compel, admitted that the wording of this Interrogatory
was broad. Bailey explained that to the extent that Monitronics’ experts intend to offer
opinions about Monitronics’ obligations under NFPA 72 and its obligations to Bailey,
Monitronics should be compelled to provide the authority on which the experts rely.
In response, Monitronics opposes this Interrogatory because it does not relate to
Monitronics’ view on its obligations under NFPA 72 or its obligations to Marie Bailey.
Monitronics, however, directs Bailey to review the authorities it already has cited in its
designation of experts.
When a party designates an expert witness, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
obligate the party to provide a written report that contains a statement of the expert’s
opinions; the facts or data the expert considered; any exhibits that will be used to
summarize or support those opinions; the expert’s qualifications; a list of cases in which
the expert has testified in the past four years, and a statement of what compensation
the expert will receive.3 To the extent that either Bailey or Monitronics desires an expert
3
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Witnesses Who Must Provide a Written Report. Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered
by the court, this disclosure must be accompanied by a written report--prepared and
signed by the witness--if the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide
expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as the party's employee regularly
involve giving expert testimony. The report must contain:
(i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and
reasons for them;
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witness to testify on Monitronics’ obligations under NFPA 72 or Monitronics’ obligations
to Marie Bailey, Monitronics an Bailey must disclose the authority on which the expert
witness relies. To the extent that this additional discovery has caused either
Monitronics’ or Bailey’s witnesses to rely on additional authority for their opinions, both
parties must disclose that authority.
III.
Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Documents
A. Request No. 1
Request No. 1 asked:
Produce a copy of the contract for the sale and installation of
an alarm system between Marie Bailey and Kingdom
Security International, or any other written agreement
between Marie Bailey and Kingdom Security International
bedsides the Alarm Monitoring Agreement attached as
Exhibit “A.”
Monitronics initially objected to this Request on the grounds that it was outside of the
scope of permissible discovery allowed in the court’s order. Monitronics, however,
admitted that it had no documents responsive to the Request.
In his motion to compel, Bailey contends that this Request No. 1 addresses
Monitronics’ view of its obligations to Bailey. The existence of other contracts or
agreements would shed more light on the duties Monitronics owed to Marie Bailey.
Bailey notes that in the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, Sherman testified that it was likely that
(ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them;
(iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them;
(iv) the witness's qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the
previous 10 years;
(v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified
as an expert at trial or by deposition; and
(vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the
case
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Monitronics had received a sales and installation agreement from Kingdom Security
when Kingdom Security sold the contract to Monitronics. Although Monitronics says it
does not have Marie Bailey’s sales and installation agreement, Bailey contends that
Monitronics, which bought other contracts from Kingdom Security the same day it
bought Bailey’s contract, may have a similar agreement in another client’s file. Bailey
asks the court to compel Monitronics to deliver any sales and installation agreement
pertaining to any client’s contract purchased from Kingdom Security.
Monitronics, however, says it has already answered this question before: it does
not have any additional contracts between Marie Bailey and Kingdom Security.
Although Monitronics does not believe it should be compelled to deliver a sales and
installation agreement from another client, Monitronics says that it investigated the other
Kingdom Security files and found no contracts that differed from the ones already
produced.
This court declines to compel discovery. Monitronics has answered that it has no
documents responsive to Request No. 1. This court cannot compel Monitronics to
produce documents that it does not have.
B. Request No. 2
Request No. 2 asks:
From March 1, 1997, until March 1, 2008, produce a copy of
any form or template that was utilized by employees of
Monitronics who conducted quality inspections of accounts
purchased by Monitronics.
Monitronics originally objected to this Request on the grounds that it was outside the
scope of permissible discovery. Monitronics also contended that Bailey already asked
Monitronics’ witnesses about this topic during the depositions.
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In his motion to compel, Bailey argues that Request No. 2 attempts to explore the
criteria used to judge the quality of installations and whether the installation complies
with Monitronics’ requirements. Simply put, Bailey says he wants to find out if
Monitronics obligated its dealers, through inspections, to comply with NFPA 72
standards.
Monitronics contends that it has already answered these questions through its
Rule 30(b)(6) depositions. Monitronics says that its witnesses already have testified
that dealers were expected to comply with local codes. Further, Monitronics denies that
it had a contractual or legal obligation to inspect the residences.
Again, the purpose of re-opening discovery was to allow Bailey to explore how
Monitronics viewed is obligations under NFPA 72 and under its contracts. Request No.
2 seeks to discover what obligations Monitronics imposed in the field. Although
Monitronics does not believe that it had an obligation to inspect every residence that
contained its alarm systems, the question of what standards it imposed when it did
inspect is salient to what Monitronics viewed its obligations to be. Therefore, this court
compels a response to Request No. 2.
C. Request No. 4
Request No. 4 asked:
Produce a copy of any reports or documents providing
feedback or criticism of any quality inspection performed by
Monitronics from March 1, 1997, until March 1, 2008.
Monitronics originally objected to this Request on the grounds that it was outside the
scope of permissible discovery allowed by the court’s order. Monitronics noted that
Bailey had deposed witnesses regarding this issue. Further, Monitronics contended
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that this request for production is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and seeks
confidential information.
Bailey contends that this Request addresses whether Monitronics had any
obligation under NFPA 72 to change the location of an improperly placed smoke
detector. Bailey seeks the actual reports in order to discover what inspectors actually
did if they discovered a code violation when inspecting homes.
In response, Monitronics complains that this Request is not designed to inquire
into what obligations Monitronics owed to Marie Bailey. Further, Monitronics submitted
an affidavit that projected the costs of reviewing and redacting these inspection
documents be around $14,456.00.
This court disagrees with Monitronics’ contention that this Request is outside the
scope of court ordered discovery. Request No. 4 addresses what rules and regulations
Monitronics imposed upon itself in the field. Monitronics, however, has demonstrated
that producing these documents would be costly. This court has already said that
Bailey can discover the identities of the inspectors (ostensibly so that Bailey may
depose those inspectors), Bailey may ask these questions of the inspectors. Therefore,
this court declines to compel this Request. Bailey, however, may seek these answers
through its depositions of the actual inspectors.
D. Request No. 6
Request No. 6 asks:
Produce a copy of the log from the Digital Alarm
Communicator Receiver listing the telephone numbers that
dialed the DACR on February 12, 2008. If there is more
than one DACR, then this request is directed at the DACR
that Marie Bailey’s DACT was programmed to dial.
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Monitronics originally objected to this Request because, Monitronics claimed, it is
outside the scope of permissible discovery. Monitronics also contended that Request
No. 6 is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not calculated to lead to admissible
evidence.
In his motion to compel, Bailey argues that Request No. 6 addresses
Monitronics’ obligation under NFPA 72 to configure the alarm system in such a way as
to contact the monitoring company. Bailey says he is attempting to explore how
Monitronics met its obligations to Marie Bailey.
In response, Monitronics contends that this Request is outside the scope of the
court ordered discovery because it does not address Monitronics’ views of its
obligations. Although Monitronics admits that it has the log that Bailey seeks,
Monitronics says that the log contains 180,680 lines of data, all of which must be
redacted to protect its other clients’ personal information. Monitronics states that there
is no need to compel this log. Both parties have already agreed that Monitronics
received no signal from Marie Bailey’s alarm system on February 12, 2008. Compelling
this log would provide no additional information beyond confirming a fact that both
parties have already agreed to.
This court declines to compel this Request. Parties have already agreed that
Monitronics did not receive a signal from Marie Bailey’s alarm system on the date in
question. Furthermore, establishing that Monitronics did not receive a signal from Marie
Bailey’s alarm does not shed light on Monitronics’ views on its obligations under NFPA
72 or the contracts.
E. Request No. 7
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Request No. 7 asks:
For the six months leading up to February 12, 2008, produce
all telephone bills/statements associated with the telephone
numbers that the digital alarm communicator transmitter
(DACT) was programmed to dial from Marie Bailey’s alarm
system to Monitronics’ central station.
Monitronics initially objected to this request on the grounds that it was outside the scope
of permissible discovery because it did not pertain to Monitronics’ view of its obligations
under NFPA 72 or its obligations to Marie Bailey. Further, Monitronics argued that the
request was overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
As with Request No. 6, Bailey contends that Request No. 7 is calculated to
discover admissible evidence on Monitronics’ obligation under NFPA 72 to configure the
alarm system in such a way as to contact the monitoring company. Bailey also
contends that Monitronics’ expert relied on this information in forming his opinion.
Monitronics denies that its expert reviewed telephone bills/statements in reaching
his opinion. Further, Monitronics argues that the telephone bills/statements do not
address Monitronics views of its obligations under NFPA 72 or its obligations to Marie
Bailey. As with Request No. 6, Monitronics notes that both sides have already agreed
that Monitronics did not receive a signal from Marie Bailey’s system on the day of the
fire. Telephone bills/statements are not likely to reveal alternative information.
This court agrees with Monitronics. Whether the DACT was sending signals is
not pertinent to Monitronic’s view of its obligations and duties. Bailey seeks information
on whether Monitronics did or did not do a particular act, not whether Monitronics had
an obligation or duty to do that act. Therefore, this court declines to compel an answer.
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IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this court compels Monitronics to respond to
Interrogatory Nos. 5 and 16 and Request No. 2. The remaining Interrogatories and
Requests either fall outside the scope of the court’s ordered discovery, or it presents too
costly a burden upon Monitronics.
SO ORDERED this 6th day of August, 2014.
s/ HENRY T. WINGATE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-158-HTW-LRA
Order
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