Smith v. Brookhaven School District et al
Filing
20
ORDER granting 14 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Carlton W. Reeves on 06/14/2011 (WB)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
ROY SMITH AND ROY SMITH AS NEXT
FRIEND OF S.S., A MINOR
PLAINTIFFS
V.
CAUSE NO. 3:10-CV-00184-CWR-LRA
BROOKHAVEN SCHOOL DISTRICT, LEA
BARRETT, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT
OF BROOKHAVEN SCHOOL DISTRICT,
ROD HENDERSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRINCIPAL OF
ALEXANDER JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL, STAN
PATRICK, DAN BROWN, CARL AYCOCK,
KAREN BRADEN, AND WILLIE HARRISON,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE
BROOKHAVEN SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD
OF TRUSTEES
DEFENDANTS
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The above-styled matter is before the Court on a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
[Docket No. 14]. The Court has considered the questions presented in that motion and the
parties’ briefs relevant thereto and has concluded that the motion should be granted.
Each defendant advancing this motion is a government entity or employee: the
Brookhaven School District, Lea Barrett in her official capacity as superintendent of the
Brookhaven School District, Rob Henderson in his official capacity as principal of Alexander
Junior High School, and Stan Patrick, Dan Brown, Carl Aycock, Karen Braden, and Willie
Harrison in their official capacities as members of the Brookhaven School District Board of
Trustees.
According to plaintiff Roy Smith’s Complaint [Docket No. 2], the defendants “raided”
1
his restaurant, Smitty’s Place, on August 30, 2007, thereby causing various non-physical
injuries. Complaint at 4. More than a year later, on September 29, 2008, “in an effort to further
intimidate” Smith, the defendants “slapped the plaintiff’s minor child while on school property.”
Complaint at 4.
In time, Smith generated no fewer than three letters regarding the incidents. On
September 25, 2007, Smith authored a two-page letter describing the first episode to Lea Barrett,
the Brookhaven School District’s superintendent, and mailed that letter via United States Postal
Service mail. Exhibit A to Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Docket No. 141]. The letter contained a brief description of the “raid” on August 30, 2007, and demanded,
among other things, “all monetary compensation for loses [sic] and damages (real and punitive).”
At some point no earlier than May 7, 2008, Smith sent a one-page letter to Brian Brown
of AIG Insurance in New York. This letter’s description of the August 2007 incident is briefer
and less detailed than was his account to Barrett, but its substance recounts the same facts and
demands compensation totaling $85,000. Exhibit B to Def. Mot. [Docket No. 14-2].
Finally, almost one year after the second incident, Smith mailed to the defendants an
eight-page document styled “Notice of Claim” on September 28, 2009. Exhibit C to Def. Mot.
[Docket No. 14-3]. This final letter discussed the two incidents and outlined various legal claims
stemming therefrom and available to Smith.
Eventually, Smith brought a 28-claim lawsuit against the defendants on March 30, 2010,
asserting various constitutional violations and state-law claims. On April 15, 2011, the
defendants moved [Docket No. 14] for partial summary judgment. Specifically, the defendants
attack only the state-law claims that arose out of the August 2007 incident. See Def. Mot. at 2
2
(“seek[ing] a dismissal of Smith’s claims arising out of the [August 2007] event due to [Smith’s]
failure to comply with the notice and filing requirements of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11.”). See
also Defendants’ Rebuttal in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Docket No. 19]
(“Defendants seek the dismissal of all state law claims related to the August 30, 2007 alleged
‘raid.’”). Without elaboration, Smith denies [Docket No. 17] the movants’ contentions.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although motions for summary judgment are filed frequently, not every case is suitable
for such disposition. Summary judgment is appropriate only if “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When confronted with these motions, this
Court focuses on “genuine” issues of “material” facts. An issue is genuine “if the evidence
supporting its resolution in favor of the party opposing summary judgement, together with an
inference in such party’s favor that the evidence allows would be sufficient to support a verdict
in favor of the party.” Zisman v. Mason, 2008 WL 879726, *3 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (citing Amant v.
Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987). A fact is material if it is one which might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be considered. Id. Likewise,
unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence. Forsyth v. Barr, 19
F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994).
The jury has the responsibility to assess the probative value of the evidence. As a
consequence, a court must step back and refrain from making credibility determinations, and it
3
must not weigh evidence or draw from the facts legitimate inferences for the movant. Strong v.
Dept. of Army, 414 F. Supp. 2d 625, 628 (S.D. Miss. 2005). This Court is ever mindful that
although a useful device, summary judgment “must be employed cautiously because it is a final
adjudication on the merits.” Jackson v. Cain, 865 F.2d 1235, 1241 (5th Cir. 1989); Hulsey v.
State of Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1991).
The issues relevant to the matter at hand, however, are well suited for summary
disposition. See, e.g., Avatar Exploration, Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 933 F.2d 314, 320 (5th
Cir. 1991) (granting summary judgment in case involving a dispute of lease agreement); FDIC v.
Int’l Prop. Mgt., Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1039 (5th Cir. 1991) (employing summary judgment in
determining whether, under Texas law, assignment of rent clause in deed gave mortgagee an
immediate right to rents upon the mortgagor’s default); Nabers v. Morgan, 2011 WL 359069, *3
(S.D. Miss. Feb. 2, 2011) (where relevant issues present no factual dispute but only how law
should be applied, summary judgment is appropriately utilized). With regard to the purported
notice-of-claim letters, there is no dispute of fact. Simply put, the question is whether the facts,
as both parties view them, amount to a satisfaction of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act’s notice
requirement.
ANALYSIS
Section 11-46-11 of the Mississippi Code contains the requirements for notice-of-claim
letters. Under that statute,
any person having a claim for injury . . . against a governmental entity or its
employee shall proceed as he might in any action at law or in equity; provided,
however, that ninety (90) days prior to maintaining an action thereon, such person
shall file a notice of claim with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity.
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1).
4
The notice-of-claim statute goes on to delineate the substantive requirements of such a
letter and requires that “[e]very notice of claim required by subsection (1) of this section . . .
shall be delivered in person or by registered or certified United States mail.” Miss. Code Ann. §
11-46-11(2). The statute specifically requires that the notice-of-claim letter be filed “with the
chief executive officer of the governmental entity.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1). Moreover,
such service must take place within one year of the allegedly tortious behavior. Miss. Code Ann.
§ 11-46-11(3).
None of the three letters generated by Smith meets all three requirements. Exhibit 2 to the
Affidavit of Lea Barrett [Docket No. 14-1] shows that Smith’s September 2007 letter was sent
by United States Postal Service mail with first-class postage – in other words, that it was not
delivered in person or by registered or certified United States mail. See also Affidavit of Lea
Barrett at 2 (“In late September [2007], I received, via U.S. mail, a copy of a letter from Mr. Roy
Smith, dated September 25, 2007. . . . I did not receive [the letter] . . . by certified mail or any
other means. Rather, the only copy I ever received . . . w[as] by U.S. Mail.”). The May 2008
letter, attached as Exhibit B [Docket No. 14-2] to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
was not sent to a governmental entity’s chief executive officer at all but, rather, to an employee
of AIG Insurance in New York. And the September 2009 letter [Docket No. 14-3], although
apparently delivered by hand to the relevant officers, was not delivered within one year of the
“raid” on his restaurant in August 2007.
Therefore, Smith never complied with the MTCA’s notice-of-claim requirements in his
pursuit of relief for the August 2007 incident, and the movants are entitled to summary judgment
on the state-law claims stemming therefrom.
5
Of course, the sovereign immunity of states cannot be interposed to excuse violations of
the United States Constitution. Black v. North Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 593 (5th Cir.
2006). More specific to the dispute at hand, the Fifth Circuit has concluded definitively that “the
MTCA notice requirement does not apply to § 1983 claims.” Id. at 595. Therefore, Smith’s
failure to adhere to the MTCA’s notice provision affects only his state-law claims and does not
preclude litigation regarding any claims brought under Title 42, Section 1983 of the United
States Code.
Apparently, the movants understand this principle, as they do not seek summary
judgment on Smith’s claims under federal law; rather, they ask only that “Smith’s state law
claim [sic] pertaining to the 2007 incident . . . be dismissed with prejudice.” Defendant’s
Memorandum [Docket No. 15] at 7.
Therefore, summary judgment is granted to the movants on all state-law claims stemming
from the August 2007 incident. But because the motion at hand addresses no other aspect of
Smith’s case, the Court does not address the question of whether summary judgment is
appropriate beyond that scope. Any federal-law claims taking root in that episode, as well as all
claims related to the September 2008 incident, remain unchallenged by the motion and wholly
unaffected by this Order.
SO ORDERED this Fourteenth day of June 2011.
/s/ Carlton W. Reeves
Hon. Carlton W. Reeves
United States District Court Judge
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?