Hinson et al v. Rankin County, Mississippi et al
Filing
44
Memorandum Opinion and Order granting re 38 MOTION for Summary Judgment. A separate judgment will be entered. Signed by District Judge Tom S. Lee on 5/11/12 (LWE)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
MICHAEL W. HINSON AND
CAROL C. HINSON
VS.
PLAINTIFFS
CIVIL ACTION NO.
RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI
3:10CV456TSL-MTP
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the court on the motion of defendant
Rankin County, Mississippi for summary judgment pursuant to Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs Michael W.
Hinson and Carol C. Hinson have responded to the motion and the
court, having considered the memoranda of authorities, together
with attachments, submitted by the parties, concludes that the
motion is well taken and should be granted.
On January 5, 2009, Richard Weaver, a neighbor of plaintiffs,
filed a criminal affidavit against Michael Hinson, claiming that
the previous day, he had discharged weapons in the direction of
Weaver’s property.
Based on the affidavits, a warrant was issued
for Michael Hinson’s arrest on misdemeanor charges of disturbing
the peace and simple assault.
The same day, Rankin County
Constable Barry Bean, accompanied by deputies with the Rankin
County Sheriff’s Department, went to plaintiffs’ residence to
arrest Michael Hinson pursuant to the warrant.
Plaintiffs allege,
and have testified that after Michael Hinson voluntarily exited
the residence and was handcuffed by Constable Bean, the sheriff’s
deputies entered the residence and began searching the residence,
ostensibly for weapons.
The officers seized two 9mm pistols, two
.12 gauge shotguns, a .22 caliber long rifle, a .410 shotgun and a
three foot long sword, all of which were returned to Carol Hinson
a week later, on January 12, 2009.
At Michael Hinson’s initial
appearance on January 6, 2009, bond was set at $50,000 on the
simple assault charge and $1,000 for the disturbing the peace
charge.
According to the complaint, he remained in jail for
eighteen days, until Carol Hinson sold the couple’s real property
in order to have money for the bond.
Plaintiffs filed the present action on August 17, 2010,
alleging state and federal law claims relating to Michael Hinson’s
arrest and detention, and to the search of the residence and
resulting seizure of the guns.
Plaintiffs initially named as
defendants Constable Bean, in his official and individual
capacities; Rankin County Justice Court; Rankin County Sheriff’s
Department; Rankin County Sheriff Ronnie Pennington, in his
individual and official capacities; and Rankin County.
The court
dismissed the Rankin County Justice Court and Rankin County
Sheriff’s Department by opinion entered May 19, 2011, and
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their individual capacity claims
against Constable Bean and Sheriff Pennington on July 7, 2011,
leaving the official capacity claims against Sheriff Pennington
2
and Constable Bean, and against Rankin County1 relating to the
search of the residence and seizure of guns and to Michael
Hinson’s detention.
Rankin County has moved for summary judgment
on various grounds.
The court concludes the motion is well taken
on the following bases.
The County contends it is entitled to summary judgment on
plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violation of
their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure because plaintiffs cannot prove that a policy, custom
or practice of Rankin County that was adopted or maintained with
objective deliberate indifference, proximately caused any
deprivation of their constitutional rights.2
In support of its
motion, the County argues, first, that plaintiffs cannot establish
any deprivation of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from
illegal search and seizure, since a warrantless search of the
residence was not unreasonable under the circumstances; and
1
The official capacity claims against Constable Bean and
Sheriff Pennington are the functional equivalent of claims against
Rankin County. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105
S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985).
2
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
3
second, that even if plaintiffs could establish a Fourth Amendment
violation, they cannot hold the County liable as they cannot
establish that such violation was the result of official County
policy.
The court will assume for purposes of the motion that the
deputies violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights when they
undertook a warrantless search inside the residence after Michael
Hinson had already been arrested outside the residence.3
3
However,
Although "‘searches and seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable,'" Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650, this
presumption may be overcome when “‘the exigencies of the
situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that
[a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment," Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394, 98 S. Ct. 2408,
57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978). Here, Rankin County suggests a number of
bases on which the deputies’ actions might have been justified,
including as a search incident to arrest, see United States v.
Jackson, 596 F.3d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that “an
arrest warrant ... carries with it the limited authority to enter
a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to
believe the suspect is within” and further that "[a]ny arrest may
be accompanied by a search ‘incident to the arrest' of the
immediate vicinity, limited to areas in which weapons might be
found, regardless of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.")
(internal quotations and citations omitted); based on a protective
sweep rationale, see United States v. Watson, 273 F.3d 599, 603
(5th Cir. 2001) (as an incident to arrest, protective sweep may be
made of suspect’s house to “look in closets and other spaces
immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack
could be immediately launched,” and may be made “even if the
arrest is made near the door but outside the lodging” if the
arresting officers “have reasonable grounds to believe that there
are other persons present inside who might present a security
risk”) (citations omitted); on the basis of probable cause to
believe that evidence of his crime might be found in the
residence, see United States v. Rojas, 671 F.2d 159, 165 (5th Cir.
1982)(“[P]robable cause to search exists when facts warrant a
reasonable person to believe that the objects sought in connection
with a crime will be found.”) (citation omitted); and pursuant to
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to recover against the County, plaintiff must prove such violation
occurred pursuant to official county policy.
A municipality or other local government may be liable
under [Section 1983] if the governmental body itself
“subjects” a person to a deprivation of rights or
“causes” a person “to be subjected” to such deprivation.
See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 692, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978).
But, under § 1983, local governments are responsible
only for “their own illegal acts.” Pembaur v.
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L.
Ed. 2d 452 (1986) (citing Monell, 436 U.S., at 665–683,
98 S. Ct. 2018). They are not vicariously liable under
§ 1983 for their employees' actions. See id., at 691,
98 S. Ct. 2018.
Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local
governments under § 1983 must prove that “action
pursuant to official municipal policy” caused their
injury. Monell, 436 U.S., at 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018; see
id., at 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018. Official municipal policy
includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the
acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so
persistent and widespread as to practically have the
force of law. See ibid.; Pembaur, supra, at 480–481,
106 S. Ct. 1292; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 167–168, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).
These are “action[s] for which the municipality is
actually responsible.” Pembaur, supra, at 479–480, 106
S. Ct. 1292.
Connick v. Thompson, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359-1360,
179 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2011) (additional citations omitted).
Thus, in
a community caretaker rationale, see Gilmer v. Trowbridge, Civ.
No. 3:08CV136TSL-JCS, 2009 WL 649692 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 10,
2009)(“[A] compelling governmental interest supports warrantless
entries where ... strict adherence to the warrant requirement
would subject the community to a continuing and noxious
disturbance ... for an extended period of time without serving any
apparent purpose.”) (citation omitted). The court need not
determine whether the search was lawful under any of these
proposed justifications in order to resolve the present motion.
5
order to hold the County liable, plaintiffs must establish their
constitutional rights were violated as a result of the County’s
official policy.
Rankin County contends that plaintiffs have not identified an
official policy which authorized the alleged constitutional
violation, and that they further have not alleged or sought to
prove a history of constitutional violations so persistent and
widespread that official policy may be inferred.
The County
observes that the only record evidence relating to the policies
and practices of the County are the written policies of the Rankin
County Sheriff’s Department that set forth standards of conduct
for all deputies; and the County submits that Policy No. 3.5
expressly prohibits unreasonable searches in violation of the
Fourth Amendment by specifying the limited (and only) situations
in which a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible, as
follows:
1. Securing weapons or evidence of a crime incident to
an arrest;
2. Assisting individuals under life-threatening
situations;
3. Protecting the public from harm;
4. Searching for additional victims at crime scenes;
5. Protecting vital evidence;
6. Pursuing a perpetrator;
7. Searching vehicles based on probable cause that the
suspects may contain contraband; and
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8. Searching individuals under their voluntary, verbal
or written consent.
The County further notes that Rankin County sheriff’s deputies
receive training with regard to these policies and procedures in
compliance with standards established by the Mississippi Law
Enforcement Officers Training Program of the State of Mississippi,
which training covers warrantless search and seizure.
In response, plaintiffs argue that the County’s policy is
“intrinsically flawed” and violates the Fourth Amendment because
it does not take into account surrounding circumstances, thus
leaving it to the officers to make a subjective decision about
whether or not a warrantless search is justified.
They submit,
for example, that the only situation covered in the policy that
might arguably have been applicable in their circumstance was “1.
Securing weapons or evidence of a crime incident to arrest”; but
they contend that this policy was maintained with objective
deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights as the
policy failed to cover well-established limitations on the
circumstances in which such a search/seizure is permissible, e.g.,
United States v. Mata, 517 F.3d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 2008) (“incident
to an arrest, law enforcement officers may contemporaneously
search areas within the arrestee's immediate control to prevent
the destruction of evidence or procurement of a weapon”).
Plaintiffs do not allege that the County’s policy is
unconstitutional because it directs constitutional violations.
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Rather, their position is that it is unconstitutional because it
contains insufficient information to prevent constitutional
violations.
However, plaintiffs’ position, that Policy 3.5 is
constitutionally deficient, does not take into account that in
addition to the written policy, deputies are provided specific
training on the circumstances in which warrantless searches are
constitutionally permissible.
The policy must be considered in
conjunction with the training; and plaintiffs have not alleged, or
sought to prove that the officers’ training was inadequate.
In
fact, in their response memorandum, plaintiffs declare, “Given the
training the officers involved in the search and seizure as stated
by Defendants together with this clearly stated policy, the
officers were aware of the constrictions of the Fourth Amendment
and the necessity for a search warrant.”
If the officers were
aware, based on their training and Policy 3.5, that a warrantless
search was not permissible under the circumstances, then there is
no apparent basis on which to hold the County liable for the
officers’ alleged violation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
Even if plaintiffs did claim the officers were not adequately
trained, they have presented no proof to support such a claim.
In
Connick, supra, the Supreme Court explained that “[i]n limited
circumstances, a local government's decision not to train certain
employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens'
rights may rise to the level of an official government policy for
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purposes of § 1983,” but it cautioned that “[a] municipality's
culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous
where a claim turns on a failure to train.”
at 1359.
Connick, 131 S. Ct.
Where a policy is based on a municipality's failure to
train, the plaintiff must prove such failure to train amounted to
“deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the
[untrained employees] come into contact.”
Id.
This ordinarily
means the plaintiff must prove “a pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees.”
Id. 1360.
The Court wrote:
“[D]eliberate indifference” is a stringent standard of
fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor
disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his
action. Thus, when city policymakers are on actual or
constructive notice that a particular omission in their
training program causes city employees to violate
citizens' constitutional rights, the city may be deemed
deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to
retain that program. The city's "policy of inaction" in
light of notice that its program will cause
constitutional violations is the functional equivalent
of a decision by the city itself to violate the
Constitution. A less stringent standard of fault for a
failure-to-train claim would result in de facto
respondeat superior liability on municipalities ....
A pattern of similar constitutional violations by
untrained employees is "ordinarily necessary" to
demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of
failure to train. Policymakers' continued adherence to
an approach that they know or should know has failed to
prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the
conscious disregard for the consequences of their
action—the “deliberate indifference”—necessary to
trigger municipal liability. Without notice that a
course of training is deficient in a particular respect,
decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately
9
chosen a training program that will cause violations of
constitutional rights.
Id. at 1360 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In the
case at bar, plaintiffs have offered no proof of any pattern of
constitutional violations by untrained employees, nor otherwise
suggested any basis for finding the County had notice that its
officers’ training program would result in constitutional
violations.
Therefore, plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claim
against the County for the alleged violation of their Fourth
Amendment rights.
In addition to their claims against Rankin County relating to
the search and seizure on January 5, 2009, plaintiffs also sued
the County based on alleged violations of Michael Hinson’s Fifth,
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights related to a January 12,
2009 hearing on contempt and setting of bond, and relating to
Carol Hinson’s securing a bond for Michael Hinson’s release.
Rankin County has moved for summary judgment on these claims,
contending that Judge Shirley’s rulings do not amount to official
County policy.
See Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.
1992) (“a municipal judge acting in his or her judicial capacity
to enforce state law does not act as a municipal official or
lawmaker”); see also Cunningham ex rel. Cunningham v. City of West
Point Miss., 380 Fed. Appx. 419, 422, 2010 WL 2331987, 2 (5th Cir.
2010 (“no doubt” that judge’s denial of bail was a judicial
action).
Plaintiffs have not responded to the County’s motion on
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these claims, and in the court’s view, have implicitly conceded
that dismissal of these claims is in order.
Plaintiffs have likewise failed to respond to Rankin County’s
motion for dismissal of their state law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress on the bases that it is untimely
under the one-year statute of limitations established in the
Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), see Miss. Code Ann.
§ 11-46-11, and that plaintiffs’ claim falls under the law
enforcement and discretionary function exemptions from the MTCA’s
waiver of sovereign immunity, see Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(c)
& (d).
As the claim is clearly untimely and subject to dismissal
on that basis, the court need not address the additional bases
urged by the County for dismissal of this claim.
Based on the foregoing, it is ordered that Rankin County’s
motion for summary judgment is granted.
A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with Rule
58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED this 11th day of May, 2012.
/s/Tom S. Lee
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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