Newman v. Sanderson Farms, Inc.
Filing
43
Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 29 MOTION for Summary Judgment, dismissing action with prejudice. Separate judgment will be entered. Signed by District Judge Tom S. Lee on 11/10/11 (LWE)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
WILLMER NEWMAN
PLAINTIFF
VS.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10CV514TSL-MTP
SANDERSON FARMS, INC.
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the court on the motion of defendant
Sanderson Farms, Inc. for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff Willmer Newman
has responded to the motion and the court, having considered the
memoranda of authorities, together with attachments, submitted by
the parties, concludes that the motion should be granted.
On January 13, 2006, Newman, an eight-year employee of
Sanderson Farms, was promoted to the position of Hatchery
Superintendent.1
On February 24, 2009, defendant terminated
plaintiff’s employment on the ostensible basis of poor work
performance.
twenties.
Newman was replaced by an individual in his
Following his termination, plaintiff filed a charge of
discrimination, claiming he was terminated because of his age, and
he subsequently filed the present action under the Age
1
This was Newman’s second stint with Sanderson Farms,
having been employed as Specialty Department Supervisor from
January 1994 to February 1997.
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623.2
See 29
U.S.C. § 623 (“It shall be unlawful for an employer (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge an individual or to otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age.”).
Sanderson Farms denies that
plaintiff was terminated because of his age, and maintains that it
terminated plaintiff due to numerous instances of poor job
performance.
It seeks summary judgment contending that plaintiff
cannot demonstrate pretext in the face of its legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination.
The evidence offered in support of Sanderson Farms’ motion
shows that as part of its business of producing and distributing
chicken products throughout the United States, Sanderson Farms
purchases eggs from breeder flocks, which are then cared for and
incubated at one of Sanderson Farms' hatcheries until the eggs
hatch into broiler chicks.
As a hatchery superintendent, Newman
oversaw all aspects of the hatchery from the time the eggs reached
the facility until they hatched and were shipped to the farms of
contract broiler growers.
These responsibilities included receipt
of the eggs from farmers, storage of the eggs in the egg room at a
2
Plaintiff also charged that his termination violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
In response to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff concedes
this claim.
2
cool temperature for a period of days and transfer of the eggs
from egg room to the incubator.
Each step of the process required
specific conditions to ensure maximum production of chicks and
Newman, as superintendent, was responsible for ensuring these
conditions were met.
Newman directly supervised the Egg Room and
Chick Room Supervisors, two egg truck drivers and two maintenance
men.
In turn, he reported to the Breeder Hatchery Manager.
While acting as superintendent, Newman received four written
reprimands with the fourth and final reprimand resulting in his
termination.
In January 2006, he was cited for numerous problems,
relating to equipment, housekeeping and personnel.
Again in 2008,
Newman received a written warning of poor work performance.
Specifically, he was disciplined for improperly recommending that
the Egg Room Supervisor receive a reprimand and for failing to
timely complete and turn in safety reports.
Both of these
reprimands came with a warning that continued poor performance
could result in additional disciplinary action, including
termination.
On January 26, 2009, Newman’s supervisor Ken Stair issued a
memorandum addressing three performance issues.
First, Newman was
cited for instructing the Egg Room Supervisor to transfer eggs to
the hatcher before it had reached the requisite temperature,
resulting in a poor hatch rate.
Secondly, Newman was counseled
regarding poor housekeeping in the hatchery while he was vacation.
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Finally, Newman was faulted for failing to properly record the
entrance and exit temperatures in the incubators on a consistent
basis.
During a discussion with Newman of the issues set forth in
the memorandum, Stair and Ken Holmes, the top human resources
official at the facility, advised that further poor work
performance could result in additional discipline, up to and
including termination.
According to defendant, despite Newman’s recent reprimands,
his performance problems continued, such that by February 24,
2009, his termination was warranted.
Specifically, in the final
reprimand, Sanderson Farms cited Newman for his failure to:
(1) properly monitor members of the Embrex Crew, who failed to
follow the proper procedure for transferring eggs to the
incubator; (2) follow the necessary steps to ensure that a parttime worker’s paperwork had been completed; (3) recognize and
correct a significant safety violation, i.e., storing combustibles
in the electrical room; and (4) properly monitor the Egg Setters,
who had mixed together eggs from different farms, thereby
potentially impeding Sanderson Farms’ ability to pay a farm
according to how well its eggs produced.
According to defendant,
these infractions, together with those summarized in the January
26, 2009 memorandum, warranted Newman’s termination.
Defendant
denies that Newman’s age was a factor in his termination.
4
A plaintiff can prove a claim of intentional discrimination
by either direct or circumstantial evidence.
Where, as here, the
plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discriminatory intent, the
plaintiff's proof by way of circumstantial evidence is evaluated
under the McDonnell Douglas framework:
“First, the plaintiff must
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.”
Russell v.
McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120
S. Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L. Ed.2d 105 (2000)); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668
(1973)).
Second, the employer must articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.
Russell, 235 F.3d at
222 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at
1817).
Third, if the employer carries its burden, the “mandatory
inference of discrimination” created by the plaintiff's prima
facie case “drops out of the picture” and the fact finder must
“decide the ultimate question: whether [the] plaintiff has proven
[intentional discrimination].”
Id. (citing Tex. Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L.
Ed. 2d 207 (1981), and St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 511-12, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993)).
As the Fifth Circuit observed in Laxton v. Gap, 333 F.3d 572,
578 (5th Cir. 2003):
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To carry this burden, the plaintiff must produce
substantial evidence indicating that the proffered
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for
discrimination. See Reeves [v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106,
147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000))]. The plaintiff must rebut
each nondiscriminatory reason articulated by the
employer. Wallace [v. Methodist Hospital System, 271
F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001)]. A plaintiff may
establish pretext either through evidence of disparate
treatment or by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is false or “unworthy of credence.” Id.;
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S. Ct. at 2106. An
explanation is false or unworthy of credence if it is
not the real reason for the adverse employment action.
See Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893,
899 (5th Cir. 2002). Evidence demonstrating that the
employer's explanation is false or unworthy of credence,
taken together with the plaintiff's prima facie case, is
likely to support an inference of discrimination even
without further evidence of defendant's true motive.
Id. at 897; Russell [v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d
219, 223 (5th Cir. 2000)].
In examining pretext, the question is “not whether [Sanderson
Farms’] proffered reason was an incorrect reason for [his]
discharge.”
Laxton, 333 F.3d at 579.
Rather, the court’s inquiry
is “‘whether [Sanderson Farms’] perception of [Newman's]
performance, accurate or not, was the real reason for [his]
termination.’”
Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 355 (5th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190
F.3d 398, 408-09 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Since Sanderson Farms offers no challenge to plaintiff’s
prima facie case3 and has presented a legitimate, non-
3
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a
plaintiff must show that “(1) he was a member of a protected
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discriminatory reason for Newman’s termination, see LeMaire v.
Louisiana Dept. of Transp., 480 F.3d 383, 391 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Job
performance is a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for
termination.”), then to survive summary judgment, plaintiff must
present sufficient evidence to create a jury issue on pretext.
In
response to the motion, by affidavit, Newman offers his
explanation of the circumstances surrounding the first three
incidents cited by Sanderson Farms in the fourth and final
reprimand.
Specifically, he maintains that upon learning on
February 17, 2009 that employees were improperly transferring
eggs, he gave them an immediate verbal reprimand and reported the
same to Stair, who at the time did not react as if the matter was
a cause for concern.
Regarding the failure to complete paperwork
on the part-time employee, Newman states that he did not realize
that the individual at issue had recently been terminated such
that it was necessary to complete new paperwork.
Finally, as to
the safety violation, Newman states that the safety inspector
twice directed him to keep the specified combustible products in
the electrical room until she could determine whether their
class-those persons over the age of forty; (2) he was qualified
for the position that he held; (3) he suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) he was either i) replaced by someone
outside the protected class, ii) replaced by someone younger, or
iii) otherwise discharged because of his age.” Berquist v.
Washington Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing
Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 309 (5th Cir.
2004)).
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presence created a safety violation, and the second time she gave
this direction, Stair and Holmes were present.
According to
Newman, the fact that he was written up on these grounds
demonstrates that Stair was actively looking for any reason to
write him up so that Stair could fire him and replace him with a
younger worker.
In the court’s opinion, even assuming that plaintiff has
presented facts to rebut three of the reasons articulated for his
termination,4 plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment where he
has failed to put forward any evidence rebutting either the charge
that the Egg Setters under Newman’s supervision had not properly
set the eggs or any of the performance issues raised in the
4
With regard to Newman’s attempt to rebut to the first two
performance issues raised in the February 24, 2009 Memorandum-failure to properly monitor performance of the Embrex Crew and
failure to ensure that a part-time employees’ paper work had been
completed, Sanderson Farms takes the position, and correctly so,
that his explanation of the events do not in any way refute the
decisionmaker’s good faith belief that he should have prevented
the transfer infraction or that he should have been aware that the
part-time employee had been discharged and thus needed to complete
new paperwork before he could work on the floor. That is to say,
plaintiff’s challenge on these issues amounts to an argument that
Sanderson Farms’ perception of his performance was inaccurate.
Laxton, 333 F.3d at 579.
On the other hand, however, Newman’s statement that, in
Holmes’ and Stair’s presence, the safety inspector told him to
keep the disputed materials in the electrical room until she
determined whether it amounted to a violation, is in direct
contradiction to the affidavits of Holmes, Stair and the safety
inspector. If the fact-finder credited Newman on this point and
discredited the other witnesses, then this explanation for his
termination would be unworthy of credence.
8
January 26, 2009 memorandum.
Laxton, 333 F.3d at 578 (“The
plaintiff must rebut each nondiscriminatory reason articulated by
the employer.”) (citing Wallace, 271 F.3d at 220 (holding that,
while the plaintiff succeeded in demonstrating a genuine issue of
fact concerning the pretext of one of her employer's reasons for
terminating her employment, she failed to meet her burden of
“presenting evidence rebutting each of the legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons” put forward by the employer and, hence,
judgment as a matter of law was appropriate)); Harris v.
Mississippi Transp. Comm’n, 329 Fed. Appx 550, 556 (5th Cir. 2009)
(holding that plaintiff who failed to rebut each legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for his termination did not sustain
burden of demonstrating pretext).
Plaintiff’s affidavit makes no
mention of the charge that he failed to properly monitor the Egg
Setters, nor has he pointed to any other evidence in the record
tending to show that this reason is false or unworthy of credence.
Likewise, plaintiff does not purport to rebut any of the
performance issues set forth in the January 26, 2009 memorandum.
Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to
create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of pretext
and that Sanderson Farms’ motion for summary judgment should
therefore be granted.
Accordingly, it is ordered that Sanderson Farms’ motion for
summary judgment is granted.
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A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with Rule
58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED this 10th day of November, 2011.
/s/Tom S. Lee
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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