Prideaux v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
Filing
44
Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 30 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Separate judgment to be entered. Signed by District Judge Tom S. Lee on 10/6/11 (LWE)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
TERRY S. PRIDEAUX
VS.
PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10CV565 TSL-MTP
TYSON FOODS, INC.
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the court on the motion of defendant
Tyson Foods, Inc. for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff Terry S. Prideaux has
responded to the motion and the court, having considered the
memoranda of authorities, together with attachments, submitted by
the parties, concludes the motion is well taken and should be
granted.
Plaintiff Terry Prideaux first became employed by Tyson in
September 2003, when Tyson purchased the Carthage facility of
Choctaw Maid, where Prideaux was employed in the human resources
department.
In March 2007, Tyson terminated Prideaux’s
employment.
Following his termination, Prideaux filed suit
against Tyson, alleging he was terminated on account of his race
in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981; his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; and in retaliation
for having complained on behalf of Tyson employees of violations
of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA),
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.
In the course of the litigation, plaintiff confessed his race and
age discrimination claims, and in March 2009, the case was tried
on his claim of retaliation, which resulted in a jury verdict for
Tyson.
In the meantime, shortly following his termination from
Tyson, plaintiff had become employed by Central Industries, Inc.
as the Environmental and Safety Manager for its facility in
Forest, Mississippi.
However, in December 2008, while Prideaux’s
first lawsuit against Tyson was pending, Tyson purchased Central
Industries’ Forest facility.
Soon thereafter, in February 2009,
plaintiff was informed that he would not be retained.
His
employment with Tyson was subsequently terminated, effective March
13, 2009.
Prideaux filed the present action on June 29, 2010 alleging
that his termination in March 2009 was on account of his age and
gender, in violation of the ADEA and Title VII, respectively, and
further asserting a retaliation claim under the FMLA.1
In
response to Tyson’s summary judgment, plaintiff has confessed his
FMLA claim, leaving for consideration the motion as to his age and
gender discrimination claims.
1
Plaintiff filed this action in the Circuit Court of
Hinds County, Mississippi. The case was timely removed to this
court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
2
Tyson contends that summary judgment is in order since
plaintiff, who admits he has no direct evidence of discrimination,
has failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case of age or gender discrimination or, assuming
arguendo that he could establish a prima facie case, to
demonstrate that Tyson’s articulated reason for his termination is
pretext for unlawful discrimination.
In the absence of direct evidence of discriminatory intent,
circumstantial evidence is examined using the burden-shifting
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).
Under the
McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first create a
presumption of intentional discrimination by establishing a prima
facie case.
Id. at 802.
Once the prima facie case is
established, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment
decision.
Id.
If the employer meets that burden, the presumption
of discrimination dissipates, and the employee then has the
ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination.
Id.
Under Title VII, to sustain this burden, the plaintiff must prove
that (1) the defendant's reason is not true, but is instead a
pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative), or (2) the
defendant's reason, though true, is only one of the reasons for
its conduct, and another motivating factor is the plaintiff's
protected characteristic (mixed motive alternative).
3
Davis v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 372 Fed. Appx. 517, 519, 2010 WL 1404000, 2
(5th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
However, the ADEA does not
authorize a mixed-motives age discrimination claim, so to prove
pretext, the plaintiff must prove that age was the “but-for” cause
of the challenged employment action.
Id. (citation omitted).
In the case at bar, the parties appear to disagree as to the
elements of plaintiff’s prima facie case.
Tyson cites the
elements applicable in the case of a failure to hire, which
require proof that plaintiff, a member of a protected class,
applied but was rejected for an open position for which the
employer was seeking applicants, and that the employer selected
someone outside the protected class or continued seeking
applicants with plaintiff’s qualifications.
See Daves v. Payless
Cashways, Inc., 661 F.2d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1981).
Tyson submits
that plaintiff cannot show he was rejected for an “open” position
or that someone outside his protected class was selected for an
“open” position, since there never was an “open” position for
which Tyson sought applicants since Lyle, as “Safety Supervisor”
at Central Industries, was already performing the Tyson job of
“Safety Manager” and was merely given the Tyson job title
commensurate with her existing job duties.
In his response, plaintiff cites the elements of a prima
facie case applicable in the case of an alleged discriminatory
discharge, i.e., that he was in a protected class, qualified for
the job, suffered an adverse employment action and was replaced by
4
someone outside the protected class.
See St. Mary's Honor Center
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407
(1993).
The court need not resolve the issue of the proper
characterization of plaintiff’s claim for purposes of identifying
the elements of his prima facie case, for in the court’s opinion,
regardless of whether he could establish the elements of any
potentially applicable prima facie case, he has not presented
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable finding that Tyson’s
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged employment
decision was pretext for age or gender discrimination.
Tyson explains in its motion, and has presented ample
supporting evidence to show that following its acquisition of
Central Industries’ Forest facility, it began the process of
converting the facility to a standard Tyson facility.
As part of
this process, in January 2009, it began evaluating all personnel
positions at the Forest facility, analyzing the job duties
formerly performed by personnel under the corporate structure of
Central Industries and matched those duties to equivalent jobs at
a typical Tyson facility.
The goal of the process was to identify
the positions from Central Industries that did and those that did
not “match” positions within the Tyson business model.
As part of
this process, Steve Patrick, Tyson’s Director of Environmental
Health & Safety Operations, evaluated the personnel within the
environmental health and safety department, and, in conference
5
with Gregg Uecker, Senior Vice President of Specialty Products for
Tyson, determined the best operational structure for the
department.
Tyson explains that its corporate structure included a
“Safety Manager” position, and that after evaluating the job
duties formerly performed by each employee at Central Industries
and comparing it with the duties performed by a Tyson “Safety
Manager,” it decided that Melissa Lyle, the “Safety Supervisor” at
Central Industries, matched the duties of a Tyson “Safety
Manager.”
Therefore, a decision was made to adjust her job title
from “Safety Supervisor” to “Safety Manager” to match Tyson’s
appellation for what was largely the same position.
Tyson further explains that there was no comparable position
in its corporate structure for an Environmental and Safety
Manager, and thus this position, which was then held by Prideaux,
was eliminated, along with several others, resulting in the
termination of a number of employees, including females and
persons under forty years of age.
Finally, Tyson states that its corporate model did provide
for a “Complex Environmental Manager,” for which there was no
counterpart at Central Industries.
It created such a position for
the Forest facility, and encouraged plaintiff to apply; and while
he did, in fact, apply for the position, Tyson ultimately selected
an admittedly more qualified candidate for the position.
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As Tyson has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its decision to retain Lyle and discharge plaintiff,
the burden is on plaintiff to bring forth evidence to establish
either that the proffered reason is unworthy of credence, or that
a discriminatory reason motivated Tyson’s decision.
See Jackson
v. Cal-Western Packing Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff must do more than “cast doubt on whether [the employer]
had just cause for its decision;” he must also “show that a
reasonable fact-finder could conclude that [the employer’s]
reasons are unworthy of credence.”
Id.
Plaintiff has failed to
sustain this burden to show that Tyson’s articulated reason was
pretextual or that its decision was motivated in any part by his
gender or age.
In his response, plaintiff appears to suggest that Tyson’s
explanation is not worthy of credence because Tyson has failed to
adequately explain the details underlying its putative conclusion
that Lyle’s Central Industries job as “Safety Supervisor” was the
equivalent of the Tyson “Safety Manager” position.
In this vein,
he argues that Tyson’s articulated reason is “quite lacking in
explaining how duties changed with regard to [plaintiff],” and he
notes that while Tyson admits that part of his former position was
safety manager, it “very noticeably fails to identify what job
responsibilities [plaintiff] had for the safety manager portion of
his job or who is not performing those job responsibility [sic].”
Plaintiff further asserts that when Lyle became Tyson’s “Safety
7
Manager,” she was assigned the duties he had formerly performed in
the safety manager aspect of his Central Industries position, and
in fact, was given a pay raise, as well, which he contends
indicates the Tyson “Safety Manager” position was not merely
Tyson’s “match” for or counterpart to Lyle’s Central Industries’
“Safety Supervisor” position but was instead a new position that
was, in fact, a promotion for her.
While plaintiff’s suggests a contrary view, Tyson clearly is
not required to prove its legitimate reason; it need only put
forth evidence of that reason, which it has done.
See Edwards v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2001 WL 43546, 3 (5th Cir. 2001).
And in
response, plaintiff has failed to present sufficient competent
evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that
Tyson’s reason is false or to otherwise show that the decision was
motivated by a discriminatory animus.
Essentially, plaintiff challenges Tyson’s business judgment
that Lyle’s job duties as “Safety Supervisor” most closely
approximated the duties of a Tyson “Safety Manager.”
However,
even assuming plaintiff had presented competent evidence that
Lyle, as a Tyson “Safety Manager,” had additional duties beyond
those she had as a Central Industries “Safety Supervisor,”2 he has
2
The only evidence plaintiff has offered in support of
this assertion is his own testimony that Lyle told him that she
would be taking over his former safety duties. Such hearsay
evidence is not competent summary judgment evidence. See Martin
v. John W. Stone Oil Distributor, Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.
1987) (court may not properly consider hearsay evidence in
affidavits and depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (“affidavits
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not shown what duties either position entailed and has otherwise
presented no evidence from which one might reasonably find that
Tyson did not, in fact, determine that Lyle’s duties in her
position at Central Industries, if not identical to, were the most
comparable to those of a Tyson “Safety Manager.”3
Plaintiff has
offered no evidence otherwise tending to show that plaintiff’s
gender or age played any role in Tyson’s decision.
For these reasons, the court concludes that Tyson’s motion is
well taken.
Therefore, it is ordered that Tyson’s motion for
summary judgment is granted.
A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with Rule
58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED this
6th
day of October, 2011.
/s/Tom S. Lee
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence ...”).
3
Tyson explains that any pay increase Lyle received after
the acquisition of Central Industries by Tyson would have solely
been an effort to ensure that she received the same pay as all
other Tyson “Safety Managers” throughout the company. The fact
that Tyson may have paid its “Safety Managers” more than Central
Industries paid its “Safety Supervisors” for performing
essentially the same duties does not suggest that the positions
were not equivalent or comparable.
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