Redmond v. Baty et al

Filing 109

ORDER granting 74 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 76 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying 78 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denying 89 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law; denying 99 Motion ; denying 100 Motion ; denying 101 Motion ; denying 103 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying 104 Motion ; denying 105 Motion to Dismiss; denying 107 Motion to Review. Signed by Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball on 8/23/12 (dfk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
DICKY WAYNE REDMOND
VS.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10cv635-FKB

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a former inmate of the
Mississippi Department of Corrections. Previously, all defendants other than Shane Baty
were dismissed. Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross motions for summary
judgment. Having considered the motions, the Court concludes that Defendant Baty is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In December of 2009, while serving time at the Noxubee County Community Work
Center, Dicky Wayne Redmond was assigned to work at the local office of the Mississippi
Forestry Commission. Shane Baty was the manager of the office. On December 17,
2009, Baty took Redmond and another inmate to the private residence of Mike Butler, an
employee with the Mississippi Forestry Commission, for the purpose of repairing Butler’s
roof. While performing the repairs, Redmond slid off the roof and fell approximately nine
feet to the ground. He sustained injuries to his feet. Redmond contends that Baty is
liable for his injuries because Baty’s actions in assigning him to perform the roof work
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment.1

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Redmond has also mentioned the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for his claim.
Because a specific clause of the Constitution, the Eighth Amendment, governs
Redmond’s claim, Redmond’s reliance upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of
substantive due process are misplaced. See Guiles v. Tarrant County Bail Bond Bd., 456

Redmond testified at the Spears hearing that prior to beginning work on the roof,
he informed Baty that he “didn’t know anything about roofs,” but that Baty nevertheless
insisted that he perform the repair work. After the accident, while Redmond was still lying
on the ground, Baty informed those present that they would have to lie and say that
Redmond had fallen off of a bulldozer in order to cover up the fact that Baty had directed
inmates to perform work on private property. MDOC officials became aware of the true
circumstances of the accident approximately one week later when Redmond’s wife
informed the work center’s commander that Redmond had been injured while doing
roofing work on the Butler home. Although Baty has disputed some of these facts in his
affidavit, the Court assumes, for purposes of the present motion, the truthfulness of
Redmond’s version. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (in
ruling on summary judgment motion, court is to resolve factual controversies in favor of
the nonmovant).
In his motion, Baty argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified
immunity is a shield from individual liability for “government officials performing
discretionary functions . . . as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought
consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d
393, 400 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). The
qualified immunity analysis consists of two prongs: whether the official’s conduct violated
a constitutional right of the plaintiff, and whether that constitutional right was clearly

Fed. Appx. 485, 489 (5th Cir. 2012) (plaintiff who alleged violation of specific constitutional
provision could not also rely upon broad notion of substantive due process).
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established at the time of the violation. Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 843 (5th Cir.
2009). A court may rely upon either of these prongs in determining the merits of a
qualified immunity defense. Id.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on government officials to take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of prison inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
832 (1994). However, to succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must
establish that the conditions of which he is complaining posed a substantial risk of serious
harm to him and that the official acted with "deliberate indifference" to the inmate's safety.
Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 524 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834) .
An official is deliberately indifferent when he "knows of and disregards an excessive risk
to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference." Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Thus, in order to defeat Baty’s
motion, Redmond must adduce evidence that Baty was aware of an excessive risk that
Redmond would fall and injure himself and that Baty was deliberately indifferent to that
risk. When viewed in light of this standard, Redmond’s evidence clearly fails. Redmond’s
statement to Baty that he did not “know anything about roofs” is insufficient to have put
Baty on notice of a substantial risk that Redmond would be seriously injured if he climbed
on the roof and attempted to repair it. Nor is there any other evidence establishing that
Baty was aware of any such risk. For these reasons, Baty is entitled to summary
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
Additionally, Redmond’s claim is subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust his

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administrative remedies. The applicable section of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e), requires that an inmate bringing a civil rights action in
federal court first exhaust his administrative remedies. Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882 (5th
Cir. 1998). This exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life,”
even if the relief sought by the plaintiff is not available through the prison administrative
remedies program. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-532 (2002). It is undisputed that
Plaintiff never sought administrative relief for his claim against Baty.
For these reasons, Baty’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and
Redmond’s motion is denied. Redmond’s remaining pending motions are denied as moot.
A separate judgment will be entered pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.
SO ORDERED this the 22nd day of August, 2012.
/s/ F. Keith Ball
______________________________________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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