Bedding v. Hinds County, Mississippi et al

Filing 43

ORDER granting 39 Motion for Summary Judgment for the reasons set out in the order. The § 1983 claim against Defendant Malcolm McMillin in his individual capacity is dismissed with prejudice. The parties are instructed to contact the magistrate judge to set the case for a status conference. The magistrate judge may then consider lifting the stay and revising, as necessary, the case management order. Signed by District Judge Daniel P. Jordan III on October 17, 2012. (SP)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
CRAIG ALLEN BEEDING

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10cv713-DPJ-FKB

HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al.

DEFENDANTS
ORDER

This § 1983 action is before the Court on the motion of Defendant Sheriff Malcolm
McMillin, in his individual capacity, for summary judgment premised on qualified immunity
[39]. The Court, having considered the memoranda and submissions of the parties, concludes
that Plaintiff has not met his burden and that McMillin is entitled to qualified immunity.
I.

Facts and Procedural History
This case arises out of Plaintiff Craig Allen Beeding’s October 23, 2008, detention by the

Hinds County Sheriff’s Department. At approximately 8:00 p.m. on that date, three Hinds
County Deputy Sheriffs, including Defendant Tyler Miller, arrested Beeding in Hattiesburg,
Lamar County, Mississippi. Beeding was charged with a misdemeanor count of petit larceny
based on an affidavit Miller executed that stated that Beeding had stolen Miller’s badge. The
petit larceny charge against Beeding was ultimately dropped.
Following Beeding’s arrest in Hattiesburg, the two Hinds County Deputy Sheriffs
accompanying Miller transported Beeding to the Hinds County jail in Jackson, Mississippi,
arriving at approximately 9:30 p.m. The deputies placed Beeding in a cell, where he remained
until approximately 2:30 a.m., at which time he was moved to the Hinds County detention center
in Raymond, Mississippi. All Hinds County detainees are booked at the Raymond facility; no
booking occurs at the Jackson jail. In Raymond, Beeding was strip searched and placed into a

cell with other prisoners. The following morning, at approximately 8:30 a.m., Beeding was
finally booked into the jail and, shortly thereafter, Beeding was released on his own
recognizance.
Beeding filed this lawsuit against Hinds County, Mississippi; McMillin, in his individual
and official capacities; and Miller, in his individual and official capacities, alleging claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law.1 Beeding alleges that McMillin promulgated policies and
procedures that violated his constitutional rights and that McMillin failed to properly train his
deputies. Specifically, he alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were
violated by his twelve-hour detention prior to being booked and released. Following some
discovery, McMillin moved for summary judgment. Beeding responded in opposition, and the
time for McMillin to file a reply has expired. The Court has personal and subject matter
jurisdiction and is prepared to rule.
II.

Standard
Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

when evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment,
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

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Beeding concedes his state-law claims against McMillin in his individual capacity. Pl.’s
Resp. [42] at 4–5.
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The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The
nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate ‘specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (citation omitted). Conclusory allegations,
speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments are not an adequate substitute
for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash.,
276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)
(en banc); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993). In reviewing the evidence, factual
controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, “but only when . . . both parties have
submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. When such contradictory
facts exist, the court may “not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (citations omitted).
III.

Analysis
McMillin seeks qualified immunity on Beeding’s § 1983 claim against him in his

individual capacity. Qualified immunity is a shield from individual liability for “‘government
officials performing discretionary functions . . . as long as their actions could reasonably have
been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.’” Good v. Curtis, 601
F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)).
“[Q]ualified immunity generally protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.’” Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). It is “an

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entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d
204, 207 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
Courts deciding qualified immunity employ a two-part test. Atteberry v. Nocona Gen.
Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 2005). First, the plaintiff “must claim that the defendants
committed a constitutional violation under current law.” Id. (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 609 (1999); Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 1999)). Second, the plaintiff
“must claim that the defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the law that
was clearly established at the time of the actions complained of.” Id. “The defendant’s acts are
held to be objectively reasonable unless all reasonable officials in the defendant’s circumstances
would have then known that the defendant’s conduct violated the United States Constitution or
the federal statute as alleged by the plaintiff.” Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., Tex., 245 F.3d 447,
457 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, “[a]n official is eligible for qualified immunity even if the official
violated another’s constitutional rights,” as long as the conduct was not objectively unreasonable.
Id. Finally, whether the conduct was objectively unreasonable is an issue of law reserved for the
court. Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1999).
Beeding fails to show McMillin violated his rights and therefore never surpasses the first
prong. Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action against persons who violate constitutional
rights while acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is well-settled that “there is no
vicarious or respondeat superior liability of supervisors under § 1983.” Rios v. City of Del Rio,
Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 2006); accord Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 189
(5th Cir. 2011) (“Under § 1983, however, a government official can be held liable only for his
own misconduct.”) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009)). Thus, a supervisory
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official like McMillin “may be held liable [under § 1983] . . . if (1) he affirmatively participates
in the acts that cause the constitutional deprivation, or (2) he implements unconstitutional
policies that causally result in the constitutional injury.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th
Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “A supervisor may also be liable for failure to supervise or train”
his subordinates if “a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation
of the plaintiff’s rights.” Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009). Under
any theory, however, a supervisor can be held liable only if he acts “with deliberate indifference
to the violations of others’ constitutional rights.” Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Prot. & Reg. Servs., 537
F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008).
Deliberate indifference “is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a
[supervisory] actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Porter, 659 F.3d
at 446–47 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011)). The actor
must have “‘actual or constructive notice’ ‘that a particular omission in [a] training program
causes . . . employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights’ and the actor nevertheless
‘choose[s] to retain that program.’” Id. at 447 (quoting Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360). “A pattern
of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees” or as a result of a particular policy
“is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference . . . .” Id. (quoting Connick, 131
S. Ct. at 1360) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff can also demonstrate deliberate
indifference in the failure to adopt a policy if “it is obvious that the likely consequence of not
adopting a policy will be a deprivation of constitutional rights.” Rayne v. Henderson Cnty., 973
F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)).

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Assuming Beeding’s twelve-hour detention prior to being booked into the jail amounted
to a violation of his due process rights, McMillin is nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity
because Beeding has no evidence of “similar constitutional violations” resulting from McMillin’s
policies or failure to train. Porter, 659 F.3d at 447 (citation omitted). In fact, Beeding has
presented no evidence that any other detainee experienced a significant delay between arrest and
booking. Nor has Beeding shown that McMillin knew or should have known that constitutional
violations would likely result from his failure to adopt different booking policies. As such,
Beeding cannot establish that McMillin was deliberately indifferent in failing to adopt different
booking policies or in failing to train his employees. McMillin is entitled to qualified immunity.
IV.

Conclusion
The Court has considered all the parties’ arguments. Those not specifically addressed

would not have changed the outcome. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Malcolm
McMillin’s Motion for Summary Judgment [39] is granted, and the § 1983 claim against him in
his individual capacity is dismissed with prejudice. The parties are instructed to contact the
magistrate judge to set the case for a status conference. The magistrate judge may then consider
lifting the stay and revising, as necessary, the case management order.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 17th day of October, 2012.
s/ Daniel P. Jordan III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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